# **1AC**

## 1AC

### 1AC Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should normalize its economic relations with The Republic of Cuba.

### 1AC Spills

#### **Drilling is inevitable—Russia coming back within the next year—we post date**

Tamayo 5/31—Juan Tamayo, writer for the Miami Herald (“Russian oil company suspends exploration in Cuba”, 5/31/13, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/31/3424471/russian-oil-company-suspends.html>, zs)

A Russian state oil company drilling off Cuba’s northern shores has reportedly confirmed that it is temporarily halting its exploration — the fourth disappointment for Cuba’s dreams of energy self-sufficiency in less than two years.¶ The announcement by Zarubezhneft signaled an end to the only active exploration program on the island, which now relies on highly subsidized oil from the beleaguered Venezuelan government of President Nicolas Maduro.¶ Zarubezhneft confirmed this week that it was halting work due to “geological” problems but added that it will resume its exploration next year, the Reuters news agency reported Thursday in a dispatch from Havana.¶ The Russians withdrawal had been expected because the Norwegian company that owns the drilling platform they have been leasing, the Songa Mercur, already had announced that it would be leaving Cuban waters in July for another contract.¶ Zarubezhneft’s confirmation, nevertheless, signals “another disappointment” for Cuba’s dreams of finding oil in its waters, said Jorge Pinon, a Cuba energy expert at the University of Texas in Austin.¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that Cuba’s offshore waters have “significant undiscovered conventional oil potential” — between 4.6 billion and 9.3 billion barrels. Cuban officials estimate the potential reserves at 20 billion.¶ “This is the second geological area in Cuba that … seemed to be promising,” Pinon said of Zarubezhneft’s exploration block. But finding the oil means “you have to go into your pocket to drill exploratory wells.”¶ Spain’s Repsol oil company spent $100 million in the early part of 2012 unsuccessfully exploring with the Scarabeo 9 drilling platform, especially built in China to avoid the restrictions of the U.S. embargo, in deep waters northwest of Havana.¶ Petronas of Malaysia, Russia’s Gazprom and Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) later leased the Scarabeo platform but also struck out, and the rig left Cuban waters at the end of last year.¶ Zarubezhneft then gave it a try, leasing the Songa Mercur to explore waters not as deep and east of Havana starting late last year. Neighboring Bahamas also has expressed interest in that area, but the Russians also drilled a dry hole.¶ The Russians are considered likely to meet their promise to return next year because President Vladimir Putin’s government has been pushing hard to warm up political and commercial ties with Moscow’s one-time allies in Havana.¶ Cuba’s oil explorations have caused concern among U.S. environmentalists and tourism officials that any spills would impact the entire Eastern Seaboard, from the Florida Keys to Cape Cod in Massachusetts.¶ Supporters of improving U.S. relations with Cuba argued that Washington should allow American oil firms to get a piece of the potential profits. The U.S. embargo adds about 20 percent to that island’s exploration costs, according to Cuban officials..

#### **Absent US experts accidents become inevitable—embargo blocks their use**

Bolstad 12—Erika Bolstad, writer for McClatchy newspaper (“Cuba embargo could threaten oil-drilling safety, expert says”, 5/10/12, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.Ug0gFGTwKkZ>, zs)

The 50-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba is getting in the way of safety when it comes to deepwater drilling in Cuban waters, an expert on the communist country’s offshore drilling activity said Thursday.¶ Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors, warned that Cold War-era economic sanctions threaten not only Florida’s economy and environment but that of Cuba, too, in the event of a major disaster on the scale of 2010’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The worst-case scenario is "state-sponsored chaos at a disaster site," Hunt said during an event sponsored by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank that advocates for a foreign policy based on human rights.¶ The U.S. Coast Guard has extensive response plans, as does the state of Florida. But Hunt said he would give prevention efforts an "F" grade. He likened the work to stocking body bags for a plane crash – but not training pilots to fly safely or to maintain aircraft properly.¶ "We’re getting ready for what will inevitably happen if we don’t take the right proactive steps," Hunt said.¶ His warning and that of other experts came as the Spanish oil company Repsol is about to tap an offshore reservoir beneath 5,600 feet of seawater and about 14,000 feet of rock. The company, the first of many set to drill for oil off Cuba’s coast, is working just 77 nautical miles from Key West.¶ Workers are about a week from completing their drilling and are beginning the technically demanding phase of capping the well and preparing it for possible production, the panelists at the event said.¶ Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly, who along with former Florida Sen. Bob Graham co-chaired the presidential commission that examined BP’s Deepwater Horizon spill, said that in his most recent visit to Cuba he was reassured that Repsol was moving slowly in Cuban waters to avoid any surprises. Dan Whittle of the Environmental Defense Fund said that in his visits to Cuba, well-thumbed copies of the commission’s report looked as though they were "read even more in Havana than here."¶ Reilly also noted that Cuban officials are regular readers of daily bulletins from U.S. agencies on U.S. oil drilling regulations. He said he urged them to follow Mexican offshore guidelines – which he said are based on U.S. rules.¶ "Nobody is predicting a catastrophe in association with anything that the Cubans are overseeing," Reilly said. "In every way, the Cuban approach to this is responsible, careful and attentive to the risks that they know they’re undertaking."¶ "Nevertheless, should there be a need for a response . . . the United States government has not interpreted its sanctions policy in a way that would clearly make available in advance the kind of technologies that would be required," Reilly said.

#### **Aff boosts reaction time—US experts solve best**

Zakaria 11—Fareed Zakaria, Host and journalist on CNN about US foreign policy (“Why our Cuba embargo could lead to another Gulf oil disaster”, 9/19/11, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/19/why-our-cuba-policy-could-lead-to-another-gulf-oil-spill/>, zs)

Can you remember what explosive crisis America and the world was fixated on last summer? It wasn't the deficit, jobs or Europe. It was an oil disaster. Remember the BP spill? Tons of crude gushing into the Gulf of Mexico? Well, in the weeks and months that followed, there was a lot of discussion about how to make sure it didn't happen again.¶ But what struck me this week is that we have a new dangerous drilling zone right on our doorstep - Cuba. Estimates suggest that the island nation has reserves of anywhere from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels of oil. The high end of those estimates would put Cuba among the top dozen oil producers in the world.¶ Predictably, there's a global scramble for Havana. A Chinese-constructed drilling rig is owned by an Italian oil company and is on its way to Cuban waters. Spain's Repsol, Norway's Statoil and India's ONGC will use the 53,000 ton rig to explore for oil. Petro giants from Brazil, Venezuela, Malaysia and Vietnam are also swooping in.¶ Of course, we can't partake because we don't trade with Cuba. But what about at least making sure there are some safety procedures that are followed that would protect the American coastline? You see at 5,500 feet below sea level, these oil rigs off Cuba will go even deeper than the Deepwater Horizon rig that blew up on our coast last year, and the coast of Florida, remember, is just 60 miles away from Cuban waters.¶ What happens if there's another oil spill? Will it be easy and quick to clean up? No. You see, the nearest and best experts on safety procedures and dealing with oil spills are all American, but we are forbidden by our laws from being involved in any way with Cuba. Our trade embargo on Cuba not only prevents us from doing business with our neighbor but it also bars us from sending equipment and expertise to help even in a crisis. So, if there is an explosion, we will watch while the waters of the Gulf Coast get polluted. Now, this is obviously a worst case hypothetical, but it's precisely the kind of danger we should plan for and one we can easily protect against if we were allowed to have any dealings with Cuba.¶ This whole mess is an allegory for a larger problem. We imposed an embargo on Cuba at the height of the Cold War, 52 years ago, when we were worried about Soviet expansion and the spread of communism. Well, there is no more Soviet Union, and I don't think there's a person in the world who believes America could be infected by Cuban communism today. But the antique policies remain - antique and failed policies. They were designed, you recall, to force regime change in Cuba. Well, the Castros have thrived for five decades, using American hostility as a badge of Cuban nationalism. All the embargo has done is to weaken the Cuban people, keep them impoverished and cut them off from the world.

#### **Oil spills spread and kill biodiversity ecosystems**

Almeida 12—Robert Almeida, former Naval Officer and partner at gCaptain (“Drilling Off Cuba, and How the Embargo Could be Very Costly for the US”, 5/18/12, <http://gcaptain.com/drilling-cuba-embargo-badly/>, zs)

In short however, Cuba’s access to containment systems, offshore technology, and spill response equipment is severely restricted by the US embargo, yet if a disaster occurs offshore, not only will Cuban ecosystems be severely impacted, but those of the Florida Keys, and US East Coast.¶ If disaster strikes offshore Cuba, US citizens will have nobody else to blame except the US Government because outdated policies are impacting the ability to prepare sufficiently for real-life environmental threats. Considering Cuba waters are home to the highest concentration of biodiversity in the region and is a spawning ground for fish populations that migrate north into US waters, a Cuban oil spill could inflict unprecedented environmental devastation if not planned for in advance.

#### Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction— key to ag, medicine

Mittermeier 11 (et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global\_biodiversity\_conservation\_the\_critical\_role\_of\_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally ﬂexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented ﬁrst? The ﬁeld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the ﬁrst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a ﬁrst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientiﬁc publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-deﬁned criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redeﬁned several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufﬁcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

### 1AC – Relations

#### US-Cuban oil coop key to check existing US-Latin American tensions.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 3-4

The development of Cuba as an energy partner will not solve America’s energy problems. But the potential for improving energy relations and deepening collaborative modalities with other regional partners is enhanced by pursuing energy cooperation with Cuba for two principal reasons. 1. Cuba’s increasing leadership role in the Caribbean region and Central America might be used by the United States to promote collectively beneficial efforts to develop a broad range of alternative energy technologies in the Americas. A Cuba-America partnership might also serve as a confidence builder in assuaging the misgivings on the part of regional partners regarding American domination. 2. Cuba’s significant human capital resources in the scientific and technological arena have been grossly underused. Cuba possesses the highest ratio of engineers and Ph.D.s to the general population of any country in Latin America, and this can been viewed as a key asset in the challenge of maintaining energy infrastructure across the region. Both Mexico and Venezuela face significant costs in maintaining their sizable energy production, refining, and storage capabilities. The integrity of these two national energy systems is of paramount interest to U.S. energy security concerns because of the potential harm to the economy that would occur if either state were unable to deliver its exports to the American market.¶ In this light, the impetus for normalization of relations writ large between the United States and Cuba is not oil per se, but enhanced energy cooperation, which could pave the way for technical and commercial exchanges that, given the evolving nature of energy resources and energy security, could provide an opening of collaborative efforts that could have mutually beneficial effects. What has the failure to engage Cuba cost the United States in these geostrategic terms? Very little, one could argue. Strategically, Cuba has been a stable entity in the region. Politically, too, it has been a mostly static environment: with the embargo in place, policymakers and elected officials have been able to predict reactions to policy initiatives with relative certainty. U.S. business interests in Cuba since the early 1960s have been negligible, with the exception of a recent increase in humanitarian agricultural and medical sales. But a more central issue is this: In light of growing concerns regarding energy supplies in the United States and demands for domestic and regional exploration to meet American consumption, what is the cost to the United States of maintaining a status quo relationship with Cuba? In economic terms, the cost of the failure to engage Cuba has been considerable. In its 2008 report, Rethinking U.S.-Latin American Relations, the Partnership for the Americas Commission, convened by the Brookings Institution, suggested that the basis for effective partnership between the United States and its Latin American and Caribbean partners is shared common interests. The report states, “Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block for U.S. relations with other countries in the hemisphere.” 6 Specifically, the report pinpoints two key challenges facing the region that are directly relevant to the subject of this book: securing sustainable energy supplies and expanding economic development opportunities. The April 2009 report of the Brookings project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition identified both medium and long-term initiatives related to energy that directly fulfilled an element of the policy objectives recommended in their report. 7 In order to specifically promote what the report termed “a constructive working relationship with the Cuban government to build confidence and trust in order to resolve disputes, with the long term objective of fostering a better relationship that serves U.S. interests and values,” it recommended a medium-term initiative that “allows licenses for U.S. companies to participate in the development of Cuban offshore oil, gas, and renewable energy resources.” The report also recommended that a long term initiative be undertaken to “provide general licenses for the exportation of additional categories of goods and services that enhance the environment, conserve energy, and provide improved quality of life.”

#### Now a key time for US-Latin American ties. Permanent collapse coming.

Shifter ‘12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship. There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

#### Cuba is key to US-Latin American Relations-specifically spills-over to *global* coop on warming- overcomes alt causes

Shifter ‘12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Iran’s nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: As the world’s lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumptionof shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

#### Improving the effectiveness of global coop key to solve warming

Slaughter‘11

(Anne-Marie, Bert G. Kerstetter '66 university professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, “Problems Will Be Global -- And Solutions Will Be, Too”, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, Issue 188, Ebsco)

A more multilateral world is just the beginning Before considering the world in 2025,14 years from now, it is worth remembering the world 14 years ago, in 1997. Back then, the United States was the sole superpower, its immensity and dominance of the international system so evident as to trigger the resentful label of "hyperpower" from the French foreign minister. The American economy was expanding fast enough to leave the country a healthy and growing surplus by the end of Bill Clinton's presidency three years later. The European Union, then still only four years old, had just 15 members; the euro did not exist. The wars dominating the headlines were in Europe: Bosnia, Croatia, and, soon, Kosovo. The term BRICs -- the Goldman Sachs label attached to the fast-growing emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China -- had not yet been invented. The Internet was booming, but social media did not exist. You get the point: A lot can change in 14 years, and rarely in ways foreseen. In the spirit of proper humility, then, here's my take on what the landscape of global diplomacy will look like a decade and a half from now: For starters, the world will be much more multilateral. By 2025 the U.N. Security Council will have expanded from the present 15 members to between 25 and 30 and will include, either as de jure or de facto permanent members, Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa, either Egypt or Nigeria, and either Indonesia or Turkey. At the same time, regional organizations on every continent -- the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, some version of the Organization of American States -- will be much stronger. Each will follow its own version of economic and political integration, inspired by the European Union, and many will include representation from smaller subregional organizations. In the Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey could provide the core of a new Middle East free trade area; alternatively the European Union could be interlocked with an emerging Mediterranean Union. Driving this massive multilateralization is the increasingly global and regional nature of our problems, combined with an expanding number of countries splitting off from existing states. National governments will remain essential for many purposes, but managing bilateral relations and engaging in successful global negotiations with nearly 200 states will become increasingly unwieldy. So we'll negotiate territorial disputes in the South China Sea in a regional framework and deal with crises in Ivory Coast or Guinea through the African Union or even smaller subregional forums. At the global level, the speed and flexibility necessary to resolve crises require smaller groups like the G-20, while long-term legitimacy and durability still require the representation of all countries affected by a particular issue through large standing organizations. As for individual countries, the states that will be the strongest in 2025 will be those that have figured out how to do more with less. They will be those governments that have successfully embraced radical sustainability -- maintaining vibrant economies through largely renewable energy and creative reuse of just about everything. The leader will be Japan, a great civilization that has for centuries pioneered spectacularly beautiful ways of appreciating and coexisting with nature. As China's youth seek more of everything, Japan's are prepared to embrace a far more sustainable path. Scandinavia, Germany, New Zealand, and possibly South Korea will also be strong; many emerging or even less developed economies have real potential, if they can tap into their indigenous habits of conservation. Embracing sustainable growth will challenge the United States; its national renewal will depend on connecting its traditions of innovation, decentralization, and liberty with a narrative of protecting America's natural bounty. Think America the Beautiful more than the Star-Spangled Banner. But the most dramatic changes between 2011 and 2025 won't take place at the level of statecraft and grand strategy; they are likely to happen as new technologies continue to transform businesses, civic organizations of all kinds, universities, foundations, and churches -- now able to self-organize as never before around issues they care about. The American social revolution that Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the early 19th century, of citizens joining groups of every conceivable kind, is about to go global, forever changing the relationship between citizens and their governments, and governments with each other. The Arab revolutions are but the first taste of this larger change. These predictions may appear rosy. In fact, the enormous changes on the horizon will require major crises, even cataclysm, before they can materialize. It took World War I to generate the political will and circumstances necessary to create the League of Nations; it took World War II to create the United Nations; it took the worst economic crisis since the 1930s to force the expansion of the G-8 into the G-20. Just imagine what it will take to break the decades-old logjam of Security Council reform. And creating and changing multilateral organizations is child's play next to the profound changes in public and private behavior required to move away from the more-is-better economic model to one which accepts that our resources are finite on a planetary scale. Yet the sources of potential crises and disasters of a magnitude sufficient to force systemic change are all around us: Climate change is driving countries closer to the extremes of desert and jungle, droughts and floods, while a global pandemic or a nuclear terrorist attack would have a similar impact. This is not Malthusian gloom, however. As Robert Wright argues in Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, catastrophe is terrible for individual human beings but beneficial for humanity as a whole. As the full consequences of genuinely global interconnectedness continue to make themselves felt, the world of both states and the societies they represent will have no choice but to adapt.

