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## 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement

## 1AC – Solvency

#### Now is the time to lock in bilateral framework for energy cooperation

Wood 13 [Duncan, Mexico Institute director “Growing Potential for U.S.-Mexico Energy Cooperation”, <http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/wood_energy.pdf>, p. 44]

The potential for effective collaboration between the two countries on questions on energy and climate change is huge. As a region, North America currently offers the most positive outlook in the world in terms of cheap, clean energy, largely thanks to the shale revolution that has taken place in recent years. Moreover, also thanks to shale, the United States, Canada and Mexico all have the chance to become energy independent and become net energy exporters to the world. The governments of the U.S. and Mexico should therefore undertake intensive discussions early in the new administrations to identify priority areas in the short- and medium-terms and should create institutional mechanisms through which these priorities can be pursued. In many cases these discussions will be bilateral, but on some long-term issues, such as climate change, for example, it makes sense to adopt a more regional approach, incorporating Canada into the process.

As Mexico undertakes a new energy reform process, the landscape for hydrocarbons and electricity will be subject to significant change. Mexico’s new government has decided that the existing state-led approach to oil and gas exploitation is no longer valid, and no longer serves the interests of the nation. This change will offer new opportunities for U.S. firms and potential competitiveness gains for the American economy. The establishment of a clear agenda for talks on bilateral cooperation is therefore a priority that should not be underestimated.

#### Mexico has already said yes and ratified the bill—they are just waiting for the US

**Velarde 12** – (Rogelio Lopez Velarde, attorney and counselor-at-law, held various positions at Pemex during 1988-1993, including that of Financial Advisor to the Finance Department, In-House Counsel in Houston, Texas, In-House Counsel in New York, and Head of the International Legal Department of Pemex. He was honored with the “Most Distinguished Attorney Award” of Pemex for the period 1990-1991, former Chairman of the Energy Committee of the Mexican Bar Association, and currently he is the President for the Latin America Chapter of the Association of the International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), as Visiting Professor of Judicial Process on the Mexican Legal Studies Program at the University of Houston Law Center, and he is currently the director of the Energy Law Seminar organized between the Universidad Iberoamericana and the Mexican Bar Association. “US-Mexican treaty on Gulf of Mexico transboundary reservoirs”, International Law Office, 3-19-2012, http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=b9326bf8-f27f-43ff-b45a-1b2b70ccb217andredir=1)

The treaty will become effective 60 days after the last notification of approval has been made by Mexico or the United States. In this regard, the Mexican Senate ratified the treaty in April 2012; therefore, the treaty's effectiveness is subject to approval and publication by the United States, which to date has neither ratified nor published the treaty.

## 1AC – Relations

#### Relations high – energy co-op key to sustainability

Brown and Meacham 12

(Neil, and Carl, ¶ current program director at CSIS, served at the Department of Commerce as special assistant to the deputy secretary, at the Cuban Affairs Bureau of the Department of State, and at the U.S. embassy in Madrid, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Oil, Mexico, And The Transboundary Agreement,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDgQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreign.senate.gov%2Fpublications%2Fdownload%2Foil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement&ei=qtPQUfzNJsisiALYloHwCw&usg=AFQjCNEZsmcfgXzQ0omtPqf8HklAkTjfxA&sig2=PORZ6WJw6OEYk7MPmfWKbw&bvm=bv.48572450,d.cGE>, P. 13, Accessed: 6/30/13)

U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation has improved dramatically in¶ the last 5 years. Mexican sensitivities regarding their sovereignty¶ are still present in government dealings. But today they don’t prevent¶ bilateral cooperation, as they did in the recent past. As evidence¶ in this regard, we have seen a significant increase in Mexico’s¶ efforts to institutionalize and even expand cooperation among¶ both civilian and military officials.¶ The willingness to improve Mexican cooperation with the United¶ States is partly due to the trust developed through the successful¶ partnership the U.S. and Mexican governments have built while¶ working against drug trafficking organizations. The $1.9 billion¶ Me´rida Initiative through which the United States provides equipment,¶ training, and technical assistance to support the Mexican¶ government’s battle against the narcotics trade and transnational¶ crime has created a platform for greater bilateral cooperation.¶ Today, our two nations work closer than ever before. Yet, there¶ are still new areas in which the bilateral relationship should improve.¶ Interlocutors both from the then-existing Caldero´n administration¶ and senior advisers to then-incoming Pen˜ a Nieto administration¶ expressed a similar desire to expand cooperation in the bilateral¶ relationship. One senior member of the then-incoming Pen˜ a¶ Nieto administration expressed that it is time to move beyond tourism¶ and drugs, issues which are so prominent in the bilateral da today.11 Of course, the development of a contemporary, comprehensive¶ immigration policy ranks high when broadening the¶ agenda is discussed.¶ The U.S. is well positioned to increase dialogue and cooperation¶ on energy security with Mexico (included in renewable power and¶ efficiency, which were not part of this review, but which are areas¶ where cooperation can move forward without significant political¶ obstacles from the Mexican side).

#### **Energy and economic ties key to broader relations – plan solves**

Farnsworth 13 [Eric, May 8, “Obama’s Mexico Trip Yielded Progress, Missed Opportunities” [http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities 6/29/13](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities%206/29/13)]

President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico City on May 2 to meet with new Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in an effort to recast perceptions of the bilateral agenda from security to economic issues. In 2012, for the first time in 12 years, the U.S. and Mexican election cycles coincided, providing an excellent opportunity to coordinate an agenda consistent with the political needs of the new administrations and the economic requirements of their respective countries. An early visit by the U.S. president was an important signal that Mexico’s significant contributions to the health of the U.S. economy can no longer be taken for granted; the bond must be strengthened in order to assure the global competitiveness of both Mexico and the United States.

Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, after Canada and China, and its second-biggest export market, after Canada. Some $1.4 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexico border every day, and an estimated 6 million U.S. jobs depend directly on trade with Mexico. These are big numbers, and they are only going to increase, particularly as Mexico’s economy grows and its middle class expands, increasing its purchasing power.

At the same time, a number of obstacles to growth must be addressed if the bilateral relationship is to reach its full potential. Many of these are domestic issues that each nation should resolve for its own self-interest but that would nonetheless meaningfully improve the bilateral economic relationship. Among these are, from Mexico’s side, reforms in fiscal, energy and competition policy, as well as the continuing implementation of labor and education reforms. Working with Mexico’s other two main political parties, Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) has successfully begun the reform process. But the Mexican president’s honeymoon period is coming to an end, and the most difficult issues remain unresolved.

#### Plan is reverse causal - Failure to pass THA kills relations- Mexico would perceive it as a violation of trust

CFR 12 – United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Super Qualified Authors, 12/21/12, (“OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT”, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, AW)

Finally, passage of the TBA would boost U.S.-Mexico relations on energy issues, which have traditionally lagged. Mexican officials roundly expressed support for the TBA and expectation for U.S. ratification in conversation with the authors. The political impact of not approving and implementing the TBA would set back U.S.-Mexican relations on energy specifically and more broadly. Each of our countries has hot button domestic political issues that take courage for political leaders to address. In Mexico, oil is one such issue, and members of both the PAN and PRI put their political weight behind ratification in Mexico. The U.S. not fulfilling its side of the agreement would, therefore, be seen as a violation of trust and could erode confidence. In the extreme, although unlikely, if Mexico proceeds with domestic energy reforms, U.S. companies could be shut out of certain opportunities until the TBA is ratified. However, bilateral benefits of approving the agreement do not require immediate passage; U.S. commitment can be demonstrated by the Obama administration formally submitting the TBA for Congressional approval and commencement of Congressional hearings.

#### **Relations solve narco trafficking**

Barry 13, Center for International Policy, senior policy analyst, 13

(Tom, 5-7-13, Truthout,”Changing Perspectives on US-Mexico Relations” <http://truth-out.org/news/item/16221-changing-perspectives-on-us-mexico-relations> accessed 7-1-13 KR)

Drugs and Guns

Drug trafficking and related violence have largely shaped the binational relationship over the past six years. During his first term, President Obama correctly identified the “shared responsibility” of the United States for the horrific drug-related violence in Mexico. But the Obama administration abysmally failed in shouldering its responsibility. By continuing the military-oriented aid of the Bush administration’s Mérida Initiative, the Obama administration contributed to the increase of drug-related violence and human rights violations in Mexico. By encouraging and largely directing the Calderón government’s military-directed drug war, the Obama administration—along with the Calderón government and Mexico’s security forces—turned large parts of Mexico into killing grounds where assault weapons, not the rule of law, are the only instruments of governance and control.

