# 1NC

## 1NC - Topicality

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The usfg is in Washington

Encarta 2k (Encarta Online Encyclopedia http://encarta.msn.com ) KENTUCKY

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### VIOLATION: The aff defends a personal politics instead of legislative action – at best they are extra topical which is a voting issue – makes the 2NR impossible

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Governmental Engagement – key to develop life skills that can change the world – pre-conceived notions means it doesn’t trade-off with conviction

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusion

Gooding-Williams 3

 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy Robert Gooding-Wiliams Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies. Issue Constellations Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 18–41, March 1998

 I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

#### AND – Decision Making – linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences and philosophical values into a course of action

Hanghoj 8 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### Key to SSD – emphasizes individual AGENCY and is key to empowerment –breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making – doesn’t trade off with conviction

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

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## 1NC - Critique

#### Their attempt at academic change sustains power’s ability to constrain ANY resistance by turning those victims of power into ghosts. The tradition of liberal citizenship is a ghostly attempt to remember past political struggles that ultimately fetishize movements of the past, especially in academic subculture—this turns the case.

Occupied UC Berkeley 2k9.http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19

Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.  With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context.  As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential.  And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter.  The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities.  A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism.  And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth.  The university is a graveyard–así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations.  This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless.In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.  Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be.  That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning.  We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot.  Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard?

#### Their argument that making this argument in a debate round actually changes something ignores the coordinates of academic power/knowledge at play in the debate tournament itself – this results in commodification of their advocacy to justify the institutional structure of the activity

Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9**.** <http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19

In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination.  We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else.  Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else.  We have measured ourselves and we have measured others.  It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman.  It should feel good, gratifying, completing.  It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination.  After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken.  We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant.  We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values.  What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general.  They sell the practice through the image.  We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation.  Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts.  Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.  It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact.  It’s the particular nature of being owned.

#### Where does their change take place? Acadamia? Debate? Their silence and demand for the ballot is damning –their advocacy is presented to legitimize the neutrality of debate – allowing more radical theories to be disregarded – remember this moment when they claim we have no alternative

Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good rea- sons for the university to be confident that such elements will be ex- posed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against al- ways already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

#### Their “try or die” framing re-inscribes the status quo’s limited scope of politics by maintaining the duality of forced choices, characterizing the question always as EITHER the aff OR the status quo, which is the same tactic that the current political climate uses to keep dissidents content but only on its own terms. Refuse the choices as offered, demand a third option.

Halberstam 13. Jack Halberstam, professor of English and Director of the Center for Feminist Research at USC, “The Wild Beyond: With and For the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Minor Compositions, pg. 8

The path to the wild beyond is paved with refusal. In The Undercom- mons if we begin anywhere, we begin with the right to refuse what has been refused to you. Citing Gayatri Spivak, Moten and Harney call this refusal the “first right” and it is a game-changing kind of refusal in that it signals the refusal of the choices as offered. We can under- stand this refusal in terms that Chandan Reddy lays out in Freedom With Violence (2011) – for Reddy, gay marriage is the option that can- not be opposed in the ballot box. While we can circulate multiple cri- tiques of gay marriage in terms of its institutionalization of intimacy, when you arrive at the ballot box, pen in hand, you only get to check “yes” or “no” and the no, in this case, could be more damning than the yes. And so, you must refuse the choice as offered**.**

Moten and Harney also study what it would mean to refuse what they term “the call to order.” And what would it mean, furthermore, to refuse to call others to order, to refuse interpellation and the re- instantiation of the law. When we refuse, Moten and Harney suggest, we create dissonance and more importantly, we allow dissonance to continue – when we enter a classroom and we refuse to call it to order, we are allowing study to continue, dissonant study perhaps, disorgan- ized study, but study that precedes our call and will continue after we have left the room. Or, when we listen to music, we must refuse the idea that music happens only when the musician enters and picks up an instrument; music is also the anticipation of the performance and the noises of appreciation it generates and the speaking that happens through and around it, making it and loving it, being in it while lis- tening. And so, when we refuse the call to order – the teacher pick- ing up the book, the conductor raising his baton, the speaker asking for silence, the torturer tightening the noose – we refuse order as the distinction between noise and music, chatter and knowledge, pain and truth. These kinds of examples get to the heart of Moten and Harney’s world of the undercommons – the undercommons is not a realm where we rebel and we create critique; it is not a place where we “take arms against a sea of troubles/and by opposing end them.” The un- dercommons is a space and time which is always here. Our goal – and the “we” is always the right mode of address here – is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. Moten and Harney refuse the logic that stages refusal as inactivity, as the absence of a plan and as a mode of stalling real politics. Moten and Harney tell us to listen to the noise we make and to refuse the offers we receive to shape that noise into “music.”

## 1NC – Case

#### Bioregional forms of political organization cause violence from transition wars

Taylor, 2K – Oshkosh Foundation Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, and Director of Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin (Bron, Beneath the Surface, 2000, pg. 282)

It is not clear, however, that in the long run and on every continent and dur­ing every era, **violence and conflict would be greater under bioregional forms of political organization** than under political units drawn according to biore­gional differences. Fear of balkanization raises important concerns, but a uni­versal condemnation of bioregional polity does not logically follow. Gary Snyder, for example, would likely point to anthropologist A. L. Kroeber's work which shows that Native Americans have usually lived peacefully, largely in dif­fering bioregional provinces. 58 A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who in­fluenced their most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, in­dustrial societies) \_ to cooperative behavior. W This debatable assumption ap­pears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness. 60 Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, **it is doubt­ful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by selfish and well-entrenched elites**. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not vol­untarily cede authority," **Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require "widespread violence and dislocatio**n.” 62 **Few bioregional­ists** seem to **recognize** this likelihood, or **how devastating to nature such a transi­tional struggle would probably be.** Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns:

#### Rejecting all instrumentalism kills billions

Michael Berliner, Ph.D in Philosophy from BU, 4/18/’8

(<http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8403&news_iv_ctrl=2457>)

