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## Politics

No government shutdown in the squo – republicans are being pressured by Obama

ABC News 9/26 [John Parkinson and Jeff Zeleny, “Despite Showdown, Boehner Doesn’t Expect Government Shutdown,” 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/despite-showdown-boehner-doesnt-expect-government-shutdown/]

As the Senate finalizes making its imprint on a stop-gap government spending bill, House Republicans today continued to press Democrats for partisan changes to the legislation that could ultimately lead to the first government shutdown in nearly 20 years.¶ While the Senate’s tweaks to the House-passed continuing resolution won a full endorsement from the White House today, House Speaker John Boehner told reporters he does not intend to accept the bill as amended by the Senate.¶ “The American people don’t want the president’s health care bill, and they don’t want the government to shut down,” Boehner, R-Ohio, said. “Republicans are listening. We passed a bill last week that would do just what the American people have asked. It’s time for the Senate to listen and pass the bill that we’ve sent over there.”¶ Given the political risks that come with a prolonged political ping pong match, Boehner was questioned whether he concedes that the government is headed for a shutdown next week.¶ “No, I do not,” he insisted. “No, I do not expect that to happen.”¶ Asked whether he is prepared to accept a clean continuing resolution from the Senate in order to avoid a government shutdown, Boehner hinted that more changes are coming from the House.¶ “I made it clear now for months and months and months, we have no interest in seeing a government shutdown, but we’ve got to address the spending problem that we have in this town,” Boehner said. “There will be options available to us. There are not going to be any speculation about what we’re going to do or not do until the Senate passes their bill.”¶ While Republicans maintain that their next move has not been decided, GOP insiders say the options being privately discussed are plentiful.¶ With just four days remaining until the government runs out of funding Oct. 1, some Republicans are said to be pushing for a short-term continuing resolution – even as brief as one week – to enable lawmakers to pursue a bipartisan agreement.¶ Another option that could be gaining favor as the House GOP’s next move on the continuing resolution: delaying the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act for one year. That plan was initially discussed as a leading preference for the GOP’s game plan on the debt limit, but with the Senate finishing its first crack at the continuing resolution a few days earlier than first expected, some House Republicans continue to press for Obamacare’s destruction.¶ Rep. Paul Ryan, chairman of the Budget Committee, however, believes the bigger budget fight and any discussion over whether to delay the Affordable Care Act should come on the debt limit debate. The former running mate of Mitt Romney said he believes the House will send an altered bill back to the Senate, but would act quickly enough to keep the government funded.¶ “We’re in a good place. We’re unified and feel like we have a good strategy,” Ryan, R-Wis., told ABC News following a meeting with the House Republican Conference. “No one is interested in shutting the government down. We don’t see what is accomplished with that.”¶ Rep. Mo Brooks said House Republicans do not want to be pushed into a corner by Senate Democrats on the budget resolution. He said Democrats should bear the blame for any potential government shutdown.¶ “We’ve agreed on funding 99 percent of the federal government. Let’s fund that 99 percent and then fight over the remaining 1 percent,” Brooks, R-Ala., told ABC News. “But Harry Reid and Barack Obama insist on a scenario that results in a government shutdown if they don’t get everything that they demand.”¶ Rep. Sean Duffy, who was critical of Sen. Ted Cruz a week ago, said the Texas Republican “fought a good fight” during his 21-hour marathon speech in the Senate this week.¶ “I thought he did a great job,” Duffy, R-Wis., said. “But the bottom line is, Do we really think the president is going to go along with defunding Obamacare? I don’t think he will, but there are some issues that we can do, like delay or opt-out for states.”¶ Current government funding runs out at the end of the day on Sept. 30. The House could act as soon as Saturday to send the continuing resolution back to the Democrat-led Senate, leaving a precarious amount of time for the upper chamber to decide whether to send the legislation on to the president. If Democrats reject the House’s next move, the prospects of a government shutdown become even more likely than any fiscal battle Congress has faced the past three years.¶ “I’ll personally be surprised if we have a government shutdown,” Brooks added. “And if we do, I’ll be extraordinarily surprised if it lasts anything beyond hours or days as opposed to weeks or months.”

#### Politics

#### Infrastructure spending drains capital - escalates fights with GOP

Tomasky ’11 (Newsweek/Daily Beast special correspondent Michael Tomasky is also editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas – Newsweek – September 19, 2011 – lexis)

Finally, Barack Obama found the passion. "Building a world-class transportation system is part of what made us an economic superpower," he thundered in his jobs speech on the evening of Sept. 8. "And now we're going to sit back and watch China build newer airports and faster railroads? At a time when millions of unemployed construction workers could build them right here in America?" Obama's urgency was rightly about jobs first and foremost. But he wasn't talking only about jobs when he mentioned investing in America--he was talking about our competitiveness, and our edge in the world. And it's a point he must keep pressing. In a quickly reordering global world, infrastructure and innovation are key measures of a society's seriousness about its competitive drive. And we're just not serious. The most recent infrastructure report card from the American Society of Civil Engineers gives the United States a D overall, including bleak marks in 15 categories ranging from roads (D-minus) to schools and transit (both D's) to bridges (C). The society calls for $2.2 trillion in infrastructure investments over the next five years. On the innovation front, the country that's home to Google and the iPhone still ranks fourth worldwide in overall innovation, according to the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the leading think tank on such questions, which conducts a biannual ranking. But we might not be there for long. In terms of keeping pace with other nations' innovation investments--"progress over the last decade," as ITIF labels it--we rank 43rd out of 44 countries. What's the problem? It isn't know-how; this is still America. It isn't identifying the needs; they've been identified to death. Nor is it even really money. There are billions sitting around in pension funds, equity funds, sovereign wealth funds, just waiting to be spent. The problem--of course--is politics. The idea that the two parties could get together and develop bold bipartisan plans for massive investments in our freight-rail system--on which the pro-business multiplier effects would be obvious--or in expanding and speeding up broadband (it's eight times faster in South Korea than here, by the way) is a joke. Says New York University's Michael Likosky: "We're the only country in the world that is imposing austerity on itself. No one is asking us to do it." There are some historical reasons why. Sherle Schwenninger, an infrastructure expert at the New America Foundation, a leading Washington think tank, says that a kind of anti-bigness mindset developed in the 1990s, that era in which the besotting buzzwords were "Silicon Valley" and "West Coast venture capital." Wall Street began moving away from grand projects. "In that '90s paradigm, the New Economy-Silicon Valley approach to things eschewed the public and private sectors' working together to do big things," Schwenninger says. "That model worked for software, social media, and some biotech. But the needs are different today." That's true, but so is the simple point that the Republican Party in Washington will oppose virtually all public investment. The party believes in something like Friedrich von Hayek's "spontaneous order"--that is, get government off people's backs and they (and the markets they create) will spontaneously address any and all problems. But looking around America today, can anyone seriously conclude that this is working?

Obama singularly focused on the fiscal crisis—his political capital will resolve it before shutdown and default

Jonathan Allen, Politico, 9/19/13, GOP battles boost President Obama, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other.

And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve.

If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit.

For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal.

Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).

Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect.

The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law.

“I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.”

While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened.

And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning.

The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made.

The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

That spills-over to government shutdown and US default—that kills the economy and US credibility

Norm Ornstein, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 9/1/13, Showdowns and Shutdowns, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/01/showdowns\_and\_shutdowns\_syria\_congress\_obama

Then there is the overload of business on the congressional agenda when the two houses return on Sept. 9 -with only nine legislative days scheduled for action in the month. We have serious confrontations ahead on spending bills and the debt limit, as the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 and the debt ceiling approaches just a week or two thereafter. Before the news that we would drop everything for an intense debate on whether to strike militarily in Syria, Congress-watchers were wondering how we could possibly deal with the intense bargaining required to avoid one or more government shutdowns and/or a real breach of the debt ceiling, with devastating consequences for American credibility and the international economy.