#### Global warming is anthropogenic and will cause extinction

James Hansen, PHD, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, May 9, 2012, “Game Over for the Climate”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>,

GLOBAL warming isn’t a prediction. It is happening. That is why I was so troubled to read a recent interview with President Obama in Rolling Stone in which he said that Canada would exploit the oil in its vast tar sands reserves “regardless of what we do.” If Canada proceeds, and we do nothing, it will be game over for the climate. Canada’s tar sands, deposits of sand saturated with bitumen, contain twice the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by global oil use in our entire history. If we were to fully exploit this new oil source, and continue to burn our conventional oil, gas and coal supplies, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere eventually would reach levels higher than in the Pliocene era, more than 2.5 million years ago, when sea level was at least 50 feet higher than it is now. That level of heat-trapping gases would assure that the disintegration of the ice sheets would accelerate out of control. Sea levels would rise and destroy coastal cities. Global temperatures would become intolerable. Twenty to 50 percent of the planet’s species would be driven to extinction. Civilization would be at risk. That is the long-term outlook. But near-term, things will be bad enough. Over the next several decades, the Western United States and the semi-arid region from North Dakota to Texas will develop semi-permanent drought, with rain, when it does come, occurring in extreme events with heavy flooding. Economic losses would be incalculable. More and more of the Midwest would be a dust bowl. California’s Central Valley could no longer be irrigated. Food prices would rise to unprecedented levels. If this sounds apocalyptic, it is. This is why we need to reduce emissions dramatically. President Obama has the power not only to deny tar sands oil additional access to Gulf Coast refining, which Canada desires in part for export markets, but also to encourage economic incentives to leave tar sands and other dirty fuels in the ground. The global warming signal is now louder than the noise of random weather, as I predicted would happen by now in the journal Science in 1981. Extremely hot summers have increased noticeably. We can say with high confidence that the recent heat waves in Texas and Russia, and the one in Europe in 2003, which killed tens of thousands, were not natural events — they were caused by human-induced climate change. We have known since the 1800s that carbon dioxide traps heat in the atmosphere. The right amount keeps the climate conducive to human life. But add too much, as we are doing now, and temperatures will inevitably rise too high. This is not the result of natural variability, as some argue. The earth is currently in the part of its long-term orbit cycle where temperatures would normally be cooling. But they are rising — and it’s because we are forcing them higher with fossil fuel emissions. The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million to 393 p.p.m. over the last 150 years. The tar sands contain enough carbon — 240 gigatons — to add 120 p.p.m. Tar shale, a close cousin of tar sands found mainly in the United States, contains at least an additional 300 gigatons of carbon. If we turn to these dirtiest of fuels, instead of finding ways to phase out our addiction to fossil fuels, there is no hope of keeping carbon concentrations below 500 p.p.m. — a level that would, as earth’s history shows, leave our children a climate system that is out of their control. We need to start reducing emissions significantly, not create new ways to increase them. We should impose a gradually rising carbon fee, collected from fossil fuel companies, then distribute 100 percent of the collections to all Americans on a per-capita basis every month. The government would not get a penny. This market-based approach would stimulate innovation, jobs and economic growth, avoid enlarging government or having it pick winners or losers. Most Americans, except the heaviest energy users, would get more back than they paid in increased prices. Not only that, the reduction in oil use resulting from the carbon price would be nearly six times as great as the oil supply from the proposed pipeline from Canada, rendering the pipeline superfluous, according to economic models driven by a slowly rising carbon price. But instead of placing a rising fee on carbon emissions to make fossil fuels pay their true costs, leveling the energy playing field, the world’s governments are forcing the public to subsidize fossil fuels with hundreds of billions of dollars per year. This encourages a frantic stampede to extract every fossil fuel through mountaintop removal, longwall mining, hydraulic fracturing, tar sands and tar shale extraction, and deep ocean and Arctic drilling. President Obama speaks of a “planet in peril,” but he does not provide the leadership needed to change the world’s course. Our leaders must speak candidly to the public — which yearns for open, honest discussion — explaining that our continued technological leadership and economic well-being demand a reasoned change of our energy course. History has shown that the American public can rise to the challenge, but leadership is essential. The science of the situation is clear — it’s time for the politics to follow. This is a plan that can unify conservatives and liberals, environmentalists and business. Every major national science academy in the world has reported that global warming is real, caused mostly by humans, and requires urgent action. The cost of acting goes far higher the longer we wait — we can’t wait any longer to avoid the worst and be judged immoral by coming generations.

#### Allowing warming to continue perpetuates racist inequalities

Hoerner 8**—**Former director of Research at the Center for a Sustainable Economy, Director of Tax Policy at the Center for Global Change at the University of Maryland College Park, and editor of Natural Resources Tax Review. He has done research on environmental economics and policy on behalf of the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Andrew received his B.A. in Economics from Cornell University and a J.D. from Case Western Reserve School of Law—AND—Nia Robins—former inaugural Climate Justice Corps Fellow in 2003, director of Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative (J. Andrew, “A Climate of Change African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy for the U.S.” July 2008, http://www.ejcc.org/climateofchange.pdf)

Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us. One of the most serious environmental threats facing the world today, climate change has moved from the minds of scientists and offices of environmentalists to the mainstream. Though the media is dominated by images of polar bears, melting glaciers, flooded lands, and arid desserts, there is a human face to this story as well. Climate change is not only an issue of the environment; it is also an issue of justice and human rights, one that dangerously intersects race and class. All over the world people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear disproportionate burdens from climate change itself, from ill-designed policies to prevent it, and from side effects of the energy systems that cause it. A Climate of Change explores the impacts of climate change on African Americans, from health to economics to community, and considers what policies would most harm or benefit African Americans—and the nation as a whole. African Americans are thirteen percent of the U.S. population and on average emit nearly twenty percent less greenhouse gases than non-Hispanic whites per capita. Though far less responsible for climate change, African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects than non- Hispanic whites. Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from such manifestations of climate change as storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by global energy price shocks, and a greater economic burden from military operations designed to protect the flow of oil to the U.S. Climate Justice: The Time Is Now Ultimately, accomplishing climate justice will require that new alliances are forged and traditional movements are transformed. An effective policy to address the challenges of global warming cannot be crafted until race and equity are part of the discussion from the outset and an integral part of the solution. This report finds that: Global warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities. Under global warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic. Thus it is essential to recognize that all justice is climate justice and that the struggle for racial and economic justice is an unavoidable part of the fight to halt global warming. Sound global warming policy is also economic and racial justice policy. Successfully adopting a sound global warming policy will do as much to strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color as any other currently plausible stride toward economic justice. Climate policies that best serve African Americans also best serve a just and strong United States. This paper shows that policies well-designed to benefit African Americans also provide the most benefit to all people in the U.S. Climate policies that best serve African Americans and other disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions in global warming pollution and support for such reductions in developing nations financed by polluter-pays principles provide the greatest benefit to African Americans, the peoples of Africa, and people across the Global South. A distinctive African American voice is critical for climate justice. Currently, legislation is being drafted, proposed, and considered without any significant input from the communities most affected. Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies, while traditional environmentalists often fail to engage people of color, Indigenous Peoples, and low-income communities until after the political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals. A strong focus on equity is essential to the success of the environmental cause, but equity issues cannot be adequately addressed by isolating the voices of communities that are disproportionately impacted. Engagement in climate change policy must be moved from the White House and the halls of Congress to social circles, classrooms, kitchens, and congregations. The time is now for those disproportionately affected to assume leadership in the climate change debate, to speak truth to power, and to assert rights to social, environmental and economic justice. Taken together, these actions affirm a vital truth that will bring communities together: Climate Justice is Common Justice. African Americans and Vulnerability In this report, it is shown that African Americans are disproportionately affected by climate change. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Climate Change and Global Warming Co-Pollutants ¶ • The six states with the highest African American population are all in the Atlantic hurricane zone, and are expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina and Rita in the future. ¶ • Global warming is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of heat waves or extreme heat events. African Americans suffer heat death at one hundred fifty to two hundred percent of the rate for non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Seventy-one percent of African Americans live in counties in violation of federal air pollution standards, as compared to fifty-eight percent of the white population. Seventy-eight percent of African Americans live within thirty miles of a coal-fired power plant, as compared to fifty-six percent of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Asthma has strong associations with air pollution, and African Americans have a thirty-six percent higher rate of incidents of asthma than whites. Asthma is three times as likely to lead to emergency room visits or deaths for African Americans. ¶ • This study finds that a twenty-five percent reduction in greenhouse gases—similar to what passed in California and is proposed in major federal legislation—would reduce infant mortality by at least two percent, asthma by at least sixteen percent, and mortality from particulates by at least 6,000 to 12,000 deaths per year. Other estimates have run as high as 33,000 fewer deaths per year. A disproportionate number of the lives saved by these proposed reductions would be African American. African Americans Are Economically More Vulnerable to Disasters and Illnesses ¶ • In 2006, twenty percent of African Americans had no health insurance, including fourteen percent of African American children—nearly twice the rate of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • In the absence of insurance, disasters and illness (which will increase with global warming) could be cushioned by income and accumulated wealth. However, the average income of African American households is fifty-seven percent that of non-Hispanic whites, and median wealth is only one-tenth that of non-Hispanic whites. ¶ • Racist stereotypes have been shown to reduce aid donations and impede service delivery to African Americans in the wake of hurricanes, floods, fires and other climate-related disasters as compared to non-Hispanic whites in similar circumstances. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Energy Price Shocks ¶ • African Americans spend thirty percent more of their income on energy than non-Hispanic whites. • Energy price increases have contributed to seventy to eighty percent of recent recessions. The increase in unemployment of African Americans during energy caused recessions is twice that of non-Hispanic whites, costing the community an average of one percent of income every year. • Reducing economic dependence on energy will alleviate the frequency and severity of recessions and the economic disparities they generate. African Americans Pay a Heavy Price and a Disproportionate Share of the Cost of Wars for Oil • Oil company profits in excess of the normal rate of profit for U.S. industries cost the average household $611 in 2006 alone and are still rising. • The total cost of the war in Iraq borne by African Americans will be $29,000 per household if the resulting deficit is financed by tax increases, and $32,000 if the debt is repaid by spending cuts. This is more than three times the median assets of African American households. A Clean Energy Future Creates Far More Jobs for African Americans • Fossil fuel extraction industries employ a far lower proportion of African Americans on average compared to other industries. Conversely, renewable electricity generation employs three to five times as many people as comparable electricity generation from fossil fuels, a higher proportion of whom are African American. ¶ • Switching just one percent of total electricity generating capacity per year from conventional to renewable sources would result in an additional 61,000 to 84,000 jobs for African Americans by 2030. ¶ • A well-designed comprehensive climate plan achieving emission reductions comparable to the Kyoto Protocol would create over 430,000 jobs for African Americans by 2030, reducing the African American unemployment rate by 1.8 percentage points and raising the average African American income by 3 to 4 percent.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Deliberation through policy debate is key to solving climate change through citizen involvement and subsumes their critiques of traditional forms of decision-making

Isham 10 (Jon, Associate Professor of Economics, Middlebury College, “The Promise of Deliberative Democracy”, Volume 1 | Issue 5 | Page 25-27 | Oct 2010, <http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/775>)

BLUE

Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project’s 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to retard the process indefinitely? One answer is found in a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens.”4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks (www.americaspeaks.org), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming (www.wwviews.org), a citizen’s deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org’s International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an “integrated resource plan” to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People’s Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town’s budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world’s investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy. If democracy is truly about representing popular opinion, policymakers should seek out deliberative polls in their decision-making process.

#### Public advocacy of climate solutions key to change governmental policy---individual change insufficient

CAG 10—Climate Change Communication Advisory Group. Dr Adam Corner School of Psychology, Cardiff University - Dr Tom Crompton Change Strategist, WWF-UK - Scott Davidson Programme Manager, Global Action Plan - Richard Hawkins Senior Researcher, Public Interest Research Centre - Professor Tim Kasser, Psychology department, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, USA. - Dr Renee Lertzman, Center for Sustainable Processes & Practices, Portland State University, US. - Peter Lipman, Policy Director, Sustrans. - Dr Irene Lorenzoni, Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia. - George Marshall, Founding Director, Climate Outreach , Information Network - Dr Ciaran Mundy, Director, Transition Bristol - Dr Saffron O’Neil, Department of Resource Management and Geography, University of Melbourne, Australia. - Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director, Understanding Risk Research Group, School of Psychology, Cardiff University. - Dr Anna Rabinovich, School of Psychology, University of Exeter - Rosemary Randall, Founder and director of Cambridge Carbon Footprint - Dr Lorraine Whitmarsh, School of Psychology, Cardiff University & Visiting Fellow at the, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. (Communicating climate change to mass public audience, http://pirc.info/downloads/communicating\_climate\_mass\_audiences.pdf)