Earth Day approaches, and with it a grave danger faces mankind. The danger is not from acid rain, global warming, smog, or the logging of rain forests, as environmentalists would have us believe. The dangerto mankind is from environmentalism**.** The fundamental goal of environmentalism is not clean air and clean water; rather, it is the demolition of technological/industrial civilization. Environmentalism's goal is not the advancement of human health, human happiness, and human life; rather, it is a subhuman world where "nature" is worshipped like the totem of some primitive religion.In a nation founded on the pioneer spirit, environmentalists have made "development" an evil word. They inhibit or prohibit the development of Alaskan oil, offshore drilling, nuclear power--and every other practical form of energy. Housing, commerce, and jobs are sacrificed to spotted owls and snail darters. Medical research is sacrificed to the "rights" of mice. Logging is sacrificed to the "rights" of trees. No instance of the progress that brought man out of the cave is safe from the onslaught of those "protecting" the environment from man, whom they consider a rapist and despoiler by his very essence. Nature, they insist, has "intrinsic value," to be revered for its ownsake**,** irrespective of any benefit to man. As a consequence, man is to be prohibited from using nature for his own ends. Since nature supposedly has value and goodness in itself, any human action that changes the environment is necessarily immoral. Of course, environmentalists invoke the doctrine of intrinsic value not against wolves that eat sheep or beavers that gnaw trees; they invoke it only against man, only when man wants something. The ideal world of environmentalism is not twenty-first-century Western civilization; it is the Garden of Eden, a world with no human intervention in nature, a world without innovation or change, a world without effort, a world where survival is somehow guaranteed, a world where man has mystically merged with the "environment." Had the environmentalist mentality prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we would have had no Industrial Revolution, a situation that consistent environmentalists would cheer--at least those few who might have managed to survive without the life-saving benefits of modern science and technology. The expressed goal of environmentalism is to prevent man from changing his environment, from intruding on nature. That is why environmentalism is fundamentally anti-man. Intrusion is necessary for human survival. Only by intrusion can man avoid pestilence and famine. Only by intrusion can man control his life and project long-range goals.Intrusionimproves the environment, if by "environment" one means the surroundings of man--the external material conditions of human **life.** Intrusion is a requirement of human nature. But in the environmentalists' paean to "Nature," human nature is omitted**.** For environmentalism, the "natural" world is a world without man. Man has no legitimate needs, but trees, ponds, and bacteria somehow do. They don't mean it? Heed the words of the consistent environmentalists. "The ending of the human epoch on Earth," writes philosopher Paul Taylor in Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, "would most likely be greeted with a hearty 'Good riddance!'" In a glowing review of Bill McKibben's The End of Nature, biologist David M. Graber writes (Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1989): "Human happiness [is] not as important as a wild and healthy planet . . . . Until such time as Homo sapiens should decide to rejoin nature, some of us can only hope for the right virus to come along." Such is the naked essence of environmentalism: it mourns the death of one whale or tree but actually welcomes the death of billions of people. A more malevolent, man-hating philosophy is unimaginable. The guiding principle of environmentalism is selfsacrifice, the sacrifice of longer lives, healthier lives, more prosperous lives, more enjoyable lives, i.e., the sacrifice of human lives. But an individual is not born in servitude. He has a moral right to live his own life for his own sake. He has no duty to sacrifice it to the needs of others and certainly not to the "needs" of the nonhuman. To save mankind from environmentalism, what's needed is not the appeasing, compromising approach of those who urge a "balance" between the needs of man and the "needs" of the environment. To save mankind requires the wholesale rejection of environmentalism as hatred of science, technology, progress, and human life. To save mankind requires the return to a philosophy of reason and individualism, a philosophy that makes life on earth possible.

#### Globalized technological thought is good. Rejecting technological thought also rejects technological innovation and dooms us to extinction. This also defends our ontology

Heaberlin, 4 – nuclear engineer, led the Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Scott, A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity, p. 31-40)

Well, then let's not do that, huh? Well, no, not hardly, because without that use of fertilizers we couldn't produce the food to feed the population. We just couldn't do it. Here are some comparisons."

If you used no fertilizers or pesticides you could get 500 kilograms of grain from a hectare in a dry climate and as much as 1000 kilograms in a humid cli­mate. If you got organic and used animal manure as fertilizer, assuming you could find enough, you might get as much as 2000 kilograms per hectare. For a sense of scale, the average in the United States, where recall we only get half the food value to hectare as the intensively farmed Chinese crop land, we get about 4500 kilograms per hectare on the average. In serious cornfields with fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides, the value is 7000 kilograms per hectare.

Modern mechanized, chemically supported agriculture produces 7 to 14 times the food that you would get without those advantages. Even the best organic farming would produce only 30 to 45% of the food value you would get from the same sized chemically fertilized farm, and that is assuming you could get the manure you needed to make it work.

In very stark terms, without the chemically enhanced farming we would have probably something like one-fifth the food supply we have now. That means four-fifths the population would not be fed, at least as we are organized now. So, no, just giving up on fertilizers is not in the deal.

However, we could get the hydrogen and energy from sources other than natural gas. Nuclear energy could be used to provide electricity to extract hydrogen from water and produce the process heat required to combine the hydrogen and nitrogen from the air. That is just a thought to stick in your mind. While we are looking at energy use in agriculture, here are a few more numbers for you.10 If you look at the energy input into agriculture and the energy you get out, you see some interesting facts. By combining the energy used to make fertilizers and pesticides, power irrigation, and run the farm machinery in the United States, we use about 0.7 kcal of fossil fuel energy for each 1 kcal of food we make. This doesn't include the energy needed to process and transport the food. In Europe where they farm more intensely, the amount of energy out is just about the same as energy in. In Germany and Italy the numbers are 1.4 and 1.7 kcal energy input to each 1 kcal output respectively. The point is you need energy to feed people, well at least a lot of people.

