# 1nc rd 3

## Shunning

#### Mexico is a flagrant violator of human rights.

HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (“Mexico,” 2013 World Report, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=1, Accessed 07-22-2013)

Mexican security forces have committed widespread human rights violations in efforts to combat powerful organized crime groups, including killings, disappearances, and torture. Almost none of these abuses are adequately investigated, exacerbating a climate of violence and impunity in many parts of the country.¶ In an historic decision in August 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of military jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights violation was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most abuses by military personnel continue to be prosecuted in military courts, which lack independence and impartiality.¶ Criminal groups and members of security forces continue to threaten or attack human rights defenders and journalists. The government has failed to provide these vulnerable groups with adequate protection or investigate the crimes committed against them. In April, Mexico passed legislation to create a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, but protocols to evaluate risk and assign protection are still being designed.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.¶ But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

## CP

#### CP Text: Texas should implement the agreement between the United States and United Mexican States concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico.

#### **The time is ripe for Texas to invest in Mexico’s shale gas refineries, both location and a want to invest are ideal for both Mexico and Texas**

Althaus, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for Mexico and Central America, 12 (Dudley Althaus, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for Mexico and Central America, “Natural gas from Mexico beckons Texas companiesBY based in Mexico City” July 17, 2012 12:23am

<http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/energy/article/Natural-gas-from-Mexico-beckons-Texas-companies-3711053.php>, accessed June 30, 2013, QDKM)

¶ MEXICO CITY — A sense of urgency gripping Mexican energy policies could bring big cash to Texas oil patch companies and eventually might include investments in shale gas deposits near the Rio Grande and vast petroleum pools beneath the deepest reaches of the Gulf of Mexico.¶But those lucrative investments depend upon whether Mexico's divided Congress buys into President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto's proposed energy reforms. Analysts and government officials say billions of dollars in new investments are needed through the next few years to feed the needs of Mexico's economy and growing population.¶Peña's first test likely will be the fate of the northern shale fields, which hold as much as 680 trillion cubic feet of gas, giving Mexico the world's fourth-largest reserves of nonconventional fuel after China, the United States and Argentina.¶ Most of Mexico's shale gas lies in an extension of the Eagle Ford Shale play, where frenzied drilling and production have undergone a boom.¶Nearly 6,000 drilling permits have been issued in Texas for the Eagle Ford, and 550 wells are producing there. Mexican oil monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, so far has drilled five exploratory wells on Mexico's share of the Eagle Ford and hopes to drill 170 more in four years.¶ American expertise¶ But Pemex's Mexican contractors aren't experienced in hydraulic fracturing techniques used for shale gas, and it will need the expertise of the U.S. companies drilling north of the border. Attracting them might mean allowing them to own a percentage of the gas rather than getting paid straight service fees.¶ That's currently illegal under the Mexican Constitution.¶ “Without reforms, you're not going to see a significant amount of foreign capital going into Mexico,” said Roger Wallace, vice president of Dallas' Pioneer Natural Resources, a major player in the Eagle Ford. “There are plenty of opportunities in Texas, a lot going on in the United States.”¶ Even so, some Mexican analysts think the timing isn't right for shale gas, at least now.¶ “With prices for natural gas so low, developing shale gas fields quickly doesn't make immediate economic sense,” said Alejandra Leon, an analyst with international energy strategy consulting company IHS-CERA in Mexico City.¶ The tens of thousands of eventual shale gas wells proposed by Pemex cost as much as $8 million each.¶ An ultra-deep-water well runs $250 million. All told, Mexico's petroleum industry will need $155 billion in investments through the next decade, Mexican Energy Minister Jordy Herrera estimates.¶ Private investment, many say, is the only answer.¶ “The potential for Mexican shale is enormous,” said Tony Garza, the Bush administration's ambassador to Mexico, who previously served as a Texas petroleum regulator. “Simply warming over the service contract approaches won't attract the kind of capital necessary to expand along the border. ... let alone what is needed to go offshore and ultra-deep, where their big reserves are.”¶ Mexico's long-term energy hopes lie in the Gulf's deep waters. Drillers and oil service companies have earned billions of dollars over the years providing contract services to Pemex.¶ That will continue as Pemex struggles to maintain or grow its 2.5 million-barrel-a-day production by opening new fields and redrilling old ones. But the so-called easy oil and gas wells those companies helped produce are running dry.¶ Texas companies have been encouraged by Mexican officials to submit bids on several thousand miles of new pipelines already planned, and more are in the works. Refineries need to be burnished, built or bought.¶ “There will be lots of opportunities,” said Wallace, a former senior U.S. diplomat overseeing commercial affairs in Mexico City.¶ Mexican energy experts envision converting Pemex to a private enterprise, such as Brazil's Petrobras or Norway's Statoil, initially owned by the state.

## Politics

No government shutdown in the squo – republicans are being pressured by Obama

ABC News 9/26 [John Parkinson and Jeff Zeleny, “Despite Showdown, Boehner Doesn’t Expect Government Shutdown,” 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/despite-showdown-boehner-doesnt-expect-government-shutdown/]

As the Senate finalizes making its imprint on a stop-gap government spending bill, House Republicans today continued to press Democrats for partisan changes to the legislation that could ultimately lead to the first government shutdown in nearly 20 years.¶ While the Senate’s tweaks to the House-passed continuing resolution won a full endorsement from the White House today, House Speaker John Boehner told reporters he does not intend to accept the bill as amended by the Senate.¶ “The American people don’t want the president’s health care bill, and they don’t want the government to shut down,” Boehner, R-Ohio, said. “Republicans are listening. We passed a bill last week that would do just what the American people have asked. It’s time for the Senate to listen and pass the bill that we’ve sent over there.”¶ Given the political risks that come with a prolonged political ping pong match, Boehner was questioned whether he concedes that the government is headed for a shutdown next week.¶ “No, I do not,” he insisted. “No, I do not expect that to happen.”¶ Asked whether he is prepared to accept a clean continuing resolution from the Senate in order to avoid a government shutdown, Boehner hinted that more changes are coming from the House.¶ “I made it clear now for months and months and months, we have no interest in seeing a government shutdown, but we’ve got to address the spending problem that we have in this town,” Boehner said. “There will be options available to us. There are not going to be any speculation about what we’re going to do or not do until the Senate passes their bill.”¶ While Republicans maintain that their next move has not been decided, GOP insiders say the options being privately discussed are plentiful.¶ With just four days remaining until the government runs out of funding Oct. 1, some Republicans are said to be pushing for a short-term continuing resolution – even as brief as one week – to enable lawmakers to pursue a bipartisan agreement.¶ Another option that could be gaining favor as the House GOP’s next move on the continuing resolution: delaying the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act for one year. That plan was initially discussed as a leading preference for the GOP’s game plan on the debt limit, but with the Senate finishing its first crack at the continuing resolution a few days earlier than first expected, some House Republicans continue to press for Obamacare’s destruction.¶ Rep. Paul Ryan, chairman of the Budget Committee, however, believes the bigger budget fight and any discussion over whether to delay the Affordable Care Act should come on the debt limit debate. The former running mate of Mitt Romney said he believes the House will send an altered bill back to the Senate, but would act quickly enough to keep the government funded.¶ “We’re in a good place. We’re unified and feel like we have a good strategy,” Ryan, R-Wis., told ABC News following a meeting with the House Republican Conference. “No one is interested in shutting the government down. We don’t see what is accomplished with that.”¶ Rep. Mo Brooks said House Republicans do not want to be pushed into a corner by Senate Democrats on the budget resolution. He said Democrats should bear the blame for any potential government shutdown.¶ “We’ve agreed on funding 99 percent of the federal government. Let’s fund that 99 percent and then fight over the remaining 1 percent,” Brooks, R-Ala., told ABC News. “But Harry Reid and Barack Obama insist on a scenario that results in a government shutdown if they don’t get everything that they demand.”¶ Rep. Sean Duffy, who was critical of Sen. Ted Cruz a week ago, said the Texas Republican “fought a good fight” during his 21-hour marathon speech in the Senate this week.¶ “I thought he did a great job,” Duffy, R-Wis., said. “But the bottom line is, Do we really think the president is going to go along with defunding Obamacare? I don’t think he will, but there are some issues that we can do, like delay or opt-out for states.”¶ Current government funding runs out at the end of the day on Sept. 30. The House could act as soon as Saturday to send the continuing resolution back to the Democrat-led Senate, leaving a precarious amount of time for the upper chamber to decide whether to send the legislation on to the president. If Democrats reject the House’s next move, the prospects of a government shutdown become even more likely than any fiscal battle Congress has faced the past three years.¶ “I’ll personally be surprised if we have a government shutdown,” Brooks added. “And if we do, I’ll be extraordinarily surprised if it lasts anything beyond hours or days as opposed to weeks or months.”

