## 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement

### 1AC – Relations

#### Relations high – energy co-op key to sustainability

Brown and Meacham 12

(Neil, and Carl, current program director at CSIS, served at the Department of Commerce as special assistant to the deputy secretary, at the Cuban Affairs Bureau of the Department of State, and at the U.S. embassy in Madrid, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Oil, Mexico, And The Transboundary Agreement,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDgQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreign.senate.gov%2Fpublications%2Fdownload%2Foil-mexico-and-the-transboundary-agreement&ei=qtPQUfzNJsisiALYloHwCw&usg=AFQjCNEZsmcfgXzQ0omtPqf8HklAkTjfxA&sig2=PORZ6WJw6OEYk7MPmfWKbw&bvm=bv.48572450,d.cGE>, P. 13, Accessed: 6/30/13)

U.S.-Mexico bilateral cooperation has improved dramatically in the last 5 years. Mexican sensitivities regarding their sovereignty are still present in government dealings. But today they don’t prevent bilateral cooperation, as they did in the recent past. As evidence in this regard, we have seen a significant increase in Mexico’s efforts to institutionalize and even expand cooperation among both civilian and military officials. The willingness to improve Mexican cooperation with the United States is partly due to the trust developed through the successful partnership the U.S. and Mexican governments have built while working against drug trafficking organizations. The $1.9 billion Me´rida Initiative through which the United States provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to support the Mexican government’s battle against the narcotics trade and transnational crime has created a platform for greater bilateral cooperation. Today, our two nations work closer than ever before. Yet, there are still new areas in which the bilateral relationship should improve. Interlocutors both from the then-existing Caldero´n administration and senior advisers to then-incoming Pen˜ a Nieto administration expressed a similar desire to expand cooperation in the bilateral relationship. One senior member of the then-incoming Pen˜ a Nieto administration expressed that it is time to move beyond tourism and drugs, issues which are so prominent in the bilateral da today.11 Of course, the development of a contemporary, comprehensive immigration policy ranks high when broadening the agenda is discussed. The U.S. is well positioned to increase dialogue and cooperation on energy security with Mexico (included in renewable power and efficiency, which were not part of this review, but which are areas where cooperation can move forward without significant political obstacles from the Mexican side).

#### **Energy and economic ties key to broader relations – plan solves**

Farnsworth 13 [Eric, May 8, “Obama’s Mexico Trip Yielded Progress, Missed Opportunities” [http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities 6/29/13](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities%206/29/13)]

President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico City on May 2 to meet with new Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in an effort to recast perceptions of the bilateral agenda from security to economic issues. In 2012, for the first time in 12 years, the U.S. and Mexican election cycles coincided, providing an excellent opportunity to coordinate an agenda consistent with the political needs of the new administrations and the economic requirements of their respective countries. An early visit by the U.S. president was an important signal that Mexico’s significant contributions to the health of the U.S. economy can no longer be taken for granted; the bond must be strengthened in order to assure the global competitiveness of both Mexico and the United States.

Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, after Canada and China, and its second-biggest export market, after Canada. Some $1.4 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexico border every day, and an estimated 6 million U.S. jobs depend directly on trade with Mexico. These are big numbers, and they are only going to increase, particularly as Mexico’s economy grows and its middle class expands, increasing its purchasing power.

At the same time, a number of obstacles to growth must be addressed if the bilateral relationship is to reach its full potential. Many of these are domestic issues that each nation should resolve for its own self-interest but that would nonetheless meaningfully improve the bilateral economic relationship. Among these are, from Mexico’s side, reforms in fiscal, energy and competition policy, as well as the continuing implementation of labor and education reforms. Working with Mexico’s other two main political parties, Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) has successfully begun the reform process. But the Mexican president’s honeymoon period is coming to an end, and the most difficult issues remain unresolved.

#### Plan is reverse causal - Failure to pass THA kills relations- Mexico would perceive it as a violation of trust

CFR 12 – United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Super Qualified Authors, 12/21/12, (“OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT”, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, AW)

Finally, passage of the TBA would boost U.S.-Mexico relations on energy issues, which have traditionally lagged. Mexican officials roundly expressed support for the TBA and expectation for U.S. ratification in conversation with the authors. The political impact of not approving and implementing the TBA would set back U.S.-Mexican relations on energy specifically and more broadly. Each of our countries has hot button domestic political issues that take courage for political leaders to address. In Mexico, oil is one such issue, and members of both the PAN and PRI put their political weight behind ratification in Mexico. The U.S. not fulfilling its side of the agreement would, therefore, be seen as a violation of trust and could erode confidence. In the extreme, although unlikely, if Mexico proceeds with domestic energy reforms, U.S. companies could be shut out of certain opportunities until the TBA is ratified. However, bilateral benefits of approving the agreement do not require immediate passage; U.S. commitment can be demonstrated by the Obama administration formally submitting the TBA for Congressional approval and commencement of Congressional hearings.

#### That’s key to solve bioterror- method cooperation

Rosales et al 11- MD has worked in the health arena for more than 20 years and in public health over 15 years, after serving five years as Director, Office of Border Health for the Arizona Department of Health Services. Dr. Rosales has expertise in program development and implementation, public health administration, policy and health disparities research in the Southwest, (Cecilia, “U.S.Mexico cross-border workforce training needs:survey implementation”, January 2011, Journal of Injury and Violence Research at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3134923/>,)

Abinational border-wide, online assessment on preparedness/emergency response and workforce training needs of personnel dedicated to the U.S.-Mexico border region was ommissioned by the ten U.S.-Mexico border state health offices through the U.S.-Mexico Border Governor’s Conference. The overarching goal of the study was to provide the Border States with information that could serve to orient, train, and evaluate the workforce charged with public health emergency preparedness and response as well as future preparedness personnel. The primary objective of the study was to assess and prioritize bioterrorism, infectious disease, and border training needs critical for responding to intentional and unintentional emergencies along the border region. The study was to describe the characteristics, learning preferences, proficiency and educational needs of the emergency preparedness and response workforce operating in the counties located in the U.S. border area. This area was defined by the La Paz Agreement and Public Law 103-400 (U.S. – Mexico Border Health Commission) as 100 kilometers north and south of the international boundary. The relative lack of literature addressing U.S.-Mexico cross-border issues related to emergency preparedness and bioterrorism highlights the importance of this assessment. This study describes and provides results of the assessment conducted with the four U.S. Border States and two Mexico Border States. While the study was mandated for all ten states funding was only provided for border cities within six states. Funding of transborder studies has been challenging for researchers focused on border health issues. The state of Sonora, sister state to Arizona, and the state of Chihuahua, sister state to Texas, were both successful in securing the resources to survey the preparedness and response workforce.

#### Also solves nuclear terrorism

Mariclaire Acosta 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, <http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf>, AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly on intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving threats from terrorist organizations. Policy oPtion: Develop border ports of entry that ensure safety and strengthen trade by employing risk-management techniques and the latest technology. Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for binational cooperation on security, which would help address both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about terrorism, would be to develop more sophisticated approaches to managing ports of entry at the border. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of the real threats to the two countries are at the ports of entry rather than between them. A new focus on these could be a win-win for both countries and for both security and trade. Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest.