This short advisory paper collates a set of recommendations about how best to shape mass public communications aimed at increasing concern about climate change and motivating commensurate behavioural changes.¶ Its focus is not upon motivating small private-sphere behavioural changes on a piece-meal basis. Rather, it marshals evidence about how best to motivate the ambitious and systemic behavioural change that is necessary – including, crucially, greater public engagement with the policy process (through, for example, lobbying decision-makers and elected representatives, or participating in demonstrations), as well as major lifestyle changes. ¶ Political leaders themselves have drawn attention to the imperative for more vocal public pressure to create the ‘political space’ for them to enact more ambitious policy interventions. 1 While this paper does not dismiss the value of individuals making small private-sphere behavioural changes (for example, adopting simple domestic energy efficiency measures) it is clear that such behaviours do not, in themselves, represent a proportional response to the challenge of climate change. As David MacKay, Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Department of Energy and Climate change writes: “Don’t be distracted by the myth that ‘every little helps’. If everyone does a little, we’ll achieve only a little” (MacKay, 2008).¶ The task of campaigners and communicators from government, business and non-governmental organisations must therefore be to motivate both (i) widespread adoption of ambitious private-sphere behavioural changes; and (ii) widespread acceptance of – and indeed active demand for – ambitious new policy interventions.¶ Current public communication campaigns, as orchestrated by government, business and non-governmental organisations, are not achieving these changes. This paper asks: how should such communications be designed if they are to have optimal impact in motivating these changes? The response to this question will require fundamental changes in the ways that many climate change communication campaigns are currently devised and implemented. ¶ This advisory paper offers a list of principles that could be used to enhance the quality of communication around climate change communications. The authors are each engaged in continuously sifting the evidence from a range of sub-disciplines within psychology, and reflecting on the implications of this for improving climate change communications. Some of the organisations that we represent have themselves at times adopted approaches which we have both learnt from and critique in this paper – so some of us have first hand experience of the need for on-going improvement in the strategies that we deploy. ¶ The changes we advocate will be challenging to enact – and will require vision and leadership on the part of the organisations adopting them. But without such vision and leadership, we do not believe that public communication campaigns on climate change will create the necessary behavioural changes – indeed, there is a profound risk that many of today’s campaigns will actually prove counter-productive. ¶ Seven Principles¶ 1. Move Beyond Social Marketing¶ We believe that too little attention is paid to the understanding that psychologists bring to strategies for motivating change, whilst undue faith is often placed in the application of marketing strategies to ‘sell’ behavioural changes. Unfortunately, in the context of ambitious pro-environmental behaviour, such strategies seem unlikely to motivate systemic behavioural change.¶ Social marketing is an effective way of achieving a particular behavioural goal – dozens of practical examples in the field of health behaviour attest to this. Social marketing is really more of a framework for designing behaviour change programmes than a behaviour change programme - it offers a method of maximising the success of a specific behavioural goal. Darnton (2008) has described social marketing as ‘explicitly transtheoretical’, while Hastings (2007), in a recent overview of social marketing, claimed that there is no theory of social marketing. Rather, it is a ‘what works’ philosophy, based on previous experience of similar campaigns and programmes. Social marketing is flexible enough to be applied to a range of different social domains, and this is undoubtedly a fundamental part of its appeal.¶ However, social marketing’s 'what works' status also means that it is agnostic about the longer term, theoretical merits of different behaviour change strategies, or the cultural values that specific campaigns serve to strengthen. Social marketing dictates that the most effective strategy should be chosen, where effective means ‘most likely to achieve an immediate behavioural goal’. ¶ This means that elements of a behaviour change strategy designed according to the principles of social marketing may conflict with other, broader goals. What if the most effective way of promoting pro-environmental behaviour ‘A’ was to pursue a strategy that was detrimental to the achievement of long term pro-environmental strategy ‘Z’? The principles of social marketing have no capacity to resolve this conflict – they are limited to maximising the success of the immediate behavioural programme. This is not a flaw of social marketing – it was designed to provide tools to address specific behavioural problems on a piecemeal basis. But it is an important limitation, and one that has significant implications if social marketing techniques are used to promote systemic behavioural change and public engagement on an issue like climate change. ¶ 2. Be honest and forthright about the probable impacts of climate change, and the scale of the challenge we confront in avoiding these. But avoid deliberate attempts to provoke fear or guilt. ¶ There is no merit in ‘dumbing down’ the scientific evidence that the impacts of climate change are likely to be severe, and that some of these impacts are now almost certainly unavoidable. Accepting the impacts of climate change will be an important stage in motivating behavioural responses aimed at mitigating the problem. However, deliberate attempts to instil fear or guilt carry considerable risk. ¶ Studies on fear appeals confirm the potential for fear to change attitudes or verbal expressions of concern, but often not actions or behaviour (Ruiter et al., 2001). The impact of fear appeals is context - and audience - specific; for example, for those who do not yet realise the potentially ‘scary’ aspects of climate change, people need to first experience themselves as vulnerable to the risks in some way in order to feel moved or affected (Das et al, 2003; Hoog et al, 2005). As people move towards contemplating action, fear appeals can help form a behavioural intent, providing an impetus or spark to ‘move’ from; however such appeals must be coupled with constructive information and support to reduce the sense of danger (Moser, 2007). The danger is that fear can also be disempowering – producing feelings of helplessness, remoteness and lack of control (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Fear is likely to trigger ‘barriers to engagement’, such as denial2 (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Weber, 2006; Moser and Dilling, 2007; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). The location of fear in a message is also relevant; it works better when placed first for those who are inclined to follow the advice, but better second for those who aren't (Bier, 2001).¶ Similarly, studies have shown that guilt can play a role in motivating people to take action but can also function to stimulate defensive mechanisms against the perceived threat or challenge to one’s sense of identity (as a good, moral person). In the latter case, behaviours may be left untouched (whether driving a SUV or taking a flight) as one defends against any feelings of guilt or complicity through deployment of a range of justifications for the behaviour (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). ¶ Overall, there is a need for emotionally balanced representations of the issues at hand. This will involve acknowledging the ‘affective reality’ of the situation, e.g. “We know this is scary and overwhelming, but many of us feel this way and we are doing something about it”.¶ 3. Be honest and forthright about the impacts of mitigating and adapting to climate change for current lifestyles, and the ‘loss’ - as well as the benefits - that these will entail. Narratives that focus exclusively on the ‘up-side’ of climate solutions are likely to be unconvincing. While narratives about the future impacts of climate change may highlight the loss of much that we currently hold to be dear, narratives about climate solutions frequently ignore the question of loss. If the two are not addressed concurrently, fear of loss may be ‘split off’ and projected into the future, where it is all too easily denied. This can be dangerous, because accepting loss is an important step towards working through the associated emotions, and emerging with the energy and creativity to respond positively to the new situation (Randall, 2009). However, there are plenty of benefits (besides the financial ones) of a low-carbon lifestyle e.g., health, community/social interaction - including the ‘intrinsic' goals mentioned below. It is important to be honest about both the losses and the benefits that may be associated with lifestyle change, and not to seek to separate out one from the other.¶ 3a. Avoid emphasis upon painless, easy steps. ¶ Be honest about the limitations of voluntary private-sphere behavioural change, and the need for ambitious new policy interventions that incentivise such changes, or that regulate for them. People know that the scope they have, as individuals, to help meet the challenge of climate change is extremely limited. For many people, it is perfectly sensible to continue to adopt high-carbon lifestyle choices whilst simultaneously being supportive of government interventions that would make these choices more difficult for everyone. ¶ The adoption of small-scale private sphere behavioural changes is sometimes assumed to lead people to adopt ever more difficult (and potentially significant) behavioural changes. The empirical evidence for this ‘foot-in-thedoor’ effect is highly equivocal. Some studies detect such an effect; others studies have found the reverse effect (whereby people tend to ‘rest on their laurels’ having adopted a few simple behavioural changes - Thogersen and Crompton, 2009). Where attention is drawn to simple and painless privatesphere behavioural changes, these should be urged in pursuit of a set of intrinsic goals (that is, as a response to people’s understanding about the contribution that such behavioural change may make to benefiting their friends and family, their community, the wider world, or in contributing to their growth and development as individuals) rather than as a means to achieve social status or greater financial success. Adopting behaviour in pursuit of intrinsic goals is more likely to lead to ‘spillover’ into other sustainable behaviours (De Young, 2000; Thogersen and Crompton, 2009).¶ People aren’t stupid: they know that if there are wholesale changes in the global climate underway, these will not be reversed merely through checking their tyre pressures or switching their TV off standby. An emphasis upon simple and painless steps suppresses debate about those necessary responses that are less palatable – that will cost people money, or that will infringe on cherished freedoms (such as to fly). Recognising this will be a key step in accepting the reality of loss of aspects of our current lifestyles, and in beginning to work through the powerful emotions that this will engender (Randall, 2009). ¶ 3b. Avoid over-emphasis on the economic opportunities that mitigating, and adapting to, climate change may provide. ¶ There will, undoubtedly, be economic benefits to be accrued through investment in new technologies, but there will also be instances where the economic imperative and the climate change adaptation or mitigation imperative diverge, and periods of economic uncertainty for many people as some sectors contract. It seems inevitable that some interventions will have negative economic impacts (Stern, 2007).¶ Undue emphasis upon economic imperatives serves to reinforce the dominance, in society, of a set of extrinsic goals (focussed, for example, on financial benefit). A large body of empirical research demonstrates that these extrinsic goals are antagonistic to the emergence of pro-social and proenvironmental concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009).¶ 3c. Avoid emphasis upon the opportunities of ‘green consumerism’ as a response to climate change.¶ As mentioned above (3b), a large body of research points to the antagonism between goals directed towards the acquisition of material objects and the emergence of pro-environmental and pro-social concern (Crompton and Kasser, 2009). Campaigns to ‘buy green’ may be effective in driving up sales of particular products, but in conveying the impression that climate change can be addressed by ‘buying the right things’, they risk undermining more difficult and systemic changes. A recent study found that people in an experiment who purchased ‘green’ products acted less altruistically on subsequent tasks (Mazar & Zhong, 2010) – suggesting that small ethical acts may act as a ‘moral offset’ and licence undesirable behaviours in other domains. This does not mean that private-sphere behaviour changes will always lead to a reduction in subsequent pro-environmental behaviour, but it does suggest that the reasons used to motivate these changes are critically important. Better is to emphasise that ‘every little helps a little’ – but that these changes are only the beginning of a process that must also incorporate more ambitious private-sphere change and significant collective action at a political level.¶ 4. Empathise with the emotional responses that will be engendered by a forthright presentation of the probable impacts of climate change. ¶ Belief in climate change and support for low-carbon policies will remain fragile unless people are emotionally engaged. We should expect people to be sad or angry, to feel guilt or shame, to yearn for that which is lost or to search for more comforting answers (Randall, 2009). Providing support and empathy in working through the painful emotions of 'grief' for a society that must undergo changes is a prerequisite for subsequent adaptation to new circumstances.¶ Without such support and empathy, it is more likely that people will begin to deploy a range of maladaptive ‘coping strategies’, such as denial of personal responsibility, blaming others, or becoming apathetic (Lertzman, 2008). An audience should not be admonished for deploying such strategies – this would in itself be threatening, and could therefore harden resistance to positive behaviour change (Miller and Rolnick, 2002). The key is not to dismiss people who exhibit maladaptive coping strategies, but to understand how they can be made more adaptive. People who feel socially supported will be more likely to adopt adaptive emotional responses - so facilitating social support for proenvironmental behaviour is crucial.¶ 5. Promote pro-environmental social norms and harness the power of social networks¶ One way of bridging the gap between private-sphere behaviour changes and collective action is the promotion of pro-environmental social norms. Pictures and videos of ordinary people (‘like me’) engaging in significant proenvironmental actions are a simple and effective way of generating a sense of social normality around pro-environmental behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein and Griskevicius, 2007). There are different reasons that people adopt social norms, and encouraging people to adopt a positive norm simply to ‘conform’, to avoid a feeling of guilt, or for fear of not ‘fitting in’ is likely to produce a relatively shallow level of motivation for behaviour change. Where social norms can be combined with ‘intrinsic’ motivations (e.g. a sense of social belonging), they are likely to be more effective and persistent.¶ Too often, environmental communications are directed to the individual as a single unit in the larger social system of consumption and political engagement. This can make the problems feel too overwhelming, and evoke unmanageable levels of anxiety. Through the enhanced awareness of what other people are doing, a strong sense of collective purpose can be engendered. One factor that is likely to influence whether adaptive or maladaptive coping strategies are selected in response to fear about climate change is whether people feel supported by a social network – that is, whether a sense of ‘sustainable citizenship’ is fostered. The efficacy of groupbased programmes at promoting pro-environmental behaviour change has been demonstrated on numerous occasions – and participants in these projects consistently point to a sense of mutual learning and support as a key reason for making and maintaining changes in behaviour (Nye and Burgess, 2008). There are few influences more powerful than an individual’s social network. Networks are instrumental not just in terms of providing social support, but also by creating specific content of social identity – defining what it means to be “us”. If environmental norms are incorporated at this level (become defining for the group) they can result in significant behavioural change (also reinforced through peer pressure).¶ Of course, for the majority of people, this is unlikely to be a network that has climate change at its core. But social networks – Trade Unions, Rugby Clubs, Mother & Toddler groups – still perform a critical role in spreading change through society. Encouraging and supporting pre-existing social networks to take ownership of climate change (rather than approach it as a problem for ‘green groups’) is a critical task. As well as representing a crucial bridge between individuals and broader society, peer-to-peer learning circumnavigates many of the problems associated with more ‘top down’ models of communication – not least that government representatives are perceived as untrustworthy (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Peer-to-peer learning is more easily achieved in group-based dialogue than in designing public information films: But public information films can nonetheless help to establish social norms around community-based responses to the challenges of climate change, through clear visual portrayals of people engaging collectively in the pro-environmental behaviour.¶ The discourse should be shifted increasingly from ‘you’ to ‘we’ and from ‘I’ to ‘us’. This is starting to take place in emerging forms of community-based activism, such as the Transition Movement and Cambridge Carbon Footprint’s ‘Carbon Conversations’ model – both of which recognize the power of groups to help support and maintain lifestyle and identity changes. A nationwide climate change engagement project using a group-based behaviour change model with members of Trade Union networks is currently underway, led by the Climate Outreach and Information Network. These projects represent a method of climate change communication and engagement radically different to that typically pursued by the government – and may offer a set of approaches that can go beyond the limited reach of social marketing techniques.¶ One potential risk with appeals based on social norms is that they often contain a hidden message. So, for example, a campaign that focuses on the fact that too many people take internal flights actually contains two messages – that taking internal flights is bad for the environment, and that lots of people are taking internal flights. This second message can give those who do not currently engage in that behaviour a perverse incentive to do so, and campaigns to promote behaviour change should be very careful to avoid this. The key is to ensure that information about what is happening (termed descriptive norms), does not overshadow information about what should be happening (termed injunctive norms). ¶ 6. Think about the language you use, but don’t rely on language alone¶ A number of recent publications have highlighted the results of focus group research and talk-back tests in order to ‘get the language right’ (Topos Partnership, 2009; Western Strategies & Lake Research Partners, 2009), culminating in a series of suggestions for framing climate-change communications. For example, these two studies led to the suggestions that communicators should use the term ‘global warming’ or ‘our deteriorating atmosphere’, respectively, rather than ‘climate change’. Other research has identified systematic differences in the way that people interpret the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, with ‘global warming’ perceived as more emotionally engaging than ‘climate change’ (Whitmarsh, 2009).¶ Whilst ‘getting the language right’ is important, it can only play a small part in a communication strategy. More important than the language deployed (i.e. ‘conceptual frames') are what have been referred to by some cognitive linguists as 'deep frames'. Conceptual framing refers to catchy slogans and clever spin (which may or may not be honest). At a deeper level, framing refers to forging the connections between a debate or public policy and a set of deeper values or principles. Conceptual framing (crafting particular messages focussing on particular issues) cannot work unless these messages resonate with a set of long-term deep frames.¶ Policy proposals which may at the surface level seem similar (perhaps they both set out to achieve a reduction in environmental pollution) may differ importantly in terms of their deep framing. For example, putting a financial value on an endangered species, and building an economic case for their conservation ‘commodifies’ them, and makes them equivalent (at the level of deep frames) to other assets of the same value (a hotel chain, perhaps). This is a very different frame to one that attempts to achieve the same conservation goals through the ascription of intrinsic value to such species – as something that should be protected in its own right. Embedding particular deep frames requires concerted effort (Lakoff, 2009), but is the beginning of a process that can build a broad, coherent cross-departmental response to climate change from government.¶ 7. Encourage public demonstrations of frustration at the limited pace of government action¶ Private-sphere behavioural change is not enough, and may even at times become a diversion from the more important process of bringing political pressure to bear on policy-makers. The importance of public demonstrations of frustration at both the lack of political progress on climate change and the barriers presented by vested interests is widely recognised – including by government itself. Climate change communications, including government communication campaigns, should work to normalise public displays of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Ockwell et al (2009) argued that communications can play a role in fostering demand for - as well as acceptance of - policy change. Climate change communication could (and should) be used to encourage people to demonstrate (for example through public demonstrations) about how they would like structural barriers to behavioural/societal change to be removed.

#### Simulation and institutional deliberation are valuable and motivate effective responses to climate risks

Marx et al 7 (Sabine M, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) @ Columbia University, Elke U. Weber, Graduate School of Business and Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Benjamin S. Orlovea, Department of Environmental Science and Policy @ University of California Davis, Anthony Leiserowitz, Decision Research, David H. Krantz, Department of Psychology @ Columbia University, Carla Roncolia, South East Climate Consortium (SECC), Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering @ University of Georgia and Jennifer Phillips, Bard Centre for Environmental Policy @ Bard College, “Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information”, 2007, http://climate.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Marx\_GEC\_2007.pdf)

Based on the observation that experiential and analytic processing systems compete and that personal experience and vivid descriptions are often favored over statistical information, we suggest the following research and policy implications.¶ Communications designed to create, recall and highlight relevant personal experience and to elicit affective responses can lead to more public attention to, processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability and climate change. Vicarious experiential information in the form of scenarios, narratives, and analogies can help the public and policy makers imagine the potential consequences of climate variability and change, amplify or attenuate risk perceptions, and influence both individual behavioral intentions and public policy preferences. Likewise, as illustrated by the example of retranslation in the Uganda studies, the translation of statistical information into concrete experience with simulated forecasts, decisionmaking and its outcomes can greatly facilitate an intuitive understanding of both probabilities and the consequences of incremental change and extreme events, and motivate contingency planning.¶ Yet, while the engagement of experience-based, affective decision-making can make risk communications more salient and motivate behavior, experiential processing is also subject to its own biases, limitations and distortions, such as the finite pool of worry and single action bias. Experiential processing works best with easily imaginable, emotionally laden material, yet many aspects of climate variability and change are relatively abstract and require a certain level of analytical understanding (e.g., long-term trends in mean temperatures or precipitation). Ideally, communication of climate forecasts should encourage the interactive engagement of both analytic and experiential processing systems in the course of making concrete decisions about climate, ranging from individual choices about what crops to plant in a particular season to broad social choices about how to mitigate or adapt to global climate change.¶ One way to facilitate this interaction is through group and participatory decision-making. As the Uganda example suggests, group processes allow individuals with a range of knowledge, skills and personal experience to share diverse information and perspectives and work together on a problem. Ideally, groups should include at least one member trained to understand statistical forecast information to ensure that all sources of information—both experiential and analytic—are considered as part of the decision-making process. Communications to groups should also try to translate statistical information into formats readily understood in the language, personal and cultural experience of group members. In a somewhat iterative or cyclical process, the shared concrete information can then be re-abstracted to an analytic level that leads to action.¶ Risk and uncertainty are inherent dimensions of all climate forecasts and related decisions. Analytic products like trend analysis, forecast probabilities, and ranges of uncertainty ought to be valuable contributions to stakeholder decision-making. Yet decision makers also listen to the inner and communal voices of personal and collective experience, affect and emotion, and cultural values. Both systems—analytic and experiential—should be considered in the design of climate forecasts and risk communications. If not, many analytic products will fall on deaf ears as decision makers continue to rely heavily on personal experience and affective cues to make plans for an uncertain future. The challenge is to find innovative and creative ways to engage both systems in the process of individual and group decision-making.