#### That’s key to solve bioterror- method cooperation

Rosales et al 11- MD has worked in the health arena for more than 20 years and in public health over 15 years, after serving five years as Director, Office of Border Health for the Arizona Department of Health Services. Dr. Rosales has expertise in program development and implementation, public health administration, policy and health disparities research in the Southwest, (Cecilia, “U.S.Mexico cross-border workforce training needs:survey implementation”, January 2011, Journal of Injury and Violence Research at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3134923/>,)

Abinational border-wide, online assessment on preparedness/emergency response and workforce training needs of personnel dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border region was ommissioned by the ten U.S.-Mexico border state health offices through the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor’s Conference. The overarching goal of the study was to provide the Border States with information that could serve to orient, train, and evaluate the workforce charged with public health emergency preparedness and response as well as future preparedness personnel. The primary objective of the study was to assess and prioritize bioterrorism, infectious disease, and border training needs critical for responding to intentional and unintentional emergencies along the border region. The study was to describe the characteristics, learning preferences, proficiency and educational needs of the emergency preparedness and response workforce operating in the counties located in the U.S. border area. This area was defined by the La Paz Agreement and Public Law 103-400 (U.S. – Mexico Border Health Commission) as 100 kilometers north and south of the international boundary. The relative lack of literature addressing U.S.-Mexico cross-border issues related to emergency preparedness and bioterrorism highlights the importance of this assessment. This study describes and provides results of the assessment conducted with the four U.S. Border States and two Mexico Border States. While the study was mandated for all ten states funding was only provided for border cities within six states. Funding of transborder studies has been challenging for researchers focused on border health issues. The state of Sonora, sister state to Arizona, and the state of Chihuahua, sister state to Texas, were both successful in securing the resources to survey the preparedness and response workforce.

#### Also solves conventional terrorism

Mariclaire Acosta 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf>, AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly on intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving threats from terrorist organizations. Policy oPtion: Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

#### Biological terrorist attack would cause extinction

Kellman ‘08[Barry, Director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law and author of Bioviolence—Preventing Biological Terror and Crime; “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008\_Kellman.pdf]

What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge. Although the number of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of certain bioweapons that distinguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A bio-offender could infect his minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately. There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic. Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life. While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable.

#### **Now is key – bioterror threats increasing**

Garrett, 1/5**/**12 [Laurie, Senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, recipient of the 1996 Pulitzer Prize for her coverage of the Ebola epidemic in what was then Zaire, and author of I Hear the Sirens Scream: How American Responded to the 9/11 and Anthrax Attacks; “Flu Season,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/05/flu\_season]

Meanwhile, bird flu is back, causing human and bird infections and deaths in Hong Kong, mainland China, India, Bangladesh, and Egypt. A Shenzhen bus driver died of H5N1on Dec. 31; the source of his infection has not been determined. Nature carries out its own mutations. Indeed, all five of the mutations that were the key in Fouchier's experiments to transforming garden-variety bird flu into a supercontagious mammalian killer have already occurred separately in nature. Yes, the birds and viruses have already done it -- but not with all five mutations in a single viral strain. The biological clock is ticking. In late December, the U.S. CDC issued a warning, noting that yet another flu threat looms, combining the 2009 H1N1 "swine flu" with a H3N2 influenza now circulating in American commercial pig farms. The naturally occurring recombinant flu had infected a dozen Americans by Christmas.

#### High risk of nuclear terrorism – acquisition and ideological motivation

Graham T. Allison 7 – Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 4/20/07, (“How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?”, <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>, AW)

A final comment on the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack before turning more specifically to terrorist motivations. We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist's bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks to initiatives like the Nunn-Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft today than they were in the early 1990s. But the risk that terrorists will buy or steal nuclear material from a rogue state increases as more countries acquire the ability to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will trigger a cascade of proliferation in its neighborhood. What about the motivation of terrorists that have attacked the American homeland? Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has stated al-Qaeda's objective: "to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands." As he explains, this is what justice requires to balance the scales for casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel. Michael Levi argues, correctly, that such a tally could be reached in a series of smaller installments, and our national security would benefit from insights into how to prevent such events. But ask yourself how many 9/11s it would take to reach that goal. Answer: 1,334, or one nuclear weapon. Jihadi terrorists are not solely interested in murdering Americans. They are also vying for Muslim "hearts and minds" by demonstrating that al-Qaeda is the "strong horse." Bin Laden has challenged his followers to trump 9/11. The London and Madrid train bombings set a bar: the first major bombing by Islamic terrorists on each country's soil. Al-Qaeda's next UK plot was more audacious, and had it been successful, it would have taken more lives. It is not clear that al-Qaeda can be deterred. Osama bin Laden describes the current conflict as a clash between the Muslim ummah [community of believers] and the "Jewish-Christian crusaders." A nuclear terrorist attack, like the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would be a world-changing event. Bin Laden well might accept significant risk of failure for a chance to draw battle lines in his clash of civilizations. Analysts with a deeper understanding of terrorist motivations should be challenged to propose policy initiatives that leverage that knowledge, particularly where those insights help us to prevent what Dr. Levi and I both agree would be the single greatest catastrophe: nuclear terrorism.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where **an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war**. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil mightalso raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

## 1AC – Trade

#### **The trade deficit is expanding**

Reuters 9-4 (Reuters, September 04, 2013 “U.S. Trade Deficit Widens in July,” <http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/09/04/us-trade-deficit-widens-in-july/>, zs)

The U.S. trade deficit widened slightly more than expected in July as exports dipped, but a rebound in imports pointed to some firming in underlying domestic demand early in the third quarter. The Commerce Department said on Wednesday the trade gap increased 13.3 percent to $39.1 billion. June's shortfall on the trade balance was revised to $34.5 billion from the previously reported $34.2 billion. Economists polled by Reuters had expected the trade deficit to widen to $38.7 billion in July. When adjusted for inflation, the trade gap expanded to $47.7 billion from $43.8 billion in June. This measure goes into the calculation of gross domestic product. Trade's contribution to GDP growth in the second quarter was neutral, but economists expect it to add to growth this quarter and the rise in the so-called real trade deficit is probably not enough to change that view. The economy grew at a 2.5 percent annual rate in the April-June quarter, stepping up from the first-quarter's 1.1 percent pace. "We expect some narrowing in the trade deficit in the third quarter. It's consistent with some pickup in the global demand," said Yelena Shulyatyeva, an economist at BNP Paribas in New York. The three-month moving average of the trade deficit, which irons out month-to- month volatility, decreased to $39.1 billion in the three months to July from $39.3 billion in the prior period. The increase in imports in July, which reflected rises in industrial supplies, automobiles and consumer goods, suggested some strengthening in domestic demand. Imports of goods and services rose 1.6 percent to $228.6 billion. Imports of autos, parts and engines were the highest on record in July. Exports of goods and services dipped 0.6 percent to $189.4 billion in July. However, exports of petroleum products hit a record high. U.S. financial markets showed little reaction to the trade data, with attention focused on the debate in the United States over whether to take action in war-torn Syria. Weak overseas demand, especially in Europe, has caused an ebb in export growth after trade helped to lift the U.S. economy out of the 2007-09 recession. But there are signs the global economy is picking up and U.S. manufacturers have also been reporting an increase in export orders. The Institute for Supply Management said on Tuesday its gauge of new export orders rebounded in August after slipping in July. In July, exports to the 27-nation European Union fell 7.4 percent resulting in a record trade deficit. Exports to the EU in the first seven months of the year were down 4.4 percent compared to the same period in 2012. Exports to China fell 4.9 percent. China has been one of the fastest-growing markets for U.S. goods, but growth there has slowed in recent months and exports to that country were up just 4.0 percent for the first seven months of 2013. Imports from China jumped 8.3 percent in July, lifting the contentious U.S. trade deficit with China to a record $30.1 billion.

#### Offshore drilling solves trade deficit – reduces necessity for oil imports

Priest, 13 – (Tyler, “Should the U.S. Expand Offshore Oil Drilling?” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324020504578398610851042612.html)

The U.S. will be the world's largest per-capita consumer of crude oil for the foreseeable future. To help meet this demand and limit reliance on imports, the country will need to increase exploration for offshore oil. As the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrated, there are risks. Critics, however, too often exaggerate the risks, including the impacts of routine drilling operations on ecosystems, and understate the benefits. Expanding offshore drilling with appropriate site selection, oversight and attention to the lessons from Deepwater Horizon—already embodied in new rules on equipment, drilling and safety—should be a central objective of U.S. energy policy. Regardless of the progress we make in limiting our carbon addiction, kicking the habit won't happen easily or soon. The raw energy produced by a single offshore oil platform in 2010—BP BP.LN +1.02% PLC's Thunder Horse facility in the Gulf of Mexico—was equivalent to the electricity generated in 2012 by all the wind and solar installations in the U.S. combined. Offshore oil also does more than help satisfy our energy appetite. Annual federal proceeds from offshore leases have ranged as high as $18 billion in recent years, second only to income taxes as a revenue source. And every barrel of consumption that isn't imported helps ease the U.S. trade deficit.