Which gets us back to Cohen and his question. One of the studies he examined looked at a "self-sustaining solar energy system." For the United States, this would replace all fossil energy and provide one-fifth to one-half the current energy use. The conclusion of the study was that this would either produce" a significant reduction in our standard of living ... even if all the energy conservation measures known today were adopted" or if set at the current standard of living, "then the ideal U.S. population should be targeted at 40-100 million people." The authors of that study then cheerfully go on to point out that we do have enough fossil fuel to last a least a century, as long as we can work out the pesky environmental problems. So, you can go to a "self-sustaining" energy economy as long as you are willing to shoot between 2 out of 3 and 6 out of 7 of your neighbors.

And this is a real question. The massive use of fossil fuel driven agriculture to provide the fertilizers and pesticides, and power the farm equipment, is a) vitally important to feed everyone, and b) something we just can't keep up in a business-as-usual fashion. Sustainable means you can keep doing it. Fossil energy supplies are finite; you will run out some time. Massive use of fossil energy and the greenhouse gases they produce also may very well tip the planet into one of those extinction events in which a lot of very bad things happen to a lot of the life on the earth.

O.K. to Cohen's big question, how many people can the earth support? What it comes down to is that the "Well, it depends" answer depends on

• what quality of life you will accept,

• what level of technology you will use, and

• what level of social integration you will accept.

We have seen some of the numbers regarding quality of life. Clearly if you are willing to accept the Bangladesh diet, you can feed 1.8 times more people than if you chose the United States diet.

If you choose the back-to-nature, live like our hearty forefathers, level of technology, you can feed perhaps one-fifth as many people as you can with modern chemical fertilized agriculture. The rest have to go.

And here is the tough one. You can do a lot better, get a lot more people on the planet, if you just force a few things. Like, no more land wasted in growing grapes for wine or grains for whiskey and beer. No cropland used for tobacco. No more grain wasted on animals for meat, just grain for people. No more rich diets for the rich countries, share equally for everyone. No more trade barriers; too bad for the farmers in Japan and France, those countries would just have to accept their dependence on other countries for their food. It is easy to see that at least some of those might actually be a pretty good thing; however, the kicker is how do you get them to happen? After all, Mussolinill did make the trains run on time. How could you force these things without a totalitarian state? Are you willing to give up your ability to choose for yourself for the common good? It is not pretty, is it?

Cohen looked at all the various population estimates and concluded that most fell into the range of 4 to 16 billion. Taking the highest value when researchers offered a range, Cohen calculated a high median of 12 billion and taking the lower part of the range a low median of 7.7 billion. The good news in this is 12 billion is twice as many people as we have now. The bad news is that the projections for world population for 2050 are between 7.8 and 12.5 billion. That means we have got no more than 50 years before we exceed the nominal carrying capacity of the earth. Cohen also offers a qualifying observation by stating the "First Law of Information," which asserts that 97.6% of all statistics are made up. This helps us appreciate that application of these numbers to real life is subject to a lot of assumptions and insufficiencies in our understanding of the processes and data.

However, we can draw some insights from all of this. What it comes down to is that if you choose the fully sustainable, non-fossil fuel long-term options with only limited social integration, the various estimates Cohen looked at give you a number like 1 billion or less people that the earth can support. That means 5 out of 6 of us have got to go, plus no new babies without an offsetting death.

On the other hand, if you let technology continue to do its thing and perhaps get even better, the picture need not be so bleak. We haven't made all our farmland as productive as it can be. Remember, the Chinese get twice the food value per hectare as we do in the United States. There is also a lot of land that would become arable if we could get water to it. And, of course, in case you need to go back and check the title of this book, there are alternatives to fossil fuels to provide the energy to power that technology.

So given a positive and perhaps optimistic view of technology, we can look to some of the high technology assumption based studies from Cohen's review. From the semi-credible set of these, we can find estimates from 19 to 157 billion as the number of people the earth could support with a rough average coming in about 60 billion. This is a good time to be reminded of the First Law of Information. The middle to lower end of this range, however, might be done without wholesale social reprogramming. Hopefully we would see the improvement in the quality of life in the developing countries as they industrialize and increase their use of energy. Hopefully, also this would lead to a matching of the reduction in fertility rates that has been observed in the developed countries, which in turn would lead to an eventual balancing of the human population.

The point to all this is the near-term future of the human race depends on technology. If we turn away from technology, a very large fraction of the current and future human race will starve. If we just keep on as we are, with our current level of technology and dependence on fossil fuel resources, in the near term it will be a race between fertility decrease and our ability to feed ourselves, with, frankly, disaster the slight odds-on bet. In a slightly longer term, dependence on fossil fuels has got to lead to either social chaos or environmental disaster. There are no other end points to that road. It doesn't go anywhere else.

However, if we accept that it is technology that makes us human, that technology uniquely identifies us as the only animal that can choose its future, we can choose to live, choose to make it a better world for everyone and all life. This means more and better technology. It means more efficient technology that is kinder to the planet but also allows humans to support large numbers in a high quality of life. That road is not easy and has a number of ways to screw up. However, it is a road that can lead to a happier place, a better place.

Two Concluding Thoughts on the Case for Technology

Two more points and I will end my defense of technology. First, I want to bring you back from all the historical tour and all the numbers about population to something more directly personal. Let me ask you two questions.

What do you do for a living?

What did you have for breakfast?

Don't see any connection between these questions or of their connection to·the subject of technology? Don't worry, the point will come out shortly. I am just trying to bring the idea of technology back from this grand vision to its impact on your daily life.

Just as a wild guess, your answer to the first question was something that, say 500 years ago, didn't even exist. If we look 20,000 years ago, the only job was" get food." Even if you have a really directly socially valuable job like a medical doctor, 20,000 years ago you would have been extraneous. That is, the tribe couldn't afford you. What, no way! A doctor could save lives, surely a tribe would value such a skill. Well, sure, but the tribe could not afford taking one of their members out of the productive */I* getting the food" job for 20 years while that individual learned all those doctor skills.