#### The plan prioritizes drilling over protecting investors, improving rig safety, respecting coastal communities, and conducting appropriate environmental review

Van Hollen 6-28 (Maryland Democratic Congressman, Democrat, “THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON AGREEMENTS AUTHORIZATION ACT (HR 1613) AND THE OFFSHORE ENERGY AND JOBS ACT (HR 2231),” June 28, 2013)

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, while I support the responsible ¶ development of our nation's resources, this week's legislation ¶ prioritizes drilling over protecting investors, improving rig safety, ¶ respecting coastal communities and conducting appropriate environmental ¶ review. For these reasons, I will be voting no and encouraging my ¶ colleagues do the same.¶ The Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements ¶ Authorization Act (HR 1613) provides specific authorization for the ¶ recently negotiated U.S.-Mexico transboundary agreement and establishes ¶ standards for all future offshore oil and gas agreements with potential ¶ foreign partners like Canada, Russia, the Bahamas and Bermuda. If¶ [[Page E1006]]¶ HR 1613 were a clean bill, it would be completely non-controversial. ¶ Instead, HR 1613 also proposes to waive a provision of the Dodd-Frank ¶ Act requiring disclosure of otherwise secret payments made to foreign ¶ governments in connection with oil and gas development. Repealing this ¶ right-to-know protection is harmful to investors and has no place in ¶ this otherwise non-controversial legislation.

Obama singularly focused on the fiscal crisis—his political capital will resolve it before shutdown and default

Jonathan Allen, Politico, 9/19/13, GOP battles boost President Obama, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other.

And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve.

If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit.

For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal.

Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).

Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect.

The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law.

“I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.”

While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened.

And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning.

The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made.

The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

That spills-over to government shutdown and US default—that kills the economy and US credibility

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy.

Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## Security

#### Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

## Hegemony

#### Multiple factors portend total hegemonic decline within the next few years

**Layne 4/25/12** – not a fan of heg

(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, “The Global Power Shift From West to East”, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796>,)

Such protestations, however, cannot forestall **real-world developments** that collectively are challenging the post-1945 international order, often called Pax Americana, in which the United States employed its overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. That era of American dominance is drawing to a close as the country’s **relative power** declines, along with its ability to manage global economics and security. This does not mean the United States will go the way of Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Harvard’s Stephen Walt wrote in this magazine last year, it is more accurate to say the “American Era” is nearing its end. For now, and for some time to come, the United States will remain primus inter pares—the strongest of the major world powers—though it is uncertain whether it can maintain that position over the next twenty years. Regardless, America’s power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of Pax Americana. That was the Old Order, forged through the momentous events of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. Now that Old Order of nearly seven decades’ duration is fading from the scene. It is natural that U.S. leaders would want to deny it—or feel they must finesse it when talking to the American people. But the real questions for America and its leaders are: What will replace the Old Order? How can Washington protect its interests in the new global era? And how much international disruption will attend the transition from the old to the new? The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China’s **astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status**, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15 percent) will **draw nearly even** with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as **the world’s largest economy** (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China’s GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the Financial Times indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces **resistance at both ends**. First, the deepening financial crisis will **compel retrenchment**, and the United States will be **increasingly less able** to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will **magnify the effects** of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, **there is a critical linkage** between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to **shape the international order through influence**, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash **growing challenges** to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America’s relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel **increasingly emboldened** to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its “century of humiliation” at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as “responsible stakeholder” in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values.

#### Multipolarity makes war unthinkable – no possibility for transition wars – their authors agree

Schweller 10 – Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University

(Randall, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010)

Though rarely mentioned, system equilibrium can emerge without balancing or power-seeking behaviour. This should not come as a surprise; for we know that a Concert system existed during a multipolar phase, roughly between 1815 and 1853. That system, however, arose from the ashes of war, the purpose of which was to defeat an aspiring hegemon before it rolled up the system. The current system, however, has already been ‘rolled up’ for all intents and purposes. So how could a balance of power be restored without deliberate balancing against the US? The answer is that uneven rates of growth among states seeking merely to get rich (wealth, not military power, security, or political influence over others) can produce a rough equivalence in capabilities among several states, none of which feel particularly threatened by each other or seek relative gains at the expense of one another. In other words, the major actors in the system are strictly egoistic, and they interact cooperatively, not competitively or strategically in a military sense, with each other. It is essentially an orthodox liberal world, in which international politics becomes a positive-sum game and the concept of equilibrium is, by definition, a Pareto optimal condition that no actor has an interest in changing (see Callinicos 2007, 546). Here, global equilibrium means maximum entropy. What has changed? Simply put, there is no longer an expectation of violent expansion among the great powers. Balance of power is built on the assumption not only that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft (Jervis 1986, 60) but that states will settle their differences by fighting. This expectation exercises a profound influence on the types of behaviours exhibited by states and the system as awhole (Lasswell 1965 [1935], chapter 3). It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each others’ expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theory.Without the very real fear of Soviet expansion, why would bipolarity have compelled the US to adopt a grand strategy of containment and deterrence? Without the traditional expectations of great power war and conquest, why would the added complexity and uncertainty of multipolar systems make them unstable? Why would states form alliances in the first place, much less worry about who aligns with whom? When war is unthinkable among the great powers, it is hard to see how polarity exerts the constraints predicted by structural balance of power theory. To the extent that this driving force of history is no longer in play, the system will experience increasing entropy. The current system’s ideational or social structures also seem to be pushing in the direction of greater entropy, suggesting that the world may be reaching an endpoint of sorts. This view of history is consistent with Kant’s (2005 [1795]) ‘perpetual peace’, Richard Rosecrance’s (1987) ‘rise of the trading state’, Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ and, for slightly different reasons, John Ikenberry’s (2001) vision of a ‘constitutional order’ rooted in liberalism. Regarding the latter, a ‘multipolar’ constitutional order would not be all that different from the current world because: (1) constitutional orders place limits on the returns to power, so presumably a switch from unipolarity to multipolarity would not be terribly significant; (2) the system, though multipolar, would retain the basic foundations of the American liberal order, its underlying social values would remain intact, and (3) there would be, just as today, no balancing behaviour among the major powers against each other, and major power war would be virtually unthinkable. That noted, Ikenberry’s view of order is more centralized, structured and deliberate than the one I have in mind. An entropy version of Ikenberry’s order would be a watered-down, more decentralized and spontaneously generated liberal order—but one that still devalues power. Liberals are not the only ones making such claims. Several prominent realists have also acknowledged that the world has fundamentally changed to the point that, if and when unipolarity ends, we will not likely see a return to traditional great power politics among the core states. Robert Jervis (2005), for instance, stresses the unprecedented development of a Security Community among all the leading powers as the defining feature of today’s world politics. The existence of this security community means not only that major power war has become unthinkable but also that bandwagoning and balancing ‘will not map on the classical form of the balance of power’ (Jervis 2005, 31). Similarly, Jonathan Kirshner (2008, 335) sees fewer prospects for great power war as a consequence of globalization. Along these lines, Fareed Zakaria (2008, 243) predicts a postAmerican world governed by a messy ad hoc order composed of a` la carte multilateralism and networked interactions among state and nonstate actors. The provision of international order in this future world will no longer be a matter decided solely by the political and military power held by a single hegemon or even a group of leading states. The bottomline is that, if war no longer lurks in the background of great power relations and if strong states must share power with institutions and nonstate actors, then to say that the world is becoming multipolar is, if not meaningless, grossly misleading. The dynamics of this new multipolar world will be significantly different from those of past multipolar systems. When great powers built arms in traditional multipolar settings, they did so under the belief that it was not only possible but probable that their weapons would be targeted and used against each other. Likewise, when they formed alliances, they targeted them at one another. A Community composed of the most developed states in the international system was not on the menu of traditional alliance politics under multipolarity. Of course, international politics can change rapidly and the mere prediction that the Community will survive into the foreseeable future, no matter how compelling it appears to us today, does not mean that the Community will not dissolve sooner than later. Even so, it is difficult to see how major power war becomes thinkable again given the intolerably high costs of war and the obvious destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the benefits of peace grounded in the perceived decoupling of territorial conquest from national prosperity, and the shared values and beliefs about how the world works among the leading states (Jervis 2005).