Beyond the deep policy and political divisions, Republican congressional leaders will likely use both a shutdown and the debt ceiling as hostages to force the president to cave on their demands for deeper spending cuts. Avoiding this end-game bargaining will require the unwavering attention of the same top leaders in the executive and legislative branches who will be deeply enmeshed in the Syria debate. The possibility -even probability -of disruptions caused by partial shutdowns could complicate any military actions. The possibility is also great that the rancor that will accompany the showdowns over fiscal policy will bleed over into the debate about America and Syria.

Extinction

**Kemp 10**

### Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regi

### 1NC Shell (1:06)

#### , Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

Case

## Shuning

### Mexico 1NC

#### Mexico is a flagrant violator of human rights.

HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (“Mexico,” 2013 World Report, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=1, Accessed 07-22-2013)

Mexican security forces have committed widespread human rights violations in efforts to combat powerful organized crime groups, including killings, disappearances, and torture. Almost none of these abuses are adequately investigated, exacerbating a climate of violence and impunity in many parts of the country.

In an historic decision in August 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of military jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights violation was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most abuses by military personnel continue to be prosecuted in military courts, which lack independence and impartiality.

Criminal groups and members of security forces continue to threaten or attack human rights defenders and journalists. The government has failed to provide these vulnerable groups with adequate protection or investigate the crimes committed against them. In April, Mexico passed legislation to create a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, but protocols to evaluate risk and assign protection are still being designed.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?

We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.

Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.

Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.

An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?

First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)

Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."

Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing.

We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

### T Incentives (0:36)

“Economic engagement” is limited to expanding economic ties

Çelik 11 – Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11

Introduction

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "*It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations* ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " *the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction*.

Vote neg

a. limits --- including political, military, or cultural engagement explodes the topic

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Senior Fellows in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 5-6

Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid.’2 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market.’

Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign mffitary officers.’4 These areas of engagement are likely to involve, working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

This brief overview of the various forms of engagement illuminates the choices open to policymakers. The plethora of options signals the flexibility of engagement as a foreign policy strategy and, in doing so, reveals one of the real strengths of engagement. At the same time, it also suggests the urgent need for considered analysis of this strategy. The purpose of this book is to address this need by deriving insights and lessons from past episodes of engagement and proposing guidelines for the future use of engagement strategies. Throughout the book, two critical questions are entertained. First, when should policymakers consider engagement? A strategy of engagement may serve certain foreign policy objectives better than others. Specific characteristics of a target country may make it more receptive to a strategy of engagement and the incentives offered under it; in other cases, a country's domestic politics may effectively exclude the use of engagement strategies. Second, how should engagement strategies be managed to maximize the chances of success? Shedding light on how policymakers achieved, or failed, in these efforts in the past is critical in an evaluation of engagement strategies. By focusing our analysis, these questions and concerns help produce a framework to guide the use of engagement strategies in the upcoming decades.

b. precision – there’s a clear distinction between different types of engagement – including all of them puts an unreasonable burden on the neg for predictable preparation

## Manufactoring Adv.

#### Manufacturing industry empirically resilient

WSJ 11 (Wall Street Journal. 2/25/11. "The Truth About U.S. Manufacturing."online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576122353274221570.html.html#articleTabs%3Darticle)

Is American manufacturing dead? You might think so reading most of the nation's editorial pages or watching the endless laments in the news that "nothing is made in America anymore," and that our manufacturing jobs have vanished to China, Mexico and South Korea. Yet the empirical evidence tells a different story—of a thriving and growing U.S. manufacturing sector, and a country that remains **by far** the world's largest manufacturer. This is a particularly sensitive topic in my hometown of Flint, Mich., where auto-plant closings have meant lost jobs and difficult transitions for the displaced. But while it's true that the U.S. has lost more than seven million manufacturing jobs since the late 1970s, our manufacturing output has **continued to expand.** International data compiled by the United Nations on global output from 1970-2009 show this success story. Excluding recession-related decreases in 2001 and 2008-09, America's manufacturing output has continued to increase since 1970. In every year since 2004, manufacturing output has exceeded $2 trillion (in constant 2005 dollars), twice the output produced in America's factories in the early 1970s. Taken on its own, U.S. manufacturing would rank today as the sixth largest economy in the world, just behind France and ahead of the United Kingdom, Italy and Brazil. In 2009, the most recent full year for which international data are available, our manufacturing output was $2.155 trillion (including mining and utilities). That's more than 45% higher than China's, the country we're supposedly losing ground to. Despite recent gains in China and elsewhere, the U.S. still produced more than 20% of global manufacturing output in 2009. The truth is that America still makes a lot of stuff, and we're making more of it than ever before. We're merely able to do it with a fraction of the workers needed in the past. Consider the incredible, increasing productivity of America's manufacturing workers: The average U.S. factory worker is responsible today for more than $180,000 of annual manufacturing output, triple the $60,000 in 1972. Increases in productivity are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, such as GM's next generation Ecotec engine. These increases are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, which last year helped boost output to record levels in industries like computers and semiconductors, medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and medicine, and oil and natural-gas equipment.

#### **Auto-industry high, sustainable, and resilient**

Krisher 13 (Tom Krisher, . 6/9/13. "American auto industry on verge of hiring spree". Detroit Free Press. [www.freep.com/article/20130609/BUSINESS01/306090123/American-auto-industry-about-to-go-on-hiring-spree](http://www.freep.com/article/20130609/BUSINESS01/306090123/American-auto-industry-about-to-go-on-hiring-spree))