#### Biological terrorist attack would cause extinction

Kellman ‘08[Barry, Director of the International Weapons Control Center at the DePaul University College of Law and author of Bioviolence—Preventing Biological Terror and Crime; “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” The Futurist, May-June 2008, http://www.wfs.org/March-April09/MJ2008\_Kellman.pdf]

What Might Bioviolence Accomplish? Envision a series of attacks against capitals of developing states that have close diplomatic linkages with the United States. The attacks would carry a well-publicized yet simple warning: “If you are a friend of the United States, receive its officials, or support its policies, thousands of your people will get sick.” How many attacks in how many cities would it take before international diplomacy, to say nothing of international transit, comes to a crashing halt? **In comparison to use of conventional or chemical weapons, the potential death toll of a bioattack could be huge. Although the number of victims would depend on where an attack takes place, the type of pathogen, and the sophistication of the weapons maker, there is widespread consensus among experts that a heightened attack would inflict casualties exceedable only by nuclear weapons. In comparison to nuclear weapons, bioweapons are far easier and cheaper to make and transport, and they can be made in facilities that are far more difficult to detect. The truly unique characteristic of certain bioweapons that distinguishes them from every other type of weapon is contagion. No other type of weapon can replicate itself and spread. Any other type of attack, no matter how severe, occurs at a certain moment in time at an identifiable place**. If you aren’t there, you are angry and upset but not physically injured by the attack. **An attack with a contagious agent can uniquely spread, potentially imperiling target populations far from where the agents are released. A bio-offender could infect his minions with a disease and send them across borders before symptoms are obvious. Carriers will then spread it to other unsuspecting victims who would themselves become extended bioweapons, carrying the disease indiscriminately.** There are challenges in executing such an attack, but fanatical terrorist organizations seem to have an endless supply of willing suicide attackers. **All this leads to the most important characteristic of bioviolence: It raises incomparable levels of panic.** Contagious bioviolence means that planes fly empty or perhaps don’t fly at all. People cancel vacation and travel plans and refuse to interact with each other for fear of unseen affliction. Public entertainment events are canceled; even going to a movie becomes too dangerous. Ultimately, bioviolence is about hiding our children as everyone becomes vulnerable to our most fundamental terror: the fear of disease. For people who seek to rattle the pillars of modern civilization and perhaps cause it to collapse, **effective use of disease would set in motion political, economic, and health consequences so severe as to call into question the ability of existing governments to maintain their citizens’ security. In an attack’s wake, no one would know when it is over, and no government could credibly tell an anxious population where and when it is safe to resume normal life.** While it is difficult to specify when this danger will strike, **there should be no doubt that we are vulnerable to a rupture**. Just as planes flying into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, instantly became a historical marker dividing strategic perspectives before from after, **the day that disease is effectively used as an instrument of hate will profoundly change everything. If you want to stop modern civilization in its tracks, bioviolence is the way to go**. The notion that no one will ever commit catastrophic bioviolence is simply untenable.

#### High risk of nuclear terrorism – acquisition and ideological motivation

Graham T. Allison 7 – Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 4/20/07, (“How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?”, <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>, AW)

A final comment on the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack before turning more specifically to terrorist motivations. We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist's bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks to initiatives like the Nunn-Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft today than they were in the early 1990s. But the risk that terrorists will buy or steal nuclear material from a rogue state increases as more countries acquire the ability to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will trigger a cascade of proliferation in its neighborhood. What about the motivation of terrorists that have attacked the American homeland? Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has stated al-Qaeda's objective: "to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands." As he explains, this is what justice requires to balance the scales for casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel. Michael Levi argues, correctly, that such a tally could be reached in a series of smaller installments, and our national security would benefit from insights into how to prevent such events. But ask yourself how many 9/11s it would take to reach that goal. Answer: 1,334, or one nuclear weapon. Jihadi terrorists are not solely interested in murdering Americans. They are also vying for Muslim "hearts and minds" by demonstrating that al-Qaeda is the "strong horse." Bin Laden has challenged his followers to trump 9/11. The London and Madrid train bombings set a bar: the first major bombing by Islamic terrorists on each country's soil. Al-Qaeda's next UK plot was more audacious, and had it been successful, it would have taken more lives. It is not clear that al-Qaeda can be deterred. Osama bin Laden describes the current conflict as a clash between the Muslim ummah [community of believers] and the "Jewish-Christian crusaders." A nuclear terrorist attack, like the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would be a world-changing event. Bin Laden well might accept significant risk of failure for a chance to draw battle lines in his clash of civilizations. Analysts with a deeper understanding of terrorist motivations should be challenged to propose policy initiatives that leverage that knowledge, particularly where those insights help us to prevent what Dr. Levi and I both agree would be the single greatest catastrophe: nuclear terrorism.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil mightalso raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### 1AC – Dodd-Frank

#### Now is crunch time to pass the agreement – no da’s

Fox News, 13 **–** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” [http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)](http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/%29//SDL)

 Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico. Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments. Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments. SUMMARY The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border. “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.” The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border. The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year. For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment. “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.” Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing. If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty. If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

#### Dodd Frank is key to transparency rules – EU modeling proves - exemption undermines the US model

Gary, 13 **–** (Ian Gary, Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries at Oxfam America. May 9, 2013. “A back door attack on oil payment transparency,” http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/09/a-back-door-attack-on-oil-payment-transparency/)//SDL

Oxfam has no problem with the approval of the US-Mexico TBA which simply lays out the rules for how hydrocarbons reserves in the Gulf of Mexico that straddle our maritime borders would be developed. We do have a big problem with an irrelevant provision inserted into the bill designed to weaken the payment disclosure requirements in Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Cardin-Lugar provision. That law provides for the annual disclosure of payments made by oil, gas and mining companies to host governments around the world – final rules were issued by the SEC in August last year. H.R. 1613 would exempt any covered company from reporting payments from in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbons agreement anywhere in the world. The American Petroleum Institute (API) – backed by companies such as Exxon, Shell, Chevron and BP – is suing the SEC in federal court and is now hoping that its Congressional allies can help weaken this landmark law. Oxfam is intervening to defend the rule. Meanwhile, the European Union has reached agreement to put in place similar reporting requirements. I spoke this week with Neil Brown who was, until very recently, a top Senate Republican aide working on energy issues for Senator Lugar, who was the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His response: “this exemption is unnecessary and inclusion would only forestall quick approval of this important agreement.” He should know. As both the co-author of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report for Senator Lugar on “Oil, Mexico and the Transboundary Agreement” as well as someone intimately familiar with the “Cardin-Lugar” provision in Dodd-Frank, Mr. Brown would know if the reporting requirements in Dodd-Frank Section 1504 present any issue in approving the US-Mexico TBA. The short answer – they don’t. The minority staff report envisions reporting under Section 1504 and says that under Section 1504 covered companies “would already have to disclose payments” to the SEC if “they invest in Mexico”. The US-Mexico TBA requires that certain information be kept confidential unless disclosure is required by law. The TBA text demonstrates that the US and Mexico have already made the correct policy judgment that the specific confidentiality provisions of the TBA should be subordinated to each country’s commitment to openness and subject to each country’s disclosure requirements. Nothing in the TBA would require the exemption provided by H.R. 1613. Tellingly, the Senate Energy Committee has introduced a bi-partisan bill, S. 812, sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) to approve the US-Mexico TBA, and it contains no Section 1504 exemption provision. If Congress is truly interested in approving this agreement and providing the “rules of the road” for joint development of oil and gas reserves straddling the US-Mexico maritime boundary, then it should adopt the clean Senate bill without the reporting exemption. Former Senator Jeff Bingaman, past Senate Energy Committee chairman, told Reuters that the exemption proposed by the House “complicates things significantly” for passage of the bill. Referring to the Section 1504 exemption language, he said, “They’ve added in some things that are going to make it difficult to pass in that form.” The Mexican Congress ratified the TBA a year ago, and the Obama administration – and the oil industry – would like to see it approved. The Obama administration, though, has made clear that implementation of Section 1504 is a priority. In a letter to Oxfam, Sec. of State Kerry said, “The Department of State and Administration strongly support transparency in the extractives sectors, as outlined in Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, and the new rule issued by the SEC. The new SEC standard directly advances our foreign policy interest in increasing transparency and reducing corruption, particularly in the oil, gas and mineral sectors.”

#### Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

Clough, 10 **-** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

 Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population. Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country. Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

#### Corruption over energy is the key internal link to stability – must avoid the resource curse

J. Edward Conway 12, doctoral candidate and postgraduate researcher at the Institute for Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies at the University of St Andrews and independent political risk consultant for mining companies in Central Asia 12 [“How Afghanistan Can Escape the Resource Curse,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137306/j-edward-conway/how-afghanistan-can-escape-the-resource-curse]

Until just a few weeks ago, serious talk about an Afghan economy based on natural resources seemed premature. But as Kabul inks more mining deals with international investors -- it awarded two major tenders at the end of 2011 -- and as NATO continues its drawdown of international troops, natural resources are shaping up to serve as the cornerstone of sustainable development there. This raises an unavoidable and possibly tragic question: Considering the country's lack of infrastructure and its rampant corruption, will Afghanistan become yet another data point in the literature on underdeveloped countries that fall victim to the resource curse? The possibility is real. Officials in both Washington and Kabul claim that the country's mineral wealth is worth as much as $3 trillion. Experts have suspected Afghanistan's resource potential for decades, and U.S. Geological Survey fieldwork conducted between 2009 and 2011 confirmed the existence of significant copper, iron ore, gold, lithium, rare earths, and mineral fuel resources such as coal, oil, and gas, and possibly even uranium. But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Mining corporations and the Afghan government have wasted no time. In late 2011, Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines signed an oil exploration and production deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation to develop the Amu Darya basin's 80 million barrels of estimated crude reserves over the next 25 years; production is expected to begin this year. At the moment, the ministry is finalizing details with an Indian consortium of mining companies to develop the Hajigak deposit, one of the largest undeveloped iron ore deposits in the world, which has the potential to produce steel for the next 40 years. Both of these deals come after Kabul signed over to the Chinese the rights to the Aynak copper deposit in 2008, and the Qara Zaghan gold deposit to a consortium of investors gathered together by J. P. Morgan in early 2011. Taken together, these first forays into Afghanistan's newfound subterranean treasure chest will mean billions of dollars in investment over the next decade; there will be new rail infrastructure, power plants, and possibly even a refinery. Kabul will reap significant new tax revenues, and tens of thousands of Afghans will be put to work. Unconditional celebration, however, would be premature. Agreements notwithstanding, not a single mine has produced anything tangible -- not even the almost four-year-old Aynak copper mine, which will allegedly begin operation next year. Chinese investors also appear to be sliding on their promise to build a railroad as a part of the Aynak deal. Because of likely high operating costs, it remains unclear when the J. P. Morgan consortium will be able to produce an ounce of gold that competes at market prices. What's more, estimates for trillion-dollar earnings are almost entirely based on resources, not reserves -- a technical but critical difference. Reserve estimates incorporate economic, legal, social, governmental, and environmental risks to determine what is actually profitable to develop, as well as the site-specific mining and metallurgical challenges. Resource estimates result in optimistic press releases; reserve estimates result in foreign investment, jobs, and budgetary contributions. Kabul and Washington have focused on signing deals, thinking that a few key agreements would soothe the concerns of risk-averse investors. But the real challenge for the industry will be in production. And the test for Afghanistan -- herein lies the possibility of a curse -- will be whether or not a majority of the country reaps the secondary benefits of the mining sector's development. Resource curse theories follow two tracks. On the first, the overwhelming revenue drawn from the sector exacerbates corruption within the government. That scenario is hardly difficult to imagine in Afghanistan, as the country is currently considered the second most corrupt in the world, according to Transparency International. On the second track, increased mineral exports strengthen a country's currency and consequently crowd out other sectors (such as agriculture) from being competitive on the world market. This is a threat in Afghanistan, clearly, as its economy is largely dependent on farming. But several countries in Central Asia have struggled with exactly these challenges in recent decades -- and offer a valuable guide to Kabul, Washington, and international investors. Many states in the region are blessed with mineral wealth but cursed by infrastructure obstacles and social instability; accordingly, they have faced challenges in attracting foreign investors, cultivating resources without losing profits to graft, and avoiding introducing new divisions among the population. The most important lesson for Afghanistan to learn is that it will have to build a resource-based economy with the support of local Afghans. Take Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous, landlocked country with little rail infrastructure, deteriorating roads, and an economy based on foreign aid, remittances, and mining. Until recently, successive authoritarian leaders since the mid-1990s, such as Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, advised foreign mining companies to avoid getting involved locally; a few token social projects to placate the people living near a project would suffice. But keeping out of local affairs has backfired. Mining revenues were funneled to elites in the capital, and a negligible percentage went to the local community for development and infrastructure projects. Over time, local miners moved their families (and wealth) to the capital city; the loss of revenue and investment left the mining towns without running water or a functioning sewage system. In Barskaun, the only paved road is the one that leads to the mine -- Kumtor, a single gold mine, which represents ten percent of the country's GDP. That neglect not only shortchanged the locals but breeds insecurity today. In Aral, where there is a foreign-operated gold mine, armed men on horseback caused a million dollars' worth of damage in October 2011, forcing the site to remain closed until a settlement was reached with villagers three months later. But then consider Kazakhstan, where the opposite has happened. The country of 16 million is an oil and gas exporter but also a global leader in copper, iron ore, chromite, lead, zinc, gold, coal, and uranium reserves and production. Since its independence in the 1990s, both foreign investors and government officials have focused on socioeconomic development in the areas surrounding key mining sites; today mines serve as a catalyst for province-wide growth. Managers and workers live locally, spend locally, and educate their children locally. Astana has imposed strict requirements on foreign miners -- forcing them to sign annual memorandums of cooperation with local governors, under which both parties together determine the social investment projects to be funded by the firm in the province for that year. The strategy dates back to the Soviet era, when most of these mining operations had their hand in all aspects of the local community. Today this is reflected in foreign mining companies funding schools, gyms, sports stadiums, daycare centers, and orphanages and foster care networks, as well as providing electric-power capacity to homes and businesses across the country. Not coincidently, Kazakhstan ranks far ahead of all other Central Asian states on country risk indices for foreign investors. Unfortunately, at the moment Afghanistan is looking more like the former than the latter. Politically the country is already overly centralized in Kabul, and with Aynak and Hajigak within driving distance, it's not difficult to envision a future where the benefits of the extractive sector remain in the capital. Further, while all foreign developers are required to invest in development projects, it remains to be seen if these firms will make good on their promises and if local leaders will be empowered in the subsequent decision-making process. Whereas Kazakhstan enforces strict production and investment quotas -- if you don't produce and invest as you promised, you're out -- citing force majeure in Afghanistan (from war to civil disturbances to labor issues) seems like an easy way for Aynak and Hajigak to renege on local commitments, potentially aggravating the existing socioeconomic gap between Kabul and the rest of the country. It all comes back to ensuring a positive correlation between increased foreign investment and improved quality of life. In Kyrgyzstan you have armed men on horseback; in Kazakhstan you have local athletes wearing jerseys sporting the foreign miner's logo. There's no question that there are significant differences between the situation in Afghanistan and those in the Central Asian states. Afghanistan's levels of corruption and violence are far higher, the education level is much lower, and on transport infrastructure and power capacity issues, it is starting from scratch. But just as Kabul's mining deals to date are little more than agreements on paper, the unsettled nature of the larger issues can provide an opportunity to forge a path ahead. If Afghanistan wants to achieve that positive correlation of foreign investment with local quality of life -- and in doing so open the gates to foreign investment from the more risk-averse -- the Kabul-based elites and their foreign miners will need to spread the wealth.

#### Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

Morgan, 7 (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

#### Dodd Frank is key to transparency to set a global norm against corruption in Africa

Geman, 13 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. April 26, 2013. “Senate bill on US-Mexico drilling lacks Dodd-Frank exemption” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/296451-senate-bill-on-us-mexico-drilling-lacks-dodd-frank-exemption-)//SDL

“API is hopeful that Congress and the administration will address the problematic 1504 rules, and we certainly would like to see these important 1504 exemptions make it through to a final bill so that U.S. companies can compete on a level playing field,” he said, referring to the numerical section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial law that required the disclosure rule. But backers of the SEC requirement oppose the exemption in the House bill and are concerned the bill is part of a wider effort to repeal the SEC rule. The rule will require SEC-listed oil, natural gas and mining companies to disclose payments to foreign governments related to projects in their countries, such as money for production licenses, royalties and so forth. It is aimed at undoing the “resource curse,” in which some impoverished countries in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by corruption and conflict alongside their energy and mineral wealth.

Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure

Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)

 “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.” The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere are plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty. A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China. In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures. “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC. But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year. “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

#### African instability goes nuclear.

Deutsch, 02(Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

### 1AC – Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### The plan solves 2 internal links

#### 1) A strong US-Mexican relationship

Pastor 2012 Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Relations key to hegemony – stabilizes Mexico

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A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### 2) Energy power

Gjelten 12 (Tom, Diplomatic Correspondent – NPR, “The Dash for Gas: The Golden Age of an Energy Game-Changer,” World Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/dash-gas-golden-age-energy-game-changer)

For a fresh perspective on geopolitical trends, look at the world through the lens of the natural gas trade. One of the reasons for Israeli unease with the Arab Spring is that the democratic uprising that took down Hosni Mubarak also brought interruptions in Israel’s supply of natural gas, much of which since 2008 has come from Egypt. Wondering about China’s new interest in Australia and Qatar? It’s about their abundant gas supplies and China’s tremendous energy needs. Desperate for signs of cooperation from North Korea? Check out reports that Kim Jong-il may agree to the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would link Russia, Pyongyang, and Seoul. From Asia to the Middle East to North America, a boom in natural gas usage is rearranging international connections, with major repercussions for global politics. Energy consumers see that natural gas is relatively inexpensive, provided it can be transported efficiently, and abundant, especially if it can be harvested from shale rock and other unconventional deposits. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that over the next twenty-five years gas will be the fastest-growing energy source, overtaking coal as soon as 2030. Around the world, natural gas is fast becoming the fuel of choice for electric power generation, especially with nuclear losing its appeal in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. Energy experts predict gas could even displace oil in the transportation sector, as car and truck engines are redesigned. The trend has so impressed IEA analysts that the agency in 2011 boldly predicted that the world is entering “a golden age of gas.” The implications are significant. Because gas is somewhat cleaner than other fossil fuels, its rise as a fuel source should have environmental benefits. Because it is cheaper than oil, its increased use would lower energy costs and bring energy to millions of people who lack access to it now. But among the most striking consequences of a dramatic growth in natural gas consumption would be its effect on international relations. The energy trade is an important determinant of the global balance of power, and the shift to natural gas will introduce a new set of winners and losers, bringing greater independence to many countries and reducing the energy leverage that oil producers have traditionally enjoyed. After chairing an advisory panel on the subject for the Department of Energy, former CIA director John Deutch concluded that the prospective geopolitical shifts amount to no less than “a natural gas revolution” in global affairs. A big difference between gas and oil is the trading infrastructure. While oil can be shipped in tankers, gas has moved mainly through pipelines, thus confining it largely to regional markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is facilitating the development of a global market in gas, but it is still traded largely on a country-to-country basis, with negotiated prices that are specified in contracts. As gas usage has grown, these gas deals have grown more important. In Bolivia, for instance, a determination to use natural gas wealth for political ends has affected relations with its neighbors for most of the past decade. Privately financed exploration in the late 1990s revealed that the country’s proven gas reserves were six times greater than what was previously believed, but Bolivian leaders could not agree on how to exploit them. A public outcry forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign and leave the country in 2003 after he proposed to export natural gas to Mexico and the United States through a terminal in Chile, where it was to have been liquefied. (Anti-Chilean sentiment has run deep in Bolivia ever since a war with Chile in 1879 cost the country its Pacific access.) Bolivian gas is now sold instead to Brazil and Argentina, but disputes with Brazil over the terms of the gas contract have cast a shadow over that relationship in recent years, and management of the country’s gas exports is probably Bolivia’s top foreign-policy challenge. The Bolivian case shows how the natural gas trade is more likely to be complicated by resource nationalism than the oil business would be. In a pique, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez can say he is prepared to cut off oil sales to the United States, but because oil is a globally traded commodity managed by middlemen, the threat is largely meaningless. For every buyer, there will always be a seller. State-to-state gas deals, by contrast, are more likely to carry geopolitical overtones. In 2005, for example, Egypt took the bold step of agreeing to sell natural gas to Israel. The gas began flowing in 2008 through a pipeline that runs across the Sinai peninsula and continues undersea to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Israel depends on natural gas for much of its power generation, and the deal with Egypt has provided the country with more than forty percent of its gas needs. The notion of exporting gas to Israel has been highly unpopular in Egypt, however, and in the months following the collapse of the Mubarak regime, the Sinai pipeline has been repeatedly blown up, forcing Israel to fire up unused coal plants and convert several gas-fueled generating stations to run on fuel oil or diesel instead, at a cost of several million dollars. But the country had a possible solution: In December 2010, a Houston-based energy exploration company announced “a significant natural gas discovery” about eighty miles off Israel’s coast. Preliminary measurements suggested it could be the world’s biggest deepwater gas discovery in ten years and could provide Israel with enough gas to become a net exporter, providing it with more clout in its regional energy relationships. South Korea also relies on imported energy sources and is keen on natural gas, which explains its interest in a Russian proposal to build a pipeline that would carry Russian gas from Siberia across the Korean peninsula. The idea has been floated for years, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently gave the proposal his firm support during a meeting in August 2011 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak subsequently agreed to work closely with the Russians to make the project a reality. The South Koreans have offered to build a natural gas power generating plant in the north as compensation for Pyongyang’s support for the pipeline. The key to the project’s success would be a design that would reassure Seoul that the North Korean authorities had no incentive to steal the gas or cut off the supply before it reaches the south. The textbook illustration of a link between geopolitics and the natural gas trade is Russia. As of 2010, the country was the world’s top gas producer (after briefly being surpassed by the United States), with one state-controlled company, Gazprom, accounting for about eighty percent of the country’s production. Originally part of the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Gas Industry, Gazprom is in effect a state monopoly, and its power and reach are without comparison in the energy world. The company has its own armed forces, with as many as twenty thousand armed security guards and a private fleet of unmanned drones, used mainly to monitor pipelines and production facilities. The company effectively operates as an arm of the Russian state, and the company’s gas deals in Europe and Asia can legitimately be seen as an extension of Russian foreign policy, exemplifying the growing importance of “gas diplomacy.” Though its relative importance as a gas provider to Europe has diminished over the past ten years, Russia still meets about a quarter of Europe’s needs, more than any other supplier, and European governments have long been uneasy about their dependence on Russian gas. About eighty percent of the Russian gas shipment to Europe goes through Ukraine, and the flow has been cut on two major occasions at least in part because of geopolitical wrangling. In January 2006, after Kiev resisted price increase demands, Gazprom reduced the flow of gas to Ukraine, causing shortages in other European countries that received gas through Ukraine. Politics seems to have played a role in the Russian move. Ukraine at the time was moving closer to the West, and Ukrainian leaders charged that Moscow, with its price increase demands, was trying to “blackmail” Ukraine into changing its political course. The gas flow was cut once again in January 2009, causing a severe midwinter gas shortage across Europe. The two episodes convinced many European leaders that Russia was ready and willing to use Gazprom’s clout in what it considered its “privileged sphere of influence,” with the goal of bringing the former Soviet republics back under Moscow’s control. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, spoke for many European observers when he wrote in 2010, “The primary goal of Russian gas policy isn’t economic but political, namely to further the aim of revising the post-Soviet order in Europe.” The eagerness of European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian gas has prompted ongoing efforts to find alternative supply routes. Iraq and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are promising sources, and for about a decade European authorities have been scheming to develop a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia. The Nabucco pipeline project, launched in 2002, would bring gas from the Caspian basin across Turkey to a hub in Austria. In addition, BP and two Italian companies have been promoting pipeline projects of their own along that southern corridor. The European Commission and the United States have both given strong backing to the Nabucco project, but the pipeline planners have had a difficult time lining up the supply commitments needed to make the project economically worthwhile. Moscow has put pressure on the Central Asian states to send their gas to Russia rather than Europe, and China is pursuing supply deals of its own in the region. Among the major new developments has been the construction of new facilities to liquefy natural gas. Petroleum engineers have long known how to convert gas into liquid form through extreme cooling, but only in recent years has the LNG industry expanded to the point that it has altered gas trading patterns. The construction of dozens of new liquefaction and regasification plants around the world, along with the introduction of LNG tanker ships, has made it possible for island nations like Australia to become major gas exporters, and it has given gas-consuming countries new supply sources. The United States, Japan, China, and European countries were all quick to embrace the industry. (In the US alone, twelve new terminals have been built to receive LNG, with plants to regasify the LNG for shipment through pipelines around the country.) The development has been rapid. The International Energy Agency predicts that between 2008 and 2020 total liquefaction capacity will double. Qatar, which opened its first LNG plant in 1997, by 2006 had become the world’s top LNG producer and was investing in LNG terminals around the world. For European countries with terminals, importing LNG from Qatar or Algeria or Nigeria is another way to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. By 2035, for example, LNG is expected to supply about half of the United Kingdom’s natural gas needs, with imports from Qatar leading the way. British Prime Minister David Cameron’s February 2011 visit to Qatar, culminating in a new gas deal, put Moscow on notice that Europe had alternatives to Russian gas. Qatar and other LNG exporters have an even more inviting market in Asia. The IEA foresees China’s gas consumption growing by nearly six percent annually up to 2035. Japan, having lost much of its nuclear generating capacity as a result of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, is now a huge gas market as well, and LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, and the other gas exporting countries will be essential to its energy mix. Such developments were not foreseen twenty years ago. The LNG industry has diversified the gas trade, introducing new producers into the picture and giving gas importers more supply choices just as their demand for gas is growing. Without a doubt, the most revolutionary recent development in the natural gas world has been an improvement in the ability to extract gas from shale rock and other unconventional sources. Geologists have known for two hundred years that shale contains combustible gas, but the tightness of the shale formation meant that the gas was generally considered unrecoverable. In the last decade, however, energy companies in the United States have found that it is economically possible to harvest shale gas through the use of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), by which large amounts of water mixed with sand and chemicals are injected at high pressure into the rock formations in order to free the gas trapped inside. In addition, gas producers are now employing horizontal drilling techniques, turning their drill bits in a horizontal direction after reaching a deep shale reservoir and thus reaching more deposits from a single well. These developments have proven so promising that analysts are dramatically increasing their estimates of how much shale gas can be recovered around the world. In the United States, shale accounted for almost no gas production as recently as 2000. It now provides about twenty percent of the total production, and within twenty years it could be half. The US government’s Energy Information Administration has estimated that if recoverable shale gas reserves are included, the United States may have enough natural gas to meet US needs for the next hundred years, at current consumption rates. Such estimates are imprecise and may well be adjusted downward, but the production of shale gas has already dramatically altered the US energy picture. Just a few years ago, it was assumed that the United States would be a net importer of natural gas, with much of it arriving as LNG. But the terminals and regasification facilities that were built to facilitate LNG imports are now going largely unused. The successful production of shale gas could even mean the United States will soon be a net gas exporter. Some of the existing regasification facilities, built for LNG imports, could actually be converted to liquefaction plants, so that excess domestic gas production can be exported as LNG. If the United States became self-sufficient in natural gas, there would be significant geopolitical implications. When Arab states in 1973 imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the United States as punishment for US support of Israel, American consumers learned how vulnerable their country was to the “oil weapon” when used by potentially hostile states. As the United States moves toward energy independence, if only in gas, that vulnerability disappears. There would also be geopolitical effects overseas. With the United States no longer importing LNG, that gas could go to European consumers instead, and Europe’s dependence on Russia for its gas supply would diminish. In 2000, Russia was supplying about forty percent of Europe’s gas; some estimates have the Russian share sliding to ten percent by 2040. Whether the United States can maintain a sharply upward trend in shale gas production depends on whether the reserves are as promising as they now appear to be, whether the gas price is sufficient to cover production costs, and especially whether environmental concerns associated with shale drilling are addressed. Hydraulic fracturing requires enormous amounts of water, and recycling or disposal of the waste water can be problematic. There have been cases where shale well casings have proved defective, and contamination of the surrounding soil or water has occurred. Authorities in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland have imposed temporary moratoria on fracking in order to assess the practice and determine whether it imposes any risks to drinking water or human health.