#### Heg is dead and we have killed it – trying to postpone the collapse fails and causes conflict with China

**Layne 12 –** not a fan of heg

(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly (2012), 1–11)

What effect will China’s rise—and unipolarity’s concomitant end—and the United States’ internal economic and ﬁscal troubles have on the Pax Americana? Not much, according to prominent scholars such as Ikenberry (2001, 2011), Zakaria (2008), and Brooks and Wohlforth (2008). They have argued that the United States can cushion itself against any future loss of hegemony by acting now to ‘‘lock in’’ the Pax Americana’s essential features—its institutions, rules, and norms—so that they outlive unipolarity. 11 As Ikenberry puts it, the United States should act today to put in place an institutional framework ‘‘that will safeguard our interests in future decades when we will not be a unipolar power’’ (Ikenberry 2011:348). This is **not** a **persuasive** argument. First, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige and soft power, on the other. The ebbing of the United States’ hegemony raises the question of **whether it has the authority to take the lead** in reforming the post-1945 international order. The Pax Americana projected the United States’ liberal ideology abroad, and asserted its universality as the only model for political, economic, and social development. Today, however, the American model of free market, liberal democracy—which came to be known in the 1990s as the Washington consensus—**is being challenged** by an alternative model, the Beijing consensus (Halper 2010). Moreover, the Great Recession **discredited America’s liberal model**. Consequently, **it is questionable** whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy **to spearhead the revamping of the international order**. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, ‘‘The collapse of the western ﬁnancial system, while China’s ﬂourishes, marks a humiliating end to the ‘unipolar moment.’ As western policy makers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?’’ (Wolf 2009). The second reason a US lock-in strategy is unlikely to succeed is because the United States **does not have the necessary economic clout** to revitalize the international order. Ikenberry deﬁnes the task of securing lock-in as ‘‘renewing and rebuilding the architecture of global governance and cooperation to allow the United States to marshal resources and tackle problems along a wide an shifting spectrum of possibilities’’ (Ikenberry 2011:353) To do this, the United States will need to take the lead in providing public goods: security, economic leadership, and a nation building program of virtually global dimension to combat the ‘‘socioeconomic backwardness and failure that generate regional and international instability and conﬂict’’ (Ikenberry 2011:354, 359). At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a ﬁnancially strapped United States **increasingly will be unable to be a big time provider** of public goods to the international order. 12 The third reason the post-World War II international order cannot be locked in is the rise of China (and other emerging great and regional powers). The lock-in argument is marred by a glaring weakness: if they perceive that the United States is declining, the incentive for China and other emerging powers is to **wait a decade or two and reshape the international system themselves** in a way that reﬂects their own interests, norms, and values (Jacques 2009). China and the United States have **fundamental differences** on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’ While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it **is converting wealth into hard power** to challenge American geopolitical dominance. And although China is working ‘‘within the system’’ to transform the post-1945 international order, it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—for constructing **an alternative world order that**, over the next twenty years or so, **could displace the Pax Americana**. As Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating ‘‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’’ (Jacques 2009:362). Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions **do not exist in vacuum**. Rather, they reﬂect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. The post-World War II international order is an American order that privileges the United States’ interests. Even the discourse of ‘‘liberal order’’ cannot conceal this fact. This is why the notion that China can be constrained by integrating into the post-1945 international order **lacks credulity**. For US scholars and policymakers alike, China’s successful integration hinges on Beijing’s willingness to accept the Pax Americana’s institutions, rules, and norms. In other words, China must accept playing second ﬁddle to the United States. Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, **and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain** because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding SinoAmerican rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, **Washington and Beijing are on a collision course**.

**That escalates and causes extinction – it’s highly probable**

**Wittner 11** – Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany

(Lawrence, “COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”, <http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446>,)

While nuclear weapons exist, **there remains a danger that they will be used**. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. **The gathering tension** between the United States and China **is clear enough**. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, **there are signs that it could**. After all, both the United States and China possess **large numbers of nuclear weapons**. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, **nuclear saber-rattling persists**. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that **such wars can occur**. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But **what would that “victory” entail?** A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to **smoldering, radioactive wastelands**. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would **blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe**—**destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction**. Moreover, in another decade **the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse**. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

## Joint Cooperation

#### The US is a huge buyer of Nigerian oil, but the plan eliminates oil imports, which will collapse the Nigerian economy

Kent, 13

[Sarah, contributor to WSJ, “Nigeria Bearing Brunt of U.S. Shale-Oil Boom,” 3/6/13, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324662404578333981454427720.html>]

ABUJA—Nigeria is suffering from reduced demand for its oil from North America, in a sign of what could be in store for other OPEC members. The U.S. had long been one of the main customers of oil from Nigeria, the largest African member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. But a recent rise in production of domestic crude in the U.S., largely attributable to the introduction of shale-rock drilling technology, has reduced the reliance on imported oil in the world's largest economy. As a result, exports of Nigerian oil to the U.S. have fallen to their lowest levels in decades, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, disquieting political elites in a country where oil export is the mainstay of the economy. Analysts say it may be a taste of what is to come for other OPEC members, even though the group has largely shrugged off the threat presented by the U.S. shale-oil boom. For many years, the biggest problems facing Nigeria have been attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta and the difficulties in passing new laws to overhaul of the oil industry, which encompass everything from tax rates to environmental laws to the structure of Nigeria's state-owned oil company. But at a conference in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, last month, rising U.S. oil production was the hot topic. "Shale oil and the increase in their gas production is already affecting our exports to the United States," said Nigerian Oil Minister Alison Madueke. Exports of Nigerian oil to the U.S. almost halved between 2011 and 2012, according to EIA data. In the late 2000s, Nigeria regularly shipped around one million barrels a day of crude to the U.S., but last year that number was just 405,000 barrels a day. Other members of OPEC have also been affected. Exports from both Angola and Algeria fell more than 30% last year. But the impact has been the most severe in Nigeria, which has historically sent the bulk of its oil exports to the U.S., and the country has been forced to react. "Nigeria is repositioning its exports in the light of this emergent threat," and has so far been able to find alternative markets for its crude, said Andrew Yakubu, group managing director of Nigeria's state oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. But traders and analysts say Nigeria has experienced difficulty finding a home for its crude, and it has had to cut prices. Weak demand forced Nigeria to sell some cargoes of its oil below the official selling price in January, said a report from analysts at Ecobank. Cargoes of Qua Iboe crude, one of Nigeria's benchmark grades, sold for almost 40 cents a barrel below the official price, the bank said. This is just a fraction of the total selling price, but would still see the country lose $380,000 on a typical cargo, according to calculations by The Wall Street Journal. Many Nigerian oil cargoes are being redirected to the Mediterranean or the North Sea, said one trader active in the West African crude market, who didn't wish to be named for reasons of commercial confidentiality. But it wasn't clear whether Europe, where oil demand is falling, could be a long-term market for Nigerian crude, the trader said. Fast-growing Asia is an obvious destination, but prices would have to fall to gain the interest of Chinese buyers, the trader said. Oil accounts for 75% of the Nigerian government's revenue, so a sustained decline could have a sizable impact. Much of Nigeria's population lives in poverty, while the government is struggling to contain an Islamist insurgency in the north and widespread theft of oil from pipelines in the south. But the effects could spread further. Rising production in the U.S. "is a major challenge for Nigeria and the rest of OPEC," said Bright Okugo, director general of the Nigerian budget office. OPEC's own projections now show that demand for its oil will be fairly stagnant over the next four years, even as global consumption rises. "We can't stand still and think the world will wait for us," Mr. Okugo said.