The auto industry is about to go on a hiring spree as car makers and parts suppliers race to find engineers, technicians and factory workers to build the next generation of vehicles.¶ The new employees will be part of a larger, busier workforce. From coast to coast, the industry is in top gear. Factories are operating at about 95% of capacity, and many are already running three shifts. As a result, some auto and parts companies are doing something they've been reluctant to consider since the recession: Adding floor space and spending millions of dollars on new equipment.¶ "We're really bumping up against the edge," says Michael Robinet, managing director of IHS Automotive, which forecasts auto production. "So it really is brick-and-mortar time."¶ The auto industry's stepped-up hiring will help sustain the nation's job growth and help fuel consumer spending. On Friday, the government said U.S. employers added 175,000 jobs in May, roughly the monthly average for the past year and a sign of the economy's resilience.¶ At 7.6%, U.S. unemployment remains well above the 5% to 6% typical of a healthy economy. Growth is still modest, in part because of higher taxes and government spending cuts that kicked in this year and weak overseas economies. But the housing market is strengthening, and U.S. consumer confidence has reached a five-year high.¶ The auto industry's outlook is bright. Vehicle sales for 2013 could reach 15.5 million, the highest in six years. To meet that demand, automakers must find more people. Hundreds of companies that make parts for automakers have to hire, too, just to keep up.¶ "As volume goes up, we will really need to add heads," says Mel Stephens, a spokesman for Lear Corp., which makes automotive seats.¶ From January through May, automakers and parts companies hired 8,000 workers, a relatively slow rate. But the pace is picking up. The Center for Automotive Research expects the industry to add 35,000 over the full year.¶ The hiring plans are widespread. Chrysler Group LLC, Honda Motor Co., General Motors Co., Mercedes-Benz and Ford Motor Co. plan to add more than 13,000 people this year.¶ Large parts companies such as Lear, BorgWarner Inc. and TRW Automotive Holdings Corp. are hiring at factories and research centers. Smaller suppliers are adding jobs as well.¶ The auto business has helped keep the economy afloat while Americans wait for the rest of the business world to start hiring. Since 2009, 1 in every 4 manufacturing jobs added in the U.S. came in the auto industry, says Daniel Meckstroth, chief economist for the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, a manufacturing trade group. The auto industry is just under 7% of U.S. manufacturing jobs.¶ Car companies and parts makers created 167,500 jobs from the end of the recession in June 2009 through May. At the same time, U.S. auto sales rose from a low point of 10.4 million in 2009 to an annual rate of more than 15 million so far this year.¶ Chrysler's comeback gave Jeff Caldwell the confidence to leave a human resources consulting firm. Caldwell joined the company in February as an assembly line supervisor at a Jeep Grand Cherokee factory in Detroit. He supervises 100 workers who build the SUV's chassis.¶ "I knew Chrysler was moving in the right direction," says Caldwell, 29, who was born in Detroit and always had an interest in cars. "They kind of reinvented themselves, and I really wanted to get in while I could."¶ Among the hiring planned for this year:¶ — Chrysler will add more than 3,500 workers this year at factories in Indiana, Ohio and Michigan to make transmissions and to build Jeeps and Ram pickups.¶ — Ford expects to hire 2,200 salaried workers in information technology, product development and manufacturing. Plus the company is hiring 1,400 factory workers and recalling another 2,000 laid-off employees, in Michigan and Missouri.¶ — GM is hiring 4,000 engineers and computer professionals at four technical centers in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan and Texas to develop software and other innovations.¶ — Honda is adding at least 500 jobs this year at factories in Ohio, Indiana and Alabama as it moves more production to North America.¶ — At TRW Automotive, recruiters are looking for 50 engineers in the Detroit area to work on new safety features such as a system that warns drivers when large animals are in their path.¶ Smaller companies also are joining in. Automotive business at Waukesha Metal Products in Sussex, Wis., is so strong that the company is near its capacity to make metal parts for axles, drive shafts and interiors. It's adding $1 million worth of equipment near Milwaukee and building a plant in Mexico to be closer to companies it supplies.¶ Most industry analysts predict that U.S. auto sales will rise gradually during the next five years. Estimates for this year range from 15 million to 15.5 million, compared with 14.5 million a year ago. LMC Automotive, a Troy, Mich., forecasting firm, predicts that sales will gradually increase to 17 million in 2017. That level would be almost equal to the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s.¶ Analysts say sales will climb as more people reach driving age. Also, many consumers and businesses still have cars and trucks they bought last decade, if not earlier. The average vehicle on U.S. roads is now a record 11.2 years.¶ The improving economy also helps lift sales. As the housing and construction sectors have come back to life, pickup sales have risen faster than the rest of the market. That has meant a job for Curtis Enkey of suburban Kansas City.¶ Enkey was laid off in April of last year when Ford moved production of the Escape SUV from his factory near Kansas City to Louisville, Ky. He wasn't supposed to come back until Ford started making a commercial van at his plant in July or August. But higher sales of the F-150 pickup, which also is made at his factory, brought an early call to return.¶ Now Enkey is happily working 50-hour weeks. A Ford worker since 1995, he makes about $29 per hour plus benefits.¶ Even with the added hiring, the auto industry isn't the job creator it once was. In 2005, before huge cuts began, more than 1.1 million people made motor vehicles and parts. Today, 798,000 do, according to the latest government statistics.¶ For engineers and many white-collar jobs, auto companies pay salaries that are competitive with the rest of the country. But wages and benefits in the factories have declined.¶ Most new hires will start around $16 per hour, a little over half the pay that longtime workers get. The lower wage was a concession made by the United Auto Workers union to cut costs as the companies ran into financial trouble six years ago. New hires receive health care but get 401K plans instead of pensions, and they don't get health care in retirement like longtime workers do. Still, their wages are better than most other factory workers, who make $13 to $14 per hour in the U.S.¶ The industry would be adding even more workers if not for productivity gains made since the boom years, says Kristin Dziczek, head of the labor and industry group at the Center for Automotive Research.¶ In 2004, the nation had 70 auto-assembly plants. Now there are only 55. But the industry will make 10.7 million vehicles in those plants this year, only 850,000 fewer than in 2004, according to Ward's Automotive.¶ Executives are being forced to rethink hard lines they've drawn against adding space — and costs — since they closed factories during the economic downturn.¶ For instance, General Motors is building a 500,000-square-foot addition to its plant in Wentzville, Mo., to handle expected sales of the next generation of midsize pickup trucks due out next year.¶ But at Ford, executives want to keep costs down by squeezing as many cars and trucks as possible out of existing factory space, mostly by increasing line speeds and breaking up equipment bottlenecks.¶ "We are running a number of our plants pretty full," says Joe Hinrichs, the company's president of the Americas. "But we have more upside if we need it."¶ The recent hiring binge is even causing worker shortages in some areas. Skilled workers such as engineers, machinists, software developers and welders are hard to find, especially in the Detroit area. Entry-level factory jobs, which start around $15 per hour, are filled quickly.

#### Reshoring’s inevitable – commitments and predictions

Khan 7/24 (Mubin S., Special Correspondent of New Age, a leading Bangladeshi newspaper, graduate of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, The Guardian, July 24, 2013, “US manufacturing and the troubled promise of reshoring,” <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/24/us-manufacturing-troubled-promise-reshoring>, alp)

The buzz has been growing to a point of headiness: American giants including Apple, General Electric, Ford, Chrysler, Whirlpool, Lenovo and Caterpillar have all started setting up new plants or reinvesting in old plants in the US. The Boston Consulting Group predicted that up to 5 million manufacturing and related service jobs will be returning by 2020." The White House promised last year that major American companies like Ford will invest $16bn at home and add 12,000 jobs in the US by 2015. The president praised companies like Master Lock for revitalizing America's economy. "Right now we have an excellent opportunity to bring manufacturing back – but we have to seize it," the president said last year.

## Relations

### 1NC – Frontline

#### Alternate causalities to an effective border policy — immigration and law enforcement

O’Neil 13 — Shannon K. O’Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of the forthcoming book Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (Oxford University Press, 2013), from which this essay is adapted (Shannon K. O’Neil, Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2013, “Mexico Makes It”, <http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-makes/p30098>, Accessed 08-01-2013 | AK)

For all these reasons, the United States should strengthen its relationship with its neighbor, starting with immigration laws that support the binational individuals and communities that already exist in the United States and encourage the legal immigration of Mexican workers and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to send such legislation to Congress, but a strong anti-immigrant wing within the Republican Party and the slow U.S. economic recovery pose significant barriers to a comprehensive and far-reaching deal. Nevertheless, the United States and Mexico urgently need to invest in border infrastructure, standardize their customs forms, and work to better facilitate legal trade between them. Furthermore, getting Americans to recognize the benefits of cross-border production will be an uphill battle, but it is one worth fighting in order to boost the United States' exports, jobs, and overall economic growth. On the security front, U.S. efforts must move beyond cracking down on drug trafficking to helping Mexico combat crime more generally. Security links have expanded since 2007, when Washington and Mexico City began taking on drug traffickers together. Today, Obama should support Peña Nieto's strategy of cracking down on violence rather than try to eliminate the drug trade. Washington should also expand its law enforcement training programs, currently conducted primarily at the federal level, to Mexico's state and local police forces and justice systems. Washington and Mexico City should also invest together in border community projects and programs that support social and economic development in often neglected and crime-ridden areas.

#### U.S Mexico relations inevitable

Hakim 5/1/2013 (Peter is president emeritus and senior fellow of the [Inter-American Dialogue](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-American_Dialogue), a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs. He served as president of the Dialogue from 1993 to 2010, May 1, 2013, Which Mexico for Obama?, Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/>)

Washington has viewed Mexico largely as a source of problems for the United States in the past six years. Many Mexicans, in a mirror image, consider the United States the origin of their troubles. They blame Mexico’s epidemic of violent crime on an insatiable appetite for drugs and loose control over gun and ammunition sales in the United States. In addition, the U.S. financial crisis left the Mexican economy reeling in 2009. But in the past year, particularly since Peña Nieto’s election in July 2012, Mexico’s standing in the United States and internationally has increased dramatically — along with its national self-esteem. Though organized crime and violence remain key concerns for Mexico, stories of economic and social reform are now among the headlines. A November Economist article about Mexico was titled “[From Darkness, Dawn](http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21566773-after-years-underachievement-and-rising-violence-mexico-last-beginning).” And that message has become a standard media refrain. Some in Washington [talked about](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/americas/09iht-letter.1.19217792.html?_r=0) Mexico as a likely failed state, but that has been decisively debunked. Mexico is now viewed as on the rise, though its homicide rate has fallen only slightly and no one is sure that improvements can be sustained. In fact, there are many Mexicos for Obama to deal with — the successful and prospering; the backward, corrupt and stagnant; and everything in between. This mix is not unusual. It is characteristic of most nations, even the United States. Obama needs to bring an optimistic perspective with him to Mexico, reflecting the growing confidence that Mexicans have in their country — and the image they project internationally. In this, Obama has little choice. No country is likely to affect the future of the United States more than Mexico, just as none will affect Mexico’s future more than the United States. No two nations have more to gain from energetically pursuing closer cooperation.