If you examine the "what you do for a living" just a bit I think you will see a grand interconnectedness of all things. I personally find it pretty remarkable that we have a society that values nuclear engineers enough that I can make a living at it. Think about it. Somehow what I have done has been of enough value that, through various taxpayer and utility ratepayers, society has given me enough money for food and shelter. The tribe 20,000 years ago wouldn't have put up with me for a day.

You see, that is why we as humans are successful, wildly successful in fact. We work together. "Yeah, sure we do," you reply, " read a newspaper lately?" Well, *O.K.,* we fuss and fight a good deal and some of us do some pretty stupid and pretty mean things. But the degree of cooperation is amazing if you just step back a bit.

O.K., what did you have for breakfast: orange juice, coffee, toast, maybe some cereal and milk? Where do these things come from? Orange juice came from Florida or California. Coffee came from South America. Bread for the toast came perhaps from Kansas; cereal, from the Mid-West somewhere. The jam on the toast may have come from Oregon, or maybe Chile. Milk is probably the only thing that came from within a hundred miles of your breakfast table. Think about it. There were hundreds of people involved in your breakfast. Farmers, food-processing workers, packaging manufacturers, transportation people, energy producers, wholesale and retail people. Perhaps each one only spent a second on their personal contribution to your personal breakfast, but they touch thousands of other people's breakfasts as well. In turn, you buying the various components of your breakfast supported, in your part, all those people. They in turn, in some way or another, bought whatever you provide to society that allowed you to buy breakfast. Pretty amazing, don't you think?

Now when you look at all that, think about what ties all the planetwide interconnection, Yep, you guessed it: technology. Without technology, you get what is available within your personal reach, and what you produce is available only to those who are near enough that you can personally carry it to them on your own two feet. Technology makes our world work. It gives you personally a productive and socially valuable way to make both a living and to provide your contribution to the rest of us.

I want you to stop a minute and really think about that. What would your life be like without technology? Could you do what you currently do? Would anyone be able to use what you do? Would anyone pay you for that? "But I am a school teacher," you say, "of course, they would pay me!" Are you sure? Why do you need schools if there is no technology? All I need is to teach the kid how to farm and how to hunt. Sons and daughters can learn that by working in the fields along with their parents. See what I mean?

Now, I have hopefully reset your brain. Sure, you are still going to be hit with daily "technology is bad" messages. Hopefully, you are a bit more shielded against that din, and you have been given some perspective to balance that message and are prepared to see the true critical value of technology to human existence. The point is that technology is what makes us human. Without it, we are just slightly smarter monkeys.

You may feel that 6 billion of us are too many, and that may very well be. I personally don't know how to make that value decision. Which particular person does one select as being one of the excess ones?

However, the fact is that there are 6 billion of us, and it looks like we are headed for 10 to 12 billion in the next 50 years, Without not only the technology we have, but significantly better and more environmentally friendly technology, the world is going to get ugly as we approach these numbers,

On the other hand, with the right technologies we can not only support those numbers, we can do it while we close the gap between the haves and have-nots. We can make it a better place for everyone. It takes technology and the energy to drive it. Choosing technology is what we have to do to secure the evolutionary selection of us as a successful species, Remember, some pages back in discussing the unlikely evolutionary path to us, I said we are not the chosen, unless. Unless we choose us. This is what I meant. We are totally unique in all of evolutionary history. We humans have the unique ability and opportunity to choose either our evolutionary success or failure. A choice of technology gives us a chance. A choice rejecting technology dooms us as a species and gives the cockroaches the chance in our place. Nature doesn't care what survives, algae seas, dinosaurs, humans, cockroaches, or whatever is successful. If we care, we have to choose correctly.

As an aside, let me address a point of philosophy here. If any of this offends your personal theology, I offer this for your consideration. Genesis tells us God gave all the Earth to humanity and charged us with the stewardship thereof. So it is ours to use as well as we can. That insightful social philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli put it this way in 1501:

"What remains to be done must be done by you; since in order not to deprive us of our free will and such share of glory as belongs to us, God will not do everything Himself."

*O.K.,* you are saying, "I give." You have beaten the socks off me. Technology is good; technology is the identifying human trait and our only hope. But what is this stuff about choosing technology or not? Technology just happens doesn't it? I mean, technology always advances, it always has, so why the big deal?

Well, that is my last point on technology. It doesn't always just happen, and people have chosen to turn away from technology. In what might have seemed at the time to be a practical social decision, huge future implications were imposed on many generations to come. It has happened. Let me take you on one more trip through history. I think you will find it enlightening. In *Guns, Germs, and Steel,* Jared Diamond explores the question of why the European societies came to be dominate over all the other human cultures on earth. It is a fascinating story and provides a lot of insight into how modern societies evolved. In moving through history, he comes across a very odd discontinuity. He observes that if you came to earth from space in the year 1400 A.D., looked around, and went home to write your research paper on the probable future of the earth, you would clearly conclude the Chinese would run the entire planet shortly. Furthermore, you could conclude they would do it pretty darn well. If those same extraterrestrial researchers were to pop into their time machine and come back to earth in any year from say 1800 to now, they would be totally amazed to see China as a large, but relatively backward, country, struggling to catch up with their European and American peers.

To understand the significance of this, you have to go on that research trip with the extraterrestrials and look at China before 1400. In *The Lever af Riches,* Joel Mokyr dedicates one chapter looking at the comparisons of technology development in China to that in Europe. He lists the following as technology advantages China had in the centuries before 1400:

• Extensive water control projects, alternately draining and irrigating

land, significantly boosting agricultural production

• Sophisticated iron plow introduced sixth century B.C.

• Seed drills and other farm tools, introduced around 1000 *A.D.*

• Chemical and organic fertilizers and pesticides used

• Blast furnaces and casting of iron as early as 200 B.C., not known in Europe until fourteenth century

• Advanced use of power sources in textile production, not seen in Europe until the Industrial Revolution

• Invention of compass around 960 A.D.

• Major advances in maritime technology (more in a bit on this)

• Invention of paper around 100 A.D. (application as toilet paper by *590 A.D.).*

In the year 1400 AD., China was a world power, perhaps the only true world power. Their technology in agriculture, textiles, metallurgy, and maritime transportation were far in advance of any other country. They had a strong central government and a very healthy economy.