#### Nigerian stability is key to African stability---Nigeria plays the largest role in peace

Ploch, 13

[Lauren, Specialist in African Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” 4/24/13, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf>] STRYKER

The U.S. government considers its relationship with Nigeria, Africa’s largest producer of oil and its second largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with more than 170 million people, roughly divided between Muslims and Christians. U.S. diplomatic relations with Nigeria, which is regularly among the top six suppliers of U.S. oil imports, have improved since the country made the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, and Nigeria is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is an influential actor in African politics, having mediated disputes in several African countries and ranking among the top five troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions. Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges that have the potential to threaten the stability of both the state and the region, and to affect global oil prices. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since independence. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the authority and legitimacy of the state. Despite its extensive oil and natural gas resources, Nigeria’s human development indicators are among the world’s lowest, and a majority of the population suffers from extreme poverty. Years of social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production and impeded the southern region’s economic development. Perceived neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north. Thousands have been killed in periodic ethno-religious clashes in the past decade. The attempted terrorist attack on an American airliner by a Nigerian in December 2009 and the ri of a militant Islamist group, Boko Haram, have heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has increasingly targeted churches, triggering some retaliatory violence and threatening to inflame religious tensions in Nigeria. While the group remains primarily focused on a domestic agenda, some of its members appear to have expanded ties with other violent Islamist groups, namely those operating in Mali and the Sahel, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Nigeria deployed troops to Mali in 2013 as part of a U.N.-authorized African-led military operation. Ansaru, a Boko Haram splinter group, appears intent on kidnapping foreigners. Nigeria’s last elections, in 2011, were viewed by many as a key test of the government’s commitment to democracy. The U.S. government had deemed previous elections to be deeply flawed. Election observers described the 2011 polls as a significant improvement over previous efforts, but not without problems. Post-election protests and violence across the north highlighted communal tensions, grievances, and mistrust of the government in that regi on. President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, was reelected and faces multiple, sometimes competing pressures to implement reforms to address Nigeria’s security and development challenges. The Obama Administration has been supportive of Nigerian reform initiatives, including anti- corruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development in the Niger Delta. In 2010, the Administration established the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, a strategic dialogue to address issues of mutual concern. Congress regularly monitors Nigerian political developments, and some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, environmental damage from oil drilling, and the threat of violent extremism in Nigeria. Congress oversees more than $600 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria—one of the largest U.S. bilateral assistance packages in Africa. 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Nigeria at a Glance ................................................................................................. .......... 2 Figure 2. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election ......................................................................... 5 Ta b l e s Table 1. State Department and US AID Assistance to Nigeria ....................................................... 21 Contacts Author Contac t Information..................................................................................................... ...... Overview Nigeria is considered a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but because of its political and economic role in the region. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa call Nigeria home. The country’s commercial center, Lagos, is among the world’s largest cities. Nigeria’s economy is Sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest, and it is one of the world’s major sources of high-quality crude oil. Nigerian leaders have mediated conflicts throughout Africa, and Nigerian troops have played a key role in peace and stability operations on the continent. The country ranks among the top five troop contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Few countries in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region.

**African instability goes nuclear.**

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

***The Rabid Tiger Project believes that*** a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars ***in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone,*** and domestic instability ***in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as*** occasional brushfire and other wars ***(thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones)*** turn into a really nasty stew***. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown.*** Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. ***Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you.*** Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly***. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But*** an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. ***Certainly,*** such a strike would ***in the first place*** have been facilitated by outside help ***- financial, scientific, engineering, etc.*** Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

#### Small amount of oil in the gulf means prices stay the same - prices actually increase because of a lack of supply. Independently, takes 15 years to start even exploratory drilling – means the aff could never solve

**Romm, 8 –** (Joseph Romm, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Editor of ClimateProgress.org. Huffington Post Politics, August 6, 2008. “We Tried Offshore Drilling and Oil Prices Doubled,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-romm/we-tried-offshore-drillin\_b\_117263.html)//SDL

At the end of 2006, the Republican Congress and the president enacted "The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act," which opened for drilling 8 million acres of the Outer Continental shelf estimated to contain more than 40 billion barrels of oil. Oil prices were only $60 a barrel then. In the two years since, prices have more than have doubled.¶ Doesn't that prove that legislation to permit offshore drilling increases oil prices? That seems to be the "logic" of John McCain and the Republicans. Late last month, "Republican John McCain on Wednesday credited the recent $10-a-barrel drop in the price of oil to President Bush's lifting of a presidential ban on offshore drilling."¶ That's right, the man who wants to be the next President of the United States believes that doing absolutely nothing -- which is what Bush did when he reversed his father's ban, since the congressional ban is still in place -- dropped oil prices $10.¶ And Conservative Rep. John Shadegg (R-AZ) just claimed, "Gas prices have gone down, and they've gone down in part because the market is realizing that this kind of pressure from the Congress may actually cause a change in American policy."¶ Something about the air in Arizona must lead to magical thinking.¶ What's especially absurd about all this is that ending the federal moratorium on offshore drilling would probably add only another 8 billion barrels (assuming California still blocks drilling off its coast) -- one fifth of what was opened for drilling offshore two years ago.¶ Who thinks that adding under 100,000 barrels a day in supply sometime after 2020 -- some one-thousandth of total supply -- would be more than the proverbial drop in the ocean? Remember the Saudis didn't stop prices from rising when they announced earlier this year that they would add 500,000 barrels of oil a day by the end of this year!¶ The Bush administration's own Energy Information Administration analysis, "Impacts of Increased Access to Oil and Natural Gas Resources in the Lower 48 Federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), spells out the reality:¶ Look closely. As of 2003, oil companies had available for leasing and development 40.92 billion barrels of offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico. I asked the EIA analyst who wrote this report how much of that (estimated) available oil had been discovered in the last five years. She went to her computer and said "about 7 billion barrels have been found." That leaves about 34 billion still to find and develop.¶ The federal moratorium only blocks another 18 billion barrels of oil from being developed. But, as you can see, most of that is off of California, which has bipartisan opposition to drilling from Republican Governor Schwarzenegger -- who, unlike McCain, seems serious about his commitment to greenhouse gas reduction -- and the Democratic legislature, which remembers all too well the devastating 1969 oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara. Indeed, Karen Bass, the newly appointed speaker of the State Assembly, said, "The idea of increasing offshore drilling off the coast of California I think is absurd, and I can't even imagine we would entertain that." Why would they, given the risk to their beautiful coasts and their commitment to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions 80% by midcentury?¶ So that only leaves about 8 billion barrels, which is about what the world uses in three months. Not bloody much. And that assumes every other state, including Florida, goes aggressively with offshore drilling, which is exceedingly unlikely. Indeed, the military is unlikely to let Virginia drill offshore because they use that area for Naval training. Most other Atlantic Coast states don't have a pipeline delivery infrastructure, which makes them far less attractive to the oil industry. Why would you drill off the coast of Maine when you would have to get that oil to a distant refinery? And Senator Martinez (R-FL) is dead set against drilling off Florida's coast.¶ So in the real world, ending the federal moratorium on coastal drilling might add 50,000 barrels of oil a day some time after 2020. That is so tiny that it certainly can't have any impact on oil prices ever, psychological or not. That is so tiny that I agree with Sen. Obama that we should be open to a compromise in which progressives give up that nothing in return for a genuine effort to jumpstart the transition to a clean energy economy.¶ You may ask why Big Oil hasn't gotten around to the 34 billion barrels already available to them offshore, given the staggering price for oil? The answer is pretty much the same reason why the EIA analyst told me that ending the federal moratorium is "certainly not going to make a difference in the next 10 years": It ain't easy being non-green off-shore.¶ As she explained, the constraints on offshore drilling have little to do with the price of oil, but a lot to do with timing. Once the leases are available, it is a 5 to 10 years before you get to exploratory drilling. There is a tremendous shortage of drilling rigs and manpower. Plus, offshore drilling is so expensive, you don't want to make any mistakes. So you spend do a lot of seismic analysis to minimize your chances of a dry well.¶ And it is probably another five or more years from drilling your exploratory well to getting significant production from the area -- and that assumes you didn't dig a dry well. If you did, then you are probably going to be even more cautious. And all that assumes you have developed a pipeline infrastructure for delivering the oil. But again the Atlantic Coast lacks such an infrastructure, so who knows how long it would take to get its oil?¶ One small final point. The EIA analysis concludes¶ The projections in the OCS access case indicate that access to the Pacific, Atlantic, and eastern Gulf regions would not have a significant impact on domestic crude oil and natural gas production or prices before 2030.¶ But in listening to the radio and TV debates, I realize that some people have the impression that the EIA meant offshore drilling might eventually lower oil prices, after 2030. It did not. The year 2030 is merely as far out as they project. So I wouldn't say, as some do, that the Bush administration concludes offshore drilling wouldn't lower oil prices until 2030. I'd say the Bush administration found that allowing offshore drilling would have no significant effect on prices as far out into the future as the analysis projected.