### 2AC – Environment

#### Resslient and no impact

Easterbrook ‘95 (Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### No extinction

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law Symposium Defining Takings: Private Property And The Future Of Government Regulation: Muddle Or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets The Endangered Species Act”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

# 2NC

## Shunning

### 2NC – Overview

#### YOU HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO SHUN – flagrant, persistant human rights violators demand shunning – refusal to do so constitutes a complacency within the system – causing global repression — comparatively outweighs the case – ontological damnation means death doesn’t matter and removes psychological barriers to genocide – only scenario for extinction – that’s Beverslius

#### Mexico is a violator of human rights – reject their government statements – incentive to mask brutality — Mexican security assaults citizens – repressive judicial systems prove– that’s Human Rights Watch

#### ALSO Arraigo confirms

HRW 13 (Human Rights Watch 4-25-2013, “Mexico: Abolish “Arraigo” Detention from Constitution” <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/25/mexico-abolish-arraigo-detention-constitution> Date Accessed: 7-2-2013)

Neither the proposal to reduce the arraigo detention period to a maximum of 40 days, nor the proposal to replace it with up to 10 days of pre-charge detention under judicial control, complies with international human rights standards, Human Rights Watch said. Both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have indicated that a period in excess of four days before a person is brought before a judge to be charged or released is prima facie too long. While the Inter-American Court has only had to give judgment in a case involving a 15-day detention period with a 30-day maximum and ruled that it violated the American Convention on Human Rights, it has explicitly endorsed the approach of the European Court and Human Rights Committee on the importance of promptness in judicial control over detention. The UN Committee on Torture, the UN Group on Arbitrary Detentions, the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, and the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers are among the international entities that have called for the abolition of pre-charge detention in Mexico. “Any additional time before a detainee is brought before a judge for charging – whether days or weeks, and whether it is called arraigo or another name – would constitute an unreasonable infringement on fundamental rights, and will create an environment ripe for more abuse,” Vivanco said. Human Rights Watch has documented scores of cases in which victims have been subjected to serious abuses – including torture and rape – in the period before and during preventive detention under the existing provision. For example, four men from Baja California – Ramiro Ramírez Martínez, Rodrigo Ramírez Martínez, Orlando Santaolaya and Ramiro López Vázquez – were arbitrarily detained in June 2009 and taken to an Army base, where military personnel applied electric charges to their genitals, asphyxiated them, pulled out their toenails, and beat them in front of one another until they signed false confessions. The confessions were then used against the men to obtain pre-charge detention orders from a judge. They were held during that period on a military base, where they were subjected to additional abuses.

### 2NC – A2 Consequentialism/Util

#### Util is incoherent – infinite scenarios – especially true for policymakers

Read 9 — Rupert Read, Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, 2009 (“The difference principle is not action-guiding,” Available Online at http://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/The%20difference%20principle%20is%20not%20action%20guiding.doc, Accessed 04-15-2011)

There is a flaw in Utilitarianism that is one step beyond the problem mentioned above. It is a deeper, more ‘constitutive’ version of the ‘no stable rules’ problem. It is one of the most widely-touted serious flaws in Utilitarianism (at least, in Act Utilitarianism ) that it is ultimately not merely liable to defy our moral intuitions and produce social uncertainty, but is not action-guiding at all. Any course of action can be justified, given uncertainties about others’ reactions, other’s expectations, and so forth, with a good enough story to tell, and a long enough view of the consequences. Utilitarianism, in other words, never rules out any choice since it makes permissibility always depend on consequences in a manner that is in-terminable. When agents are act-utilitarians, they need to undertake an endlessly iterable process of trying to determine how they will react to one another’s actions. ¶ This is a particular, very damaging version of the ‘calculation problem’ in Utilitarianism. How can we really calculate utility, when it depends upon the consequences of our actions, and these depend upon other people’s reactions to those? Gigantic, impenetrable co-ordination problems result.

#### Util is morally monstrous – never kill to save

Kramer 11 — Nicholas Kramer, author of *Taking Responsibility for Empire—*a blog about American foreign policy, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, 2011 (“Murdering Some to Save Others,” *Antiwar.com*, April 13th, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/, Accessed 04-15-2011)

In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching a series of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University’s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins the series by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the first, Sandel suggests that a surgeon has a choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or saving the one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almost unanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel’s second scenario, the choice is the same, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organs necessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost of the one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; although these future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales, the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all.¶ Murdering some people to save others is fundamentally immoral. When this principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel’s, it is easy to understand, even instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths, narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their own devices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism to the extreme of murdering another person even if that action would benefit many others. I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us know such murders to be wrong and would not participate in them.¶ If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of “moral” reasoning expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alike in favor of the “humanitarian” bombing of Libya? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either the interventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allows people to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor, he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, “Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes? Yet we dropped a single bomb on them, and those who lose sleep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.”¶ The simple and uncomfortable truth is that murder is murder, regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered via cruise missile or with a broadsword. As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows and perpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name. The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall “bad” folks can be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions. If we accept that otherwise “good” people cannot be relied upon to maintain their moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for “humanitarian” causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy. I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeons actively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking as it is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it is indeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoid committing murder.

## politics

## 2nc impact ov

Economic decline causes global instability that goes nuclear—that’s Kemp

Growth solves their impacts

Griswold, Trade Policy Studies @ Cato, 4/20/’7

(Daniel, Trade, Democracy and Peace, <http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>)

A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

Best studies validate the impact

Jedidiah **Royal 10**, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signalling And The Problem Of Economic Crises”, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

## Turns Heg

Crushes heg

Friedberg, professor of politics and IR @ Princeton, and Schoenfeld, visiting scholar @ the Witherspoon Institute, 10/21/’8

(Aaron and Gabriel, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>)

One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions.

Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow.

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future?

Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern.

If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk.

In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

## Turns environment

Economic crisis turns environment – increases fossil fuel use and outweighs short-term gains

Reuters, 3/20/’9

(http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-GreenBusiness/idUSTRE52J1BV20090320)

ROME (Reuters) - The economic crisis may lower carbon emissions in the short term but will raise them over the long term by crimping investment in cleaner energy sources, the International Energy Agency's chief economist said on Thursday.

The impact of the financial crisis and the ensuing economic slump on energy investments had been "stronger than anyone expected" and significant enough to have an impact on climate change and the whole energy supply chain, warned Fatih Birol.

"To think that lower economic growth is good for the environment is completely wrong," Birol told Reuters.

"Because there are many investments that are good for the environment, like efficiency, renewables and nuclear, that are being postponed or canceled. One or two years of lower carbon emissions won't count for much at the end of the day."

A $100 a barrel price drop from a record high last year has hurt oil producers, but is a bigger threat to generators of more environmentally-friendly fuels, which are considered commercially viable only as alternatives to expensive oil.