#### Taking action against warming represents an opportunity to rebuild progressive politics for a more just society, but only if we set aside traditional differences founded around identity in favor of a broad-based coalition

Smith 10 Brendan, co-founder of Labor Network for Sustainability, 11-23, “Fighting Doom: The New Politics of Climate Change,” Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/11/23-1

I admit I have arrived late to the party. Only recently have I begun to realize what others have known for decades: The climate crisis is not, at its core, an environmental issue. In fact it is not an "issue" at all; it is an existential threat to every human and community on the planet. It threatens every job, every economy in the world. It threatens the health of our children. It threatens our food and water supply. Climate change will continue to alter the world our species has known for the past three thousand years. As an oyster farmer and longtime political activist, the effects of climate change on my life will be neither distant nor impersonal. Rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures may well force me to abandon my 60-acre farm within the next forty years. From France to Washington state, oystermen are already seeing massive die-offs of seed oysters and the thinning shells science has long predicted. I can see the storm clouds and they are foretelling doom. But my political alter ego is oddly less pessimistic. Rather than triggering gloom, the climate crisis has surprisingly stirred up more hope than I have felt in twenty years as a progressive activist. After decades of progressive retreat it is a strange feeling. But I am haunted by the suspicion that this coming crisis may be the first opportunity we have had in generations to radically re-shape the political landscape and build a more just and sustainable society. The Power of Doom The modern progressive movement in the U.S. has traditionally grounded its organizing in the politics of identity and altruism. Organize an affected group -- minorities, gays, janitors or women -- and then ask the public at large to support the cause -- prison reform, gay marriage, labor rights, or abortion -- based on some cocktail of good will, liberal guilt, and moral persuasion. This strategy has been effective at times. But we have failed to bring these mini-movements together into a force powerful enough to enact broad-based social reform. It takes a lot of people to change society and our current strategy has left us small in numbers and weak in power. The highlights of my political life -- as opposed to oystering -- have been marked by winning narrow, often temporary, battles, but perennially losing the larger war. I see the results in every direction I look: growing poverty and unemployment, two wars, the rise of the right, declining unionization, the failure of the Senate's climate legislation and of Copenhagen, the wholesale domination of corporate interests. The list goes on and on. We have lost; it's time to admit our strategy has been too tepid and begin charting anew. This time can be different. What is so promising about the climate crisis is that because it is not an "issue" experienced by one disenfranchised segment of the population, it opens the opportunity for a new organizing calculus for progressives. Except for nuclear annihilation, humanity has never faced so universal a threat where all our futures are bound inextricably together. This universality provides the mortar of common interest required for movement building. We could literally knock on every door on the planet and find someone -- whether they know it or not -- who has a vital self-interest in averting the climate crisis by joining a movement for sustainability. With all of humanity facing doom, we can finally gather under one banner and count our future members not in the thousands but in the millions, even billions. But as former White House "Green Jobs Czar" Van Jones told the New Yorker in 2009, "The challenge is making this an everybody movement, so your main icons are Joe Six-Pack, Joe the Plumber, becoming Joe the Solar Guy, or that kid on the street corner putting down his handgun, picking up a caulk gun." The climate crisis is carrying us into uncharted waters and our political strategy needs to be directed toward making the climate movement an "everybody movement." Let me use a personal example. As an oysterman on Long Island Sound my way of life is threatened by rising greenhouse gases and ocean temperatures. If the climate crisis is not averted my oysters will die and my farm will be shuttered. Saving my livelihood requires that I politically engage at some level. Normally I would gather together my fellow oyster farmers to lobby state and federal officials and hold a protest or two. Maybe I would find a few coalitions to join. But we would remain small in number, wield little power, and our complaints about job loss would fall on largely unsympathetic ears in the face of so many suffering in so many ways. And what would we even petition our government to do about the problem? Buyouts and unemployment benefits? Re-training classes? Our oysters will still die and we will still lose our farms. To save our lives and livelihood we need to burrow down to the root of the problem: halting greenhouse gas emissions. And halting emissions requires joining a movement with the requisite power to dismantle the fossil fuel economy while building a green economy. To tackle such a large target requires my support for every nook and cranny effort to halt greenhouse gases and transition to a green economy. I need to gather up my fellow oyster farmers and link arms with students blocking new coal-fired power plants while fighting for just transition for coal workers; I need to join forces with other green workers around the country to demand government funding for green energy jobs, not more bank and corporate bailouts; I need to support labor movement efforts in China and elsewhere to climb out of poverty by going "green not dirty." I have a stake in these disparate battles not out of political altruism, but because my livelihood and community depend on stopping greenhouse gases and climate change. In other words, the hidden jewel of the climate crisis is that I need others and others need me. We are bound together by the same story of crisis and struggle. Some in the sustainability movement have been taking advantage of the "power of doom" by weaving together novel narratives and alliances around climate change. Groups in Kentucky are complementing their anti-mountain top removal efforts by organizing members of rural electrical co-ops into "New Power" campaigns to force a transition from fossil fuels to renewable power -- and create jobs in the process. Police unions in Canada, recognizing their members will be first responders as climate disasters hit, have reached out to unions in New Orleans to ensure the tragedies that followed Katrina are not repeated. Artists, chefs, farmers, bike mechanics, designers, and others are coalescing into a "green artisan movement" focused on building vibrant sustainable communities. Immigrant organizers, worried about the very real possibility of ever-worsening racial tensions triggered by millions of environmental refugees flooding in from neighboring countries, are educating their membership about why the climate crisis matters. My hope is that over the coming years we will be able to catalog increasing numbers of these tributaries of the climate crisis. Our power will not stem from a long list of issue concerns or sponsors at events -- we have tried that as recently as the October 2nd Washington D.C. "One Nation Working Together" march with little impact. Nor, with the rise of do-it-yourself organizing, will our power spring from top-down political parties of decades past. Instead oystermen like me, driven by the need to save our lives and livelihood, will storm the barricades with others facing the effects of the climate crisis. We will merge our mini-movements under a banner of common crisis, common vision and common struggle. We will be in this fight together and emerge as force not to be trifled with. This Time We Have an Alternative I am also guardedly optimistic because this time we have an alternative. My generation came of age after the fall of communism, and as a result, we have been raised in the midst of one-sided debate. We recognize that neoliberalism has ravaged society, but besides nostalgic calls for socialism, what has been the alternative? As globalization swept the globe, we demanded livable wages and better housing for the poorest in our communities; we fought sweatshops in China; we lobbied for new campaign finance and corporate governance laws. But these are mere patchwork reforms that fail to add up to a full-blown alternative to our current anti-government, free-market system. Never being able to fully picture the progressive alternative left me not fully trusting that progressive answers were viable solutions. But when I hear the proposed solutions to the climate crisis, the fog lifts. I can track the logic and envision the machinery of our alternative. And it sounds surprisingly like a common sense rebuttal to the current free-market mayhem: We face a global emergency of catastrophic proportions. Market fundamentalism will worsen rather than solve the crisis. Instead we need to re-direct our institutions and economic resources toward solving the crisis by replacing our carbon-based economy with a green sustainable economy. And by definition, for an economy to be sustainable it must addresses the longstanding suffering ordinary people face in their lives, ranging from unemployment and poverty to housing and healthcare. For years I have tossed from campaign to campaign, but the framework of our new progressive answer to the climate crisis now provides a roadmap for my political strategy. It helps chart my opponents -- coal companies and their political minions, for example -- as well as my diverse range of allies. It lays out my policy agenda, ranging from creating millions of new green jobs to building affordable green housing in low-income communities. I finally feel confident enough in my bearings to set sail. The Era of Crisis Politics While building a new green economy makes sense on paper, it is hard to imagine our entrenched political system yielding even modest progressive reform, let alone the wholesale re-formatting of the carbon economy. But I suspect this will change in the coming years, with our future governed by cascading political crises, rather than political stasis. We are likely entering an era of crisis politics whereby each escalating environmental disaster -- ranging from water shortages and hurricanes to wildfires and disease outbreaks -- will expose the impotence of our existing political institutions and economic system. In the next 40 years alone, scientists predict a state of permanent drought throughout the Southwest US and climate-linked disease deaths to double. As Danny Thompson, secretary-treasurer of the Nevada AFL-CIO, told the Las Vegas Review Journal, the ever-worsening water crisis could be "the end of the world" that could "turn us upside down, and I don't know how you recover from that." As if that is not enough, these crises will be played out in the context of a global economy spiraling out of control. Each hurricane, drought or recession will send opinion polls and politicians lurching from right to left and vice versa. Think of how quickly, however momentarily, the political debate pivoted in the wake of Katrina, the BP disaster, and the financial crisis. As White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel famously said "Never let a serious crisis go to waste...It's an opportunity to do things you couldn't do before." While addressing the climate crisis requires radical solutions that cannot be broached in today's political climate, each disaster opens an opportunity to advance alternative agendas -- both for the left and right. While politicians debate modest technical fixes, ordinary people left desperate by floods, fires, droughts and other disasters will increasingly -- and angrily -- demand more fundamental reforms. While our current policy choices appear limited by polls and election results, in an era of crisis politics what appears unrealistic and radical before a storm may well appear as common sense reform in its wake. My generation has been raised in the politics of eternal dusk. Except for a passing ray of hope during the Obama campaign, our years have been marked by the failure of every political force in society -- whether it be political elites or social movement leaders -- to address the problems we face as a nation and world. They have left us spinning towards disaster. We can forge a better future. Climate-generated disasters will bring our doomed future into focus. The failure of political elites to adequately respond to these cascading crises will transform our political landscape and seed the ground for social movements. And if we prepare for the chaos and long battle ahead, our alternative vision will become a necessity rather than an impossibility. As a friend recently said to me, "God help us, I hope you're right."

#### The state is inevitable and an indispensable part of the solution to warming

Eckersley 4 Robyn, Reader/Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, “The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty”, MIT Press, 2004, Google Books, pp. 3-8

While acknowledging the basis for this antipathy toward the nation- state, and the limitations of state-centric analyses of global ecological degradation, I seek to draw attention to the positive role that states have played, and might increasingly play, in global and domestic politics. Writing more than twenty years ago, Hedley Bull (a proto-constructivist and leading writer in the English school) outlined the state's positive role in world affairs, and his arguments continue to provide a powerful challenge to those who somehow seek to "get beyond the state," as if such a move would provide a more lasting solution to the threat of armed conflict or nuclear war, social and economic injustice, or environmental degradation.10 As Bull argued, given that the state is here to stay whether we like it or not, then the call to get "beyond the state is a counsel of despair, at all events if it means that we have to begin by abolishing or subverting the state, rather than that there is a need to build upon it.""¶ In any event, rejecting the "statist frame" of world politics ought not prohibit an inquiry into the emancipatory potential of the state as a crucial "node" in any future network of global ecological governance. This is especially so, given that one can expect states to persist as major sites of social and political power for at least the foreseeable future and that any green transformations of the present political order will, short of revolution, necessarily be state-dependent. Thus, like it or not, those concerned about ecological destruction must contend with existing institutions and, where possible, seek to "rebuild the ship while still at sea." And if states are so implicated in ecological destruction, then an inquiry into the potential for their transformation even their modest reform into something that is at least more conducive to ecological sustainability would seem to be compelling.¶ Of course, it would be unhelpful to become singularly fixated on the redesign of the state at the expense of other institutions of governance. States are not the only institutions that limit, condition, shape, and direct political power, and it is necessary to keep in view the broader spectrum of formal and informal institutions of governance (e.g., local, national, regional, and international) that are implicated in global environmental change. Nonetheless, while the state constitutes only one modality of political power, it is an especially significant one because of its historical claims to exclusive rule over territory and peoples—as expressed in the principle of state sovereignty. As Gianfranco Poggi explains, the political power concentrated in the state "is a momentous, pervasive, critical phenomenon. Together with other forms of social power, it constitutes an indispensable medium for constructing and shaping larger social realities, for establishing, shaping and maintaining all broader and more durable collectivities."12 States play, in varying degrees, significant roles in structuring life chances, in distributing wealth, privilege, information, and risks, in upholding civil and political rights, and in securing private property rights and providing the legal/regulatory framework for capitalism. Every one of these dimensions of state activity has, for good or ill, a significant bearing on the global environmental crisis. Given that the green political project is one that demands far-reaching changes to both economies and societies, it is difficult to imagine how such changes might occur on the kind of scale that is needed without the active support of states. While it is often observed that states are too big to deal with local ecological problems and too small to deal with global ones, the state nonetheless holds, as Lennart Lundqvist puts it, "a unique position in the constitutive hierarchy from individuals through villages, regions and nations all the way to global organizations. The state is inclusive of lower political and administrative levels, and exclusive in speaking for its whole territory and population in relation to the outside world."13 In short, it seems to me inconceivable to advance ecological emancipation without also engaging with and seeking to transform state power.¶ Of course, not all states are democratic states, and the green movement has long been wary of the coercive powers that all states reputedly enjoy. Coercion (and not democracy) is also central to Max Weber's classic sociological understanding of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."14 Weber believed that the state could not be defined sociologically in terms of its ends\* only formally as an organization in terms of the particular means that are peculiar to it.15 Moreover his concept of legitimacy was merely concerned with whether rules were accepted by subjects as valid (for whatever reason); he did not offer a normative theory as to the circumstances when particular rules ought to be accepted or whether beliefs about the validity of rules were justified. Legitimacy was a contingent fact, and in view of his understanding of politics as a struggle for power in the context of an increasingly disenchanted world, likely to become an increasingly unstable achievement.16¶ In contrast to Weber, my approach to the state is explicitly normative and explicitly concerned with the purpose of states, and the democratic basis of their legitimacy. It focuses on the limitations of liberal normative theories of the state (and associated ideals of a just constitutional arrangement), and it proposes instead an alternative green theory that seeks to redress the deficiencies in liberal theory. Nor is my account as bleak as Weber's. The fact that states possess a monopoly of control over the means of coercion is a most serious matter, but it does not necessarily imply that they must have frequent recourse to that power. In any event, whether the use of the state's coercive powers is to be deplored or welcomed turns on the purposes for which that power is exercised, the manner in which it is exercised, and whether it is managed in public, transparent, and accountable ways—a judgment that must be made against a background of changing problems, practices, and under- standings. The coercive arm of the state can be used to "bust" political demonstrations and invade privacy. It can also be used to prevent human rights abuses, curb the excesses of corporate power, and protect the environment.¶ In short, although the political autonomy of states is widely believed to be in decline, there are still few social institution that can match the same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have to redirect societies and economies along more ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems such as global warming and pollution, the buildup of toxic and nuclear wastes and the rapid erosion of the earth's biodiversity. States—particularly when they act collectively—have the capacity to curb the socially and ecologically harmful consequences of capitalism. They are also more amenable to democratization than cor- porations, notwithstanding the ascendancy of the neoliberal state in the increasingly competitive global economy. There are therefore many good reasons why green political theorists need to think not only critically but also constructively about the state and the state system. While the state is certainly not "healthy" at the present historical juncture, in this book I nonetheless join Poggi by offering "a timid two cheers for the old beast," at least as a potentially more significant ally in the green cause.17

#### Pragmatic warming policy is effective and key to prevent extinction

Simpson 10 (Francis, College of Engineering, Vanderbilt University, “Environmental Pragmatism and its Application to Climate Change The Moral Obligations of Developed and Developing Nations to Avert Climate Change as viewed through Technological Pragmatism”, Spring 2010 | Volume 6 | Number 1) BLUE

Pragmatism and Footprinting¶ Environmental pragmatism is a relatively new field of environmental ethics that seeks to move beyond the strictly theoretical exercises normal in philosophy and allows the environmental movement to formulate substantial new policies (Light, 1). Environmental Pragmatism was initially posited by Bryan Norton and evolved to not take a stance over the dispute between non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric ethics. Distancing himself from this dispute, he preferred to distinguish between strong and weak anthropocentricism (Light, 290-291, 298). The main philosophers involved in advancing the debate in environmental pragmatism include Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and Bryan Norton. This particular discipline advocates moral pluralism, implying that the environmental problems being faced have multiple correct solutions. Light argues that the urgency of ecological crises requires that action is necessary through negotiation and compromise. While theorists serve to further the field of environmental ethics and to debate the metaethical basis of various environmental philosophies, some answers to questions are best left to private discussion rather than taking time to argue about them publically (introduction of pragmatism). Pragmatism believes that if two theories are equally able to provide solutions to a given problem, then debate on which is more is argued that: “the commitment to solving environmental problems is the only precondition for any workable and democratic political theory” (Light, 11). While the science behind a footprint is well understood, what can the synthesis of environmental pragmatism and footprinting tell us about the moral obligation to avert climate change? How does grounding the practice of sustainability footprinting in environmental pragmatism generate moral prescriptions for averting climate change?¶ Environmental Pragmatism necessitates the need for tools in engineering to be developed and applied to avert the climate change problem, since pragmatism inherently calls for bridging the gap between theory and policy/ practices. With the theory of pragmatism in mind, further research and development of tools such as life-cycle analysis and footprinting are potential policy tools that are necessary under a pragmatist viewpoint so that informed decisions can be made by policy makers. Since the role of life-cycle analysis and footprinting attempt to improve the efficiency and decrease the overall environmental impact of a given process, good, or service, environmental pragmatism would call for the further development and usage of these tools so that we can continue to develop sustainably and fulfill our moral obligation to future generations. By utilizing footprinting and life-cycle analysis, it becomes possible to make environmentally conscious decisions not only based upon a gut instinct but additionally based on sound science. Finally, in regards to averting climate change, footprinting and life-cycle analysis offer another dimension to traditional cost-benefit analysis and can allow for our moral obligation to future generations to weigh into final decisions which will eventually result in policies and/ or a production of a good or service. Since traditional cost benefit analysis does not account for the environment explicitly, pragmatism would call for the application of these tools to ensure that the environment is adequately protected for future generations.¶ Climate change modeling inherently contains many unknowns in terms of future outcomes and applied simplifications, but these factors should not be enough to hold us back from an environmental pragmatism stand point. Rather than hiding behind a veil of uncertainty with the science, the uncertainty of the possible catastrophic outcomes demands action on the part of every human individual. Environmental pragmatism could also adopt a view point like the precautionary principle where a given action has great uncertainty, but also great consequence (Haller). Since we are attempting to protect human lives and prevent unnecessary suffering, environmental pragmatism would dictate that we should take action now and stop debating the theoretical aspects of this problem. A moral obligation exists to protect human life, and it becomes our obligation to avert climate change. Despite the relatively high economic costs of averting climate change, it is worth noting that the creation of green jobs and new sectors will help to stimulate the economy rather than completely hindering it. People inherently fear change, and it is my opinion that averting climate change requires a drastic change in our consumption patterns, an important reason why people are resisting averting climate change. From an environmental pragmatism viewpoint, it is humanities responsibility to avert climate change before it is too late since we have a moral obligation to protect the future of humanity and the biosphere.