#### Horizontal drilling solves energy independence

Hamm 7/4 – CEO of Continental Resources, energy advisor to Mitt Romney (Harold Hamm, 7/4/13, “Happy (Energy) Independence Day” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/07/04/happy-energy-independence-day/>) // CB

By unlocking oil and natural gas resources that were once thought to be unrecoverable, **horizontal drilling** has sparked an **American energy renaissance** that will revolutionize everything from job creation to balance of trade to national security. This advanced technology allows us to drill two miles down, turn right, go another two miles, and hit a target the size of a lapel pin. With technological advances in horizontal drilling, oil imports have dropped 26% since 2008 and the United States is likely to **overtake Saudi Arabia** as the world’s largest oil producer by 2017.¶ Some may say this **new abundance** in oil and gas is due to **hydraulic fracturing**. However, fracking technology has been consistently in use for more than 60 years. What is new is horizontal drilling. In 2000, there were less than 50 horizontal drilling rigs in the U.S. and experts believed we had reached peak oil. In 2009, the Domestic Energy Producers Alliance issued its Declaration of Energy Independents due to the phenomenal turnaround caused by horizontal drilling. By the end of 2012, there were nearly 1,200 horizontal drilling rigs in the U.S. and Raymond James, Citi and the International Energy Agency had all released reports declaring the reality of American energy independence by 2020.¶ Just as the American Revolution changed the world in 1776, so too will this modern-day American oil and gas revolution. Energy independence means we no longer have to rely on oil from the Middle East, it means the creation of more than a million high-paying jobs, and it means a solution to the U.S. debt crisis through a shift in balance of trade.¶ Horizontal drilling has forged the path to **energy independence**, freeing us from unfriendly nations and financial disaster. On this Independence Day, as we look to the future of U.S. oil and gas production, we can once again celebrate the best of American innovation and perseverance brought to you by Americans at their best.

# 2nc

### 2NC – Mexico

#### ALSO Arraigo confirms

HRW 13 (Human Rights Watch 4-25-2013, “Mexico: Abolish “Arraigo” Detention from Constitution” <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/mexico-abolish-arraigo-detention-constitution> Date Accessed: 7-2-2013)

Neither the proposal to reduce the arraigo detention period to a maximum of 40 days, nor the proposal to replace it with up to 10 days of pre-charge detention under judicial control, complies with international human rights standards, Human Rights Watch said. Both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have indicated that a period in excess of four days before a person is brought before a judge to be charged or released is prima facie too long. While the Inter-American Court has only had to give judgment in a case involving a 15-day detention period with a 30-day maximum and ruled that it violated the American Convention on Human Rights, it has explicitly endorsed the approach of the European Court and Human Rights Committee on the importance of promptness in judicial control over detention. The UN Committee on Torture, the UN Group on Arbitrary Detentions, the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, and the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers are among the international entities that have called for the abolition of pre-charge detention in Mexico. “Any additional time before a detainee is brought before a judge for charging – whether days or weeks, and whether it is called arraigo or another name – would constitute an unreasonable infringement on fundamental rights, and will create an environment ripe for more abuse,” Vivanco said. Human Rights Watch has documented scores of cases in which victims have been subjected to serious abuses – including torture and rape – in the period before and during preventive detention under the existing provision. For example, four men from Baja California – Ramiro Ramírez Martínez, Rodrigo Ramírez Martínez, Orlando Santaolaya and Ramiro López Vázquez – were arbitrarily detained in June 2009 and taken to an Army base, where military personnel applied electric charges to their genitals, asphyxiated them, pulled out their toenails, and beat them in front of one another until they signed false confessions. The confessions were then used against the men to obtain pre-charge detention orders from a judge. They were held during that period on a military base, where they were subjected to additional abuses.

### 2NC – A2 Consequentialism/Util

#### Util is incoherent – infinite scenarios – especially true for policymakers

Read 9 — Rupert Read, Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, 2009 (“The difference principle is not action-guiding,” Available Online at http://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/The%20difference%20principle%20is%20not%20action%20guiding.doc, Accessed 04-15-2011)

There is a flaw in Utilitarianism that is one step beyond the problem mentioned above. It is a deeper, more ‘constitutive’ version of the ‘no stable rules’ problem. It is one of the most widely-touted serious flaws in Utilitarianism (at least, in Act Utilitarianism ) that it is ultimately not merely liable to defy our moral intuitions and produce social uncertainty, but is not action-guiding at all. Any course of action can be justified, given uncertainties about others’ reactions, other’s expectations, and so forth, with a good enough story to tell, and a long enough view of the consequences. Utilitarianism, in other words, never rules out any choice since it makes permissibility always depend on consequences in a manner that is in-terminable. When agents are act-utilitarians, they need to undertake an endlessly iterable process of trying to determine how they will react to one another’s actions. ¶ This is a particular, very damaging version of the ‘calculation problem’ in Utilitarianism. How can we really calculate utility, when it depends upon the consequences of our actions, and these depend upon other people’s reactions to those? Gigantic, impenetrable co-ordination problems result.

#### Util is morally monstrous – never kill to save

Kramer 11 — Nicholas Kramer, author of *Taking Responsibility for Empire—*a blog about American foreign policy, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, 2011 (“Murdering Some to Save Others,” *Antiwar.com*, April 13th, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/, Accessed 04-15-2011)

In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching a series of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University’s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins the series by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the first, Sandel suggests that a surgeon has a choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or saving the one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almost unanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel’s second scenario, the choice is the same, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organs necessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost of the one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; although these future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales, the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all.¶ Murdering some people to save others is fundamentally immoral. When this principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel’s, it is easy to understand, even instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths, narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their own devices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism to the extreme of murdering another person even if that action would benefit many others. I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us know such murders to be wrong and would not participate in them.¶ If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of “moral” reasoning expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alike in favor of the “humanitarian” bombing of Libya? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either the interventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allows people to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor, he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, “Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes? Yet we dropped a single bomb on them, and those who lose sleep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.”¶ The simple and uncomfortable truth is that murder is murder, regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered via cruise missile or with a broadsword. As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows and perpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name. The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall “bad” folks can be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions. If we accept that otherwise “good” people cannot be relied upon to maintain their moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for “humanitarian” causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy. I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeons actively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking as it is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it is indeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoid committing murder.

## Hegemony

### 2NC – Decline

#### China rise – all objective indicators confirm

**Layne 12 –** not a fan of heg

(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly (2012), 1–11,

The ascent of new great powers is **the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end**. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are **relative growth rates and shares of world GDP** (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—**is now impossible to deny**, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States. To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low proﬁle in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’ The fact that China joined the international economic order did not mean its long-term intentions were benign. Beijing’s long-term goal was not simply to get rich. It was also to become wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities it needs to compete with the United States for regional hegemony in East Asia. 2 The Great Recession **caused a dramatic shift in Beijing’s perceptions** of the international balance of power. China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-conﬁdence was evident in its 2010 foreign policy muscle-ﬂexing. **Objective indicators conﬁrm** **the reality** of China’s rise, and the United States’ corresponding relative decline. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation— a crown the United States had held for a century. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy. While analysts disagree on the date when this will happen, the most recent projections by leading economic forecasters have advanced the date dramatically over what was being estimated just a few years ago. For example, in 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2041, and in 2008, it advanced the date to 2028 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2008). However, the most recent forecasts are now that China will pass the United States much sooner than 2028. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021; PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) says 2020, and the Economist magazine says 2019 (World’s Biggest Economy 2010) (see Figure 3). 3 More strikingly, according to a 2011 International Monetary Fund study, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China will overhaul the United States in 2016. In fact, economist Arvin Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated, also using PPP, that China is already the world’s largest economy (Subramanian 2011). 4 What could be clearer proof of the United States’ relative decline than the fact that China will soon leapfrog the United States and become the world’s largest economy, if indeed it has not already done so? That China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s largest economy has more than economic signiﬁcance. **It is signiﬁcant geopolitically**. The pattern of great-power rise is well established. First, China’s claims of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ notwithstanding, the emergence of new great powers in the international system has invariably been destabilizing geopolitically. The near-simultaneous emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan as great powers in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered two world wars (Layne 1993). Second, as rising great powers become wealthier, their political ambitions increase and they convert their newfound economic muscle into the military clout (Zakaria 1998). Already, China is engaged in an impressive military modernization and buildup. While China has not yet caught up to the United States’ sophisticated military technology, it clearly is narrowing the US advantage. Third, rising powers invariably seek to dominate the regions in which they are situated (Mearsheimer 2001). This means that China and the United States **are on a collision course in East Asia**—the region where the United States has been the incumbent hegemon since 1945, and which an increasingly powerful and assertive China sees as its own backyard. Fourth, as they rise, new great powers acquire economic and political interests abroad, and they seek to acquire the power projection capabilities to defend those interests (Zakaria 1998).