Their naval strength provides a real insight into the degree of this dominance. Dr. Diamond sends us to an extremely readable book *When China Ruled the Seas-The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne 1405-1433* by Dr. Louise Levathes. Dr. Levathes takes us on an inside tour of the Chinese empire during these years. She focuses on the great treasure fleets that China set forth in these early years of the fifteenth century. In her book she has a wonderful graphic that overlays a Chinese vessel of the treasure fleet (-1410) with Columbus's *St. Maria* (1492). At 85 feet in length and three masts, the *St. Maria* is dwarfed by the nine-masted, 400-foot-long Chinese vessel.

The Chinese sailed fleets of these magnificent vessels throughout oceans of South Asia, to India, and even as far as the eastern coast of Africa. With this naval domination China claimed tribute from Japan, Korea, the nations of the Malay Archipelago, and various states within what is now India. Through both trade and the occasional application of military force, China provided an enlightened and progressive direction for all the nations within this sphere of influence. If two princes in India were fighting over a throne, it was the recognition, or lack thereof, from the Chinese emperor that decided who would rule. Setting a policy of religious inclusion and tolerance, the Chinese engaged the Arabian traders and calmed religious disputes within Asia.

With applications of power sources in textiles and advanced metallurgy, the Chinese were in the same position in 1400 as the British were in 1750, ready to launch into the Industrial Revolution. They traded with nations thousands of miles from home with vast, sophisticated shipping fleets. They were poised to extend this trade all the way to Europe and perhaps find the New World by going east instead of the European's going west in search of the rich Chinese markets.

But if we pop into that extraterrestrial time machine and drop into China in 1800, we find a technologically backward nation, humbled by a relatively small force of Europeans with "modern" military technology who wantonly imposed their will on the Chinese. The Chinese have been struggling to catch up with European and American technology ever since and so far not quite being able to do that. The domination of China by the Japanese during World War II shows how complete the turnaround was. In 1400 Japan was but one of many vassal states huddled about the feet of the Imperial Chinese throne. In 1940 the Japanese military crushed the Chinese government while marching on to control much of South Asia.

What could have happened to turn this clear champion of technology, trade, enlightened leadership with all its advantages over both its neighbors and yet-distant foreign competitors into such a weak, backward giant?

Mokyr goes through a pretty complete list of potential causes. He looks at diet, climate, and inherent philosophical mindset rejecting each as a credible actor mainly on the bases that all of these conditions were present during the period of technological and economic growth as well as the subsequent stagnation. Therefore, these were not determining factors in the turnabout. In the end he concludes, as does Diamond and Levathes, that it was just politics.

Yep, that is right. It was good, old human politics. Dr. Levathes gives us a delightful insider's view of the personalities and politics of Imperial progressions during this critical time period. To make a short story of it, the party that had been in control during the expansionist period supported the great treasure fleets, commerce with foreign nations, use and expansion of technology, and a rather harsh control of the rival party. The rival party was based on Confucian philosophy that preached a rigid, inward-looking, controlled existence.

When the Confucian party gained control of the throne, they had their opportunity to push back on the prior ruling party that had oppressed them so harshly for so long. And they did. They wanted nothing to do with foreigners; we have all we need at home, here in China, they said. The fleet was disbanded and the making of ocean-going vessels forbidden. Technology was no longer "encouraged." Again, their position was what we have is good enough, stop with all this new nonsense. Over a period of just a few years, the course of the entire nation was shifted from what would have appeared to be a bright future as the leading power in the world to a large, but relatively insignificant, backwater, rich in history and culture, but all backward looking to a former glory.

That was it. A shift in the political agenda. At the time, to the leaders in control, one that made sense. Focus at home, use what you have now, create order, discipline, control. In 50 years Japanese pirates controlled the coast of China, and the former ruler of the seas from Asia to Africa could not get out of their harbors safely.

So, you see if the "technology is bad" message gets incorporated into too many of our daily decisions, we can turn from our bright future into something else. The difference is that this time the stakes are much higher than they were in fifteenth century China. If we, in the developed nations, make the wrong choices, we doom all of humanity by our folly. It is not just that we miss the potential bright future, we miss the chance to avoid the combined human population growth and resources exhaustion disaster coming at us like a runaway train. Technology is the only way to prevent that train wreck. We can hear the siren's call of anti-technology, come back to nature and let the train run us down in a bloody mess, or we can try our best to use technology wisely and win free to make a better life for everyone.

#### Dualism is inevitable

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values, or preferences seems to be a hopeless quest. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned to promote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimate part of such a flourishing. The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade the quality of the planet's living systems. But these judgements are possible only if we assume a set of values (that is, preference rankings), based on human preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of human interests and concerns. What's wrong with shallow views is not their concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-being consists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception. Our sort of world, with our sort of fellow occupants is an interesting and engaging place. There is every reason for us to try to keep it, and ourselves, going for a few more cosmic seconds [10].

#### Borders in Latin America may contribute to rivalry, but do not cause conflict – Studies prove

Trinkunas 12

[Harold, Naval Postgraduate School, Maiah Jaskoski- Naval Postgraduate School, Borders and Borderlands in the Americas- PASCC Report Number 2012 009]