### 1AC – Science

#### Adopting a mindset of scientific inquiry for climate change makes sense because it’s a phenomenon uniquely suited to an empiricist methodology

Jean Bricmont 1, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain, “Defense of a Modest Scientific Realism”, September 23, <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/bielefeld_final.pdf>

Given that instrumentalism is not defensible when it is formulated as a rigid doctrine, and since redefining truth leads us from bad to worse, what should one do? A hint of one sensible response is provided by the following comment of Einstein: Science without epistemology is insofar as it is thinkable at all primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving epistemological systematic that far. ... He therefore must appeal to the systematic epistemologist as an unscrupulous opportunist.'1'1 So let us try epistemological opportunism. We are, in some sense, "screened'' from reality (we have no immediate access to it, radical skepticism cannot be refuted, etc.). There are no absolutely secure foundations on which to base our knowledge. Nevertheless, we all assume implicitly that we can obtain some reasonably reliable knowledge of reality, at least in everyday life. Let us try to go farther, putting to work all the resources of our fallible and finite minds: observations, experiments, reasoning. And then let us see how far we can go. In fact, the most surprising thing, shown by the development of modern science, is how far we seem to be able to go. Unless one is a solipsism or a radical skeptic which nobody really is one has to be a realist about something: about objects in everyday life, or about the past, dinosaurs, stars, viruses, whatever. But there is no natural border where one could somehow radically change one's basic attitude and become thoroughly instrumentalist or pragmatist (say. about atoms or quarks or whatever). There are many differences between quarks and chairs, both in the nature of the evidence supporting their existence and in the way we give meaning to those words, but they are basically differences of degree. Instrumentalists are right to point out that the meaning of statements involving unobservable entities (like "quark'') is in part related to the implications of such statements for direct observations. But only in part: though it is difficult to say exactly how we give meaning to scientific expressions, it seems plausible that we do it by combining direct observations with mental pictures and mathematical formulations, and there is no good reason to restrict oneself to only one of these. Likewise, conventionalists like Poincare are right to observe that some scientific "choices", like the preference for inertial over noninertial reference frames, are made for pragmatic rather than objective reasons. In all these senses, we have to be epistemological "opportunists". But a problem worse than the disease arises when any of these ideas are taken as rigid doctrines replacing 'realism". A friend of ours once said: "I am a naive realist. But I admit that knowledge is difficult." This is the root of the problem. Knowing how things really are is the goal of science; this goal is difficult to reach, but not impossible (at least for some parts of reality and to some degrees of approximation). If we change the goal if, for example, we seek instead a consensus, or (less radically) aim only at empirical adequacy then of course things become much easier; but as Bert rand Russell observed in a similar context, this has all the advantages of theft over honest toil. Moreover, the underdetermination thesis, far from undermining scientific objectivity, actually makes the success of science all the more remarkable. Indeed, what is difficult is not to find a story that "fits the data'\*, but to find even one non-crazy such story. How does one know that it is non-crazy7 A combination of factors: its predictive power, its explanatory value, its breadth and simplicity, etc. Nothing in the (Quinean) underdetermiiiation thesis tells us how to find inequivalent theories with some or all of these properties. In fact, there are vast domains in physics, chemistry and biology where there is only one"18 known non-crazy theory that accounts for Unknown facts and where many alternative theories have been tried and failed because their predictions contradicted experiments. In those domains, one can reasonably think that our present-day theories are at least approximately true, in some sense or other. An important (and difficult) problem for the philosophy of science is to clarify the meaning of “approximately true'" and its implications for the ontological status of unobservable theoretical entities. We do not claim to have a solution to this problem, but we would like to offer a few ideas that might prove useful.

#### We are not science, we use science – our method is the same one everyone inevitably uses on a day-to-day basis, just more rigorous

Jean Bricmont 1, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Louvain, “Defense of a Modest Scientific Realism”, September 23, <http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/bielefeld_final.pdf>

So, how does one obtain evidence concerning the truth or falsity of scientific assertions? By the same imperfect methods that we use to obtain evidence about empirical assertions generally. Modern science, in our view, is nothing more or less than the deepest (to date) refinement of the rational attitude toward investigating any question about the world, be it atomic spectra, the etiology of smallpox, or the Bielefeld bus routes. Historians, detectives and plumbers indeed, all human beings use the same basic methods of induction, deduction and assessment of evidence as do physicists or biochemists.18 Modern science tries to carry out these operations in a more careful and systematic way, by using controls and statistical tests, insisting on replication, and so forth. Moreover, scientific measurements are often much more precise than everyday observations; they allow us to discover hitherto unknown phenomena; and scientific theories often conflict with "common sense'\*. But [he con f I id is al the level of conclusions, nol (he basic approach. As Susan Haack lucidly observes: Our standards of what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and what constitutes good, strong, supportive evidence are not internal to science. In judging where science has succeeded and where it has failed, in what areas and at what times it has done better and in what worse, we are appealing to the standards by which we judge the solidity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and thoroughness of empirical inquiry, generally.1'1 Scientists' spontaneous epistemology the one that animates their work, regardless of what they may say when philosophizing is thus a rough-and-ready realism: the goal of science is to discover (some aspects of) how things really are. More The aim of science is to give a true (or approximately true) description of reality. I'll is goal is realizable, because: 1. Scientific theories are either true or false. Their truth (or falsity) is literal, not metaphorical; it does not depend in any way on us, or on how we test those theories, or on the structure of our minds, or on the society within which we live, and so on. 2. It is possible to have evidence for the truth (or falsity) of a theory. (Tt remains possible, however, that all the evidence supports some theory T, yet T is false.)20 Tin- most powerful objections to the viability of scientific realism consist in various theses showing that theories are underdetermined by data.21 In its most common formulation, the underdetermination thesis says that, for any finite (or even infinite) set of data, there are infinitely many mutually incompatible theories that are "compatible'' with those data. This thesis, if not properly understood22, can easily lead to radical conclusions. The biologist who believes that a disease is caused by a virus presumably does so on the basis of some "evidence" or some "data'\*. Saying that a disease is caused by a virus presumably counts as a "theory'' (e.g. it involves, implicitly, many counlerfactual statements). But if there are really infinitely many distinct theories that are compatible with those "data", then we may legitimately wonder on what basis one can rationally choose between those theories. In order to clarify the situation, it is important to understand how the underdetermination thesis is established; then its meaning and its limitations become much clearer. Here are some examples of how underdeterminatiou works; one may claim that: The past did not exist: the universe was created five minutes ago along with all the documents and all our memories referring to the alleged past in their present state. Alternatively, it could have been created 100 or 1000 years ago. The stars do not exist: instead, there are spots on a distant sky that emit exactly the same signals as those we receive. All criminals ever put in jail were innocent. For each alleged criminal, explain away all testimony by a deliberate desire to harm the accused; declare that all evidence was fabricated by the police and that all confessions were obtained bv force.2'1 Of course, all these "theses'1 may have to be elaborated, but the basic idea is clear: given any set of facts, just make up a story, no matter how ad hoc, to "account" for the facts without running into contradictions.2,1 It is important to realize that this is all there is to the general (Quinean) underdetermination thesis. Moreover, this thesis, although it played an important role in the refutation of the most extreme versions of logical positivism, is not very different from the observation that radical skepticism or even solipsism cannot be refuted: all our knowledge about the world is based on some sort of inference from the observed to the unobserved, and no such inference can be justified by deductive logic alone. However, it is clear that, in practice, nobody ever takes seriously such "theories" as those mentioned above, any more than they take seriously solipsism or radical skepticism. Let us call these "crazy theories'\*2'1 (of course, it is not easy to say exactly what it means for a theory to be non-crazy). Xote that these theories require no work: they can be formulated entirely a priori. On the other hand, the difficult problem, given some set of data, is to find even one non-crazy theory that accounts for them. Consider, for example, a police enquiry about some crime: it is easy enough to invent a story that "accounts for the facts'" in an ad hoc fashion (sometimes lawyers do just that); what is hard is to discover who really committed the crime and to obtain evidence demonstrating that beyond a reasonable doubt. Reflecting on this elementary example clarifies the meaning of the underdelermination thesis. Despite the existence of innumerable "crazy theories'\* concerning any given crime, it sometimes happens in practice that there is a unique theory (i.e. a unique story about who committed the crime and how) that is plausible and compatible with the known facts; in that case, one will say that the criminal has been discovered (with a high degree of confidence, albeit not with certainty). It may also happen that no plausible theory is found, or that we are unable to decide which one among several suspects is really guilty: in these cases, the underdetermination is real.-'' One might next ask whether there exist more subtle forms of underdetermination than the one revealed by a Duhem Quine type of argument. In order to analyze this question, let us consider the example of classical electromagnetism. This is a theory that describes how particles possessing a quantifiable property called "electric charge" produce "electromagnetic fields" that "propagate in vacuum" in a certain precise fashion and then "guide" the motion of charged particles when they encounter them.2' Of course, no one ever "sees" directly an electromagnetic field or an electric charge. So, should one interpret this theory "realistically'', and if so, what should it be taken to mean? Classical electromagnetic theory is immensely well supported by precise experiments and forms the basis for a large part of modern technology. It is "confirmed'' every time one of us switches on his or her computer and finds that it works as designed.'8 Does this overwhelming empirical support imply that there are "really"' electric and magnetic fields propagating in vacuum? In support of the idea that thenare, one could argue that electromagnetic theory postulates the existence of those fields and that there is no known non-crazy theory that accounts equally well for the same data; therefore it is reasonable to believe that electric and magnetic fields really exist. But is it in fact true that there are no alternative non-crazy theories? Here is one possibility: Let us claim that there are no fields propagating "in vacuum", but that, rather, there are only "forces" acting directly between charged particles.29 Of course, in order to preserve the empirical adequacy of the theory, one lias to use exactly the same Maxwell Lorentz system of equations as before (or a mathematically equivalent system). But one may interpret the fields as a mere "calculational device" allowing us to compute more easily the net effect of the "real" forces acting between charged particles.30 Almost every physicist reading these lines will say that this is some kind of metaphysics or maybe even a play on words that this "alternative theory" is really just standard electromagnetic theory in disguise. Xow, although the precise meaning of "metaphysics" is hard to pin down 31, there is a vague sense in which, if we use exactly the same equations (or a mathematically equivalent set of equations) and make exactly the same predictions in the two theories, then they are really the same theory as far as "physics" is concerned, and the distinction between the two if any lies outside of its scope. The same kind of observation can be made about most physical theories: In classical mechanics, are there really forces acting on particles, or are the particles instead following trajectories defined by variational principles? In general relativity, is space-time really curved, or are there, rather, fields that cause particles to move as if space-time were curved?'2 Let us call this kind of underdetermination "genuine'\*, as opposed to the "crazy" underdeterminations of the usual Duhem Quine thesis. By "genuine'\*, we do not mean that these underdeterminations are necessarily worth losing sleep over, but simply that there is no rational way to choose (at least on empirical grounds alone) between the alternative theories if indeed they should be regarded as different theories.

#### The inclusion of hypothetical impact scenarios supercharges the deliberative process by providing a normative means of assessing consequences

Larsen et al 9

a KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History of Technology, Division of History of Science and Technology, Teknikringen 76, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

b KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Planning and Environment, Division of Environmental Strategies Research, Drottning Kristinas väg 30, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden

Habitat International

Volume 33, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 260–266

Climate Change and Human Settlements

Climatechange scenarios and citizen-participation: Mitigation and adaptation perspectives in constructing sustainable futures

In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions. These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt within other field, such as climatechange predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about (Larsen & Höjer, 2007). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes. Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies. Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning (Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005: 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007) underline the importance of deliberative processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome. Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the process as crucial, but aiming for goals such as minimized climatechange both the content and the impact of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with Connelly and Richardson (in press) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' “effectiveness in delivering an intended policy”. They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as “the recognised right to make policy” (Connelly & Richardson, in press). There are thus three dimensions Connelly and Richardson (in press) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climatechange, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. Hendriks et al. (2007) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analysing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators (Hendriks et al., 2007: 362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process Hendriks et al. (2007) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so (Hendriks et al., 2007: 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy “so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums” (Hendriks et al., 2007: 371). In the study by Hendriks et al. (2007: 372) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: “the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes.” In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts (Hendriks et al., 2007: 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasising participatory processes (and the inherent process values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. “astroturfing”1 or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the “normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors” as described in Suchman (1995: 571) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory (Healey, 1996) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions (Healey, 2000). Campbell (2006) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as Campbell (2006: 95) puts it: “In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping.” Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a “particular responsibility to society's weakest groups” (Andersson, 2006: 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the “weakest groups” (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory (Sally, 1995). Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by “cheap talk”. As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that “when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as “natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are “better than rational” when they are allowed to communicate, or do “cheap talk” as some economists call it (see e.g. Ostrom, 1998). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase.

#### Our heuristic overcomes disbelief and mobilizes public responses

Romm 12 (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” Time named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT., 2/26/2012, “Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of ‘Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages’ on Climate”, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546)

The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn’t work and indeed is actually counterproductive! These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?“). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see “Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging“) The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not “doomsday” but what I’d call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here). You’d think it would be pretty obvious that the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue. And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle. Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I’ll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research. Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain’t doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme. The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the “constant repetition of doomsday messages” doesn’t work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above. But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I’ve been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn’t easy to stay up with the latest movies. That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain’t. In fact, if that is truly someone’s idea of environmental movie, count me out. The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd “global cooling” notion in people’s heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and “the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid,” as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, “Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie,” but it isn’t a climate movie. I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I’ve read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that’s my job! — and they don’t qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don’t expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate. Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to: The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages, let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face. The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see “Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011“). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and many outlets still feature hard-core deniers. Just imagine what the public’s view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an “employment denier” quoted on TV or in a newspaper? The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, “Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding? Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly “liberal media” like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn’t doomsday. Indeed, there isn’t even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most “liberal” columnists rarely mention it. At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC’s Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime. The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked. There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain’t doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday? If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you’ve all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it. Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven’t even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven’t read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world. Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they’d be right — see “The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2.” It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public’s concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media’s disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.