## Uniqueness Core

Passage of the senate bill proves uniqueness – Obama has the upper hand to pressure republicans

LA times 9/27 [“Michael A. Memoli,” http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-senate-vote-government-shutdown-20130927,0,7144213.story]

WASHINGTON -- Most Senate Republicans joined with the chamber's Democratic majority Friday to overcome a filibuster on a bill to keep the government running past Monday, turning back a persistent stand by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) to use the vote to kill President Obama’s healthcare law.¶ [Updated, 10:11 a.m. PDT Sept. 27: The Senate voted, 79-19, to move forward on the bill, clearing the required 60-vote hurdle. Twenty-five Republicans joined all the Democrats; 19 Republicans opposed the measure. Two Republicans did not cast votes.]¶ The Senate is now expected to pass a Democratic amendment to strip a provision in the bill that cuts money for the Affordable Care Act. A simple majority is all that's required for that vote.¶ A final vote will return the bill to the House, putting pressure on the Republican-controlled chamber to act with just three days left to avoid a government shutdown before the end of the federal fiscal year.¶ If Congress fails to settle on a plan to keep the government funded by midnight Monday, the federal government will see its first shutdown in nearly two decades.¶ Republicans who lined up against Cruz’s strategy explained that they were simply voting to move forward on a budget measure they supported. "I don't understand how I can otherwise vote on a matter that I want to see passed," said Sen. John Cornyn, the chamber's No. 2 Republican and Cruz’s Texas colleague.¶ “There are some people across America that are so upset with Obamacare -- and I understand their frustration -- that say we ought to shut down the federal government,” Cornyn said. “It won’t work.”¶ Furthermore, those Republicans also said acting quickly to return the bill to the House served the cause of undermining the law, commonly called Obamacare, because the GOP majority there would have time to attach alternative amendments that might have a greater chance of being passed in the Senate.¶ House Republicans have considered amendments to eliminate the law's new tax on medical devices or to postpone its requirement that Americans have health insurance by 2014 or pay a fine.¶ In a final floor speech before the vote, Cruz all but conceded defeat, acknowledging “Republican division on this issue.” But the fight wasn’t over, he said.¶ “I very much hope the next time this issue’s before this body in a few days, that all 46 Republicans are united against Obamacare and standing with the American people, that we listen to the American people the way Senate Democrats are not,” he said.¶ Cruz, in a more than 21-hour filibuster-like speech, interviews and more floor speeches, had insisted that the vote to move ahead on the bill was tantamount to a vote to sustain Obama's landmark healthcare law. If Republicans were united, he argued, the onus would be on Democrats to choose between the unpopular law and a government shutdown.¶ In an email sent Friday to supporters, Obama said the economy was being put at risk by “a group of far-right Republicans in Congress.”¶ “They refuse to pass a budget unless I let them sabotage Obamacare, something they know is not going to happen. Now, we’re left with only four days before a government shutdown,” he wrote. “This is reckless and irresponsible. Republicans are not focused on what’s best for you. They’re playing political games.”¶ The GOP’s divisions over Cruz's strategy have largely played out behind closed doors, but they spilled into the open Thursday during a rare intraparty debate on the Senate floor. Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) said Cruz and his conservative ally, Sen. Mike Lee of Utah, were more interested in generating publicity for themselves than supporting an effort to quickly send the bill back to the House.¶ On Friday, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said the battle is “very dysfunctional.”¶ "We are dividing the Republican Party," he said in an interview on CBS’ “This Morning.” “Rather than attacking Democrats and maybe trying to persuade those five or six Democrats who are in states that are leaning Republican, we are now launching attacks against Republicans funded by commercials that Senator Lee and Senator Cruz appear in."

Republicans can be persuaded without defunding Obamacare

WP 9/26 [Ed O'Keefe, Rosalind S. Helderman and Lori Montgomery, “Shutdown grows more likely as House digs in,” 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-republicans-reject-senate-spending-bill-explore-strategy-to-avoid-shutdown/2013/09/26/7b585a18-26b8-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852\_story.html]

“With October 1 four days away from submission to Obamacare, I think now is the right time to protect everybody and not wait until later,” said Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), a key conservative advocate for undoing the health-care law.¶ The House GOP proposal to raise the debt ceiling would delay implementation of the health-care law for one year, it would establish a timetable for tax reform, squeeze $120 billion from federal health programs over the next decade — in part by tightening medical malpractice laws — and cut federal civil service pensions.¶ The measure also would approve construction of the Keystone XL oil pipeline and advance other GOP economic goals, including increasing offshore oil drilling, blocking federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and restricting most forms of federal industry regulation.¶ About the only major piece of the Republican agenda missing from the bill is a ban on late-term abortions — and some lawmakers who oppose abortion were arguing to add that, GOP aides said.¶ By stuffing the bill with so many appealing provisions, GOP leaders hoped to persuade at least 217 Republicans to support its sole negative aspect: raising the $16.7 trillion federal debt limit through Dec. 31, 2014 — an increase worth about $1.1 trillion, by independent estimates.¶ Rep. Pete Sessions (R-Tex.), a key leadership lieutenant, said he was “very confident” that rank-and-file Republicans would support the debt-limit package.

## Link

#### The plan uniquely poisons the well on immigration reform — ensures GOP backlash over spending, and assumes their link turns

Irwin 13 — Neil Irwin, Washington Post columnist and the economics editor of Wonkblog, The Post’s site for policy news and analysis (Neil Irwin, Washington Post: Wonkblog, 02-11-2013, “Is Congress really going to miss its free lunch on infrastructure?”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/11/is-congress-really-going-to-miss-its-free-lunch-on-infrastructure/>, Accessed 08-01-2013 | AK)

Since the election, there have been hints that we could be entering a period with some actual productive, bipartisan dealmaking, most explicitly on immigration reform. But the Republican reaction to Obama’s expected proposals on infrastructure in Tuesday’s State of the Union address may be a better indicator of whether we are in for a year of real legislative give-and-take—or a return of the ugly politics of the last several years.¶ It will also be an indication of whether the U.S. government is going to let a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rebuild the nation’s roads and bridges more or less for free slip through its fingers.¶ The early buzz from the White House is that while Obama will discuss the current legislative hot-buttons of immigration and gun control, the economy is a major focus of his speech. In particular, he will call for new infrastructure investment—roads, bridges, power grid, that sort of thing.¶ The big question on infrastructure is whether the White House is correctly reading the politics of the moment. Could Congressional Republicans be ready to sign on to some form of large-scale investment in the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure? Or is Obama tilting at windmills (literally, in this case).¶ It comes as we may be approaching the end of a five year period in which investing in the nation’s physical infrastructure has been something close to a free lunch. With interest rates near all-time lows and millions of construction workers unemployed, the last few years have been a time that it would have been a historical bargain for the United States to do upgrades to roads, bridges, and airports that will eventually need to take place anyway. It has been a political breakdown—in particular conservatives’ view of almost any non-defense federal spending as wasteful—standing in the way.¶ This graph shows total private fixed investment relative to the nation’s potential GDP, going back to 1949. (That’s how much the private sector is spending on both houses and commercial installations). After averaging 15.5 percent from 1949 to 2007, private investment fell as low as 10.6 percent in the economic collapse starting in 2008 (it was 12.2 percent at the end of 2012).¶ In other words, for the last few years private construction activity has been far below its historic norms. And so long as the private sector isn’t building houses and office buildings and factories, the government can build without crowding out private investment.¶ But that window might not last much longer; at the current pace, private investment will be back to its historical average in another few years. It’s not now or never, exactly, but it very likely will be cheaper now to spruce up the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure than it will be in the not-too-distant future.¶ In concept, this is an area where there should be room for the two parties to work together. Business interests tend to favor new infrastructure spending, for both the benefits it brings for the companies that would like faster and more efficient ways to ship their goods and the construction companies that stand to make money actually building the stuff. Even small government conservatives want to have quality roads in their districts. Wisely chosen infrastructure spending should not increase the national debt over time, as upfront expenditures are paid back either through tolls and user fees, greater economic development, or both.¶ Over the last few years, though, those facts have crashed headlong into a widespread view in the Republican caucus that any federal spending is wasteful. “Anything that is akin to the stimulus bill is not going to be acceptable to the American people,” House Majority Leader Eric Cantor said in September 2011, after Obama proposed a series of job-creation measures centered around new infrastructure.¶ But a few things have changed since then. First, Republicans have seen electoral damage by their image as an obstruction-at-all-cost party, losing the White House and seats in both houses of Congress in the 2012 elections. Cantor himself delivered a speech last week aimed at presenting a more pragmatic face to the party. Second, the president has been re-elected, so there is no longer the odd dynamic where bipartisan dealmaking could make Obama look more statesmanlike and help his re-election chances.¶ Much of the Republican opposition to infrastructure spending has been rooted in a conviction that all government spending is a boondoggle, taxing hard-working Americans to give benefits to a favored few, and exceeding any reasonable cost estimate in the process. That’s always a risk with new spending on infrastructure: that instead of the Hoover Dam and the interstate highway system, you end up with the Bridge to Nowhere and the Big Dig.¶