#### Free trade on the brink – perception of US leadership key

Suominen 12 – resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, 7-6-12

(Kati, “America the Absent,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/06/america_the_absent?page=full>)

In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early 1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism. Eight multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low and steady inflation around the world. Globalization was not wished into being: It was the U.S.-led order that generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants of Brazil, China, and India. It was the United States that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among nations and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime, deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1 trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy. Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table. Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains. Still, while the American order is peerless, it is also imperiled. The deepening European debt crisis, discord over national policies to restore growth, and the all-but-dead Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations speak to the failures of the global economy's existing instruments to manage 21st-century challenges. Instead of coordinating policies, leading countries are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma, elbowing for an edge in world trade and jockeying for power on the world stage. Tensions simmer over issues such as exchange-rate manipulation, capital controls, creeping protectionism, and financial nationalism. Right at the moment when we most need to shore up the troubled global economic order, America -- the architect of this very order -- is failing to lead. Even as the United States remains pivotal to global growth, U.S. corporations -- the engines of the American economy -- are stifled by taxes, regulations, and policy uncertainty. Gaping fiscal deficits in the United States are undermining the dollar, exacerbating trade deficits, and undercutting U.S. economic dynamism and credibility in world affairs, but political posturing has obstructed the country's path to solvency. Earlier this week, the IMF warned that if political deadlock takes America to the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts in January 2013, it could have a devastating impact on the U.S. and world economies. No wonder America's image as the global economic superpower is receding around the world. Europe's travails, meanwhile, are reducing U.S. companies' exports and overseas profits, threatening America's recovery. And yet Congress has balked at boosting the IMF's resources to fight the eurozone crisis while the Obama administration has deflected responsibility, framing the crisis as Europe's to manage. It has fallen to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia to instead build the firewall that will shield the rest of the world from Europe. The welcome momentum in negotiations between the United States and Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement does not undo over three years of drift in U.S. trade policy that has jeopardized the very global trading system that the United States built and powered in the postwar era. The only trade deals that the Obama administration has passed -- with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -- were launched and negotiated by the Bush administration. The world is now facing a triple threat of global economic instability, divisions among top powers, and a global leadership vacuum. This perfect storm could produce a world disorder of mercurial financial markets, widening global imbalances, spreading state capitalism, and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism -- a scenario with a sorry past and few safe exits. In the late 1940s, a new world order arose because of American strength, vision, and leadership, not because global governance was in vogue. Leadership was never easy: Resistance from allies, protectionist pressures at home, and resource-draining wars all stood in the way. But capitalism spread, trade and financial markets were liberalized, and emerging-market crises were defeated. Global economic integration forged ahead. Today, American leadership is again essential.

#### Data proves resolving the deficit solves protectionism

Hufbauer 10 (Gary, Senior Chair at Council of Relations, “US Protectionist Impulses in the Wake of the Great Recession”, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf)

The U.S. unemployment rate more than doubled between the onset of the Great Recession in¶ December 2007 and December 2009, and is now hovering just below 10 percent (figure 1).¶ 1¶ Considering that this discouraging figure likely understates broader deterioration in the U.S.¶ labor market,¶ 2¶ the absence of sustained Congressional pressure for large‐scale protectionist¶ measures, beyond “Buy American” provisions and several smaller companions (all examined in¶ this report), is in some ways surprising.¶ 3¶ At least part of the explanation for the restrained political response is the simultaneous large¶ improvement in the U.S. trade balance during 2008 and early 2009. Figure 1 illustrates how the¶ total U.S. deficit in goods and services trade was nearly cut in half during this period, creating a¶ political obstacle to kneejerk protectionism. As we will elaborate in section IV, during recessions¶ an improving external balance (from imports falling faster than exports) often acts an¶ “automatic international economic stabilizer,” which temporarily fulfills an equivalent¶ economic function to a Keynesian government stimulus package. The “external sector” of the¶ U.S. economy during the early quarters of the Great Recession provided an “automatic offset”¶ to sliding U.S. economic activity. This probably caused policymakers to think twice about¶ succumbing to short‐term protectionist instincts.¶ However, figure 1 also shows how the improvement in the U.S. trade balance has been only¶ temporary and indeed began to reverse as the U.S. economy exited the Great Recession during¶ the second half of 2009. Crucial for the political threat of protectionism, economic forecasts¶ indicate that the U.S. unemployment rate will probably remain at very high levels over the¶ medium term, despite President Obama’s emphasis on “jobs, jobs, jobs” in his State of the¶ Union Address delivered on January 27¶ th¶ , 2010.¶ 4¶ A time lag of at least 12 to 18 months probably separates the point at which the U.S. trade¶ balance showed maximum improvement (spring 2009) and the expected drop in measured¶ unemployment well below 10 percent (fall 2010). Absent the “feel good” factor of an improving¶ trade balance, but facing continuing high unemployment levels, protectionist sentiment in the¶ U.S. Congress may increase in the coming months, especially as the November 2010 midterm¶ election draws near.¶ This is particularly so, as current economic forecasts suggest a more robust U.S. economic¶ recovery in the coming years, relative to other industrial trading partners (table 1). A large and¶ growing deficit in the U.S. external balances will likely persist for some time, while the external¶ balances of other major trading partners could hold steady or even improve. If the United¶ States thus returns to its “pre‐crisis role as the world’s importer/consumer of last resort,”¶ protectionist impulses in the U.S. Congress are destined to escalate.¶ 5¶ Fresh U.S. protectionist initiatives, at a time when the U.S. economy is growing at a decent pace,¶ will likely invite in‐kind retaliation by America’s trading partners, despite the relatively muted¶ reaction to the original “Buy American” provisions in early 2009 and other protectionist measures implemented since then. No longer facing a newly‐elected U.S. president, who¶ entered office with considerable global appeal in the midst of an unprecedented economic¶ crisis, foreign leaders are unlikely to give the U.S. an easy pass on future new instances of U.S.¶ protectionism.

#### Protectionism causes extinction

Panzer 8 (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Trade deficit destroys economy

Sherter 5/10/13 – (Alain, “How the U.S. trade gaps hurts the economy”, CBS, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123\_162-57431723/how-the-u.s-trade-gaps-hurts-the-economy/)

The global U.S. trade deficit rose in March at its fastest clip in 10 months, as sales of consumer goods coming from overseas outstripped gains in U.S. exports, according to new Commerce Department data. Despite Europe's financial woes, imports from the region jumped nearly 23 percent in March and hit a new high of roughly $35 billion. Since the U.S. economy officially started recovering in 2009, the trade deficit has doubled, notes economist Peter Morici. It's worth noting that many of those clothes, electronic gadgets, and other low-priced products coming into the U.S. from China and elsewhere are, in fact, goods made overseas by American companies. In theory, that should drive job-creation here in the states. The lower the price of, say, a Chinese-made flat-screen TV, the more units American consumers will buy. Rising demand for nice TVs is supposed to boost hiring, as U.S. companies gear up to fill orders. If only theory jibed better with reality. With the U.S. economy still showing symptoms of depression, demand has yet to fully rebound. Hiring remains slow. As the trade deficit has grown, meanwhile, U.S. businesses have moved a lot more jobs abroad in recent years than they've created at home. Between 1999 and 2008 U.S. multinationals slashed their domestic workforce by 1.9 million, while increasing overseas employment by 2.4 million, economist Martin Sullivan has shown. And it's not only about wages. The U.S. has lost more manufacturing jobs since 2000 than several countries that pay their workers more, including Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. Nor is it only about manufacturing. The number of financial services, IT, HR, and other white-collar jobs lost to offshoring has risen since the financial crisis. How does offshoring relate to America's growing trade deficit? Both stifle job-creation, which in turn is affected by U.S. trade policy. Since 2001, for example, the U.S. trade gap with China has resulted in a loss of 2.8 million jobs, according to the Economic Policy Institute, a Washington think-tank. More broadly, a widening deficit can act as a drag on the economy by muting the job-creating effects of consumer spending. Why? Because when people hit their local mall or big-box retailer, what they buy is mostly made abroad. That creates more jobs overseas than it does here. It also weakens the impact of government stimulus by reducing the "multiplier" effect you get when formerly unemployed workers in the U.S. suddenly have a job and money in their pockets. (Again, the idea there is that higher consumer spending drives hiring, which continues the virtuous circle by pushing up spending.)