#### Economic factors

**Layne 12 –** not a fan of heg

(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly (2012), 1–11,)

 China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ **mounting economic and ﬁscal problems**—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ downgrading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difﬁculties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly **will compel the United States to retrench strategically**, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US ﬁscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difﬁcult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inﬂation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can ﬁnance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domestic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deﬁcit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade **there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts** and control inﬂation. 8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is **the Great Recession**, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is **the mounting costs of entitlement programs** like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is **the cost of wars** in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been ﬁnanced by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to ﬁght there, and ﬁscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 **the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce forecast** that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deﬁcits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an **increasingly urgent and unsustainable ﬁscal problem’**’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current ﬁscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its ﬁnancial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deﬁcits that fuel it—**could imperil the dollar** by undermining foreign investors’ conﬁdence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inﬂation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inﬂows from abroad both to ﬁnance its deﬁcit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. **If the dollar loses that status,** US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and⁄ or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card” provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, **the United States would have to pay** for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States **would have to learn to live within its means**. 9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially signiﬁcant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008).

### 2NC – Multipolarity

#### And here’s a piece of framing evidence – there’s no bandwagoning – other countries would probably backlash against US hegemony in a unipolar world – multipolarity is comparatively better for US leadership

Schweller 10 – Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University

(Randall, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010)

On the downside, the unipole’s overwhelmingly large capability advantage does not easily translate into actual power over others. Indeed, the so-called hyperpower may have less capacity to change or influence others’ behaviour than poles in a bi- or multipolar system. The unipole’s dilemma is that the relationship between relative capabilities and relative power is not a linear one. Just as the unipolar power is largely unconstrained by the need for others, weaker powers, in turn, have less need for a polar-power patron than they would normally have under more traditional balance-of-power structures. I say ‘less need’ rather than ‘no need’ because many states still face local threats for which American protection and assistance is valuable if not necessary. Moreover, there may be other ways in which the US can be extremely helpful to states and, thereby, get influence over them. Nevertheless, leadership requires followers. If the unipole is seen as unnecessary or incompetent—here, the recent economic downturn as a result of US bank deregulation and export of toxic assets comes to mind—its leadership will be unneeded and unwanted. Obviously, nobody wants to follow an incompetent leader. What is unique about unipolarity is that lesser powers have fewer reasons than in the past to do so. Unipolarity exemplifies the problematic relationship between relative capabilities and usable power and influence. The extra resources that a unipole possesses over normal polar powers found in other structures are akin to what is called ‘useless energy’ associated with entropy. In international politics, bigger is not always better.

(if you read China 1NC impact) Multipolarity solves China threat

Goure 11(Daniel, Dr. Goure is a Vice President with the Lexington Institute. The Lexington Institute, “Empowering, a strategy for allies share the security burden, Partners” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/EmpoweringPartners.pdf> pg. 18)

How should the United States respond? With its own strategy for competition. One aspect of such a strategy is to exploit enduring U.S. advantages, the most significant of which is its alliance relationships throughout the region. In East Asia, the United States created a web of security relationships based on a series of bilateral agreements with nations in the region. The most important security relationships are with Japan, the ROK, Australia and Taiwan. The economic and military power of these nations taken together with that of the United States can more than offset the growth of China’s capabilities and resources. Even Chinese observers see the power in a security structure based on the alliances the U.S. has built in the region. Addressing U.S. involvement in the recent confrontation with China over the South China Sea, an official Chinese news organization opined that: The U.S. power play caters to the fact that China’s neighboring countries are on guard against its growing influence ... The U.S. is returning to Southeast Asia with a clear political agenda. It is trying to expand U.S. influence and strengthen cooperation with countries in the region, but seeds of distrust are also being planted with its attempt to contain China.24

## A2 Lashout

#### No lashout – it is not grounded in any of their evidence – best analysis goes neg

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

### 2NC – China Must Read

**Heinrichs** 9/17/**11** (Raoul Sir Arthur Tange Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, and Deputy Editor of Pnyx. The Diplomat, “America’s Dangerous Battle Plan” <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/17/america%E2%80%99s-dangerous-battle-plan/>)

These are questions that Washington will, in time, be forced to answer. In the meantime, the US Navy and Air Force have begun preparing [AirSea Battle](http://the-diplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/07/28/airsea-battle-and-escalation/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) contingencies, a war-fighting doctrine aimed at countering China’s denial strategy. By denying China’s capacity for anti-access, the United States intends to preserve its options for sea-control and power projection, reinforcing its primacy and role as the region’s guarantor of free navigation. This decision, in turn, reflects a deeper, more quixotic judgement that such an objective is both vital to the United States and attainable at a level of cost and risk commensurate with US interests in the region.

On both counts, though, there are reasons to be sceptical. First, the cost of AirSea Battle is likely to be prohibitive. Though it remains a largely notional concept, AirSea Battle will depend on an expansive set of upgraded capabilities: a hardened and more dispersed network of bases and C4ISR systems; more and better submarine, anti-submarine and mine-warfare capabilities; and new, long range conventional strike systems, including bombers and anti-satellite weapons. Then, of course, there are the aircraft carriers and other major surface combatants, strike-fighter aircraft, and possibly even amphibious ships.

Needless to say, these are expensive capabilities. Many are disproportionately costly (and vulnerable) relative to the platforms against which they’re being fielded. And in some cases, particularly anti-submarine warfare and ballistic missile defence, their prospective cost greatly exceeds the operational effect they can be expected to produce. All of this would be exacting for the United States in peak economic condition. In a new era of fiscal stringency, with US debt expanding and the Pentagon looking to save hundreds of billions over the next decade, expecting the US military to do more with less is at best unlikely, and at worst wholly untenable.

It also risks failing to learn from history. Strategic competition in the Western Pacific is beginning to echo the Cold War, only this time the United States is at risk of reprising the role of the Soviet Union. Washington has already repeated Moscow’s mistakes in Afghanistan. With AirSea Battle, Washington is trying to do too much with too little. It’s facing off against an opponent in better economic shape whose smarter, more asymmetric strategy will impose a disproportionate military burden. For Washington, adopting such a maximalist doctrine risks playing into China’s hands and, like the Soviet Union, spending itself into penury.

But cost factors are only part of the danger. An arms race is already underway in Asia. AirSea Battle will accelerate this process, with serious implications for regional stability and crisis management. First, by creating the need for a continued visible presence and more intrusive forms of surveillance in the Western Pacific, AirSea Battle will greatly increase the range of circumstances for maritime brinkmanship and dangerous naval incidents.

Second, AirSea Battle’s emphasis on pre-empting China by striking early against the PLA will continue to compress the time available to decision-makers in a crisis. As military plans become increasingly dependent on speed and escalation, and diplomacy fails to keep up, a dangerous ‘use it or lose it’ mentality is likely to take hold in the minds of military commanders. This risks building an automatic escalator to war into each crisis before diplomatic efforts at defusing the situation can get underway.

And finally, AirSea Battle calls for deep strikes on the Chinese mainland to blind and suppress PLA surveillance systems and degrade its long-range strike capabilities. Such an attack, even if it relied solely on conventional systems, could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at pre-emptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options. Under intense pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict – including, in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold.

Taken together, the costs and risks associated with AirSea Battle spell trouble for US primacy in Asia, and for the sea control and power projection capabilities on which it relies. Yet while Washington’s comfortable hegemonic habits will be hard to kick – especially after so many peaceful, prosperous decades – it’s not all doom and gloom. Primacy, after all, is only a means to an end, a way of preventing China from attaining regional dominance. There are other, more cost effective ways of doing that, including by playing China at its own game. That would involve developing a maritime denial strategy, focused mainly on the use of submarines, designed to inhibit China’s use of the sea for its own power projection. Indeed, the same capabilities that imperil US power projection in the Western Pacific would have an equally profound effect on China’s own fledgling effort.

### 1NC – Russia-China

#### Heg spurs Russia-China balancing – nuclear war

**Roberts 7 –** Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Reagan, has held numerous academic appointments

(Paul, “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html>, dml)

This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is **a real world response** to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world **to take neocon intentions seriously**. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving **will be a nuclear conflict**. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are **being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries**. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach.