#### Energy power solves nuclear conflict

Hagel 12 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, “The Challenge of Change”, 5/15/12, <http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change>]

A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. America’s responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, “Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.” Staying a step ahead of the forces of change requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right. America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions. This has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear (WAR) holocaust. The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges, debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution. American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare, terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like “process,” they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven “coalitions of the willing” by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically. American military power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy. There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nation’s strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The connections between America’s trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the world’s strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. America’s security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is accessible and affordable is the core of America’s energy security. Much of the world’s energy is produced in countries and regions that are consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself.

 None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

#### US power is the most peaceful

Busby, 12 [Get Real Chicago IR guys out in force, Josh, Assistant Professor of Public Affairs and a fellow in the RGK Center for Philanthropy and Community Service as well as a Crook Distinguished Scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. <http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2012/01/get-real-chicago-ir-guys-out-in-force.html>]

Is Unipolarity Peaceful? As evidence, Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war. For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, I've been following some of the discussion by and about Steven Pinker and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_new) that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful with interstate wars and intrastate wars becoming more rare. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful (with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo) and Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period? Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity (at least for Monteiro) is not the number of years the great power has been at war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity **compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Pinker may be wrong. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. But, if my read of other [reports](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) based on Uppsala data is right**,** war is becoming more rare and less deadly (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_new) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media .Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II. Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So, I kind of took issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. In Monteiro's world, disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

## 2AC

### 2AC – Economic Engagement

#### We meet – The Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement is key foster engagement

DoS 12 (6-20-12, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. - Mexico Intention to Negotiate Hydrocarbon Reservoirs Agreement” [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143573.htm, accessed: 6-26-13](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143573.htm%2C%20accessed%3A%206-26-13))

Further Growth in the Bilateral Energy Relationship

This Agreement has been a catalyst for increased engagement between our respective safety regulators for the oil and gas sector. That engagement is expected to deepen in the years ahead as we work together to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico.

#### Counter interpretation – economic engagement with Mexico pertains to energy

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf>, p. 3, accessed 6/26/13)

The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative (USMLI) was launched in May 2010, on the occasion of President Felipe Calderón’s state visit to Washington, DC. Corporate members of the Initiative work with public and private sector partners in Mexico and the United States to ensure that policymakers and legislators understand the importance of our countries’ economic ties, and to focus their attention on the considerable work that remains to be done to optimize the relationship. The goal of the USMLI is to move true economic partnership between the United States and Mexico from policy aspiration to reality by making both countries more competitive in global markets; raising living standards for workers in both countries; making the U.S.-Mexican border the most modern, streamlined, and secure in the world; promoting the continent’s energy independence while respecting our shared environment; and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation, all within a framework that fully respects and supports national sovereignty and interests.