#### Econ decline causes global conflict - studies

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Free trade creates multiple disincentives for conflict, but it’s declining globally

Carafano, 12 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation. “More Free Markets Will Mean Fewer Wars,” [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars Accessed 6/30/12](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2012/01/more-free-markets-will-mean-fewer-wars%20Accessed%206/30/12)

Sir Ralph Norman Angell had all the answers. In 1909, he published "Europe's Optical Illusion," a pamphlet arguing that the global integration of economies through trade and industrialization had made total war obsolete. The outbreak of World War I dented the theory somewhat. But such was the power of Angell's argument -- and the insight of European elites -- that he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. World War II started six years later. Angell and others had missed a key point. It's not just the intensity of trade between nations that influences the tide of war and peace; the kind of nations engaged in trade matters as well. The old British adage "trade follows the flag" had an important postscript: "War often follows trade." When free-market nations rubbed up against mercantilist and other "not free" economies, the friction often produced bloodshed. On the other hand, economic activity between nations that share a commitment to economic freedom tends to flow peacefully, without rancor. Indeed, strong trade ties between free-market nations tend to actually promote national security. Economic freedom helps nations generate the wealth that allows them to defend themselves. Beyond that, it creates a community of nations with a shared interest: protecting their right to freely exchange goods, peoples, services and ideas. This common bond promotes the cause of peace by creating strong, self-reliant, sovereign and independent nations interested in preserving the mutual freedoms that allow them to engage commercially and prosper. Economic freedom hinges on an institutional framework that allows all individuals to exercise their liberties in the market place. In addition to accommodating free trade, that framework includes institutional commitments to fight corruption, protect property rights and the sanctity of contracts and pursue responsible fiscal policies. Each year, the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal produce an Index of Economic Freedom that measures 10 major components essential to economic freedom and assesses the state of virtually every economy in the world. The 2012 Index of Economic Freedom should be a wake-up call for the world. It found that, generally speaking, economic freedom is in decline throughout the globe. The decline is very real right here in the United States. For the second straight year, America has failed to qualify as a free economy; it rates as only "mostly free." As recently as 2008, the U.S. was a Top Five country in terms of economic freedom. This year, we barely managed a 10th place finish. The loss of freedom has been accompanied by a stagnant economy and persistently high unemployment. Reviving economic freedom is essential to growing the economy and creating jobs ... and for national security as well. Beyond getting our own house in order, encouraging and working with other nations to promote economic freedom is equally important. Washington needs to embrace ambitious policies that create economic dynamism, policies that will unshackle innovation, which leads to better products, new markets and greater investment. Promoting property rights and anti-corruption measures ought to be high on our foreign policy agenda as well. And virtually every region of the world offers opportunities for the United States to enter new free trade agreements. New initiatives such as the proposed nine-country Trans-Pacific Partnership could create new economic opportunities by expanding trade between the United States, Asia and Latin America. The prescription for solving America's ills requires a double dose of national security and economic freedom. That's what's needed to make "peace through strength" a reality, rather than a bumper sticker.

#### US trade leadership solves nuclear conflict

Panitchpakdi 4 (DG Supachai, Former Director-General – World Trade Organization, “American Leadership and the World Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?”, National Press Club, 2-26, http://www.wto.org/french/ news\_f/spsp\_f/spsp22\_f.htm)

I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues, trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO — or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests. Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade, stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy. The Doha Round is a crucial test. The core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher — with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about the future of multilateralism in trade. This should be a major concern to the US for two reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy. The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules. All of these were America’s objectives. The US needs to be both clearer about the magnitude of what it has achieved, and more realistic about what it is trying to — and can — accomplish. Multilateralism can be slow, messy, and tortuous. But it is also indispensable to managing an increasingly integrated global economy. Multilateralism is based on the belief that all countries — even powerful countries like the United States — are made stronger and more secure through international co-operation and rules, and by working to strengthen one another from within a system, not outside of it. Multilateralism's greatest ideal is the ideal of negotiation, compromise, consensus, not coercion. As Churchill said of democracy, it is the worst possible system except for all the others. I do not believe America's long-term economic interests have changed. Nor do I believe that America's vision for a just international order has become blurred. If anything, the American vision has been sharpened since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington; sharpened by the realization that there is now a new struggle globally between the forces of openness and modernity, and the forces of separatism and reaction. More than ever, America's interests lie in an open world economy resting on the foundation of a strong, rules-based multilateral system. More and more, America's growth and security are tied to the growth and security of the world economy as a whole. American leadership today is more — not less — important to our increasingly interconnected planet. A recent successful, and much needed, example is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and access to medicines for poor countries, in which the US played a pivotal role. It would be a tragic mistake if the Doha Round, which offers the world a once-in-a-generation opportunity to eliminate trade distortions, to strengthen trade rules, and open markets across the world, were allowed to founder. We need courage and the collective political will to ensure a balanced and equitable outcome. What is the alternative? It is a fragmented world, with greater conflict and uncertainty. A world of the past, not the future — one that America turned away from after 1945, and that we should reject just as decisively today. America must lead. The multilateral trading system is too important to fail. The world depends on it. So does America.

#### Free trade creates disincentives for war – studies prove

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Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

#### Free trade is key to solve disease

Indur M. Goklany, an independent scholar and the author ofThe Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment August 22, 2002, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf

Are the trends in the various measures of human well-being improving as globalization marches on? Have gaps in these measures between the rich and the poor countries widened and, if they have, is globalization responsible? Figure 1, based on cross-country data, shows that various indicators of human wellbeing improve as countries become wealthier, with improvements coming most rapidly at the lowest levels of wealth. There are several possible explanations for this association. First, economic development indeed improves these indicators. Greater wealth translates into greater resources for researching and developing new technologies that directly or indirectly advance human well-being.19 It also means increased resources for advancing literacy and education, which, too, are generally conducive to greater technological innovation and diffusion. 20 Equally important, wealthier societies are better able to afford new as well as existing, but underused, technologies.21 For instance, with respect to health—captured in Figure 1 by both infant mortality and life expectancy— these include “old” technologies such as water treatment to produce safe water, sanitation, basic hygiene, vaccinations, antibiotics, insect and vector control, and pasteurization,22 as well as newer science-based technologies such as AIDS and oral rehydration therapies, organ transplants, mammograms, and other diagnostic tests. They also include agricultural technologies that increase crop yields, thereby increasing available food supplies and reducing hunger and malnourishment, which then reduces the toll of infectious and parasitic diseases. 23 4 Historically, reducing hunger and undernourishment has been among the first practical steps nations have taken to improve public health. That step has reduced infant mortality and increased life expectancy.24 And if despite increased food production a country is still short of food, greater wealth makes it possible, through trade, to purchase food security.25 Greater wealth also makes it more likely that a society will establish and sustain food programs for those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder.26 Therefore, while “you can’t eat GDP,”27 the larger GDP is, the less likely you are to go hungry or be undernourished. As Figure 1 illustrates, greater wealth, through a multiplicity of mechanisms—higher literacy, greater food supplies, and greater access to safe water— leads to better health.28 effect, devoting what once was literally a lifetime to learning their trade. And having acquired expertise, those doctors and researchers are poised to contribute to technological innovation and diffusion in their chosen fields and to guide others along the same path. Thus better health helps raise human capital, which aids the creation and diffusion of technology and thereby further advances health and accelerates economic growth. Both wealth’s and health’s causes and effects probably reinforce each other in a set of interlinked cycles. One such cycle is the health-wealth cycle in which—as we have seen—wealth begets health and health, wealth. Another cycle consists of food production, food access, education, and human capital, which also helps turn the health wealth.

#### The impact is extinction

Darling 12 [Astrobiologist Dirk Schulze-Makuch and British astronomer David Darling Seattle's Big Blog, <http://blog.seattlepi.com/thebigblog/2012/03/18/9-strange-ways-the-world-really-might-end/?fb_xd_fragment>, Washington State University]

Catastrophometer Scale 7.5: The enemy within (Pandemics) Our body is in constant competition with a dizzying array of viruses, bacteria, and parasites, many of which treat us simply as a source of food or a vehicle for reproduction. What’s troubling is that these microbes can mutate and evolve at fantastic speed – the more so thanks to the burgeoning humyn population – confronting our bodies with new dangers every year. HIV, Ebola, bird flu, and antibiotic-resistant “super bugs” are just a few of the pathogenic threats to humynity that have surfaced over the past few decades. Our soaring numbers, ubiquitous international travel, and the increasing use of chemicals and biological agents without full knowledge of their consequences, have increased the risk of unstoppable pandemics arising from mutant viruses and their ilk. Bubonic plague, the Black Death, and the Spanish Flu are vivid examples from history of how microbial agents can decimate populations. But the consequences aren’t limited to a high body count. When the death toll gets high enough, it can disrupt the very fabric of society. According to U.S. government studies, if a global pandemic affecting at least half the world’s population were to strike today, health professionals wouldn’t be able to cope with the vast numbers of sick and succumbing people. The result of so many deaths would have serious implications for the infrastructure, food supply, and security of 21st century man. While an untreatable pandemic could strike suddenly and potentially bring civilization to its knees in weeks or months, degenerative diseases might do so over longer periods. The most common degenerative disease is cancer. Every second men and every third women in the western world will be diagnosed with this disease in their lifetime. Degeneration of our environment through the release of toxins and wastes, air pollution, and intake of unhealthy foods is making this problem worse. If cancer, or some other form of degenerative disease, were to become even more commonplace and strike before reproduction, or become infectious (as seen in the transmitted facial cancer of the Tasmanian Devil, a carnivorous marsupial in Australia) the very survival of our species could be threatened.