### Kagan

#### Kagan uses flawed analysis and perpetuates imperialism

**Sorensen 4/20/12 –** Army veteran, writer for CounterPunch

(Christian, “Beltway Academics and the War Machine”, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/20/beltway-academics-and-the-war-machine/>, dml)

The Brookings Institution’s Dr. Robert Kagan also **actively perpetuates the US war machine**. Kagan argues that democracy, the free market, and peace among world powers are a direct result of the United States’ post-WWII leadership. Kagan’s vacuous arguments, which **neglect** the Pentagon’s support for dictatorships, the indigenous populations ravaged by the Pentagon’s protection of neoliberal economic policies, and the Pentagon’s tradition of interference in sovereign lands, illustrate how some DC academics and the Pentagon benefit symbiotically. In a fashion complementary to O’Hanlon, Kagan supports the Pentagon through **complacent manipulation** of financial data and **sycophantic clouding** of historical events. Kagan argues complacently that cutting defense spending will not revive USA’s fiscal health. Deeming any cuts in military funding as “reckless,” Kagan inaccurately insists that withdrawing from Middle East locales and cutting “all the waste [the Defense Department] can find,” would still amount to less than a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. Ending Overseas Contingency Operations, which are projected at roughly $118 billion, would save roughly 16.7 percent of the total $707 billion Pentagon FY 2012 budget. **Mathematics proves Kagan wrong**. Kagan demands that high levels of war funding continue, yet so many Pentagon contracts are extraneous or completely avoidable. For example, here are one day’s worth of Pentagon contracts from the month in which Kagan decried war spending cuts: Boeing received $94,985,863 for APACHE and CHINOOK weapon systems; Bristol Environmental & Engineering Services received $8,614,694 for hazardous waste cleanup in Alaska; Caterpillar received $6,771,854 for supplying equipment to Mubarak’s Egypt; Cazador Apparel received $11,626,483 for office furniture and equipment for BRAC 133; DRS C3 7 Aviation received $19,691,000 for surveillance hardware and services for Mubarak’s Egypt; EADS received $52,509,992 for UH-72A Helicopters, radio systems, and two engine filters; FLIR Systems received $15,892,846 for camera systems and operator classes; General Dynamics received $75,343,937 to reconfigure M1A2 tanks, for an M1A2S production facility in undemocratic Saudi Arabia, and for operations at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; IAP Worldwide Services received $55,557,377 for transportation work in Kuwait and Iraq; Lockheed Martin received $18,708,099 for DDG 51 services; Marsh Creek received $10,363,735 for environmental cleanup in Alaska; Mission 1st Group received $3,000,000 for IT projects; N-Link received $6,751,326 for digital training facilities; PAE Government Services received $5,618,615 for equipment and support to the Afghan National Security Force; Science Applications International received $34,654,306 for operating a training center at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, for airborne ISR, and for US Central Command ammunition stocks. These contracts highlight many realities, **all of which Kagan dodges**. Should the Pentagon spend millions in one day on office furniture? Should the Pentagon have poisoned the environment in the first place, necessitating environmental remediation today? Should the Pentagon have supplied Mubarak’s Egypt and undemocratic nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with materiel and weaponry? By **writing well and invoking fear**, Kagan stresses how frightful possibilities might occur if the Pentagon were to embrace fiscal responsibility. Clinging to dread, Kagan insists that the Pentagon’s military presence in “Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make[s] it harder for [terrorists] to strike.” He again omits a sad reality: the Pentagon’s presence in each of these countries is **the single greatest recruiting tool** for those who resist the United States’ empire. By waging war around the world, the Pentagon feeds inflammatory rhetoric of its resisters. In another act of clerical overindulgence, Kagan complacently praises the “financial benefits” of US military hegemony. Critical minds wonder, who has actually benefited? **Certainly the military-industrial-congressional complex** profits directly. While retired four-star generals play golf, consult for Lockheed-Martin part-time, and collect a hefty retirement pension, global citizens pay for the Pentagon’s transgressions with blood, sweat, and tears. Inequality **doesn’t begin to describe** the “financial benefits” that transpire. Kagan flatters the Pentagon by **never mentioning civilian casualties**. Unfortunately for all, NATO forces accounted for 440 Afghan civilian deaths alone in the year 2010 and 410 in 2011. These figures exclude the 168 children who have died in CIA drone strikes across the border in Pakistan. US officials can apologize profusely for their errors, but they never consider the potency of revenge in Afghan culture. Even Kagan would fight back if a JDAM, AGM-114, or night raid wiped out his family. If Pentagon officials were actually serious about implementing their glorified counter-insurgency doctrine (FM 3-24), they would study Afghanistan’s history closely and demand that all commanders consider the prospect of revenge when pursuing any “intelligence” lead. “Promising” is how Pentagon officials describe the fact that the majority of civilian deaths are attributable to Taliban action. However, having occupied Afghanistan for over a decade, Pentagon commanders and policy-makers are responsible for all civilian deaths, which **Kagan obsequiously avoids** en route to perpetuating the Pentagon’s **wars of aggression**. Offering “offshore balancing” as the only strategy that could accompany Pentagon budget cuts, Kagan demonstrates **a sycophantic aspiration** to remain within the confines of **US imperialism**. Operating under an all-or-nothing rubric, he never considers that a partial withdrawal would be appropriate in many circumstances. For instance, the Pentagon’s presence in Germany, comprising dozens of separate installations, can be pared down without compromising “national security,” a frequently invoked but highly vague term. War would not break out with a reduction in the number of US facilities across Europe. One can even argue that **wars occur because of, not despite**, **the presence of the United States’ war machine**. Kagan’s concessions are noteworthy. He confesses that USA has been engaged in combat roughly 47 percent of the time during the last 112 years. He further admits that the US military has intervened abroad an astounding 70 percent of the time since the end of the Cold War. Kagan concedes that “many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan… and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations.” Yet Congressional and military policy-makers, by Kagan’s own admission, do not listen to the voice of the US citizenry. Many thanks for Kagan’s honesty about our broken democracy. Kagan accurately asserts that addressing entitlement spending helps achieve fiscal responsibility, but confronting entitlements doesn’t mean that the Pentagon can continue to bathe in a $700 billion budget or that the policies behind imperial overreach can continue unbridled. The complacency and sycophantic stances adopted by Dr. Michael O’Hanlon and Dr. Robert Kagan shed light on a major force in post-9/11 USA. Like children obsessed with toy soldiers or obese citizens unfit for service, beltway academics **fail to see** how their personal veneration of USA’s warfare distorts public perception of foreign policy. Democrats and Republicans, unable to think independently, worship military power, passively contort support our troops into support the Pentagon, and neglect to dissent against imperial wars. As a result, military generals are immune from public scrutiny, the Pentagon’s wars continue unabated, and war funding continues to monopolize the federal government’s discretionary budget. In sum, professional profit, bolstered by personal veneration of the troops, actively perpetuates the Pentagon’s imperial reach. Throughout it all, O’Hanlon and Kagan **deliberately miss the point**: Tough love is the best love, and a tight leash on the Pentagon is better than no leash.

## Joint cooperation

### Bioterror

#### No extinction impact

Space.com 01 (30 October, <http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/generalscience/colonize_now_011030-1.html>)

#### Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped. Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and ever-evolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks. "I'd be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said.

# 1nr

Growth solves their impacts

Griswold, Trade Policy Studies @ Cato, 4/20/’7

(Daniel, Trade, Democracy and Peace, <http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>)

A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

Best studies validate the impact

Jedidiah **Royal 10**, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signalling And The Problem Of Economic Crises”, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

## Turns Heg

Crushes heg

Friedberg, professor of politics and IR @ Princeton, and Schoenfeld, visiting scholar @ the Witherspoon Institute, 10/21/’8

(Aaron and Gabriel, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>)

One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions.

Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow.

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future?

Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern.

If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk.