White House pressure is key to getting republicans to make a deal

Sink, 9/20 **–** (Justin Sink, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. “White House seeks Hill leadership meetings to avoid shutdown,” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/323625-white-house-seeks-hill-meetings-to-avoid-shutdown)//SDL

The White House is attempting to organize a meeting with congressional leaders next week ahead of the deadline for lawmakers to strike a deal to keep the federal government open.¶ ¶ The president and congressional leaders have not yet been able to iron out a specific date and time, although it will have to come in the latter half of the week. President Obama will be in New York on Monday and Tuesday to attend the United Nations General Assembly. ¶ The White House hopes to use the meeting to convince lawmakers to strike a deal on the federal budget, with a pair of rapidly approaching deadlines threatening the nation's economic stability. ¶ If lawmakers do not strike a budget deal before the end of the month, the government would shut down all non-essential services. A few weeks later, the government is expected to hit the debt ceiling if Congress cannot agree to raise the borrowing limit.¶ But Republicans on Capitol Hill expressed skepticism that the meeting would have any effect on a contentious budgeting process.¶ “The White House has indicated it would like to convene a meeting with congressional leaders," said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio). ¶ "The Speaker will attend, of course, but given that the president has said he won’t discuss the debt limit with Congress, we’re not sure why it’s even taking place.”¶ Relations between Obama and Boehner have been severely strained since the failure of talks to reach a grand bargain on the debt in 2011. Earlier this week, the Speaker questioned why Obama was willing to work with the Russians to find a diplomatic solution in Syria but not with Republicans over the debt limit.¶ The same day, Boehner said he had no intention of returning to the one-on-one grand bargain talks he pursued with Obama in 2011. ¶ On Friday, White House press secretary Jay Carney said there was "no doubt" the president would "be in conversations with congressional leaders in the coming days about the need to deal with these pressing deadlines."¶ But Carney would not reveal who Obama hoped to meet with, or what format those meetings might take.¶ "I can only say that you can expect that he’ll have conversations with leaders in Congress about these looming deadlines and about the need for Congress to do the right thing, make sure they don't shut down the government and make sure they don't default," he said. "I don't have any more details for you."

Capital key determines uniqueness—overcomes House GOP opposition

Heidi Moore, The Guardian, 9/10/13, Syria: the great distraction, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.

It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.

There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

Produces a budget compromise even if it looks impossible now

Joe Klein, TIME, 9/11/13, Obama and Syria: Stumbling Toward Damascus, swampland.time.com/2013/09/11/obama-and-syria-stumbling-toward-damascus/

There are domestic consequences as well. This was supposed to be the month when the nation’s serious fiscal and budgetary problems were hashed out, or not, with the Republicans. There was a chance that a coalition could be built to back a compromise to solve the debt-ceiling problem and the quiet horrors caused by sequestration and to finally achieve a long-term budget compromise. But any deal would have required intense, single-minded negotiation, including political protection, or sweeteners, for those Republicans who crossed the line. Precious time has been wasted. And, after Syria, it will be difficult for any member of Congress to believe that this President will stick to his guns or provide protection.

Obama effectively deploying capital—every day matters

Patrick Reis, National Journal, 9/16/13, Obama Dares Republicans to Defy Tea Party on Obamacare, Shutdown Deal, www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-dares-republicans-to-defy-tea-party-on-obamacare-shutdown-deal-20130916

President Obama took a swipe at the Hard Right on Monday, accusing tea-party-aligned House Republicans of gambling with the nation's economy by threatening to shut down the government unless Obamacare is defunded.

In a sprawling economic speech, Obama called on Congress to avert a government shutdown by passing a budget, and he insisted he would brook no wrangling over a raise in the debt ceiling. Obama said such a shutdown, or even the possibility of default, would damage the still-fragile economic recovery.

Specifically, the president went after Republicans who say they won't vote for any budget deal that does not nullify the Affordable Care Act. "I cannot remember a time when one faction of one party promises economic chaos if it can't get 100 percent of what it wants," Obama said. "That's never happened before, and that's what happening right now."

Obama appealed to the rest of the Republican Party for help in brokering a budget compromise, challenging members to break with those calling for defunding Obamacare.

"Are some of these folks so beholden to one extreme wing of their party that they're willing to tank our whole economy?" he said. "Are they willing to hurt people?"

By going after one GOP "faction" and appealing to the other, Obama is seeking leverage in a tactical dispute that has vexed Republicans all summer. In one camp are legislators—headlined by Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas—who are insisting that the party shut down the government unless funding is stripped for the health care law. Other Republicans, including much of the party's leadership, say they too want to defund the health care law, but they see connecting Obamacare to a government shutdown as too politically risky.

In seeking to further divide the camps, Obama is hoping to avert a government shutdown while also achieving some Democratic policy aims, such as rollbacks of the sequester-induced spending cuts that Obama on Monday said were hurting economic growth.

The government's current budget is set to expire Oct. 1. If Congress cannot pass a budget before then—a possibility that seems increasingly likely as days dwindle on the legislative calendar—it has the option forestall shutdown by passing a short-term extension.

Obama’s capital will be effective on the budget

John Harris, Politico, 9/18/13, What’s wrong with President Obama?, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=B56971FB-BD77-47B8-8EF0-DC47E9CD7FC6

With big tests now looming on the budget and immigration, there could hardly be a better time for Obama to show at last that he has the ability to provide cover to the people who support him on difficult issues, and the ability to punish the people who choose a different path.

## Relations

### 2NC – Ext: Relations Inev

#### US-Mexico economic and political interdependence guarantees persistent relations

Hakim 5/1/2013 (Peter is president emeritus and senior fellow of the [Inter-American Dialogue](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-American_Dialogue), a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs. He served as president of the Dialogue from 1993 to 2010, May 1, 2013, Which Mexico for Obama?, Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/>)

Crime and violence are likely to remain unrelenting challenges for Peña Nieto. They could even take central stage again. In fact, public security may not improve anytime soon — despite the new government’s multiple initiatives. Peña Nieto’s predecessor, Felipe Calderón, learned how arduous a task it is to reform Mexico’s police and its justice system, and restore public confidence in them. Now, Peña Nieto is making clear his deep dissatisfaction with — and [his intention to overhaul](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) — Calderón U.S.-supported approach to security and drug issues. The expected changes will almost surely irritate many in Washington and may even become a new source of friction in the bilateral relationship. But neither the United States nor Mexico is perfect. The two nations cannot look at each other only as sources of opportunity and gain; cooperation is needed to address risks and problems. Neither country has much of an option, however, because their economies and populations are so deeply integrated. There is no turning the clock back. Mexico and the United State have to solve their problems together and find ways to generate and exploit new opportunities jointly. If they can do it, the payoff will be enormous.

## Manufacturing

### econ

#### US Economy performing better than expectations

**Babad, 8/6 –** (Michael Babad, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Globe and Mail. “Trade numbers suggest U.S. economy stronger than believed,” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/top-business-stories/trade-numbers-suggest-us-economy-stronger-than-believed/article13618843/)//SDL

The U.S. economy is now believed to have performed much better than believed in the second quarter, based on new statistics showing the smallest monthly trade deficit in almost four years.¶ ¶ The first estimate of gross domestic product pegged growth in the United States at an annual pace of 1.7 per cent in the second quarter. Another estimate is scheduled for later this month.¶ Economists believe the new estimate will put growth at 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent after today’s release of the U.S. trade performance in June.¶ The trade gap narrowed in June to $34.2-billion (U.S.), the smallest since the depths of the recession in the fall of 2009, as American exports climbed 2.2 per cent, while imports slipped by 2.5 per cent.¶ A revision to the GDP growth is now a virtual certainty.¶ GDP numbers, said senior economist Krishen Rangasamy of National Bank of Canada, are akin to the Tour de France, where the end results often differ from what you see first.¶ “The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis had estimated that real imports grew at a faster clip than real exports in Q2 — based on the assumption of just a small improvement in June’s net exports,” Mr. Rangasamy said.¶ “But as it turns out, June’s trade report was much stronger than expected,” he said in a research report.¶ “With June’s results, Q2 real exports expanded at an annualized pace of 10.7 per cent, almost double the pace estimated by the BEA,” he added.