### 2AC – Conditions Counterplan

#### Commitment to certainty is key to hegemony

APSA 09 – American Political Science Organization, September 2009, (“US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, http://www.apsanet.org/media/pdfs/apsa\_tf\_usstanding\_long\_report.pdf)

But two additional factors have come into play that reflect on America itself: first, a growing sense that Washington is no longer a dependable “team player,” and second, a fear that Americans may be less committed to providing international public goods today than they were during the Cold War. It is clear is that when the United States is seen as acting as a “team player,” it can have positive repercussions for U.S. standing, whereas perceptions of U.S. unilateralism can have the opposite effect. Whether these perceptions of U.S. behavior are accurate is open to debate, but when it comes to America’s standing in the world, perceptions define the reality. When the United States fails to sign and ratify high-profile, widely accepted international agreements, for example, its international standing falls, as has been the case with the Kyoto Protocol.27 The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements, which is over twice as many as Canada and France and five times as many as Japan.28 Yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements . . . yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future American standing also falls when Washington violates international laws and norms and fails to comply with U.S. treaty commitments and values. For example, violations of highprofile agreements, such as the Geneva Convention on torture, have clearly hurt U.S. standing as measured by opinion polls, statements by foreign governments, and NGOs.29 Evidence of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo severely damaged the global esteem in which the U.S. was held, especially among its allies.30 U.S. reluctance to commit to new international legal obligations may in part be due to a generally strong compliance record with international law. Unlike some states, the U.S. is hesitant to sign agreements with which it knows it cannot comply. Nonetheless, a few highprofile cases wash out the effects of U.S. adherence to almost all of its other international treaty obligations. Perhaps perceived U.S. hypocrisy is more deleterious because we hold ourselves up—or others look to us—as a model. If the United States pursues controversial, high-profile policies through unilateral means when multilateral ones are expected, U.S. standing will likely suffer. This pattern seems apparent at the United Nations, where agreement with the United States increased significantly with the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This was the time when the United States had newfound relative material power as the sole remaining superpower. The United States was also trumpeting a new form of international community. As President George H. W. Bush put it, the United States would “pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.”31 It was a vision of a collaborative world in which the United States’ unchecked dominance would be used for jointly agreed ends.

#### **Certainty is key for investment**

Taylor 1/9 [ 1/9/13, Phil Taylor reporter for the E and E publishing LLC, “E&E: U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement mired in Congress”, <http://www.bromwichgroup.com/2013/01/ee-offshore-drilling-u-s-mexico-transboundary-agreement-mired-in-congress/>]

The impasse derailed, for now, an agreement that many think could improve bilateral relations and spur much-needed reforms in Mexico’s energy sector. Moreover, while the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has offered leases in U.S. waters affected by the agreement, no firms will invest in the area until they are confident the resource can be legally developed. “There is no way a major company would go out and start drilling on the U.S. side unless this agreement is passed, because that would infuriate Mexico,” said one Senate Republican aide. That is because even if a U.S. company were to drill within U.S. waters, oil could be siphoned from reservoirs that extend to Mexican territory. Since Mexico nationalized its oil in 1938, its relationship with the United States on energy matters has been extremely sensitive, according to experts. “The agreement also offers some sense of assurance that the tremendous investments necessary to look in these areas would not be lost in an international dispute,” said Nicolette Nye, a spokeswoman for the National Ocean Industries Association, which urged Congress to approve the measure.

#### Mexico says no to added conditions

Gonzalez 8 (Rosa Gonzalez, Department of sociology MA University, “Biofuels production in Mexico a complex problem”, 9/22/8, <https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/36934/Rosa_Luz_Gonzalez_Biofuels_Production.pdf?sequence=1>, zs)

In Mexico the possibility of producing biofuels has generated a wide range of political, economical and technical comments and opinions. This is due mainly to the fact that the oil industry has contributed heavily to the direct financing of the Mexican government for the last 70 years, in 2007 this income represented 37% of the total expenditure of the Government and any change to this situation is looked upon with great suspicion and so there are not clear strategies of how to bring renewable energies (v. gr. bioenergy) into Mexico. The analysis of the present and future of energy, especially oil, has become complex and difficult. Several points of view concerning biofuel production have created at least two groups: one that is in favor because bioenergetics are a better source of fuels, its renewable nature goes quite well with the notion of sustainable development and in some instances it is looked as a way to help and support rural development, particularly in poor areas; the second group opposes biofuel production considering that there will be a competition for resources between agriculture for food and feed purposes and energy, and that from the perspective of climatic change biofuels are not an answer in the long run; one of the main oppositions comes from the oil company, PEMEX, which has operated as a government monopoly and the production of the biofuels in some way will open up its structure and the company will have to share its enormous power. The major differences and discrepancies among groups are on the economic impact, where questions such as: who will pay for the subsidy required for biofuel production?, how will biofuel be introduced into the market?, what are the real and true benefits and problems associated with biofuels?. They have not been answered.

#### Certainty key to encourage collaborative development

Smart Energy Universe 12 (SEU, "U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement", <http://www.smartenergyuniverse.com/regulatory-update/13077-u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement>, zs)

The United States and Mexico have signed an agreement concerning the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico. The Agreement is designed to enhance energy security in North America and support our shared duty to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards. Elements of the Agreement The United States and Mexico jointly announced their intention to negotiate a transborder hydrocarbons agreement on June 23, 2010, following the Joint Statement adopted by Presidents Obama and Calderon at the conclusion of President Calderon’s State Visit to Washington on May 19, 2010. Upon entry into force, the current moratorium on oil exploration and production in the Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico will end. The Agreement establishes a cooperative process for managing the maritime boundary region that promotes joint utilization of transboundary reservoirs. The Agreement provides a legal framework for possible commercial activities at the maritime boundary and sets clear guidelines for transboundary developments. It establishes incentives for oil and gas companies to voluntarily enter into arrangements to jointly develop any transboundary reservoirs. In the event such an arrangement is not achieved, the Agreement establishes a process by which U.S. companies and PEMEX can individually develop the resources on each side of the border while protecting each nation’s interests and resources. The legal certainty created by the Agreement will enable U.S. companies to explore new business opportunities and carry out collaborative projects with PEMEX. The Agreement also provides for joint inspections teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will review all plans for the development of any transboundary reservoirs.

### 2AC – Gap Counterplan

#### TBA is the key factor to overall cooperation

CFR, 12(Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 12/21/12, “ OIL, MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm)

The TBA further contains requirements of data sharing and notification of likely reserves between the United States and Mexico, opening the opportunity for increased government-to- government collaboration on strategic energy policy choices. Mexico and the United States are relatively less advanced in effective communication and linkages of our energy systems than we are in less politically-controversial economic areas. Improved ties can improve understanding and galvanize cooperation in often unexpected ways. In the immediate term, closer oil sector communication will be beneficial in case of accidents in the Gulf of Mexico or in case of significant disruptions to global oil supplies.