Border policies are rooted in a deep history of partial, problematic state building in the region. Historically, Latin American states have engaged in rivalry rather than war. Rivalry benefits these states because it enables the development of nationalism and nationality. Rivalry promotes state coherence and acts as an attractor for weak central governments, using nationalism to retain some loyalty and some authority over populations in their borderlands.8 Though rivalry impedes interstate cooperation to resolve border issues in some key cases in the Americas (Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; Venezuela and Colombia), it does not rise to such a level that it generates the cycle of international conflict, defense preparedness, taxation, and popular mobilization. This means that Central and South America did not experience the type of state building that led to the development of hard fiscal/military/industrial states in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries.9 This historically limited state capacity across much of the region to address border security issues unilaterally, but rivalry also limited the possibility for cooperation across borders to address security and other dimensions of borderlands. This project found no cases in the Americas in which borders were seriously at risk of provoking international war, even in the cases that were most ideologically polarized, as was the case on the Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorean borders. While we still see the militarization of borders as vehicles for signaling during international disputes, we found that leaders in the contemporary Americas were constrained by domestic stakeholders and economic considerations. In fact, much of the violence identified in borderlands has occurred in precisely those spaces where international relations are smoothest, especially due to strong economic relations: in Central America, regional economic integration and cross-border flows are growing even as states struggle to maintain border security.10 The peaceful settlement of international disputes and uti posidetis (the legal concept that borders are based on those inherited from the colonial period) has become the norm across the region. In some cases, there is an increased tendency to legalize territorial claims, settling border disputes in international tribunals and through judicial arbitration. This means that states do not necessarily view their borders as matters of existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated.11

#### Reject their generic link claims - borders produce cultural connections as much as they exclude.

Parker 12

[Noel, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Geopolitics, 17:4, 727-733, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.706111]

On the other hand, bordering practices – and the various forms of contestation and resistance they often give rise to – are not treated simply as normatively ‘bad’ phenomena. Rumford, for example, highlights the ways in which borders are also sites of ‘cultural encounter’ rather than simply a mechanism of division and exclusion. Indeed, even in some of the world’s most persistently troubled border-zones, such as the India-Pakistan region, the border can be said to act as an ‘interlinking and cooperative space’ (Bouzas, this issue). On this view, as Salter might say about Bouzas’ material, ‘borders then knit the world together’ even though the colonial ‘sutures’ remain living after-traces of past violence. Methodologically, the empirical thrust of CBS research is conversant with anthropological approaches to the phenomenology of the border and indeed several of the pieces included here reflect extensive ethnographic fieldwork – for example Bouzas’ interviews with migrants in the border villages near Kargil, Pakistan and Gielis’s time spent with Dutch migrants in Kranenburg.

#### Aff cedes the political

Redfield 5 [Peter, Ph.D. Anthropology at UC Berkeley, professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, “Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis,” Cultural Anthropology 20(3)] \*\*\*MSF = Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)

Here the context of MSF’s “ethic of refusal” comes most sharply into focus.¶ The group’s insistence on a politics of witnessing combined with its abstention¶ from taking a directly political role stems from an unwillingness to accept the extended state of emergency within which it generally operates. Simply to denounce¶ situations would achieve no immediate humanitarian ends and to endorse political¶ agendas would potentially sacrifice the present needs of a population for the hope¶ of future conditions. But to maintain formal neutrality at all times without protest¶ would mimic the classic limitations of the Red Cross movement that the founders¶ of MSF originally rejected. Confronted with such a range of unsatisfying options¶ while still being committed to humanitarian values, MSF’s ideological strategy¶ is to claim a position of “refusal” in the form of action taken with an outspoken,¶ troubled conscience.

The practical application of this approach varies according to the situation.¶ In truly exceptional circumstances MSF has found itself forced out or has chosen to withdraw. For example, during the highly televised Ethiopian famine of¶ 1984–85, the French section was forced to leave after accusing the regime of using both famine and relief aid to effect a forced resettlement policy. During the¶ dark Rwandan spring a decade later, MSF publicly proclaimed its helplessness¶ with a bitter, angry refrain: “you can’t stop genocide with doctors.” The French¶ section both denounced the political complicity of its national government and¶ issued its first call for some form of military intervention to halt the slaughter.¶ Upset at the flagrant manipulation of aid by the perpetrators of genocide in the¶ aftermath, MSF–France subsequently pulled out of the Rwandan refugee camps¶ in Zaire and Tanzania at the end of 1994 and then condemned the new Rwandan¶ regime for the forcible repatriation and massacre of Hutu refugees. Although other¶ MSF sections followed different strategic lines of action amid heated debate, they¶ all eventually withdrew from the camps by the end of 1995, publicly protesting¶ the continuing political situation within them. Most recently and poignantly, the organization withdrew from Afghanistan following the murder of five members of¶ a team from MSF–Holland in 2004. After more than two decades of continuous¶ presence, the organization felt that the altered political circumstances of U.S.-led¶ coalition efforts to administer a post-Taliban reconstruction had eliminated the¶ “humanitarian space” necessary for its operations.

#### **Borders are key to social solidarity that solves poverty, equality, and are key to macroeconomic regulation**

Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., “Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking,” Ethics and Global Politics, pg 5, <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf>)

A second theme in how borders serve political identity is a broadly social democratic emphasis on how social solidarity within national borders furthers goals such as diminished poverty, increased equality of opportunity, and given the absence of effective global-level institutions, macroeconomic regulation and stabilization. To Paul Hirst, for example, as sources of power are increasingly ‘pluralistic’, the state becomes even more important in providing a locus for political solidarity.28 In particular, he writes, ‘Macroeconomic policy continues to be crucial in promoting prosperity, at the international level by ensuring stability, and at the national and regional levels by balancing co-operation and competition. Governments are not just municipalities in a global market-place’

#### Borders are necessary as they fulfill our ethical and identity of humans as means to independence, limits of violence, and the ability for stability

Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of International Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322–338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)