#### Our deployment of risk is enabling – we need to visualize climate change to shake up political apathy

Ulrich Beck 10, sociology prof at Munich, “Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity?”, Theory Culture Society 2010 27: 254

Sixth thesis: The political explosiveness of global risks is largely a function of their (re-)presentation in the mass media. When staged in the media, global risks can become ‘cosmopolitan events’. The presentation and visualization of manufactured risk makes the invisible visible. It creates simultaneity, shared involvement and shared suffering, and thereby creates the relevance for a global public. Thus cosmopolitan events are highly mediatized, highly selective, highly variable, highly symbolic local and global, public and private, material and communicative, reflexive experiences and blows of fate. To understand this, we have to draw upon the picture of ‘Mediapolis’ so minutely and sensitively painted by Silverstone (2006) and the picture sketched much earlier by Dewey (1946). There Dewey defends the thesis that it is not actions but their consequences which lie at the heart of politics. Although he was not thinking of global warming, BSE or terrorist attacks, his theory can be applied perfectly to world risk society. A global public discourse does not arise out of a consensus on decisions, but rather out of disagreement over the consequences of decisions. Modern risk crises are constructed out of just such controversies over consequences. Although some insist on seeing an overreaction to risk, risk conflicts do indeed have an enlightening function. They destabilize the existing order but can also be seen as a vital step towards the construction of new institutions. Global risk has the power to confuse the mechanisms of organized irresponsibility and even to open them up for political action. This view of ‘enforced enlightenment’ and ‘cosmopolitan realism’ opens up the possibility that the ‘manufactured uncertainties’ and ‘manufactured insecurities’ produced by world risk society prompt transnational reflexivity, global cooperation, coordinated responses against the background of ‘cosmopolitan communities of risk’, so the same processes may also prompt much else besides. My emphasis on staging follows from the fact that my central concept is not ‘crisis’ but ‘new global risk’. Risks are, essentially, man-made, incalculable, uninsurable threats and catastrophes which are anticipated but which often remain invisible and therefore depend on how they become defined and contested in ‘knowledge’. As a result their ‘reality’ can be dramatized or minimized, transformed or simply denied, according to the norms which decide what is known and what is not. They are, to repeat myself, products of struggles and conflicts over definitions within the context of specific relations of definitional power and the (in varying degrees successful) results of staging. If this is the core understanding of risk, then this means that we must attach major significance to media staging and acknowledge the potential political explosiveness of the media. How does this correspond to empirical facts? As Cottle (2009) argues, the release in early 2007 of the latest International Panel on Climate Change report proved to be a transformative moment in the news career of climate change (IPCC, 2007). At first climate change featured relatively in frequently in scientifically framed news reports, then it was contested by a small group of news-privileged climate change sceptics, and finally it came of age as a widely recognized ‘global risk’ demanding responses from all the world’s nations. If IPCC predictions and those of more recent scientific modelling come to pass over the next couple of decades, then climate change may yet prove to be the most powerful of forces summoning a civilizational community of fate into existence. The Western news media’s spectacular visualization of climate change, presenting dramatic and symbolic scenes collected from around the world, has undoubtedly helped to establish the latter’s status as a widely recognized global challenge and serves to illuminate a third-generational modernity staged as global spectacle. Here the news media do not only function in terms of a global focusing of events; rather, the news media adopt a more performative stand, actively enacting certain issues as ‘global risks’. Images which function in a more indexical sense to stand in for global processes of climate change now regularly feature across the news landscape. And here some sections of the news media have sought to champion climate change awareness, often through visually arresting images which aim to register the full force and threat produced by global warming around the world. In images such as these, the abstract science of climate change is rendered culturally meaningful and politically consequential; geographically remote spaces become literally perceptible, ‘knowable’ places of possible concern and action. This performative use of visual environmental rhetoric is not confined to selected newspapers; interestingly enough, it has become mainstream. In this way the threat and reality of global climate change has been ‘brought home’, especially in the West, as possibly ‘the’ global risk of the age. On the other hand, the continuing pull of the national within the world’s news formations and discourses cannot be underestimated. This is, of course, true in the case of wars. Wars continue to be reported through spectacles tinted by national interests. However, as climate change moves into a new phase of national and international contention, countries, corporations and citizens are also negotiating their respective roles and responsibilities, whether in respect of national policies of mitigation and adoption, or through governmental support of developing countries confronting the worst effects of global warming. Here, too, actions and reactions are often reported in and through national news prisms and frames of reference. However, the narrative of global risk is misinterpreted as a narrative of the Western ‘emergency imaginary’ (Calhoun, 2004). It is not a ‘singing into the apocalypse’, and it is not simply a ‘wake-up call to reality’. Rather it is about expectation and anticipation, it is about a narrative to dream differently. ‘Emancipation’ is the key word. Either the ecological concern manages to be at least as powerful as this hunger for modernization or it is condemned to repeated failure.

Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation" book review of Red, Black & White: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms and Mama Africa: Reinventing Blackness in Bahia, Cultural Studies Review volume 17 number 2 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index pp. 381–91

Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes:¶ The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’¶ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7¶ Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279)¶ Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

# 2AC

## 2AC

#### A) Debate is key to UDL’s – and those are good

NAUDL ‘13

“Urban debate continues to grow - 7,000 debaters and counting!” *National Association for Urban Debate League.* <http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs163/1108902086854/archive/1114092371558.html>. EJW.)

In the 2012-13 school year, the number of students competing in urban debate leagues grew by more than 1,000 to reach 7,301 participants, an increase of more than 16%.¶ ¶ "We are thrilled that **the number of urban debaters in the U.S. now exceeds 7,000**," said Linda Listrom, Executive Director, NAUDL. "The opportunity to compete on a debate team is life-changing, particularly for students in urban public schools. Two years ago NAUDL set an ambitious goal to triple the number of urban debaters across the U.S. At that time, there were 4,000 students participating. Our **steady growth over the last two years shows we are on the right track.** We congratulate our leagues on their success and outstanding results."¶ ¶ In addition to the increased number of participants, **the average number of debates per student increased by 18%,** indicating many **debaters are staying with the activity longer**. Studies have shown that the more rounds a student debates, the greater the benefits to the student's academic performance, likelihood of graduating high school, and civic commitment.¶ ¶ Urban debate leagues currently reach 438 public schools in 19 cities across the United States. **Seventy-six percent of urban debaters are from low-income families and 86% are students of color.** While debate programs in many suburban school districts are robust, cash-strapped urban schools struggle to offer the same academically rigorous debate programs to their students. **Urban debate programs level the playing field.** It is NAUDL's goal to triple the number of students participating in urban debate by 2016.

#### Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle proves the education garnered from policy debate translates into applicable social justice skills

LBS No Date

“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle: About Us.” *Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle.* <http://lbsbaltimore.com/about-us/>. EJW.)

**Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle** (LBS) is a for-profit, youth led think-tank and political action committee (PAC) which **works toward transformative change on behalf of marginalized people** Baltimore City.¶ We seek **to radically change the discourse** around local and regional politics by injecting community voices into political conversations **through policy research, advocacy, and community organizing from a grassroots perspective.**¶ As one of the few political action committees where all the founding members are under the age of 25, **we** seek to use our unique experience as college educated youth raised in Baltimore City to **challenge status quo** “politics as usual” around the **issues that** most deeply **effect disadvantaged communities**.¶ We receive no funding from any foundations, nonprofits, or political parties. Instead, **we are an independent group of concerned youth** attempting to engage hands on with the political sphere.¶ Established in August 2010, LBS is comprised of a Board of Directors which runs day to day operations. All board members attended Baltimore City Public Schools. We feel this gives us critical personal experience with the conditions of poverty and community disempowerment we now seek to address.¶ The real life “Great Debaters”¶ **The organization’s focus on policy stems** the unique experience many of our members had **with the activity of intercollegiate policy debate** while attending Towson University in Baltimore, MD. In a community which had traditionally favored a dispassionate “C-SPAN” style of debate, members of LBS introduced a style that reflected their experience as African American youth from Baltimore, with political hip-hop, poetry, and an explicit focus on social justice at its foundation. This style eventually transformed the college debate community, carrying LBS director Dayvon Love to the 2008 Debate National Championship and other members of LBS to great success as debaters and coaches. Towson consistently defeated teams from powerhouse debate schools like Dartmouth, Harvard, and Northwestern with its unique approach and having analyzed issues ranging from Supreme Court Statutory Law to Federal Agricultural Policy through the lens of racial justice. **LBS now seeks to find practical applications for the knowledge we gained in becoming**, in the words of Syracuse Professor Dr. Boyce Watkins, “ The Real Life ‘**Great Debaters’** ”.¶ This is also the reason why we chose to engage in public speaking. **With** over 30 years of combined **experience** dedicated to studying, **practicing** and teaching public speaking¶ and **debate** at a national championship level, we feel **we have acquired presentation and argumentation skills that make our organization uniquely suited to fill** a role **this role**. Simply put, speaking is not just something we want to do, it’s who we are, and we seek to use public speaking as platform to educate and inform others, while simultaneously raising funds to support our work.

#### Debate good—the skills we gain from debate create the education of empowerment

Warner and Bruschke ‘01

*“GONE ON DEBATING:” COMPETITIVE ACADEMIC DEBATE AS A TOOL OF EMPOWERMENT FOR URBAN AMERICA.* Dr. Ede Warner¶ (University of Louisville¶) Dr. Jon Bruschke¶ (California State University, Fullerton. Paper presented at the 2001 Western States Communication Association convention in Coer d’Alene, Idaho. <http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/jbruschke/Papers/Debate%20as%20a%20Tool%20of%20empowerment.htm>. EJW.)