#### **Only the TBA can resolve energy security**

Kerry 12 (John Kerry, Secretary of state in the United States, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE AGREEMENT”, December 2012, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm>, ZS)

The centerpiece of the TBA is the mandate to establish so- called “unitization'' agreements by which companies licensed by the United States and Mexico's state oil company PEMEX would jointly develop oil and gas reservoirs that have been discovered to extend across the maritime boundary. In effect, unitization agreements would work similarly to more well-known production sharing agreements (PSAs), whereby companies involved will jointly develop a project in order to spread risk given that deep water developments will cost billions of dollars each. Given PEMEX's lack of experience in deep water, the most likely outcome is that IOCs licensed by the United States would operate the developments and utilize infrastructure based on the United States side of the border, which is more extensive than that of Mexico near to the area of operation. However, the United States does have an interest in PEMEX gaining expertise in operation in deep water in order to improve the integrity of potential PEMEX operated developments exclusively in Mexican territory. A key difference between the unitization agreements envisioned under the TBA and traditional PSAs is that physical barrels produced will be allocated to the legal jurisdictions of the United States and Mexico, presumably in proportion to the amount of reserves found on their respective sides of the border. The Mexican barrels, presumably, will be property of PEMEX as a state entity and the U.S. barrels will be treated under standard terms of U.S. licensing in the Gulf of Mexico. It is unlikely that, from the U.S. perspective, the TBA will meaningfully increase U.S. domestic oil production in the near term. The maritime border area is deep water and would require massive investments. Such investments are possible and should be encouraged by the U.S. government, however, it will take years to get through regulatory hurdles and normal project development needs. However, the TBA would unlock the maritime border region from moratoria, thereby offering long-term opportunities to increase U.S. domestic production. The TBA should be seen as a net positive to helping reduce U.S. dependence on imports from troublesome regions and boosting domestic economic activity, and therefore the TBA should be viewed as a benefit for U.S. energy security.

### 2AC – Diplomatic Capital

#### No Iran prolif and long timeframe

Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran”, January 17, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show>

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon,Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear deviceand considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

#### LOL nice joke of a DA – everything here pounds

Matthew Lee 10/31, Writer for Yahoo News, (“Kerry to Mideast, Europe on damage control mission”, <http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-mideast-europe-damage-control-mission-161719032--politics.html>, AW)

Kerry will leave Washington this weekend for Saudi Arabia, Poland, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Morocco, the State Department said on Thursday. With tensions between the U.S. and many of its allies rising, the department acknowledged that at least parts of the nine-day trip might be difficult. "The secretary overall believes that rolling up his sleeves and having personal diplomacy is the way that we should continue to approach either issues we work together on, global challenges, or issues where there may be concerns as it relates to the intel-gathering reports," spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. At his first scheduled stop in Riyadh, Kerry will confront multiple spats with the Saudis over resolving the continuing conflict in Syria, nuclear negotiations with Iran and President Barack Obama's decision to withhold significant amounts of U.S. assistance to Egypt. In his meeting with Saudi King Abdullah, Kerry "will reaffirm the strategic nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, given the importance of the work between our two countries on shared challenges, and the leadership Saudi Arabia provides for the region," Psaki said. It may be a hard sell. Senior Saudi officials have expressed frustration and anger with the Obama administration's Syria policy, despite Washington's and Riyadh's shared goal of bringing an end to President Bashar Assad's rule. Kerry himself has publicly acknowledged Saudi disappointment with the fact that Obama did not follow through on his threat to punish Assad for the use of chemical weapons with military strikes. Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront of providing military assistance to Assad's foes and wants the U.S. to take a more active role, a course the White House has resisted. In addition, Saudi Arabia has watched with dismay as the administration has embarked on a tentative rapprochement with its archrival Iran and distanced itself from the government in Egypt in the aftermath of the military's ouster of the country's first democratically elected president. Kerry told a town hall meeting with State Department employees earlier this week that he would like to travel to Egypt in the near future, but the itinerary released on Thursday did not include a stop there. From Saudi Arabia, Kerry will travel to Warsaw for discussions with senior Polish officials on strategic and democracy issues, including missile defense and plans for NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan next year. Although it is the only European stop on Kerry's schedule, the visit to Poland will likely highlight the uproar over the revelations of alleged NSA spying on the continent and elsewhere. The controversy is particularly acute in neighboring Germany, where officials are incensed that Chancellor Angela Merkel was targeted for surveillance. From Poland, the secretary will fly back to the Middle East, first visiting Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The visit will mark Kerry's fifth solo trip to Israel since April. In Jerusalem and Bethlehem, Kerry will go over developments in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that have been going on with no tangible signs of progress since July with a nine-month target for reaching a deal. Earlier this week, Israel released a second batch of Palestinian prisoners as a goodwill gesture. The next day, however, it announced plans for new construction in east Jerusalem, angering the Palestinians who claim the territory for their future capital. Nuclear negotiations with Iran, which will be entering their second round in Geneva while Kerry is in Jerusalem, will also be a topic of discussion with Israeli officials, Psaki said. Israel views a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been openly disdainful of the administration's outreach to Iran's new President Hassan Rouhani who took office in August promising reforms. Netanyahu has disparaged Rouhani as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" and warned that he cannot be trusted in negotiations meant to get Iran to prove that is not trying to develop nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian atomic energy program. "The secretary is open and willing to talk about what our goals and our bottom line is (in the negotiations with Iran), and he looks forward to doing that, as well as discussing direct negotiations," Psaki said. After seeing Palestinian officials in the West Bank town of Bethlehem, Kerry will make the short flight to Amman, where he will discuss the peace process as well as the situation in Syria with top Jordanian officials. Jordan is under significant strain due to the conflict in Syria and is hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, who are proving a drain on its already shaky economy. After Jordan, Kerry heads to the United Arab Emirates, another strong supporter of increased U.S. involvement in Syria, and will then head back to Washington via North Africa. In Algeria and Morocco, he will compare notes on security and counterterrorism matters as well as democratic and economic reform in the wake of the revolutions that convulsed the region. The United States has "strategic dialogues" with both countries that are meant to enhance cooperation on a wide range of issues.

#### **NSA nukes DipCap**

Dan Roberts 10/31, Writer for The Guardian, “John Kerry admits: some US surveillance has gone too far”, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/31/john-kerry-some-surveillance-gone-too-far>, AW)

John Kerry, the US secretary of state, conceded on Thursday that some of the country's surveillance activities had gone too far, saying that certain practices had occurred "on autopilot" without the knowledge of senior officials in the Obama administration. In the most stark comments yet by a senior administration official, Kerry promised that a previously announced review of surveillance practices would be thorough and that some activities would end altogether. "The president and I have learned of some things that have been happening in many ways on an automatic pilot, because the technology is there and the ability is there," he told a conference in London via video link. "In some cases, some of these actions have reached too far and we are going to try to make sure it doesn't happen in the future." In recent days, the Obama administration has put some distance between it and the National Security Agency (NSA). Kerry's comments are a reflection in particular of a concern about the diplomatic fallout from the revelation that the US monitored the cellphone of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel. The tactic has irritated senior intelligence officials. On Thursday evening, the director of the NSA, General Keith Alexander, blamed US diplomats for requests to place foreign leaders under surveillance. During a pointed exchange with a former US ambassador to Romania, James Carew Rosapepe, Alexander said: "We, the intelligence agencies, don't come up with the requirements. The policy-makers come up with the requirements." He added: "One of those groups would have been, let me think, hold on, oh: ambassadors." Alexander said that the NSA collected information when it was asked by policy officials to discover the "leadership intentions" of foreign countries. "If you want to know leadership intentions, these are the issues," he said at a discussion hosted by the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in Washington, the debate continued about whether further legal constraints should be placed on the NSA. The Senate intelligence committee approved a bill that placed largely cosmetic restrictions on the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance programme. The bill, sponsored by committee chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat, allows the NSA continue to collect phone metadata of millions of Americans for renewable 90-day periods, but orders it to be more transparent about the practice. "I think there's huge misunderstanding about this NSA database programme, and how vital I think it is to protecting this country," Feinstein told reporters. The bill, which is competing with more restrictive measures from other committees, now moves forward to a full Senate vote. The stage is now set for a showdown with the USA Freedom Act, a bipartisan bill that would prohibit bulk collection of Americans' telephone records. Senator Mark Udall, a Democratic member of the Senate intelligence committee and a supporter of NSA reform, said it did not go far enough. "The NSA's invasive surveillance of Americans' private information does not respect our constitutional values and needs fundamental reform, not incidental changes," he said. In a separate development on Thursday, a group of technology giants called for substantial reforms to the US government's surveillance programmes. The companies were furious about revelations this week – the latest to emerge from documents leaked by the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden – that the agency had intercepted the cables that link the worldwide data centres belonging to Google and Yahoo. It was also reported that Obama had ordered the NSA to stop eavesdropping on the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Reuters cited a US official as saying the president had ordered the halt in the past few weeks. The NSA's surveillance of the IMF and World Bank has not previously been disclosed. In response to Reuters inquiries, a senior Obama administration official said, "The United States is not conducting electronic surveillance targeting the headquarters of the World Bank or IMF in Washington." The Obama administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, did not address whether the NSA had eavesdropped on the two entities in the past. Kerry, in his comments to a conference organised by the Open Government Partnership, acknowledged that trust needed to be restored. "There is an effort to try to gather information, yes, in same cases inappropriately, and the president is now doing a thorough review, in order that nobody will have a sense of abuse," he said. Despte the cracks between the administration and the spy community, Kerry was careful to defended the motives of US intelligence agencies, insisting no "innocent people" were being abused and saying surveillance by several countries had prevented many terrorist plots. After the 9/11 attacks, he said, the "US and others – I emphasise to you, others – realised that we are dealing with a new world where people are willing to blow themselves up. There are countless examples. Look at Nairobi. What if you were able to intercept that? We have prevented airplanes from going down and buildings from being blown up because we have learned ahead of time of such plans." Kerry also criticised what he said was an "enormous amount of exaggeration and misreporting" about the extent of the surveillance programmes, appearing to single out recent European reports that millions of French and Spanish citizens had been targeted by the US. Kerry will leave Washington this weekend for Saudi Arabia, Poland, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Morocco. With tensions between the US and many of its allies rising, the department acknowledged that at least parts of the nine-day trip might be difficult.