Nevertheless, when taken collectively, these complaints perhaps overstate the case and over the past 5 years or so in particular there have been some notable attempts at acknowledging and offering theoretically reflective accounts of the concept of the border of the state. Jackson, for example, has built upon the work of Hedley Bull and emphasized the normative role that state borders play in international life: ‘‘the sanctity and stability of inherited boundaries is a fundamental building block of international society and a principle behind which the vast majority of sovereign states rally’’ (Jackson 2000:333). On his view, borders between states not only delimit the spheres of national interests, security, and law but also shape rights and duties such as those relating to non-intervention (Jackson 2000:319). As such, borders are said to perform a key normative role by distinguishing between insider groups (members of international institutions such as the UN) and outsider groups (those who enjoy no legal existence as independent states) (Jackson 2000:333). A similar line of argument is pursued by Williams who also draws on Bull to argue that borders between states perform an important ethical function in world politics (Williams 2002:739). For Williams, state borders are ‘‘ubiquitous’’ and ‘‘embedded’’ in IR because they are a necessary facet of human existence: ‘‘The durability and depth of sedimentation of territorial borders as fences suggest that division, and division on a territorial basis, speaks to a deep-seated need of human identity and also in human ethics’’ (Williams 2003:39; emphasis added). On this view, borders between states are said to act as ‘‘fences between neighbours’’ in such a way that ‘‘tolerates diversity’’ instead of stifling difference (Williams 2003:39). Without borders, Williams claims, the international juridical–political system would not be able to ensure ‘‘state independence, limits on violence, sanctity of agreement or the stability of possession’’ (Williams 2002:739–740). Hence, he argues, ‘‘to remove, or even to re-conceptualize, territorial borders would mean the end of IR… requiring a shift in the conduct of politics on the planet that is unimaginable’’ (Williams 2003:27). However, Williams’ argument might be challenged on two grounds: first, that borders between states are not necessarily limits on but rather markers and even upholders of violence in political life; and, second, in any case, as we have already seen in the case of legal arguments deployed by the UN in defence of the Human Rights of detainees in Guanta´namo, planetary shifts in the conduct of politics occasioned by (or reflected in) the disaggregation of territorial limits and limits of law appear to be already well under way.

#### Modern borders are engines of connectivity that allow for engagement with the other

Rumford 11, Chris Rumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, “Seeing like a border” Political Geography 30 (2011) pages 61-69

Borders are no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own right (as in the idea of “borderlands”) and as processes; in short, there has been a shift from borders to bordering (or rebordering, on some accounts). The argument advanced here is that the changes to borders are in fact more far-reaching than can be captured by either the idea that “borders are everywhere” or a security-driven rebordering thesis. I propose that to understand borders fully scholars need to “see like a border”. Three key dimensions of borders/bordering are generating a distinct research agenda and associated literature. First, borders can be “engines of connectivity”. Rather than curtailing mobility, borders can actively facilitate it; many key borders are at airports, maritime ports, and railway terminals. Borders can connect as well as divide, not just proximate entities, but globally. This means that more conventional views of interactions across borders (e.g. Minghi, 1991) are in need of revision. It also means that border scholars must take issue with the idea, expressed by Häkli and Kaplan (2002, p. 7), that “cross-border interactions are more likely to occur when the ‘other side’ is easily accessible, in contrast to when people live farther away from the border”. For van Schendel (2005) borderlanders are able to “jump” scales (local, national, regional, global) and therefore do not experience the national border only as an immediate limit. People can construct the scale of the border for themselves; as a “local” phenomenon, a nation-state “edge”, or as a transnational staging post: the border can be reconfigured as a portal.

#### Even if Borders split up the world artificially they are key to preserving our ontological connection to the world and pre-requisite for political agency

Parker and Addler-Nissen 12, Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012 [Noel and Rebecca, “Picking and Choosing the ‘Sovereign’ Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices”, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582>]

We can ﬁrst observe that borders help fulﬁl epistemological conditions. Borders produce particular conditions for understanding ‘reality’. We who are inside the border are also expected to possess greater knowledge of insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a bulwark sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality (such as national-currency measures for inﬂation or relative welfare). The border slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well. That increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the circumstances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal, borders help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in communications between insiders by comparison with communications with those on the outside. This leads to an assumption that we will be able to agree on the terms used to evaluate changes and preferences – even the order of priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions. Put in a nutshell, the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those within it. Thompson also makes explicit an ontological claim for the border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralism’s prioritisation of dif- ferences as against commonalities: namely, that ‘...borders exist “before” entities ...’ – that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to speciﬁc enti- ties. Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world. This can be demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of the epistemological claims above. For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key onto- logical pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an integrated entity; and hence also for its identity.14 The ‘fact’ of the border helps produce shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both internal and external to the particular itself. This includes understandings of internal variations and sub-categories (constituencies, classes ... ) between insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of mem- bers and sub-categories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing those particulars in relation to each other.15 Likewise, the boundary sustains any determination of the collectivity (the ‘nation’, or whatever it may be) whose interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf. This, as Rokkan noted,16 is especially signiﬁcant in democratic collectivities, where a large self-aware demos is postulated as the ground for decisions that need to accord in some way with the preference of an indeterminable category, the ordinary mass of the people. The above ontological effects of borders yield yet further consequences. For borders provide pre-conditions for determinations of the situation of insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed and/or potential different conditions (be it better or worse) for insiders than for outsiders.17 The same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser (or poten- tially greater/lesser) welfare than outsiders. Only with these kinds of claims and impressions in place, can an additional, politically important category of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential improvements or deteriorations in conditions for the inside.18 If the existence of the subjects who experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not ﬁnd meaning in headlines such as ‘Danish schools worst on PISA tests’.19 A fortiori threats which it may be necessary to protect again

#### The aff can’t overcome bio-political or sovereign distinctions.

Salter ‘6 Mark B, School of Poli Sci @ U of Ottawa, The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics; Alternatives 31 P 174-7, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb3225/is\_2\_31/ai\_n29276866/?tag=content;col1

Derrida describes how becoming suppliant before the law at the border is inevitable: The foreigner is someone whose name must be asked in order that he or she might be received. The foreigner must state and guarantee his or her identity, like a witness before a court. This is someone to whom you put a question and address a demand, the first demand, the minimal demand being, "What is your name?" or then "In telling me what your name is, in responding to this request, you are responding on your own behalf, you are responsible before the law and before your hosts, you are a subject in law." (29) And yet, as Agamben illustrates in terms of the homo sacer, the appellant is subject to the law, but not a subject in the law. This article continues to address the question of the politics of decision below. What are the asymmetric structures of choice that create the frequent and massive movement of individuals through the border, into a zone of indistinction and control, where they are subject to the law but do not enjoy rights? While the characteristics of the globalized world make movement necessary (in addition to desirable), the structure of the global mobility regime reinforces the act of crossing the frontier as an exceptional act.