## 1AC – Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### The plan solves 2 internal links

#### 1) Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship

Pastor 2012 Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Mexico relations – it’s a key pillar for U.S. hegemony

Smith 13 Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### 2) Energy power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce a new set of winners and losers, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, if only in gas, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

#### Energy power solves nuclear conflict

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear (WAR) holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

#### US power is the most peaceful

Busby, 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

## 2ac

### 2AC – Economic Engagement

#### We meet – Economic engagement includes energy

Sullivan 8 (Daniel, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, 8-4-8, Scoop World News, “Addressing Energy Issues in the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0808/S00038.htm, accessed 7-1-13)

Our two countries have also benefited from a candid exchange of views on biofuels through other channels, including the U.S. - Brazil CEO Forum, and meetings of business people, academics, and citizens groups. With Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, I co-chair an Economic Partnership Dialogue with Brazil. Other members of the economic team at the State Department also have traveled on numerous missions to Brazil to talk with government and business groups about the whole range of our economic engagement, including biofuels. The Deputy Secretary of Energy departs for Brazil shortly to continue this broad and deep engagement.

#### Their interpretation bad—it steals all ground for all energy affs—that’s a key part of the topic—under their interpretation most Cuba affs as well as Venezuela oil affs go away—that ensures the negative wins and kills aff ground

#### Counter interpretation – economic engagement with Mexico pertains to energy

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf>, p. 3, accessed 6/26/13)

The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative (USMLI) was launched in May 2010, on the occasion of President Felipe Calderón’s state visit to Washington, DC. Corporate members of the Initiative work with public and private sector partners in Mexico and the United States to ensure that policymakers and legislators understand the importance of our countries’ economic ties, and to focus their attention on the considerable work that remains to be done to optimize the relationship. The goal of the USMLI is to move true economic partnership between the United States and Mexico from policy aspiration to reality by making both countries more competitive in global markets; raising living standards for workers in both countries; making the U.S.-Mexican border the most modern, streamlined, and secure in the world; promoting the continent’s energy independence while respecting our shared environment; and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation, all within a framework that fully respects and supports national sovereignty and interests.

#### Prefer out interpretation—its contextualized to engagement with Mexico and is in the context of economic engagement—checks all of their standard arguments—and literature checks all abuse—they still have sufficient literature to be able to debate is about the aff—and we have a solvency advocate which checks back any abuse—and not a voting issue—we still allow stable negative ground—we still link to all generic disads and counterplans—and no fairness loss—that was answered above

#### We are core of the topic—topic paper proves

Bauschard 13 (Stefan, Director of Debate at Lakeland School district and Assistant debate coach at the Harvard Debate Council Assistant Debate Coach, [Harvard Debate Council](http://harvarddebate.org" \t "_blank), “Defining ‘Economic Engagement,’” <http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economic-engagement/>, Accessed: 7/1/13)

What issues can be covered by economic engagement? The core question here is how the term “economic” limits the topic beyond what would be true if the topic simply said “increase its engagement with…” Obviously, the term “economic” limits the type of engagement, but contextual usage evidence doesn’t suggest that there is too much of a limit. I’ve found contextual evidence that supports including all of the following in economic engagement - Trade - Information technology - Investment - General environmental issues - Forest and wetland conservation - Water and air quality - Small & Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - Health care - Clean energy, including renewable energy - Electricity production and transmission - Nuclear power - General energy security - Defense and security - Economic development - Intellectual property - Reducing corruption - Food regulation - Environmental regulation How does the US engage? As noted, this question is also related to the third question because whether or not engagement can (or should) include a quid pro quo is a how question related to engagement. I separated them because the conditionality question applies to all other how issues and is really a core question about the types of acceptable Negative counterplans. For example, the US might engage by providing foreign aid, but whether or not that aid can or should be delivered as part of a quid pro quo is a separate question. In terms of specific mechanisms for engagement, contextual evidence exists for engaging in all of the following ways – -Official contacts with the government -Academic exchanges -Two track dialogue(s) -Development programs (foreign aid) -Providing loans -Working through non-governmental organizations (NGOS) -Enabling International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to support work in the topic countries -Negotiating trade agreements and facilitating trade ties -Developing standards and practices for businesses -Using the US Agency for International Development (AID) to support business development -Encouraging other countries to reduce trade barriers -Providing visas to individuals in other countries (this was an entire college resolution!) -Supporting increased investment -Helping US companies navigate the business climate -Strengthening measures to protect intellectual property -Encouraging countries to invest in the US -Integrating countries into the global economic system -Reduction in sanctions and other trade barriers -Facilitating action by IFIs -Boosting capital investment -Supporting joint technology development -Providing technical cooperation on energy environment -Facilitating the development of regulation

#### Default to reasonability—they create an arbitrary to exclude to us

### 2AC – Counterplan

#### Perm do both

#### Perm do the counterplan

#### Can’t solve heg—US key

#### Can’t solve trade US key

#### Can’t solve relations

#### China influence in Latin America is ineffective and ignores environmental and political concerns

Hilton, Latin America correspondent, 2/20

[Isabel, 2/20/2013 “China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?” pg. 3, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf, date accessed 7/2/13 IGM]

The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourable comment. The first major ¶ Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang ¶ Group, which began operations in Peru in 1992 with the ¶ purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 times an ¶ independent valuation. Shougang has contributed heavily ¶ to the poor reputation of Chinese companies, over fines for ¶ environmental damage for the contamination of water supplies, low wages and dangerous working conditions. It has ¶ been the object of frequent strikes and protests.¶ Other companies have experienced problems with community relations. After buying the Canadian company ¶ Corriente in 2010, Tongling and China Railway Construction ¶ Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of ¶ Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador. National protests followed ¶ an agreement with the government, including a march ¶ on the capital by the country’s most powerful Indigenous ¶ movement, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del ¶ Ecuador (CONAIE).¶ Chinese companies lack experience of compliance with ¶ much higher environmental or community relations standards than prevail at home. Some are adapting, hiring local ¶ managers, public relations (PR) and law firms, but they are ¶ likely to struggle for some time with the cultural gaps and ¶ the lack of understanding of local concerns and political ¶ considerations.

#### U.S. solves best – diversification of exports

Cerna, staff writer at the China Research Center, 11

[Michael, 5-15-11, China Research Center, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region”, http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/, accessed 7-2-13, HG]

“We reached our main goals, which were to open the doors for our more sophisticated products to enter China and for working together in important fields such as science and technology,” President Rousseff said upon her return to Brazil as reported by the People’s Daily Online. She continued: “There’s a delicate balance between ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ between the two sides.” These concerns also are shared by the rest of the region, in order to prevent China from overwhelming local industries.¶ While China’s commodity-based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encourage diversification of Latin America’s exports into more value-added goods, manufactured products, and modern services. Economic relations are dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is far more diversified and spans a range of value-added activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retail and other services. Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts for 6.7% of the region’s total exports, the United States continues to be the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin America’s exports to the U.S. are more diversified and remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in Latin America. Roughly 24% of the region’s exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik of Latin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: “The steep overvaluation of the region’s currencies—due in part to the flood of investment flows and export proceeds—is eroding the competitiveness of its higher-value added goods and services. This could in turn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities.”

#### Latin American countries don’t want Chinese investment they’ll say no

Regenstreif, Editor, Special Projects Rueters, 6/12/13

[Greg, Rueters, “The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ Date Accessed: 7/7/13]KG

China has particular interest in Mexico, the region’s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Peña Nieto shared with Xi is that though Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China. China is looking for even more however. It is eager to pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico, but Mexico City said last week it was too soon. Meanwhile, Mexico’s trade with the United States continues to flourish and it is due to displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner by the end of the decade, according to the Dialogue. China is also considering joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which aims to boost trade among the Americas, Asia and Australia. The talks include the United States, Canada and other major economies on the Pacific rim. Each superpower also brings baggage to the region. Washington still seeks to exert pressure on its partners. It has told Brazil, for example, that it has the responsibility to use its leverage with others, such as Iran. Meanwhile, “Chinese investment,” Farnsworth said, “doesn’t always bring with it good governance practices or anti corruption or environmental concerns.” Just as Latin America doesn’t want to rely too much on the United States, it also now doesn’t want to depend too much on Beijing, particularly in light of the China’s current economic slowdown.