What does empowerment mean? An understanding of the term must begin in our contemporary social context. The postmodern situation is one where individuals are more and more dependent upon institutions and bureaucracies, and those bureaucracies have a **tendency** to insulate themselves from the individuals that they are supposed to serve. As the situation warps itself, **the institutions** become self-protective and increasingly orient themselves to support the well off while increasingly ignoring the needs of the under-served. The institutions **serve the privileged because only the privileged have access to and influence in the institutions**. Thus, “one of the most debilitating results of modernization is a feeling of powerlessness in the face of institutions controlled by those whom we do not know and whose values we often do not share” (Galston, 1996, p. 164). **Individuals and communities become empowered when they possess “the capacity to change** social relations and the ownership, management, and distribution of wealth” (Jennings, 1992, p. 34) in both public and private contexts. Thus, at its most basic level, **social policy should focus on “empowering poor people to do the things that the more affluent can already do**, aim at spreading the power around a bit more – and to do so where it matters most, in people’s control over their own lives” (Galston, 1996, p. 164).¶ We believe that empowerment occurs at both individual and community levels, and that **communities are empowered as the individuals in those communities are empowered**. Professor Galston (1996) puts forth the view in a powerful way:¶ Empowerment should be understood…as a multidimensional social possibility. Along one dimension, individuals can be empowered to make personal choices that improve their lives -- choices that may (but need not) require new or stronger associational bonds with others. Along another dimension, communities can be empowered to act in ways that promote the common good as defined collectively by their members. Empowerment, then, is frequently, but not invariably, linked to mediating institutions; it may sometimes be promoted and pursued by individuals through instruments other than these institutions. (pp. 58-69)¶ ¶ **Education has** long **been** a **key facet of empowerment**. Galston (1996) has firmly located education at the center of empowerment: “For many younger Americans, empowerment comes through post-secondary education and advanced training” (p. 60). “Education” is not a static variable, however, and there can be little doubt that the type of education one receives (both its content and its means of transmission) makes a profound difference. What are the characteristics of an empowering education? The possibilities are, of course, multifaceted, and to capture the richness of the concepts we quote Ira Shor (1992) at some length here:¶ **Empowering education invites students to become** skilled workers and **thinking citizens who are** also **change agents and social critics**. Giroux (1988) described this as educating students “to fight for a quality of life in which all human beings benefit.” He went on to say, “Schools need to be defended, as an important public service that educates students to be critical citizens who can think, challenge, take risks, and believe that their actions will make a difference in the larger society” (214). Further, McLaren (1989) discussed the pedagogy as “the process which students learn to critically appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their understanding of themselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way that we live” (186). Banks (1991) defined empowerment in terms of transforming self and society: “A curriculum designed to empower students must be transformative in nature and help students to develop the knowledge, skills, and values needed to become social critics who can make reflective decisions in effective personal, social, political, and economic action” (131). (pp. 16-17).¶ ¶ Beyond the curricular issues, the manner in which education is conducted should be empowering. In contrast to the traditional, top-down, and lecture-oriented model of educational communication, an empowering classroom must see student growth as “an active, cooperative, and social process” (Shor, 1992, p. 15). Friere (1993) has taken a similar view and criticized what he deems “narrative sickness” in our schools.¶ Broken down, this compendium of definitions include at least three requirements for an empowering education. First, **students must learn to engage knowledge in a critical way**. They **must be able to listen carefully to a point of view, examine its strong and weak points in a dialectical way, and then choose for themselves their own beliefs about a subject**. They must “approach received wisdom and the status quo with questions” (Shor, 1992, p. 17). Second, **they must be social critics**. Essentially, t**hey must apply the same dialectical stance toward the world they live in** **and** the public policies they are asked to live by and participate in enacting. Third, studentsmust **agents of change** whoare **willing to take risks, and believe that those actions can make a difference**. Ostensibly, the more comfortable students are in participating with the systems that produce change the more willing they will be as risk takers and change agents. Running through all themes is a critical approach, a dialectical thinking process whereby students develop “habits of inquiry and critical curiosity” (Shor, 1992, p. 15).¶ In sum, **empowerment is the ability to change one’s own life** and one’s community, empowerment occurs at both individual and community levels, and t**he most crucial role education can play in relation to empowerment is teaching students the skills of critical intellectual engagement.** What remains is to discover how academic debate fits into this scheme of empowerment.¶ THE NATURE OF ACADEMIC COMPETITIVE POLICY DEBATE¶ Competitive academic debate is a broad field that includes contests on many different sorts of topics (e.g., value or policy) in a variety of formats. Although it is true that “argument is argument” and a full-service debate program can offer a variety of debate formats to serve a variety of student needs, this essay will focus on the unique research and critical thinking emphasis of policy debate. There are at least six characteristics of academic debate that are relevant to empowerment: Debate is based on student performance, and it is competitive, interscholastic, time pressured, research intensive, and dialectical.¶ A brief description of policy debate may be useful for those unfamiliar with its content and format. Policy debate squads are composed of multiple two-person teams and each school can field as many teams as they have resources to support. At the high school level, a national organization, the National Forensics League, sets a topic for the entire season. Each school takes its teams to interscholastic tournaments, hosted by either high schools or colleges, and contestants will usually compete in between three and eight preliminary rounds. Teams are awarded wins and losses and each speaker is assigned individual speaker points. Each round takes roughly an hour and a half to complete. At the conclusion of the preliminary rounds the tournament administrator will either recognize the top teams and speakers in order or hold a single-elimination run-off to determine an overall champion. Either way, the top teams and speakers at the tournament receive trophies or awards. The topic is usually fairly broad (past topics, for example, have included “Resolved: That the United States should significantly change its foreign policy towards Russia”), and each team must debate both sides of the topic, called the affirmative and negative. At a four round tournament, for instance, each team would have two affirmative and two negative rounds. When affirmative, teams are free to choose from any case area under the broad topic. On the Russia topic, a team might choose to focus on nuclear policy, immigration policy, military deterrence, or economic policy. Those case areas might further be refined to cases about NATO expansion, nuclear alert status, etc. When negative, teams must refute whichever specific case area the affirmative chooses. Obviously, being prepared to debate any possible case area under the topic requires a staggering amount of research and preparation before the tournament begins. A high school squad typically competes in eight to twelve tournaments a year.¶ A first characteristic of competitive **academic debate is thus that it is student performance based.** During the course of the debate students respond to each other’s speeches. An affirmative speaker presents the case, a negative speaker will then conduct a cross-examination, and the negative partner will refute the affirmative case. This basic sequence repeats through four constructive speeches and four rebuttals. Importantly, the students are responding to each other. The judge, usually a teacher or college debater, observes the debate and provides feedback after the debate is over either in the form of an oral critique or written comments on a ballot. Notice that **the students are** not learning by taking notes and memorizing facts, they are **“learning by doing.”** During their debates students must be able to make a solid presentation, defend their stance against objections and contrary evidence, answer questions about their own claims and evidence, think on their feet, and coordinate their strategies with their partner. ¶ There are two powerful benefits to the performance-oriented nature of **debate**. First, there is strong reason to believe **that students develop and grow much faster when they are actually engaged in the subject** they are supposed to be internalizing as opposed to simply being exposed to the writing and lecturing of others (Friere, 1993). The learning cycle is complete when students are taught how to do something and then get the chance to do it for themselves. Second,the very nature of the event **empowers students by putting them in charge of their own fates.** **Rather than relying strictly on the authority figure** of the teacher to direct the learning, the **students** are **depend**ing **on themselves and each other**. As Melissa Wade (1998) writes:¶ There are certainly trends **in** **education** which encourage interactive and dialogic pedagogies, but **few are as potent as debate**. Teachers and students from many different schools from across the United States learn from each other as positions are built and evaluated in the laboratory of competition. **A contest round reverses the narration pattern of traditional education**. The student speaks to the teacher, referencing information that reflects an understanding of concrete knowledge grounded in research. Through the ballot or the oral critique the teacher reacts, refines ideas, and encourages the student, but the basis of their meeting is student driven; the basis uniquely relevant for student experiential education. In this way, students have an authentic learning experience, an experience that does not treat them like an object to be “filled,” but as a person with whom a teacher shares. (pp. 63-4) ¶ ¶ Third, **the skills developed in debate transfer to other endeavors**. Competitive academic debate targets advanced skill development; **competitors** must **master** the basic **reading, writing, and research skills** (the “Three R’s” of debate) **and** also **develop critical thinking**, time management, and organizational skills.Brand assesses the generalizability of these proficiencies:¶ **Debate promotes strong research and reasoning skills which go beyond** most in-**class** speaking or writing assignments. **The time and commitment of debate competitors manifests itself in skills which can be successfully transferred to a variety of professional experiences. Once removed from the competitive debate environment, debaters are more than capable of using effective delivery and other communication skills.** Evaluations of debate based on the competitive environment do an injustice to the excellence which the activity promotes. These benefits need to be made evident to others in the discipline. (p. 263)¶ ¶ Debate participation also has the potential to improve traditional grades and test scores. In a very direct way, many underachieving students, once “gone on debating,” become better academic performers. In a more indirect way others choose to meet the debate team’s academic eligibility requirements because they want to keep participating on the squad. Of course, some students fail to improve academically but our experience in over two decades of coaching is that at-risk and underachieving students tend to fall into the first two categories if they get excited about debate. Empirical data on the subject is hard to come by, however, one recent meta-analysis demonstrated that participation in debate is a powerful way to advance critical thinking skills (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). It is important to note that whether social scientists can prove a relationship between traditional educational measures and debate the point may be ancillary to an overall educational strategy. This paper seeks not simply to prove that debate can improve traditional student performance, but that debate is the sort of activity that can lead to student empowerment in a way that traditional education fails to encourage. In other words, academic debate has tremendous value quite apart from its ability to improve achievement. ¶ Secondly, **academic debate is competitive**. Wins and losses are awarded at the end of every debate. The best teams at each tournament receive trophies, as do the top speakers. Students are not competing against an abstract measure for a grade; they are competing against each other. The result is a much more rigorous evaluation process. Instead of relying on a single teacher to point out the strengths and weaknesses of each argument, the students (motivated by a desire to win) point out the weaknesses in each other’s arguments. Over the course of a season of debating, virtually all weaknesses are exposed at some point. The better teams, of course, address those shortcomings and improve. In all cases, **the competition drives students to improve themselves and impress the judges.¶** Put bluntly, the competition makes debate frightening. It is well known that there is widespread fear of public speaking, and academic debate takes the stakes up a notch. Not only are students asked to speak in public, they must speak in public knowing that their positions will be attacked and about half the time they will be handed a loss for their efforts. Much can be done to make debate less intimidating (good judges will provide positive and negative feedback, and tournament environments can be made encouraging), but successful competitors will gain their success only by taking on great risks and overcoming great challenges.¶ Third, **academic debate is interscholastic**. Although practice **debates** are held against other teams from a student’s own school, tournaments almost always feature competition against other high schools. The very nature of an interscholastic activity is such **that students are constantly meeting people outside of their immediate social circle**. At large tournaments with a national draw debaters interact with other students who live in distant states and have experiences far removed from the other competitors. Students are exposed to other campuses, including collegiate venues, and are often judged by college students. Unlike athletic interscholastic activities, where students might never converse with their opponents, there is a large amount of “down time” before and after **debates** that affords ample opportunity for informal conversation. These characteristics necessarily **broaden the perspectives and horizons of students. By meeting different people** from different cities, seeing different sights and campuses, the **students are exposed to a way of life different** (if only by degree) from their own. The benefits of contact with college campuses and college-student judges cannot be overestimated; urban students who may be the first in their families to attend college may not have a social support network that encourages post-secondary education. Meeting people who go to college and seeing campuses first hand is a powerful way to make college a less intimidating and more attainable place to be.¶ Further, the interscholastic model accelerates learning in a exponential way. Interscholastic debate differs from debate in the classroom (sometimes referred to as “debate across the curriculum”). The difference between the two is analogous to the difference between a regular gym class and a school’s basketball team that competes against other schools. The philosophy behind the gym class is that all students will benefit from some exposure to physical fitness; in a similar vein, the idea behind classroom debate is that all students will benefit from an exposure to the basic precepts of argument and debate. The philosophy behind the basketball team is that the very best athletes will excel to vastly greater levels of development by competing against the very best athletes of other schools. Similarly, tournament debate offers the students most “gone on” academic debating to sharpen and refine their skills to truly advanced degrees by competing in tournament formats against the best speakers and debaters from other institutions.¶ Fourth, academic debate is a time-pressured activity. **The critical thinking and strategic skills are learned in a fast-paced environment.** Every speech, the cross-examination periods, and even the preparation time allotted for each team during the debate is subject to strict and limits. Time allocation often determines who wins and loses a debate, and the task is made all the more difficult given the complex number of arguments advanced in a given round. Consequently, debaters must not only work at understanding the arguments, but work at understanding which arguments are the most important to the final decision. A negative team may initiate ten arguments in their first speech (traditionally eight or nine minutes), but since their rebuttal speeches are roughly half as long competitors face decisions about which arguments are the more crucial. Constant awareness of the interrelationships between arguments is critical to success. Efficiency in word selection, language variety, and rhetorical choice are premium skills. All in all, the highly-specialized technical aspects of debate teach students not just to develop reasoning, speaking, and strategy skills, but teaches these skills in a pressured environment. By its very nature, debate sets the highest possible expectation for what students are capable of doing.¶ Fifth, **academic debate is research intensive.** Debaters must know what the best arguments are against a particular position, and that understand must include knowing how the opposition can answer the those arguments. For example, a recent collegiate topic on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act necessitated discussions of a wide range of issues, regarding everything from pregnancy accommodation laws, to stronger protections for gays and lesbians in the workplace, to consideration of the effect of Title VII on minority businesses. On the high school Russia topic, an affirmative choosing to discuss the de-alerting of our nuclear weapons could expect a varied negative attack including diverse argumentation on the feasibility of the proposal, the lack of a risk of nuclear launch given current institutional structures, philosophical objections to any attempt make nuclear weapons “safer,” the political unpopularity of the proposal, and the program’s cost. **The research demands** of academic debate, coupled with the competitive nature of debate, can **motivate a student** with little interest in research or education to research simply **because they want to do well in debate**. In other words, competition becomes a vehicle for motivating students to research.¶ Finally, at its core debate is a dialectical process. Originally, the dialectical process referred to a question-and-answer format between students and teachers and was juxtaposed with a lecturing method of teaching (Infante, Rancer, & Womack, 1990, p. 97). In more modern Hegelian and Marxist terms, it has come to mean the offering of a thesis, the counter of the thesis with an antithesis, and the continual refining of both the thesis and antithesis into a synthesis. Most recently, the term has been used to communicate relationships of constant tension, nonlinearity, and process. The term is used here to mean a type of thinking that recognizes both sides of problem, resists absolutist conclusions, demands the thorough questioning of any proposition, and recognizes the value of continually challenging both a thesis and its opposite. At least one theorist has argued that the dialectical process, thinking, and arguing, are synonymous (Billig, 1987).¶ Such dialectical practices lie at the heart of an academic debate. In the most general terms, the topic provides the thesis and is supported by the affirmative. The negative must offer the antithesis, and both teams defend their positions through a process of continual challenging. At a more microscopic level, each point either team offers is its own smaller thesis, and each point needs to be supported by evidence. The opposition will challenge the point with a contrary claim, an antithesis, and offer evidence for that contrary proposition. The remainder of the debate will be a process in which each team challenges the other side’s theses and evidence, defends its own claim and its own evidence, and may offer additional evidence to support its own point or refute that of the opposition. Cross-examination periods provide the chance for literal question-and-answer formats. The fact that debaters switch sides between rounds and defend both the affirmative and the negative side of a topic ensures that they are exposed to all possible points of view on a policy question. In short, academic debate demands that students challenge propositions, debate them from each side, and develop their discussions through the interrogation of policy claims. Academic debate is not an activity that simply facilitates dialectical thinking; debate is the practice of dialectical thinking in its most pure form. ¶ DEBATE AS A TOOL OF EMPOWERMENT¶ Given the criteria for an empowering education developed in the opening section of this paper, three questions remain. How does debate encourage students to think critically? How does debate teach students to be social critics? Finally, how does debate facilitate students becoming agents of change?¶ **Debate teaches students to become critical thinkers because of its dialectical nature**. **Students in the habit of questioning the claims** of others and thinking through the possible objections to their own claims **easily** **develop** the mental **faculties needed to become active consumers of info**rmation. Rather than simply taking knowledge offered to them at face value, students almost automatically begin thinking through possible objections to any knowledge claim and develop poignant questions about it. Consider the recent controversies over whether evolutionism or creationism should be taught in science classes. Some groups would have only creationism taught; some groups would have only evolutionism taught. The most enlightened compromise is, of course, to teach both possibilities and allow students to choose their own answers. **Debate facilitates critical outcomes in all possible permutations** of the issue. If only one side of the dispute is taught, debaters will automatically begin to question the point of view advanced by the teacher by virtue of mental habit. If both sides of the issue are taught, debaters will have the intellectual skills necessary to ask the most pointed questions and evaluate the dispute in a mature, informed, and systematic way.¶ **Academic debate facilitates the development of students as social critics because of its policy oriented and research intensive nature.** Although learning to think dialectically certainly might have some transferable skill that would allow students to evaluate questions of governance, no such transfer is even necessary. Students are directly debating questions of policy, and evaluating the effectiveness, morality, and desirability of different governmental actions and the possibility of non-governmental alternatives. Because all debates begin with an affirmative indictment of the status quo, all policy **debates invoke questions of** what **the current social order** is like **and how it can be improved.** Even when negative, students may offer “counter-plans” that provide alternative policy arrangements or philosophical critiques that ask the judge to “re-think” social orders and evaluate the affirmative plan in that new light. The research intensive nature of debate facilitates all these processes, and not only requires that students develop a broad base of knowledge about particular policy questions but also teaches them how to obtain knowledge on any policy question that they encounter.¶ Debate teaches students to become agents of change and risk takers because of its competitive, time-pressured, and interscholastic nature. Because debate is competitive, it can be terrifying. Students must engage in a public speaking event, then face the challenges of their opponent, and then immediately receive evaluation by a judge. Students who can face and overcome those challenges and those fears are seldom afraid of public dialogue in any other context, be it a political rally, city board meeting, electoral campaign, legal proceeding, or town hall meeting. The time pressured nature of the activity adds another element of challenge which, when mastered, makes other public discourse seem mundane by comparison. Finally, the interscholastic nature of debate makes students comfortable in dialogues with others of different backgrounds. Although there is no single, easy solution to the problem of confronting an institution controlled by someone that “we do not know and whose values we often do not share,” debate at least gives students the experience of competing against someone from a different socioeconomic level. ¶ **Debate** thus **confronts** at all levels the problems that the under-served confront when approaching institutions so often governed by the graduates of rich, private schools: The under-served gain practice at policy discussions on equal footing with the wealthy, **skills of discourse are equalized,** the experience can make economic disadvantage less of a barrier when confronting other rhetors, and **debate can serve as a conduit for the economically under-served to gain positions of power in institutions**. The interaction between students from all economic levels can increase understanding and common ground, making it less likely that the governing bodies will represent a single class and will misunderstand others due to a lack of contact. More basically, when students from urban schools debate against elite high schools and win, the students learn that victory is possible and that economic disadvantages can be overcome.¶ These arguments are theoretical; they cannot speak as powerfully as the voices of those who have experienced both the oppression of an education system failing from the “unique synergy between lack of funding and anachronistic pedagogical practices.” Ed Lee, who now holds a Master’s degree and works for an Urban Debate League in San Francisco, recounts his experience as an urban debater:¶ Educated in the public school system of inner-city Atlanta, my high school experience was tragically similar to the one depicted above. My savior, like many others, was the Atlanta Urban Debate League. It provided the opportunity to question the nefarious rites of passage (prison, drugs, and drinking) that seem to be uniquely debilitating to individuals in the poor urban communities. In enclaves of poverty, there is also an undercurrent of nihilism and negativity that eats away at the soul of the community. Adults are hopeless. Children follow their lead and become hopeless. The solution is to offer people a choice beyond minimum wage or prison. Urban Debate Leagues provide that. Debating delivers a galaxy of alternatives and opportunity for those who are only offered hopelessness and were unnecessary elements of our culture that existed becaused they (predominantly) go unquestioned. Questioning the very nature of our existence is at the heart of the debate process. I am left wondering what would occur if debate became as compulsory in inner-city educational culture as football and basketball? Imagine graduating from high school each year millions of underprivileged teenagers with the ability to articulate their needs, the needs of others, and the ability to offer solutions. I am convinced that someone would be forced to listen.¶ Urban **debate** Leagues **offer a pedagogical tool that** simultaneously **opens the mind to alternatives and empowers students to take control of their lives**. Half of the time, students are disseminating information and forming arguments about complex philosophical and political issues. In the other half, they answer the arguments of others. Self-reflexivity is an inherent part of the activity. Debating gives students the ability to articulate the partiality of all critical assessments. Contemporary educational techniques teach one side of the issue and universalize it as the only “truth.” **Debate forces students to evaluate both sides**, **and** determine their independent contextualized truth. Additionally, unlike the current pedagogy, debate **allows everything to be questioned…**The ability to question subjectivities presented as the objective truth makes debate uniquely empowering for individuals disenfranchised by the current system. **It teaches students to interrogate their own institutionalized neglect and the systemic unhindered oppression of others. It is one of the few venues we are able to question authority.** (pp. 95-6)¶ ¶ Given the possibilities an urban debate program presents, it is worth examining the practical possibilities for a revitalization of urban debate. One thing is clear: Urban debate is under-utilized at present. Many urban debate programs died in the late sixties and early seventies as the result of massive budget cuts. As tax revenues diminished in educational coffers, debate programs, always treated as just one of the “extracurricular” activities, got lost in efforts to stop the institutional bleeding by “doing more with less.” While college debate is more vibrant, as early as 1975 major college debate organizations were acknowledging the lack of diversity in intercollegiate forensics. Little has changed over the past twenty-five years; minority participation remains exceptionally low at the two major national policy debate tournaments, the Cross Examination Debate Association championship and the National Debate Tournament (Hill, 1997; Stepp, 1997)¶ There has been some discussion about the reasons that current academic debate fails to include participants of all stripes. Loge (1998) maintains that the perception of debate as a white activity is one deterrent for black students. Hill (1997) argues that cultural communication differences hurt efforts at motivating African-American participation. Cirlin (1997) contends that the style in academic debate turns people off in general, and we need to consider sociological approaches to changing the nature of the activity. Cirlin believes that the rapid rate of delivery, the extreme emphasis on research, and the technical nature of the “game” serve to destroy the rhetorical usefulness of the event, he argues. However, Brand (1997) argues that criticism over format acts to shield discussions about the benefits of forensic participation. We agree with Brand, and believe that one primary reason for the lack of minority participation is that high schools remain segregated, and because race and class lines overlap to a large extent the minority students attending impoverished high schools often simply fail to have debate available to them. At the very least, there is not a conscious effort to encourage students, especially under-achieving students, to participate in debate.¶ The advent of new Urban Debate Leagues demonstrates that when debate opportunities exist in under-served high schools students tend to flock to them. Two seminal programs that can provide a model for success exist in Detroit and Atlanta. Detroit has the longest running contemporary urban debate policy league. Created in 1984, the Detroit Urban Debate League was initiated as part of a plan to expand opportunities for the city’s “Gifted and Talented” (Ziegelmueller, 1998). In partnership with Wayne State University, the Detroit Urban League (UDL) offered summer scholarships and a city league, culminated in a city championship. The program in Atlanta has been spearheaded by Emory University and has been tremendously successful. Emory partnered with the Soros Foundation’s Open Society Institute (OSI) early in their efforts; based on the Emory experience, the OSI has expanded its debate outreach programs and now sponsors Urban Debate Leagues in 10 different cities (including Detroit). One such program exists in New York, which was able to generate a fifteen team league in it’s first year of existence. The program was a success in every level: Traditionally at-risk students reported marked improvements in school, the popularity of these debate programs grew in each participating school, and some students received debate scholarships at colleges and universities around the country. This season, OSI expanded the program to an additional fifteen schools and generated donations and sponsors which offered first year UDL students the opportunity to continue instruction at summer camp. For example, the Universities of Iowa, Michigan, and Northwestern all gave full scholarships to UDL students demonstrating financial need and competitive success.¶ The Director of OSI program, Beth Breger, speaks to the success of the program:¶ Since the program’s inception, there has been significant networking and information exchange among grantees, as well as potential partners interested in launching similar programs elsewhere in the country. These initiatives have made great strides in attracting other sponsors and supporters, as programs in Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago, and New York already have funds allocated by the participating schools. Universities have contributed extensive in-kind support, school systems have begun to allocate funding from their budgets, and community and corporate foundations have expressed interest in supporting these initiatives.” (pp. 67-8)¶ ¶ William Baker, director of the New York Urban Debate League, made this additional observation: “The students are reporting grades, watching CNN, and learning, in some cases for the first time, that **knowledge is power and debate is the tool for exercising that power**” (1998, pp. 70-1).¶ In short, **academic debate has tremendous potential to empower urban students and assist them in their development into active agents of change**. Although urban debate is not currently widespread, there are some very promising vanguard programs that have demonstrated that urban debate on a national scale can be very successful. The efforts in Detroit and Atlanta and the interest and support of the OSI have allowed several promising models of urban debate to emerge. One can only wonder at the tremendous transformative effect programs and models could have if duplicated nationwide.