#### 2. The overall US econ is resilient

Morningstar 13

1/19/13(Morningstar provides data on more than 385,000 investment offerings, including stocks, mutual funds, and similar vehicles, along with real-time global market data on more than 8 million equities, indexes, futures, options, commodities, and precious metals, in addition to foreign exchange and Treasury markets. Morningstar also offers investment management services through its registered investment advisor subsidiaries and has more than $186 billion in assets under advisement and management as of June 30, 2012. The company has operations in 27 countries. “U.S. Economy Not So Fragile After All”, http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)

No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All. Although most economists got at least some things right about the U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error was the expectation that the economy was fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be anything but fragile. I believe this to be the single biggest error that economists have made over the last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a major debt crisis in Europe, a divisive election, temporarily going over the fiscal cliff, gasoline prices that have been on a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York and even the stock exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.

#### 3. Econ decline does not breed war – 93 data points prove

Miller, 2k (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence.

#### 4. US not key to global economy- emerging economies more important

**The Economist 07** (“America's vulnerable economy”, 11/15/07, <http://www.economist.com/node/10134118>) Swoap

**The best hope that global growth can stay strong lies** instead **with emerging economies**. A decade ago, the thought that so much depended on these crisis-prone places would have been terrifying. Yet thanks largely to economic reforms, **their annual growth rate has surged to around 7%.** This year **they will contribute half of the globe's GDP growth**, measured at market exchange rates, over three times as much as America**. In the past, emerging economies have** often **needed bailing out** by the rich world. **This time they could be the rescuers**.Of course, a recession in America would reduce emerging economies' exports, but they are less vulnerable than they used to be. America's importance as an engine of global growth has been exaggerated. Since 2000 **its share of world imports has dropped from 19% to 14%.** Its vast current-account deficit has started to shrink, meaning that **America is no longer pulling along the rest of the world**. Yet **growth in emerging economies has quickened**, partly thanks to demand at home. In the first half of this year the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in **China and India added more to global GDP growth than** that in **America**. Most **emerging economies are in healthier shape than ever** (see [article](http://www.economist.com/node/10136509)). They are **no longer financially dependent on the rest of the world**, but have large foreign-exchange reserves—no less than three-quarters of the global total. Though there are some notable exceptions**, most** of them **have small budget deficits** (another change from the past**), so they can boost spending** to offset weaker exports if need be.

# 1NR

## Relations

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Hakim 5/1/2013 (Peter is president emeritus and senior fellow of the [Inter-American Dialogue](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-American_Dialogue), a Washington-based think tank on Western Hemisphere affairs. He served as president of the Dialogue from 1993 to 2010, May 1, 2013, Which Mexico for Obama?, Reuters, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/01/which-mexico-for-obama/>)

Crime and violence are likely to remain unrelenting challenges for Peña Nieto. They could even take central stage again. In fact, public security may not improve anytime soon — despite the new government’s multiple initiatives. Peña Nieto’s predecessor, Felipe Calderón, learned how arduous a task it is to reform Mexico’s police and its justice system, and restore public confidence in them. Now, Peña Nieto is making clear his deep dissatisfaction with — and [his intention to overhaul](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/friction-between-us-and-mexico-threatens-efforts-on-drugs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) — Calderón U.S.-supported approach to security and drug issues. The expected changes will almost surely irritate many in Washington and may even become a new source of friction in the bilateral relationship. But neither the United States nor Mexico is perfect. The two nations cannot look at each other only as sources of opportunity and gain; cooperation is needed to address risks and problems. Neither country has much of an option, however, because their economies and populations are so deeply integrated. There is no turning the clock back. Mexico and the United State have to solve their problems together and find ways to generate and exploit new opportunities jointly. If they can do it, the payoff will be enormous.

## Manufactoring

**Investor sell-off will collapse hegemony and risks great power wars**

**Khalilzad, ’11** – Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN and former director policy planning at the DOD (Zalmay, “The Economy and National Security”, National Review, 2-8-11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>)  
The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual [interest payments](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. [debt problem](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance [economic growth](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=2) and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options.

### 1AR – Environment

#### **Best studies**

McDermott, 9 [ Tree Hugger.Com,” Good news: most ecosystems can recover in one lifetime from human induced or natural disturbance”, <http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/most-ecosystems-can-recover-from-disturbance-in-one-lifetime.php>]

There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research done at the [Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science](http://environment.yale.edu/) reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation. Published in the journal [PLoS ONE](http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0005653), the study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done: Forests Take Longest of Ecosystems Studied The analysis found that on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes. To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed. Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.

#### Prefer our methodology

Campbell 11 (Hank, Science Writer for Science 2.0, “I Wouldn't Worry About The Latest Mass Extinction Scare,” March 8th, <http://www.science20.com/science_20/i_wouldnt_worry_about_latest_mass_extinction_scare-76989>,

You've seen it everywhere by now - Earth's sixth mass extinction: Is it almost here? and other articles discussing an article in Nature (471, 51–57 doi:10.1038/nature09678) claiming the end of the world is nigh. Hey, I like to live in important times. So do most people. And something so important it has only happened 5 times in 540 million years, well that is really special. But is it real? Anthony Barnosky, integrative biologist at the University of California at Berkeley and first author of the paper, claims that if currently threatened species, those officially classed as critically endangered, endangered, and vulnerable, actually went extinct, and that rate of extinction continued, the sixth mass extinction could arrive in 3-22 centuries. Wait, what?? That's a lot of helping verbs confusing what should be a fairly clear issue, if it were clear. If you know anything about species and extinction, you have already read one paragraph of my overview and seen the flaws in their model. Taking a few extinct mammal species that we know about and then extrapolating that out to be extinction hysteria right now if we don't do something about global warming is not good science. Worse, an integrative biologist is saying evolution does not happen. Polar bears did not exist forever, they came into existence 150,000 years ago - because of the Ice Age. Greenpeace co-founder and ecologist Dr. Patrick Moore told a global warming skepticism site, “I quit my life-long subscription to National Geographic when they published a similar 'sixth mass extinction' article in February 1999. This [latest journal] Nature article just re-hashes this theme” and "The fact that the study did make it through peer-review indicates that the peer review process has become corrupted.” Well, how did it make it through peer review? Read this bizarre justification of their methodology; "If you look only at the critically endangered mammals--those where the risk of extinction is at least 50 percent within three of their generations--and assume that their time will run out and they will be extinct in 1,000 years, that puts us clearly outside any range of normal and tells us that we are moving into the mass extinction realm." Well, greater extinctions occurred when Europeans visited the Americas and in a much shorter time. And since we don't know how many species there are now, or have ever been, if someone makes a model and claims tens of thousands of species are going extinct today, that sets off cultural alarms. It's not science, though. If only 1% of species have gone extinct in the groups we really know much about, that is hardly a time for panic, especially if some 99 percent of all species that have ever existed we don't know anything about because they...went extinct. And we did not. It won't keep some researchers, and the mass media, from pushing the panic button. Co-author Charles Marshall, also an integrative biologist at UC-Berkeley wants to keep the panic button fully engaged by emphasizing that the small number of recorded extinctions to date does not mean we are not in a crisis. "Just because the magnitude is low compared to the biggest mass extinctions we've seen in half a billion years doesn't mean they aren't significant." It's a double negative, bad logic and questionable science, though.

### 1AR – Enviornment – A2 – Air Pollution

Ronald Bailey, science correspondent, author of Earth Report 2000: Revisiting the True State of the Planet, former Brookes Fellow in Environmental Journalism at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, May 2000, Reason Magazine, “Earth Day, Then and Now,” <http://reason.com/0005/fe.rb.earth.shtml>

So has air pollution gotten worse? Quite the contrary. In the most recent National Air Quality Trends report, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency--itself created three decades ago partly as a response to Earth Day celebrations--had this to say: “Since 1970, total U.S. population increased 29 percent, vehicle miles traveled increased 121 percent, and the gross domestic product (GDP) increased 104 percent. During that same period, notable reductions in air quality concentrations and emissions took place.” Since 1970, ambient levels of sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide have fallen by 75 percent, while total suspended particulates like smoke, soot, and dust have been cut by 50 percent since the 1950s. In 1988, the particulate standard was changed to account for smaller particles. Even under this tougher standard, particulates have declined an additional 15 percent. Ambient ozone and nitrogen dioxide, prime constituents of smog, are both down by 30 percent since the 1970s. According to the EPA, the total number of days with air pollution alerts dropped 56 percent in Southern California and 66 percent in the remaining major cities in the United States between 1988 and 1997. Since at least the early 1990s, residents of infamously smogged-in Los Angeles have been able to see that their city is surrounded by mountains.