### 2AC – Kritik

#### Condo is a voting issue – fairness – 2AC can’t make best arguments – Education – hurts depth of discussion and discourages research – Advocacy – only goes for least covered position

#### The Judge is a policymaker tasked with evaluating cost benefit policy analysis - prevents unpredictable frameworks that divert topic focus and moot 1AC time

#### Making specific demands of government accountability is politically productive – Latin America proves

Sheila Coronel, PhD, Columbia, 94 [THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN DEEPENING DEMOCRACY,” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010194.pdf]

IV. GOOD PRACTICES: HOW THE MEDIA HAVE PROMOTED DEMOCRACY AND GOOD¶ GOVERNANCE¶ IN MANY NEW democracies, the mass media are challenged by market forces, illiberal¶ states, and in some cases, a hostile or apathetic citizenry. Yet despite these, news¶ organizations and media NGOs in many countries have managed to assert the media’s¶ role in buttressing and deepening democracy. The following sections describe some of¶ the ways in which media groups have lived up to the democratic ideal of the press **as¶ watchdog, public forum, catalyst of social reform, and builder of peace and consensus**.¶ A. Investigative Reporting: The Media as Watchdog¶ Perhaps **the most instructive case is that of Latin America**, where it is widely¶ acknowledged that sustained investigative reporting on corruption, human rights¶ violations and other forms of wrongdoing has helped **build a culture of accountability in¶ government** and strengthened the fledgling democracies of the continent. There, media exposure, particularly of corruption in high places, has helped bring down governments.

#### Judges choice—just because you have read a kritik to one of our advantages doesn’t wholesale disprove that our aff is a good idea—the judge still votes aff for reasons independent of the kritik

#### Perm do both – alt cedes politics

Walt 11 (Stephen M, Professor at the University of Chicago, October 19, “Lessons for the social sciences” , [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons\_for\_the\_social\_sciences](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/19/lessons_for_the_social_sciences%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Needless to say, I like this argument because I believe it is important for the social sciences to be a diverse intellectual ecosystem instead of a monoculture where one approach or method reigns supreme. Even if one approach or theoretical model were demonstrably superior -- and that is rarely, if ever, the case -- there would still be considerable value in having lots of other scholars working in different ways. Sometimes we learn by exploring deductions in a formal model (though we often just restate the obvious when we do); at other times we learn by "soaking and poking" among policymakers, by constructing a data set and exploring patterns within it, or by immersing ourselves in the details of historical cases or by exploring the categories of thought and discourse that surround a given policy domain. Given that all these approaches yield useful knowledge, why would any serious department want to privilege one approach over all others? But because academic disciplines are largely self-defining and self-policing (i.e., we determine the "criteria of merit" and success depends almost entirely on one's reputation among fellow academics), there is the ever-present danger that academic disciplines spin off into solipsistic and self-regarding theorizing that is divorced from the real world (and therefore unlikely to be refuted by events) and of little value to our students, to policymakers, or even interested citizens. This tendency occurs primarily because proponents of one approach naturally tend to think that their way of doing business is superior, and some of them work overtime to promote people who look like them and to exclude people whose work is different. Anybody who has spent a few years in a contemporary political science department cannot fail to have observed this phenomenon at work; there just aren't very many people who are genuinely catholic in their tastes and willing to embrace work that isn't pretty much like their own. This situation creates a real dilemma: if you believe in academic freedom (and I do), then you don't want outside authorities interfering in the production of knowledge, telling academics how to do their work, or setting stupid criteria for evaluating scholarly contributions. But without some pressure to be at least potentially relevant, the social sciences are prone to drift off into what Hans Morgenthau once decried as "the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical -- in short, the politically irrelevant." I've already touted my own prescriptions for this problem here, but I don't have enormous confidence that any of them will be heeded. But at the risk of seeming to tout my own employer (and similar programs elsewhere), that's why I increasingly expect the most interesting and relevant work to emerge from schools of public policy, and not from the increasingly arcane worlds of traditional disciplinary departments.

#### Nuclear war is bad– turns all of their impacts and is comparative on timeframe probability and magnitude

Harrell 9 (Eben Harrell, writer for the Time Magazine, text taken from article titled “The Nuclear Risk: How Long Will Our Luck Hold?” published February 20th, 2009. Text found at [http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1880702,00.html]) In the 1980s, climate scientists in Russia and the U.S. theorized that all-out nuclear war between the superpowers would result in a "nuclear winter," as smoke from the atomic explosions blackened the sky and sent summer temperatures plummeting below freezing — killing crops and eventually starving all those who survived the initial explosions. Now that the risks of an all-out U.S.-Russian exchange have diminished, scientists are looking at the climactic effects of regional nuclear war — and the predictions are still sobering. Alan Robock, a Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University who participated in the original nuclear winter research, recently completed a study on the results of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. He spoke with TIME from his office in New Brunswick, New Jersey. (See pictures from the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.) Tensions between India and Pakistan have been high recently. If they escalated to all-out nuclear war, what would be the effect to the global climate? We looked at a scenario in which each country used 50 Hiroshima-sized weapons, which they are believed to have in their arsenals. That's enough firepower to kill around 20 million people on the ground. We were surprised that the amount of smoke produced by these explosions would block out sunlight, cool the planet, and produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. Your study predicts mass cooling. With all the heat and radioactivity of the explosions, why wouldn't nuclear war warm the planet? It has nothing to do with the radioactivity of the explosions — although that would be devastating to nearby populations. The explosions would set off massive fires, which would produce plumes of black smoke. The sun would heat the smoke and lift it into the stratosphere — that's the layer above the troposphere, where we live — where there is no rain to clear it out. It would be blown across the globe and block the sun. The effect would not be a nuclear winter, but it would be colder than the little ice age [in the 17th and 18th centuries] and the change would happen very rapidly — over the course of a few weeks. Would you be able to see the smoke? The sky would not be blue. It would be grey. And what would the results be for humanity? We calculated that there would be a shortening of the growing season in the mid-latitudes — that includes Europe and America in the Northern Hemisphere — by a couple of weeks. The growing season is defined as the period between the last frost in spring and first frost in the fall. Some crops that need the whole growing season would not reach fruition and there would be no yield. Others would grow more slowly and produce a small yield. In addition there would be less precipitation and it would be darker, also damaging yield. You compound that with [the shutdown of] the current global network of food trading — countries would likely stop shipping food and focus on feeding their own populations — and it's a big crisis. We don't have the resources to do detailed analyses on the impacts of crops in different farming regimes but this suggests it could be a very serious problem. How confident are you that your modeling is correct? We used ModelE, designed by NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and one of the models used to produce the results of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The model does an excellent job of simulating climate change that resulted from volcanic eruptions in the past. That gave us confidence. What's more, a group repeated the calculations for the Pakistan-India scenario with a different model at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo., and the results almost exactly agreed. Their research showed how the smoke from the fires would open up holes in the ozone, which would cause even more problems for humanity. We'd like other people to test the calculations with their models, but we're pretty confident that they'll get the same answer. So we get a clue of the climatic effects of nuclear war from volcanic eruptions? Yes. 1816 was known as the "year without summer." It followed the Tambora Volcano eruption in Indonesia in 1815. It was sudden climate change on a similar scale, and it resulted in a severe famine in Europe, food riots and mass emigrations. Volcanic aerosols have a lifetime of about a year in the stratosphere. The lifetime of soot from nuclear fires is about five years. It's obviously much harder for a society to recover from such an extended cooling. Some scientists, most notably Freeman Dyson of The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, have stirred controversy by arguing that nuclear weapons are a more urgent environmental threat than global warming. Do you agree? Yes. If India and Pakistan engaged in nuclear war, they would use about 0.3% of the global nuclear stockpile. And still the effects on the climate would be dramatic. Our calculations on nuclear winter from the early 1980s have been confirmed by modern climate models. And fundamentally the situation hasn't changed — even with reduced stockpiles there still exists enough weapons to cause nuclear winter. That's something that maybe people don't realize. I think we have to solve the problem of the existence of all these weapons before we have the luxury of worrying about global warming

#### No impact – plan solves the environment and wars

Dickinson 4 (Edward Ross, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37, p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### Consequentialism is best – extinction outweighs – epistemology doesn’t matter

Cowen 4 (Tyler Cowen 4, Department of Economics George Mason University, November 2, 2004 , “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism”)

As the above arguments suggest, the epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call “big event consequentialism.” In this view, we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. Consequences of these kinds include stopping the use of nuclear weapons, saving children from smallpox, making progress against global poverty, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. Big events, as I define them, typically are of significant practical importance, involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast consider “small events.” Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in reflective equilibrium. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are of relevance. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior. In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits. Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all or some) other values. For instance arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures (Norcross 1997). A very large number of “muzak and potato” lives (Parfit 1986, 1987) do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization. Rawls (1987) put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons. For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to have relevance to our endeavor. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons. Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.9 To sum up these points, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: “We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much, relative to other factors, such as deontology or virtue ethics. We should abandon consequentialist morality.” But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those that carry values with some lexical properties, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.