#### Critical thinking and research skill that we learn from debate spill over and allow us to effectively pressure and draw attention to issues that creates actual change—we can turn back the master’s tools

Hager 92, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentaryco mmissiont o studye nergyp olicy,w hichf or the first time would draw all concernedp articipantst ogetheri n a discussiono f both short-termc hoicesa nd long-termg oals of energyp olicy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49T hese commissionsg ave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernizationa nd technicali nnovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurizationd evices. With proddingf rom the energyc ommission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### A strategy of fanaticism rejects critical thinking—turns empowerment education

Marimaa ‘11

Kalmer Marimaa¶ Ph.D. Student in Social Science, ¶ Lecturer in Religious Studies and Sociology at the Tartu ¶ Theological Seminary, Estonia, “THE MANY FACES OF FANATICISM.” KVÜÕA toimetised, (14), 29-55.<http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_14_2_kalmer_marimaa.pdf>¶ EJW.)

Unwavering conviction about the absolute rightness of one’s understanding¶ According to Calhoun, **“fanaticism [is not] merely a strong commitment to a worldview, ideology or belief system.**”24 **Many** **people are devoted** to a cer-tain religion, ideology or political system **without being fanatics**. In Calhoun’s view, **fanaticism is not** the same as **merely** exhibiting **extreme enthusiasm** either. Men and women of principle are considered confident and not fanatic. Besides, those who fight selflessly and tirelessly for social change are con- sidered heroes. If someone has strong convictions it does not mean that s/he would think about her/himself as infallible. **What does differentiate fanatics from people who are confident in a positive way is that they are absolutely certain their understandings are absolutely correct**.25¶ Perkinson sees **fanatics as dogmatic people whose** theories, **ideology and** **proposed solutions are absolutely right in their own eyes**. At the same time **fanatics avoid critical thinking when they ignore or are not able to see those** “**arguments**, facts, or consequences **that refute his solutions**”.26 According to Klassen, the religious fanatic takes his/her scripture as a “paper pope”, that needs to be taken as is, without any need to think about how to interpret or apply it considering present-day and human experience. S/he believes that the text of the scripture is able to answer all questions.27 There is a meeting point between religious fundamentalism and fanaticism: the scripture is taken as the infallible Word of God and in cases where it contradicts scientific discov- eries or everyday experiences the written text is trusted and scientific facts and experience are considered erroneous or are totally ignored.28 Doctor of Philosophy Leonidas Donskis, while relying on George Orwell’s concept of nationalism, considers that fanatical faith goes hand-in-hand with fanatical distrust of reality where obvious facts are denied and illusions are preferred. Therefore, in the fanatic’s opinion, reality that does not confirm or support his/her convictions must be rejected**.**29 According to Professor of Sociology Charles Selengut, some psychological tension that comes from the incompat- ibility between an ideal and reality can be related to certain manifestations of fanaticism. While many believers adapt their religious ideas and theology to surrounding reality and scientific discoveries, some are not willing to make such compromises in their theology. That is why they try to subject reality to their religious views and can even use violence for this purpose, if need be.30

#### Coalitions DA—Political fanaticism kills coalitions—those are key to anti-racist struggle and rejecting patriarchy and homophobia **West 93**

 1993 (Cornel, Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York, Race Matters, Beacon Press)

**Instead of a closing-ranks mentality**, **a** prophetic **framework encourages** a **coalition strategy** **that solicits genuine solidarity with** those deeply committed to **antiracist struggle**. This strategy is neither naive nor opportunistic; black suspicion of whites, Latinos, Jews, and Asians runs deep for historical reasons. Yet there are slight though **significant antiracist traditions among whites, Asians**, and especially **Latinos, Jews, and indigenous people** that **must not be cast aside**. Such **coalitions are important** precisely **because** **they** not only **enhance the plight of black people** but also because they enrich the quality of life in America. Last, a prophetic framework **replaces black cultural conservatism with black cultural democracy**. Instead of authoritarian sensibilities that subordinate women or degrade gay men and lesbians, **black cultural democracy promotes the equality of black women and men and** the humanity of black gay men and lesbians. In short, black cultural democracy **rejects** thepervasive **patriarchy and homophobia in black American life.**

#### Debate is the critical location for focusing the discussion—their author

Reid-Brinkley 08

SHANARA ROSE REID-BRINKLEY. African American Studies and Communications as well as the Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,” 2008. <http://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/handle/10724/12500/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf?sequence=1> EJW.)

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. **The Louisville Project** has not convinced the debate¶ community to change its normative practice. Gi¶ ven the adversarial na¶ ture of tournament¶ competition, opposing teams seem most concerned¶ with developing viable strategies to beat¶ Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a¶ resolution of conflict between the Louisville team¶ and other community members. Yet, it seems¶ that attempts to engage the structural barriers¶ that maintain the lack of community diversity¶ seems to not have substantially increased racial¶ and ethnic inclusion. That¶ the Louisville team¶ **shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate¶ community to significantly increase its discussion¶ of the problem**. In other words, **the Project¶ may not directly result in sweeping changes** in¶ the policy debate comm¶ unity, **it did create a¶** rhetorical **controversy that forced the issu¶ e of racial exclusion and privilege onto the**¶ community’s **agenda.** Thus, I argue that t**he tourna¶ ment round is a critical plateau** from which **to¶ force a reflexive conversation about the normative¶ practices of debate that** might **operate to¶ maintain racial exclusion and privilege**

#### Change is the product of compromise

Lieberman 02

Robert C. Lieberman is Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change.” *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 96, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), pp. 702. EJW.

There is no reason to presume, however, that the¶ ideological and institutional currents that prevail at any given time or place are necessarily connected with each other in any coherent or functional way. This is true for a number of reasons. First, **political arrangements are** **rarely**, if ever, **the products of a coherent, total vision of politics that informs institutions** and ideas **and knits them** together **into a unified whole** (and even in times¶ and places that approach this extreme-revolutionary¶ France, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany-politics re-¶ mains subject to multiple, discordant forces). Rather,¶ **they are inevitably the products of compromise**, partial¶ and circumscribed, incoherent and jury-rigged, **rarely¶ if ever sweeping away the detritus of a previous or-¶ der to construct a new one.** New policies, institutional¶ arrangements, or ideological paradigms thus do not¶ replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns,¶ creating what Jeffrey Tulis (1987, 17-18) has called a¶ "layered text."

#### Endorsing political fanaticism means endorsing a constructed battlefield of all good versus evil

Marimaa ‘11

Kalmer Marimaa¶ Ph.D. Student in Social Science, ¶ Lecturer in Religious Studies and Sociology at the Tartu ¶ Theological Seminary, Estonia, “THE MANY FACES OF FANATICISM.” KVÜÕA toimetised, (14), 29-55.<http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_14_2_kalmer_marimaa.pdf>¶ EJW.)

Destructive **fanaticism goes beyond** the “moderate” distinction between “**us” and “them”**. Usually, in-groups ( “us”) are viewed in a positive light and

out-groups ( “them”) are vilified or regarded with scepticism. But **in fanati- cism** such distinction exceeds all moderation. “**They” become enemies who** are not simply bad but even **embody** “**cosmic evil**”. So **the world** **does not simply consist of people with their virtues and vices**, it **becomes a battlefield between** light and dark, **good and evil**. In literature on this subject it is some- times referred to as a Manichean dichotomy or Manichean construction.45

For example, traditional Christianity makes a distinction between Chris- tians and “the world” (the latter is seen as being under Satan’s rule). In Islam there has historically been division between the “House of Islam” (Dar al-Islam) where Muslims live and rule and the “House of war” (Dar al-Harb) that needs to be Islamized either peacefully or, when unsuccessful, with war. When both of those beliefs are **taken to extremes a peaceful mission turns into violence** and blood where either coldly-calculated violence or fanati- cal fervour are used to reach their goals.46 We can also turn to the two most famous 20th century totalitarian regimes – **National Socialism** in Germany **and Bolshevism** in the Soviet Union – to see that **both** of them **frequently used violence since both had a clear “enemy” who needed to be destroyed**. Whilst **the former targeted Bolshevists and Jews**, the latter, relying on the concept of class struggle, targeted**“enemies of the people”.** Conspiracy theories are also suitable for such mindsets. For a fanatic, Donskis notices, there is satisfaction in such conspiracy theories that ascribe all the bad to the “community, whom we hate”.47

#### Reject the neg—they endorse Janelle Monae who uses insulting ableist lyrics in her song “Faster” when she says “shake it like a schizo”

“Faster” by Janelle Monae. <http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/janellemone/faster.html>. EJW.

You, since that magic day

We've been like magnets in a play

We smash in then pull away

Every day

You, you're a jet, a flying gun

You kill me softly with your sun

You melt my wings and call it fun

I should run

Faster and faster

I should run

Faster and faster

From your arms

I watch my powers die

Falling out of starry skies

You kryptonite my life

Every night

The ending of this road

Dashing prince or horny toad?

Who really ever knows?

I should know

Faster and faster

I should run

Faster and faster

From your arms

Mmm, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah

**I'm running**

**shaking like a schizo**

'Lectric sheep are dancing in the window

My heart beats

It's kicking like a kick drum

**Am I a freak?**

**Or just another weirdo**

Call me weak

Or just call me your hero

You can't zap down all my good times

I know right from wrong

Kissing loving's feeling good

And not this feeling down

You hide your chainsaw deep in kisses

That don't make it quiet

You got em running, muttering, screaming, each and every night

Faster and faster

I should run

Faster and faster

From your arms

#### Ableist language internal link turns their argument and is a reason to not vote for that narrative—it perpetuates perjorative narrative that reduces peoples’ identities to their disabilities

Cohen-Rottenberg ‘13

Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg holds a Master's degree in English from the University of California at Berkeley and is pursuing a second Master's degree, in History and Culture, at Union Institute and University with a concentration on Disability Studies. “Doing Social Justice: Thoughts on Ableist Language and Why It Matters.” Disability and Representation: Changing the Cultural Conversation. 9/14/13. <http://www.disabilityandrepresentation.com/2013/09/14/ableist-language/>. EJW.)

The economy has been crippled by dept.¶ You’d have to be insane to want to invade Syria.¶ They’re just blind to the suffering of other people.¶ Only a moron would believe that.¶ **Disability metaphors abound** in our culture, and they exist **almost entirely as pejoratives**. You see something wrong? Compare it to a disabled body or mind: **Paralyzed. Lame. Crippled.** Schizophrenic**. Diseased. Sick.** Want to launch an insult? The words are seemingly endless: **Deaf. Dumb. Blind. Idiot. Moron. Imbecile. Crazy. Insane. Retard. Lunatic. Psycho. Spaz**.¶ I see **these terms** everywhere: in comment threads on major **news stories, on social justice sites, in everyday speech**. These words seem so “natural” to people that th**ey go uncritiqued a great deal of the time.** I tend to remark on this kind of speech wherever I see it. In some very rare places, my critique is welcome. In most places, it is not.¶ When a critique of language that makes reference to disability is not welcome, it is nearly inevitable that, as a disabled person, I am not welcome either. I might be welcome as an activist, but not as a disabled activist. I might be welcome as an ally, but not as a disabled ally. I might be welcome as a parent, but not as a disabled parent. That’s a lot like being welcomed as an activist, and as an ally, and as a parent, but not as a woman or as a Jew.¶ Many people have questions about why ableist speech matters, so I’ll be addressing those questions here. Please feel free to raise others.¶ 1. Why are you harping so much on words, anyway? Don’t we have more important things to worry about?¶ I am always very curious about those who believe that words are “only” **words** — as though they do not **have tremendous power**. Those of us who use words understand the world through them. **We use words to construct frameworks with which we understand experience**. Every time we speak or write, we are telling a story; every time we listen or read, we are hearing one. No one lives without entering into these stories about their fellow human beings. As Arthur Frank writes:¶ “Stories work with people, for people, and always stories work on people, affecting what people are able to see as real as possible, and as worth doing or best avoided. What is it about stories – what are their particularities – that enables them to work as they do? More than mere curiosity is at stake in this question, because human life depends on the stories we tell: the sense of self that those stories impart, the relationships constructed around shared stories, and the sense of purpose that stories both propose and foreclose.” (Frank 2010, 3)¶ The stories that **disability metaphors** tell **are deeply problematic, deeply destructive, and deeply resonant of the kinds of violence and oppression that disabled people have faced over the course of many centuries. They perpetuate negative and disempowering views of disabled people,** and these views wind their ways into all of the things that most people feel are more important. If a culture’s language is full of pejorative metaphors about a group of people, that culture is not going to see those people as fully entitled to the same housing, employment, medical care, education, access, and inclusion as people in a more favored group.¶ 2. What if a word no longer has the same meaning it once did? What’s wrong with using it in that case?¶ Ah yes. The etymology argument. When people argue word meanings, it generally happens in a particular (and largely unstated) context. With regard to ableist metaphors, people argue that certain meanings are “obsolete,” but such assertions fail to note the ways in which these “obsolete” words resonate for people in marginalized groups.¶ For example, I see this argument a great deal around the word moron, which used to be a clinical term for people with an intellectual disability. I have a great-aunt who had this label and was warehoused in state hospitals for her brief 25 years of life. So when I see this word, it resonates through history. I remember all of the people with this designation who lived and died in state schools and state mental hospitals under conditions of extreme abuse, extreme degradation, extreme poverty, extreme neglect, and extreme suffering from disease and malnutrition. My great-aunt lay dying of tuberculosis for 10 months under those conditions in a state mental hospital. The term moron was used to oppress human beings like her, many of whom are still in the living memory of those of us who have come after.¶ **Moron** — and related terms, like **imbecile and idiot** – may no longer be used clinically, but their clinical use is not the issue. **They were terms of oppression**, **and every time someone uses one without respect** for the history of disabled people, **they disrespect the memory of the people who had to carry those terms to their graves.**¶ 3. What’s wrong with using bodies as metaphors, anyway?¶ Think about it this way: Consider that you’re a woman walking down the street, and someone makes an unwanted commentary on your body. Suppose that the person looks at you in your favorite dress, with your hair all done up, and tells you that you are “as fat as a pig.” Is your body public property to be commented upon at will? Are others allowed to make use of it — in their language, in your hearing, without your permission? Or is that a form of objectification and disrespect?¶ In the same way that a stranger should not appropriate your body for his commentary, you should not appropriate my disabled body — which is, after all, mine and not yours — for your political writing or social commentary. A disabled body should not appear in articles about how lame that sexist movie is or how insane racism is. A disabled body should be no more available for commentary than a nondisabled one.¶ The core problem with **using a body as a metaphor is that people actually live in bodies**. We are not just paralyzed legs, or deaf ears, or blind eyes. **When we become reduced to our disabilities**, others very quickly forget that there are people involved here. **We are no longer seen as whole**, living, breathing **human beings.** Our bodies have simply been put into the service of your cause without our permission.¶ 4. Aren’t some bodies better than others? What’s wrong with language that expresses that?¶ I always find it extraordinary that people who have been oppressed on the basis their physical differences — how their bodies look and work — can still hold to the idea that some bodies are better than others. Perhaps there is something in the human mind that absolutely must project wrongness onto some kind of Other so that everyone else can feel whole and free. In the culture I live in, disabled bodies often fit the bill.¶ A great deal of this projection betrays a tremendous ignorance about disability. I have seen people defend using mental disabilities as a metaphor by positing that all mentally disabled people are divorced from reality when, in fact, very few mental disabilities involve delusions. I have seen people use schizophrenic to describe a state of being divided into separate people, when schizophrenia has nothing to do with multiplicity at all. I have seen people refer to blindness as a total inability to see, when many blind people have some sight. I have seen people refer to deafness as being locked into an isolation chamber when, in fact, deaf people speak with their hands and listen with their eyes (if they are sighted) or with their hands (if they are not).¶ **Underlying this ignorance, of course, is an outsider’s view of disability as a Bad Thing. Our culture is rife with this idea**, and most people take it absolutely for granted. Even people who refuse to essentialize anything else about human life will essentialize disability in this way. Such people play right into the social narrative that disability is pitiful, scary, and tragic. But those of us who inhabit disabled bodies have learned something essential: **disability is what bodies do. They all change. They are all vulnerable. They all become disabled at some point.** That is neither a Good Thing nor a Bad Thing. It is just an essential fact of human life.¶ I neither love nor hate my disabilities. They are what they are. They are neither tragic nor wonderful, metaphor nor object lesson.¶ 5. Disabled people aren’t really oppressed. Are they?¶ Yes, **disabled people are members of an oppressed group**, and disability rights are a civil rights issue. Disabled people are assaulted at higher rates, live in poverty at higher rates, and are unemployed at higher rates than nondisabled people. **We face widespread exclusion**, **discrimination, and human rights violations**. For an example of what some of the issues are, please see the handy Bingo card I’ve created, and then take some time over at the Disability Social History Project.¶ 6. If my disabled friend says it’s okay to use these words, doesn’t that make it all right to use them?¶ Please don’t make any one of us the authority on language. It should go without saying, but think for yourself about the impact of the language you’re using. If you stop using a word because someone told you to, you’re doing it wrong. It’s much better if you understand why.¶ 7. I don’t know why we all have to be so careful about giving offense. Shouldn’t people just grow thicker skins?¶ For me, it is not a question of personal offense, but of political and social impact. **If you routinely use disability slurs, you are adding to a narrative that says that disabled people are wrong,** broken, dangerous, pitiful, and tragic. That does not serve us.