# Block

#### Power structures are not neutral — the only consciousness shift they create is co-opted and used against them

Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke University, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 41

Here one comes face to face with the roots of professional and criti- cal commitment to negligence, to the depths of the impulse to deny the thought of the internal outside among critical intellectuals, and the necessity for professionals to question without question. What- ever else they do, critical intellectuals who have found space in the university are always already performing the denial of the new society when they deny the undercommons, when they find that space on the surface of the university, and when they join the conquest denial by improving that space. Before they criticise the aesthetic and the Aes- thetic, the state and the State, history and History, they have already practiced the operation of denying what makes these categories pos- sible in the underlabor of their social being as critical academics.

The slogan on the Left, then, “universities, not jails,” marks a choice that may not be possible. In other words, perhaps more universities promote more jails. Perhaps it is necessary finally to see that the uni- versity produces incarceration as the product of its negligence. Perhaps there is another relation between the University and the Prison – be- yond simple opposition or family resemblance – that the undercom- mons reserves as the object and inhabitation of another abolitionism. What might appear as the professionalization of the American uni- versity, our starting point, now might better be understood as a cer- tain intensification of method in the Universitas, a tightening of the circle. Professionalization cannot take over the American university – it is the critical approach of the university, its Universitas. And in- deed, it appears now that this state with its peculiar violent hegemony must deny what Foucault called in his 1975-76 lectures the race war.

War on the commitment to war breaks open the memory of the con- quest. The new American studies should do this, too, if it is to be not just a people’s history of the same country but a movement against the possibility of a country, or any other; not just property justly distrib- uted on the border but property unknown. And there are other spaces situated between the Universitas and the undercommons, spaces that are characterized precisely by not having space. Thus the fire aimed at black studies by everyone from William Bennett to Henry Louis Gates Jr., and the proliferation of Centers without affiliation to the memory of the conquest, to its living guardianship, to the protection of its honor, to the nights of labor, in the undercommons.

The university, then, is not the opposite of the prison, since they are both involved in their way with the reduction and command of the social individual. And indeed, under the circumstances, more uni- versities and fewer prisons would, it has to be concluded, mean the memory of the war was being further lost, and living unconquered, conquered labor abandoned to its lowdown fate. Instead, the under- commons takes the prison as a secret about the conquest, but a secret, as Sara Ahmed says, whose growing secrecy is its power, its ability to keep a distance between it and its revelation, a secret that calls into being the prophetic, a secret held in common, organized as secret, calling into being the prophetic organization.er

#### They make the ballot a commodity that makes social transformation impossible

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities).

Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse.

The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

#### Resolved proves the resolution requires Switch Side Debate and policy action

Parcher 1—Jeff Parcher, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University [Feburary 2001, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Interpretation – the resolution is defined as:

Darin M. Maier, Director of Forensics, St. Andrew’s Episcopal School, 2012, “NFHS Policy Debate Topic Proposal: Latin America”, PDF, KENTUCKY

According to Miles Kahler and Scott Kastner, economic engagement is defined as “a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations” (www) The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation. (Mastanduno, www) foreign policy “The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other nations”. American Heritage Online Dictionary increase “Plan of action adopted by one nation in regards to its diplomatic dealings with other countries. Foreign policies are established as a systematic way to deal with issues that may arise with other countries”. Businessdictionary.com “become or make greater in size, amount, intensity, or degree”. Oxford Online Dictionary “to become greater or larger” American Heritage Online Dictionary Latin America promote “to contribute to the growth or prosperity of”. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary “To contribute to the progress or growth of; further”. American Heritage Online Dictionary should “used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone’s actions”. Oxford Online Dictionary “used to express obligation or duty”. American Heritage Online Dictionary stability “The state or quality of being stable, especially: a. Resistance to change, deterioration, or displacement. b. Constancy of character or purpose; steadfastness. c. Reliability; dependability.” American Heritage Online Dictionary “The state of being stable”. Oxford Online Dictionary substantially Note – as anyone who has coached or debated will know, several legal definitions exist that assign a percentage to this term. However, those definitions are often, by their context, limited to addressing the issue that was at bar. Thus, while a list of cases could cite substantially as meaning anything from 10 percent up to 90 percent, I will refrain from listing them here. “to a great or significant extent”. Oxford Online Dictionary “considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent”. American Heritage Online Dictionary “The countries of the Western Hemisphere south of the United States, especially those speaking Spanish, Portuguese, or French”. American Heritage Online Dictionary “Latin America is generally understood to consist of the entire continent of South America in addition to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose inhabitants speak a Romance language.” Encyclopedia Britannica Online towards “as regards, in relation to”. Oxford Online Dictionary “in the direction of”. American Heritage Online Dictionary United States federal government “The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary.” US Legal.com Definitions “The government of the United States, established by the Constitution, is a federal republic of 50 states, a few territories and some protectorates. The national government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.” Word IQ.com

#### Turns and solves case –governmental engagement can create change

Coverstone, 05 – masters in communication from Wake Forest and longtime debate coach

(Alan H., “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact,” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference, 11/17/05)

It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith inthe power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### The impact is ceded politics and extinction

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 03 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

#### Turns the aff – failure to debate both sides makes everything worse

Star Muir, communication studies at George Mason University, 1993 (*Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26.4, p. 88-291)

Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values---tolerance and fairness---inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question…inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side…the other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one’s own…Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. The activity should encourage debating bosh sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are “more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.” While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right….the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race….If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error. At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically, and to “reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically.” Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Reding explains that “debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,” where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths. Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact. Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity. A final point about relativism is that switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values. Initially, it is apparent that *a priori* fairness is a fundamental aspect of games and gamesmanship. Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal about of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality----whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic----the issue of “fair ground” for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the “competitiveness” of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team’s suggested “permutation” of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation. The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralistic, rather than relativistic.