**Economic decline turns the kritik**

Friedman 6 (Benjamin, William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, “THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH,” February 6, <http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/friedman/files/The%20Moral%20Consequences%20of%20Economic%20Growth.pdf>)

I believe this thinking is seriously, in some circum- stances dangerously, incomplete. The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improve- ments it brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political and, ultimately, the moral character of a people. Economic growth—meaning a rising standard of liv- ing for the clear majority of citizens—more often than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, commitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy. Ever since the Enlightenment, Western thinking has regarded each of these tendencies positively, and in explicitly moral terms. Even societies that have already made great advances in these very dimensions, for example, most of today’s Western democracies, are more likely to make still further progress when their living standards rise. But when living standards stagnate or decline, most societies make little if any progress toward any of these goals, and in all too many instances they plainly retrogress. Many countries with highly developed economies, including the United States, have experienced alternating eras of economic growth and stagnation in which their demo- cratic values have strengthened or weakened accord- ingly.

#### Preventing extinction is the first ethical priority—this evidence is comparative to their impacts

Ochs 2 (Richard DC Black Panther, president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. After completing a course in Atomic and Nuclear Physics at Muhlenberg College, he transferred to the University of Maryland, where he had a split major in history and political science. He was a founding member of the Students for a Democratic Society at College Park, June 9th, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY”, <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>,)

Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

#### Lack of a concrete advocacy means the alternative will never solve

McClean 1 **(**Society For The Advancement Of American Philosophy – Graduate And Philosopher – NyuDavid E., “The Cultural Left And The Limits Of Social Hope”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing- questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the **character** of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"

The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen since the 1950s. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

#### Vague alts – causes shifting prevents attack – no education – voter – turns K

Galles 9 (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, <http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary_galles/>) KENTUCKY

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one–including those proposing a “reform”–can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician’s product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face “customers”–voters– far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians’ “sales pitches” for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his “solution” to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)–a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan’s details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying “that was not in our proposal” or “we have no plans to do that” or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don’t spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans’ welfare is the criterion.

#### Vague alternatives justify perm do the alt—solve all your offense

#### US power is the most peaceful

Busby, 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

#### **No root cause of conflicts—prefer specificity**

Moore 4 (John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Alt fails results in worse securitization

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In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

### 2AC – Disad

#### Plan is key to China relations

Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities – Bard College and Editor-at-Large – American Interest, “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century,” American Interest, 7-18, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/)

On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces. Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride. Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.

#### No risk of China War – mutual cooperation

Friedberg 2005, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45

Fortunately, a number of the factors to which the optimists point seem likely to continue to act as a brake on what might otherwise be an unchecked slide toward mounting competition and increasingly open confrontation. Assuming that they persist and grow, the mutual gains from an expanding economic relationship will remain the single most important peace-inducing force at work in U.S.-China relations. The potential costs of a conflict between the two powers, especially given that both possess nuclear weapons, should also help to keep competitive impulses within bounds and to make both sides very wary of embarking on any course that could risk direct conflict. The emergence of a group of Chinese “new thinkers” could also contribute to a less zero-sum

, hard realpolitik approach to relations with the United States. As with the Soviet Union during the era of perestroika, so also in this case changes in high-level thinking could have a calming effect on bilateral relations, even if they were not accompanied immediately by more profound and far-reaching domestic political reforms.

#### **And even if American influence is declining—it is inevitable**

Valencia 6/24 (Robert Valencia, writer for World Policy, “US and China: The Fight for Latin America”, 6/24/13, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america>, zs)

The United States hasn’t lost Latin America, and is unlikely to lose it completely. It is still the region’s top trade partner. The United States has recently signed free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, and maintains other trade agreements with Peru, Chile, and Mexico. Central American and several Caribbean countries rely upon U.S. military cooperation in an attempt to curtail drug trade. Nevertheless, the post 9/11 years severely eroded U.S.-Latin American relations as the Bush administration focused heavily on the war on terror, often ignoring issues in Latin America.

#### US-China influence isn’t zero-sum

Xiaoxia 5/6 (Wang, Staff Writer for the Economic Observer. “In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America” 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economy’s new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region.

## 1ar

## 2AC – Risk Management

#### The aff isn’t forecasting, it’s risk management---the inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning

Cochrane 11 John H. Cochrane is a Professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and a contributor to Business Class "IN DEFENSE OF THE HEDGEHOGS" July 15 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/15/john-h-cochrane/in-defense-of-the-hedgehogs/

Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan The answer is to change the question, to focus on risk management, as Gardner and Tetlock suggest. There is a set of events that could happen tomorrow—Chicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide “Heavens, Dodd–Frank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, let’s fix them” (Okay, not the last one.) Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen. Now “forecasting” as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, and then make a plan based on that knowledge. It’s a fool’s game. Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain, risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser. Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful. Then, ask yourself, “if this event happens, let’s make sure we have a contingency plan so we’re not really screwed.” Suppose you’re counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank? The good use of “forecasting” is to get a better handle on probabilities, so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But we must still pay attention to events, and buy insurance against them, based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability. (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) So it’s not really the forecast that’s wrong, it’s what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes “plans” as if that were the only state of the world that could occur; if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better.

## Alt

#### Aff doesn’t do anything – no concrete advocacy and it’s very vague – proves that if they lose framework they lose this round – the alt doesn’t solve anything – no spillover

#### Desecuritization is not emancipatory---it’s worse for every tangible impact they isolate

Nunes 7 – Joao Reis Nunes, Marie Curie Fellow and Ph. D. Candidate in International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, September 2007, “Politics, Security, Critical Theory: A Contribution to Current Debates on Security,” online: <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Nunes-joaonunes-politicssecuritycriticaltheory.pdf>

Yet, not all of the proponents of CSS would agree that security is something that needs to be ‘unmade’. In Fact, one of the theoreticalapproaches cited by the manifesto as an important inspiration—the Welsh School – has consistently argued that security is something that needs to be archived, promoted, and not replaced by something else. The manifesto has solved this contradiction by arguing that, in the Welsh School, security is ‘distinguished from order and power and redefinged as inclusive of individuals’ (2006:456). This is a fairly accurate view of the Welsh School’s understanding of the value of security; however, a deeper investigation of security-politics nexus implicit in this approach is needed, so that the debate is able to conceive viable theoretical alternatives to the predominant views described above. Security and politics in the Welsh School Several questions spring to mind when one faces the work of the Welsh School from the standpoint of other critical approaches. One of the most pressing is: why security? Why focus on such a loaded and manifestly dangerous term, a term that has been so often instrumentalized with the objective of justifying highly questionable practices? Can it be that the different critical approaches are talking about the same things, but with different names? Take the focus of the Welsh School on emancipation, for example (Booth 1991 and 1999a, Wyn Jones 2005): can it be placed on the same level of desecuritization, as Aradau (2004) has suggested? To use the words of the c.a.s.e. manifesto, can the politics of normality (desecuritization) and the politics of normativity (emancipation) be seen as two alternative or complementary pathways to ‘unmaking security’? It is consensual to argue that both of these strands definitely wish to ‘unmake security’, if by security one means an exceptionalist domain of violent and exclusionary practices. However, there are reasons as to why the Welsh School does not wish to get rid of the term ‘security’ – and that is why desecuritization cannot lead to emancipation. For the Welsh School, security in itself has an important normative value that needs to be maintained. This understanding of the value of security is intrinsically connected with an account of security-politics nexus that is at odds with the understandings that have achieved particular importance in the field. It must be said that the Welsh School has not engaged systematically with its own theoretical assumptions regarding the security-politics nexus. This reluctance results from a particularly pragmatic approach to the ‘realities’ of security. Booth defined traditional approaches as a form of self-deception, an ‘escape from the real’ (1995:105), and even a ‘theology’ and a set of ‘rites’ (1999b:45). As a consequence, CSS must aim at ‘engag[ing] comprehensively with the real’ (2004:8), that is, it must take into account the ‘real lives in real places in that real world which academic international relations realists disregard’ (1995:123). This comprehensive engagement is connected with a normative commitment to confront the materiality of what Booth terms ‘human wrongs’, ‘facts’ that dominate politics in a global scale and that can be said to constitute the ‘subject-matter’ of security studies: ‘The subject-matter consists of flesh (which is fed or famished) and blood (which is wet and messy, and hot or cold), and people living lives comfortably and securely, or enduring them against the wall, like a dog’ (1995:105). The crude emotion present in this description of what security studies ‘is all about’ must not be mistaken for poetic idealism: Booth has been quite consistent in his efforts to pin down security studies to a particular materiality, thereby eschewing a purely discursive critique of security. Williams (1999) has noted that the version of CSS put forward by Booth claims to be “better’ than others because of its improved ‘realism’, that is, its ability to engage with the factuality of human wrongs. This is why Booth, to the obvious disappointment of other critical security theorists who wish to put into question notions of reality and reason, consistently describes his approach as more realistic and rational that the others14. [CSS=Critical Security Studies]

## Framework

#### Framework – Negs defends governmental action – aff gets to weigh the case

#### Our epistemology is accurate and shouldn’t be prioritized

Wendt 98 (professor of international security – Ohio State University, Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method.

Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

#### **Education ­– Latin American education is good – teaches real-world interactions between nations – that’s Coronel**

#### Decision Making – key to decide between inevitable trade-offs and choices between policies – outweighs necessary to apply all other skills and make them effective

## 2AC – No Root Cause

#### No root cause – prefer specifics

Moore, 04 [John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law]

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

## 2AC – VTL Inevitable

#### Value to life is inevitable—the only thing that ends value to life is death

Lisa Schwartz, Chair at the Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 2002

“Medical Ethic: A Case Based Approach” Chapter 6, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

## 2AC – No Link To Predictions K

#### No link plan is only a list of possibilities – engagement over possible outcomes is necessary to prevent nuclear use

Han 10 – Dong-ho Han, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, January 26, 2010, “Scenario Construction and Implications for IR Research: Connecting Theory to a Real World of Policy Making,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa10/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished\_manuscript&file\_index=1&pop\_up=true&no\_click\_key=true&attachment\_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=3e890fb59257a0ca9bad2e2327d8a24f

How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? If the problem of uncertainty in future world politics is increasing and future international relations are hard to predict, then it is necessary to devise a useful tool to effectively deal with upcoming events so that policy makers can reduce the risks of future uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that the scenario methodology is one of the most effective methods to connect theory to practice, thereby leading to a better understanding of future world events. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the scenario methodology to the field of IR in a more acceptable fashion and to explore its implications for a real policy world. To achieve this goal, I will explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. More specifically, I will clarify what the scenario method is and what its core components are and explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in IR by analyzing existing IR literature with an emphasis on security studies that primarily provide the prospect of future security issues. 1. Introduction How do we assess future possibilities with existing data and information? Do we have a systematic approach to analyze the future events of world politics? Given various theoretical ideas for predicting and analyzing future events in the field of international relations (IR), to understand these events properly it is important both to cast out all plausible outcomes and to think through a relevant theory, or a combination of each major theory, in connection with those outcomes. This paper aims to explain the scenario methodology and why it is adequate to provide a better understanding of future world events. After clarifying the scenario methodology, its core components, and its processes and purposes, I will explore other field’s use of this methodology. Then I will explain the importance and implications of the scenario method in the field of IR. I will conclude with summarizing the advantage of the scenario method in a real world of policy making. 2. What is the Scenario Methodology? This section begins with one major question – what is the scenario methodology? To answer this, some history regarding the development of this method should be mentioned.1 Herman Kahn, a pioneer of the scenario method, in his famous 1962 book Thinking about the Unthinkable, argued that the decision makers in the United States should think of and prepare for all possible sequences of events with regard to nuclear war with the Soviet Union.2 Using scenarios and connecting them with various war games, Kahn showed the importance of thinking ahead in time and using the scenario method based upon imagination for the future.3 According to Kahn and his colleagues, scenarios are “attempts to describe in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation envisaged.”4 Similarly, Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as “stories about the way the world might turn out tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present environment.”5 Given a variety of definitions of scenarios,6 for the purpose of this research, I refer to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount of time. Showing all plausible future stories and clarifying important trends, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at the present time. Key Terms in the Scenario Methodology The core of the scenario method lies in enabling policy makers to reach a critical decision at the present time based on thinking about all plausible future possibilities. Key concepts in the scenario method include: driving forces, predetermined elements, critical uncertainties, wild cards and scenario plot lines.7 Driving forces are defined as “the causal elements that surround a problem, event or decision,” which could be many factors, including those “that can be the basis, in different combinations, for diverse chains of connections and outcomes.”8 Schwartz defines driving forces as “the elements that move the plot of a scenario, that determine the story’s outcome.”9 In a word, driving forces constitute the basic structure of each scenario plot line in the scenario-making process. Predetermined elements refer to “events that have already occurred or that almost certainly will occur but whose consequences have not yet unfolded.”10 Predetermined elements are “givens” which could be safely assumed and understood in the scenario-building process. Although predetermined elements impact outcomes, they do not have a direct causal impact on a given outcome. Critical uncertainties “describe important determinants of events whose character, magnitude or consequences are unknown.”11 Exploring critical uncertainties lies at the heart of scenario construction in the sense that the most important task of scenario anaysts is to discover the elements that are most uncertain and most important to a specific decision or event.12 Wild cards are “conceivable, if low probability, events or actions that might undermine or modify radically the chains of logic or narrative plot lines.”13 In John Peterson’s terms, wild cards are “not simple trends, nor are they byproducts of anything else. They are events on their own. They are characterized by their scope, and a speed of change that challenges the outermost capabilities of today’s human capabilities.”14 Wild cards might be extremely important in that in the process of scenario planning their emergence could change the entire direction of each scenario plot line. A scenario plot line is “a compelling story about how things happen” and it describes “how driving forces might plausibly behave as they interact with predetermined elements and different combinations of critical uncertainties.”15 Narratives and/or stories are an essential part of the scenario method due to the identical structure of analytical narratives and scenarios: “both are sequential descriptions of a situation with the passage of time and explain the process of events from the base situation into the situation questioned.”16 Process and Purpose of Scenario Analysis Scenario analysis begins with the exploration of driving forces including some uncertainties. However, scenario building is more than just organizing future uncertainties; rather, it is a thorough understanding of uncertainties, thereby distinguishing between something clear and unclear in the process of decision making.17 As Pierre Wack has pointed out, “By carefully studying some uncertainties, we gained a deeper understanding of their interplay, which, paradoxically, led us to learn what was certain and inevitable and what was not.” In other words, a careful investigation of raw uncertainties helps people figure out more “critical uncertainties” by showing that “what may appear in some cases to be uncertain might actually be predetermined – that many outcomes were simply not possible.”18 Exploring future uncertainties thoroughly is one of the most important factors in scenario analysis. Kees van der Heijden argues that in the process of separating “knowns” from “unknowns” analysts could clarify driving forces because the process of separation between “predetermineds” and uncertainties demands a fair amount of knowledge of causal relationships surrounding the issue at stake.19 Thus, in scenario analysis a thorough understanding of critical uncertainties leads to a well-established knowledge of driving forces and causal relations.20 Robert Lempert succinctly summarized the scenario-construction process as follows: “scenario practice begins with the challenge facing the decisionmakers, ranks the most significant driving forces according to their level of uncertainty and their impact on trends seemingly relevant to that decision, and then creates a handful of scenarios that explore different manifestations of those driving forces.”21

## 2ac - heg

Best studies validate hegemonic stability theory–it is the proximate cause of peace

Owen ‘11

John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

## A2 Serial Policy Failure

#### No Serial Policy failure –

#### Prefer specifics – aff solvency proves it’s good policy

#### Empirics disprove

James ‘9

Robin M. James, Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Spring 2009, Hypatia, available via Wiley online library

In these two instances of successful reappropriation of the master's tools—autonomy/universality and the guitar—the particular, real-world advantages offered by this technique might even require its adoption in instances where nothing else can “do” what it “does.” Indeed, **to require that we categorically abandon the master's tools** seems itself to be an overly abstract “ideal” that overlooks the often contradictory, historically overdetermined real-world contextsin which all ideas are made meaningful and in which actions unfold. In this world, **the stage is already set in certain ways, and sometimes the best or only way to maneuver** through its various obstacles **requires the repurposing of what we find** in/**on this stage**. If, as Coates's discussion demonstrates, power functions not only at the level of ideology, but also at the level of desire, then feminists cannot avoid engaging dominant structures of feeling and affective conventions (such as those at work in tonal harmony and/or rock music), because these cannot be persuaded or altered by “facts” or arguments (that is, ideological critique or demystification). Reading Butler and Peaches from the perspective of non-ideal theory demonstrates that a reappropriation of the “master's tools” is successful not only when it is more effective or affective than anything else, but also when its use of these tools problematizes or voids the master/slave or insider/outsider hierarchy itself. Under these conditions, **the master's tools** (for example, “autonomy,”“universality,” and playing the guitar) **can indeed bring down the master's house.**

## 1AR – Judge Choice

#### Judge Choice – there are multiple reasons to vote for the plan – you can vote on any of them even if others are problemative they doesn’t dirprove the policy as a whole is good - its inevitable and most real world

Nick Szabo, George Washington Law School '96 Hermeneutics: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Tradition <http://szabo.best.vwh.net/hermeneutics.html>, KENTUCKY

Analyzing the deconstruction methodology of hermeneutics in terms of evolutionary epistimology is enlightening. We see that constructions are vaguely like "mutations", but far more sophisticated -- the constructions are introduced by people attempting to solve a problem, usually either of translation or application. An application is the "end use" of a traditional text, such the judge applying the law to a case, or a preacher writing a sermon based on a verse from Scripture. In construction the judge, in the process of resolving a novel case sets a precedent, and the preacher, in the process of applying a religious doctrine to a novel cotemporary moral problem, thereby change the very doctrine they apply.

They have no links to the air pollution and poverty decrease the plan provides – that’s a sufficient justification – that’s healings