In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

## Uniqueness Debate

Passage of the senate bill proves uniqueness – Obama has the upper hand to pressure republicans

LA times 9/27 [“Michael A. Memoli,” http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-senate-vote-government-shutdown-20130927,0,7144213.story]

WASHINGTON -- Most Senate Republicans joined with the chamber's Democratic majority Friday to overcome a filibuster on a bill to keep the government running past Monday, turning back a persistent stand by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) to use the vote to kill President Obama’s healthcare law.¶ [Updated, 10:11 a.m. PDT Sept. 27: The Senate voted, 79-19, to move forward on the bill, clearing the required 60-vote hurdle. Twenty-five Republicans joined all the Democrats; 19 Republicans opposed the measure. Two Republicans did not cast votes.]¶ The Senate is now expected to pass a Democratic amendment to strip a provision in the bill that cuts money for the Affordable Care Act. A simple majority is all that's required for that vote.¶ A final vote will return the bill to the House, putting pressure on the Republican-controlled chamber to act with just three days left to avoid a government shutdown before the end of the federal fiscal year.¶ If Congress fails to settle on a plan to keep the government funded by midnight Monday, the federal government will see its first shutdown in nearly two decades.¶ Republicans who lined up against Cruz’s strategy explained that they were simply voting to move forward on a budget measure they supported. "I don't understand how I can otherwise vote on a matter that I want to see passed," said Sen. John Cornyn, the chamber's No. 2 Republican and Cruz’s Texas colleague.¶ “There are some people across America that are so upset with Obamacare -- and I understand their frustration -- that say we ought to shut down the federal government,” Cornyn said. “It won’t work.”¶ Furthermore, those Republicans also said acting quickly to return the bill to the House served the cause of undermining the law, commonly called Obamacare, because the GOP majority there would have time to attach alternative amendments that might have a greater chance of being passed in the Senate.¶ House Republicans have considered amendments to eliminate the law's new tax on medical devices or to postpone its requirement that Americans have health insurance by 2014 or pay a fine.¶ In a final floor speech before the vote, Cruz all but conceded defeat, acknowledging “Republican division on this issue.” But the fight wasn’t over, he said.¶ “I very much hope the next time this issue’s before this body in a few days, that all 46 Republicans are united against Obamacare and standing with the American people, that we listen to the American people the way Senate Democrats are not,” he said.¶ Cruz, in a more than 21-hour filibuster-like speech, interviews and more floor speeches, had insisted that the vote to move ahead on the bill was tantamount to a vote to sustain Obama's landmark healthcare law. If Republicans were united, he argued, the onus would be on Democrats to choose between the unpopular law and a government shutdown.¶ In an email sent Friday to supporters, Obama said the economy was being put at risk by “a group of far-right Republicans in Congress.”¶ “They refuse to pass a budget unless I let them sabotage Obamacare, something they know is not going to happen. Now, we’re left with only four days before a government shutdown,” he wrote. “This is reckless and irresponsible. Republicans are not focused on what’s best for you. They’re playing political games.”¶ The GOP’s divisions over Cruz's strategy have largely played out behind closed doors, but they spilled into the open Thursday during a rare intraparty debate on the Senate floor. Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said Cruz and his conservative ally, Sen. Mike Lee of Utah, were more interested in generating publicity for themselves than supporting an effort to quickly send the bill back to the House.¶ On Friday, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said the battle is “very dysfunctional.”¶ "We are dividing the Republican Party," he said in an interview on CBS’ “This Morning.” “Rather than attacking Democrats and maybe trying to persuade those five or six Democrats who are in states that are leaning Republican, we are now launching attacks against Republicans funded by commercials that Senator Lee and Senator Cruz appear in."

Republicans can be persuaded without defunding Obamacare

WP 9/26 [Ed O'Keefe, Rosalind S. Helderman and Lori Montgomery, “Shutdown grows more likely as House digs in,” 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-republicans-reject-senate-spending-bill-explore-strategy-to-avoid-shutdown/2013/09/26/7b585a18-26b8-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852\_story.html]

“With October 1 four days away from submission to Obamacare, I think now is the right time to protect everybody and not wait until later,” said Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), a key conservative advocate for undoing the health-care law.¶ The House GOP proposal to raise the debt ceiling would delay implementation of the health-care law for one year, it would establish a timetable for tax reform, squeeze $120 billion from federal health programs over the next decade — in part by tightening medical malpractice laws — and cut federal civil service pensions.¶ The measure also would approve construction of the Keystone XL oil pipeline and advance other GOP economic goals, including increasing offshore oil drilling, blocking federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and restricting most forms of federal industry regulation.¶ About the only major piece of the Republican agenda missing from the bill is a ban on late-term abortions — and some lawmakers who oppose abortion were arguing to add that, GOP aides said.¶ By stuffing the bill with so many appealing provisions, GOP leaders hoped to persuade at least 217 Republicans to support its sole negative aspect: raising the $16.7 trillion federal debt limit through Dec. 31, 2014 — an increase worth about $1.1 trillion, by independent estimates.¶ Rep. Pete Sessions (R-Tex.), a key leadership lieutenant, said he was “very confident” that rank-and-file Republicans would support the debt-limit package.

White House pressure is key to getting republicans to make a deal

Sink, 9/20 **–** (Justin Sink, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. “White House seeks Hill leadership meetings to avoid shutdown,” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/323625-white-house-seeks-hill-meetings-to-avoid-shutdown)//SDL

The White House is attempting to organize a meeting with congressional leaders next week ahead of the deadline for lawmakers to strike a deal to keep the federal government open.¶ ¶ The president and congressional leaders have not yet been able to iron out a specific date and time, although it will have to come in the latter half of the week. President Obama will be in New York on Monday and Tuesday to attend the United Nations General Assembly. ¶ The White House hopes to use the meeting to convince lawmakers to strike a deal on the federal budget, with a pair of rapidly approaching deadlines threatening the nation's economic stability. ¶ If lawmakers do not strike a budget deal before the end of the month, the government would shut down all non-essential services. A few weeks later, the government is expected to hit the debt ceiling if Congress cannot agree to raise the borrowing limit.¶ But Republicans on Capitol Hill expressed skepticism that the meeting would have any effect on a contentious budgeting process.¶ “The White House has indicated it would like to convene a meeting with congressional leaders," said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). ¶ "The Speaker will attend, of course, but given that the president has said he won’t discuss the debt limit with Congress, we’re not sure why it’s even taking place.”¶ Relations between Obama and Boehner have been severely strained since the failure of talks to reach a grand bargain on the debt in 2011. Earlier this week, the Speaker questioned why Obama was willing to work with the Russians to find a diplomatic solution in Syria but not with Republicans over the debt limit.¶ The same day, Boehner said he had no intention of returning to the one-on-one grand bargain talks he pursued with Obama in 2011. ¶ On Friday, White House press secretary Jay Carney said there was "no doubt" the president would "be in conversations with congressional leaders in the coming days about the need to deal with these pressing deadlines."¶ But Carney would not reveal who Obama hoped to meet with, or what format those meetings might take.¶ "I can only say that you can expect that he’ll have conversations with leaders in Congress about these looming deadlines and about the need for Congress to do the right thing, make sure they don't shut down the government and make sure they don't default," he said. "I don't have any more details for you."

Capital key determines uniqueness—overcomes House GOP opposition

Heidi Moore, The Guardian, 9/10/13, Syria: the great distraction, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

### AT Winner’s win

#### **Winners win isn’t true for Obama**

Galston, Brookings, Governance Studies, Senior Fellow 10

(William, 11-4-10, “President Barack Obama’s Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties”, Brookings , <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/04-obama-galston>, accessed 7-9-12 FFF)

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and-trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.

#### Winners win theory is false - Congress too polarized

Mann, Brookings, Governance Studies, Senior Fellow 10’

(Thomas E, November 2010, “AMERICAN POLITICS ON THE EVE OF THE MIDTERM ELECTIONS”, Brookings, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brookings.edu%2F~%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2Frc%2Farticles%2F2010%2F11\_midterm\_elections\_mann%2F11\_midterm\_elections\_mann.pdf&ei=QaL7T6qvO8WhrAGpwNyLCQ&usg=AFQjCNHgxxtq3WWIhoKbhRhv2P1Q0oPtjw](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CEwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brookings.edu%2F~%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2Frc%2Farticles%2F2010%2F11_midterm_elections_mann%2F11_midterm_elections_mann.pdf&ei=QaL7T6qvO8WhrAGpwNyLCQ&usg=AFQjCNHgxxt), accessed 7-9-12 FFF)

That perception of failure has been magnified by the highly contentious process by which Obama’s initiatives have been adopted in Congress. America has in recent years developed a highly polarised party system, with striking ideological differences between the parties and unusual unity within each. But these parliamentary-like parties operate in a governmental system in which majorities are unable readily to put their programmes in place.

Republicans adopted a strategy of consistent, unified, and aggressive opposition to every major component of the President’s agenda, eschewing negotiation, bargaining and compromise, even on matters of great national import. The Senate filibuster has been the indispensable weapon in killing, weakening, slowing, or discrediting all major legislation proposed by the Democratic majority.

### Not a Win

#### Contentious debate ensures plan is not perceived as a victory

Mann, Brookings Governance Studies senior fellow, 10

[Thomas, Brookings, November, “American Politics on the Eve of the Midterm Elections”, <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/11_midterm_elections_mann.aspx>, accessed 6-20-11]

The well-documented successes of the financial stabilisation and stimulus initiatives are invisible to a public reacting to the here and now, not to the counterfactual of how much worse it might have been. The painfully slow recovery from the global financial crisis and Great Recession have led most Americans to believe these programmes have failed and as a consequence they judge the President and Congress harshly.

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