#### No Link – committees do the work

Oil and Gas Journal 10/7 (http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-10/regular-features/watching-government/transboundary-treaty-glitch.html)

The federal government's partial shutdown didn't keep the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee from discussing the pending US-Mexico transboundary hydrocarbons agreement on Oct. 1. But the hearing barely mentioned the main obstacle to its being ratified. Chairman Ronald L. Wyden (D-Ore.) twice mentioned his desire to see the treaty adopted "quickly and cleanly," but did not specify what the main problem was. There obviously was one since the hearing was to consider two separate bills: S 812, which he introduced on Apr. 25, and HR 1613, which US Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-SC) introduced a week earlier and the House passed on June 27. It fell to one of the witnesses—Carlos Pasqual, special envoy and energy affairs coordinator at the US Department of State—to explain the problem: While the Obama administration supports ratifying the treaty, it dislikes a provision in Duncan's bill that would waive Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring US companies to disclose payments to foreign governments. Duncan has said this is necessary to get US companies to invest in joint ventures with Mexico's state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos. Others argue that the hydrocarbons potential within the two countries' Gulf of Mexico maritime border may be enough to encourage the necessary outside investment if the US ratifies the treaty. "We believe the agreement would help facilitate the safe and responsible management of offshore petroleum reservoirs that straddle our maritime boundary and strengthen our bilateral relations overall," Pasqual testified on Oct. 1. Mexico ratified the treaty soon after it was signed in 2012. The country's new president, Enrique Pena Nieto, proposed energy regime reforms earlier this year that would allow contracts between Pemex and outside companies for the first time since 1938.

#### There is no internal link – Kerry can focus on multiple issues at once and be super effective

Burns 7/31 (Nicholas Burns, a professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “John Kerry’s six-month report card”, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html>)

Until a few weeks ago, a small army of critics and armchair quarterbacks took aim at Secretary of State John Kerry’s first months in office in roughly similar fashion — too much globe-trotting, too many meetings, and too singular a focus on the lost cause of diplomacy — the 65-year search for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Kerry thus deserves more than a little credit with this week’s resumption in Washington of the first meaningful talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority since 2008. It is a significant achievement, and it is largely his own. It is also indicative of how Kerry does business — with persistence, drive, energy, secrecy, and attention to detail, all at warp speed. Kerry is putting diplomacy back on the [map](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html). He has embraced his role as America’s top diplomat and is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security — the Middle East and Asia. American secretaries of state are expected by the rest of the world to lead on the toughest issues as combination referee, dealmaker, and frequent flyer. Kerry has played those roles confidently since taking office in January. He is also following former Secretary of State George Shultz’s advice to “tend the diplomatic garden.” In other words, it is important to show up in a distant capital with no immediate crisis to overcome. Demonstrating interest and respect and deepening personal connections with [global leaders](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html) makes it more likely they’ll see things our way when we need them, as we invariably will. Kerry did not set out to break Hillary Clinton’s mileage record, but that may become one measure of his ultimate success. In just six months, Kerry has delivered progress on some of America’s most important priorities. The Middle East talks are significant. If Kerry and his capable new envoy, Martin Indyk, can generate momentum on borders, Jerusalem, and [settlements](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/07/31/john-kerry-six-month-report-card/F5CBhgRDlXEaQxQUeyvPtI/story.html), it may create the best opportunity for progress since President Clinton’s 2000 Camp David talks. It is a long way from peace but a situation no one would have predicted even a month ago. He is reasserting America’s primacy in the two pivotal regions for US security— the Middle East and Asia. Further East, Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden, both recent visitors to New Delhi, have begun to revive a major aim of President George W. Bush — a strategic partnership with India in troubled South Asia. And, on North Korea, Kerry worked quietly and effectively with Beijing last March to contain Pyongyang’s erratic and unpredictable young leader, Kim Jung Un. After Iraq and Afghanistan, Kerry is right to return diplomacy to the front ranks of US strategy. Critics impatient with Kerry’s six trips to the Middle East would do well to remember the time it took to create some of the most significant recent American diplomatic successes. Henry Kissinger spent well more than a year in executing his brilliant opening to China. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, James Baker worked nonstop for 10 months to achieve Germany’s stunning unification in NATO. And the Clinton administration required nearly three years to get Bosnia right before Richard Holbrooke brokered his masterful peace at Dayton. The point is that diplomacy takes time. The veteran negotiator George Mitchell framed it best by reminding his own critics that, in Northern Ireland, he had “700 days of failure and one day of success” — the day he reached the Good Friday Agreement for peace. Kerry has many more mountains to climb as secretary of state. The Iran nuclear challenge will return to the front burner following this week’s inauguration of President Hassan Rowhani. Kerry needs to decide whether he should take the lead in the first American direct negotiations with Tehran in decades. Reaching a compromise deal with Iran will require the same unyielding personal commitment he has given to Israeli-Palestinian peace. But it is the best way to avoid a military conflict in 2014. In addition, Kerry will need to push Congress toward a more effective US position on climate change. And, Kerry has an opening to strengthen our alliance with a resurgent Japan and maintain America’s predominance in Asia. Can he find a way, at the same time, to work effectively with China? The challenges never go away. But Kerry is building in his first six months on the job a promising record of accomplishment in Foggy Bottom.

#### Dip Cap thesis wrong – Kerry makes unannounced trip to Afghanistan

Lee 10/11 (Matthew http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/11/john-kerry-afghanistan-visit\_n\_4083786.html) rss

The future of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan after the last troops leave at the end of 2014 may depend on whether U.S. officials like Secretary of State John Kerry can allay Afghan President Hamid Karzai's worries about sovereignty, Pakistan and the safety of Afghan citizens at the hands of Western troops. Kerry began urgent talks Friday with Karzai as an end-of-October deadline loomed for a security deal that would allow American troops to remain in Afghanistan after the NATO-led military mission ends next year. Kerry's unannounced visit to Kabul comes as talks on the bilateral security agreement have foundered over issues of Afghan sovereignty despite a year of negotiations.

## 1AR

### 1AR – Biodiversity

#### Resilient and no impact

Easterbrook ‘95 (Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.