#### Business confidence is directly correlated to manufacturing output - internal link turns the advantage - prefer statistical and empirical analysis

Marco Malgarini 11 – (Senior Economist at the Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses (ISAE), Rome, Italy. He is also adjunct Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Tuscia in Viterbo, "Industrial production and confidence after the crisis: what’s going on?" http://www.oecd.org/std/leading-indicators/49016374.pdf )//AP

During the recession, industrial production in the manufacturing sector in the Euro Area fell by 22 percentage points (-24% in Germany, -26,7% in Italy and -20,1% in France); outside the Euro Area, production fell by 14,8% in the Uk. Since the spring of 2009, industrial activity recovered, generally remaining below pre-crisis levels. More precisely, in the Euro Area average, in France and the Uk the latest information available (July 2011) indicates that industrial production is still almost ten points below the values reached at the peak of the previous cycle; it remains more than 17 points below the peak in Italy (see Fig. 1). In Germany on the other hand production has returned on pre-crisis levels. Manufacturing production developments are generally considered to be closely monitored by those of the Business Survey on the manufacturing sector, performed throughout Europe on the basis of a Harmonised project of the European Commission. The EU harmonised survey asks a representative sample of manufacturing firms their evaluation on, among other things3 , the current and expected level of demand, production and inventories. Questions are qualitative, in the sense that firms have to report whether the variable of interest is either considered normal (or sufficient, or stable), above normal (or more than sufficient, or growing) or below normal (or less than sufficient, or decreasing). A synthetic measure of firms’ opinions is generally calculated in the form of the balance among the shares of positive and negative replies4 . The Confidence Indicator (CI) is then defined as the simple average of three balances concerning the current level of orders and inventories (the latter entering with a negative sign) and the expected level of production three months ahead. In order to examine the relationship among Confidence and industrial activity, we first have to establish whether the business cycle features of the Confidence indicator are better related either to the concept of classical, deviation or growth cycle of the quantitative indicator (for a recent analysis referred to the Italian economy, see Bruno et al, 2011). In the first case (classical cycle), the Confidence indicator is to be directly related to the level of the quantitative series. When the deviation cycle approach is considered, Confidence has to be related with the cyclical component of the quantitative series, extracted with an appropriate filter; in the following we will use both the HodrickPrescott and the asymmetric Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass filter allowing to consider also the final period of the sample. Finally, in the growth cycle approach, the cycle is extracted using the seasonal difference of (the log of) the production index. Table 2 presents cross correlations among Confidence and the various definition of industrial production cycle, reporting both the contemporaneous and the max correlation among the series. The analysis confirms that in the Euro area as a whole and in its main countries Confidence and industrial production are closely correlated; moreover, Confidence is particularly related to the cyclical component of industrial production extracted according to the growth cycle approach; finally, Confidence has to be considered as a mostly coincided indicator of industrial production growth. The only partial exception is Italy, where Confidence is also a good 3-months leading indicator of the level of industrial production, according to the classical definition of the business cycle.

#### Trade with Mexico *isn’t* key to the economy – it’s a small percentage of the GDP and their authors conflate correlation with causation

Villarreal 12 – M. Angeles Villarreal, Specialist in International Trade and Finance (M. Angeles Villarreal, *Congressional Research Service*, 08-09-2012, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf, Accessed 08-02-2013 | AK)

Effects on the U.S. Economy

The overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily because two-way trade with Mexico amounts to less than 3% of U.S. GDP. Thus, any changes in trade patterns with Mexico would not be expected to be significant in relation to the overall U.S. economy. In some sectors, however, trade-related effects could be more significant, especially in those industries that were more exposed to the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, such as the textile and apparel, and automotive industries. Since NAFTA, the automotive, textile, and apparel industries have experienced some of the more noteworthy changes in trading patterns, which may also have affected U.S. employment in these industries. U.S. trade with Mexico has increased considerably more than U.S. trade with other countries, and Mexico has become a more significant trading partner with the United States since NAFTA implementation. In the automotive industry, the industry comprising the most U.S. trade with Mexico, NAFTA provisions consisted of a phased elimination of tariffs, the gradual removal of many non-tariff barriers to trade including rules of origin provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, less restrictive government procurement practices, and the elimination of performance requirements on investors from other NAFTA countries. These provisions may have accelerated the ongoing trade patterns between the United States and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada were already highly integrated, most of the trade impacts on the U.S. automotive industry relate to trade liberalization with Mexico. Prior to NAFTA Mexico had a series of government decrees protecting the domestic auto sector by reserving the domestic automobile market for domestically produced parts and vehicles. NAFTA established the removal of Mexico’s restrictive trade and investment policies and the elimination of U.S. tariffs on autos and auto parts. By 2006, the automotive industry has had the highest dollar increase ($41 billion) in total U.S. trade with Mexico since NAFTA passage. The main NAFTA provisions related to textiles and apparel consisted of eliminating tariffs and quotas for goods coming from Mexico and eliminating Mexican tariffs on U.S. textile and apparel products. To benefit from the free trade provision, goods were required to meet the rules of origin provision, which assured that apparel products that were traded among the three NAFTA partners were made of yarn and fabric made within the free trade area. The strict rules of origin provisions were meant to ensure that U.S. textiles producers would continue to supply U.S. apparel companies that moved to Mexico. Without a rules of origin provision, apparel companies would have been able to import low-cost fabrics from countries such as China and export the final product to the United States under the free trade provision.51 While some U.S. industries may have benefitted from increased demand for U.S. products in Mexico, creating new jobs, other industries have experienced job losses. Data on the effects of trade liberalization with Mexico are limited and the effect on specific sectors of the U.S. economy is difficult to quantify. Trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the trade agreement.52 Quantifying these effects is challenging because of the other economic factors that influence trade and employment levels. The devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1995 resulted in lower Mexican wages, which likely provided an incentive for U.S. companies to move to lower their production costs. Trade-related employment effects following NAFTA could have also resulted from the lowering of trade barriers, and from the economic conditions in Mexico and the United States influencing investment decisions and the demand for goods.

Means no link to solving hegemony

### Heg unsustainable:

### Debt – will cause a loss of credibility of our promises

### Fatigue – Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have hurt public support

### Dollar Flight – Nations no longer trust the US dollar and it could lose it’s status

### Rising Powers – Modernizing their military ensure loss of US status

### Allied Ambition – Europe and other important nations have different goals an are leaving the US

### That’s Layne 10’ – Prefer our evidence – Advocates of Primacy aren’t predictive – Even if their warrents for heg sustainable are true we control a greater internal link

### Econ Crisis

### Anti Americanism

### Military Innovation

### AND – Heg doesn’t solve conflict

Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin, research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute, Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21, “Drop Pretension to Supremacy,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12156&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)

Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U.S. security. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U.S. military deployments. If our military had less to do, the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1.22 trillion less over the next 10 years, according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example — as major U.S. security threats. In nearly all cases, they are not. Geography, wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. In most cases, it is counterproductive. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U.S. ambitions. By shedding missions, the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel, weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. The resulting force would be more elite, less strained and far less expensive. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits, however, because it could enhance security. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars, limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U.S. forces, remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely, we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Fewer missions, along with advances in strike technology, would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy.

### War will decrease in the squo – heg kills the trend

Fettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. (Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” [\_\_Survival\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919), Volume [\_\_52\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919~tab=issueslist~branches=52#v52), Issue [\_\_2\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=g920313969) April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld, KENTUCKY)

This trend is apparent on every continent. At the beginning of 2010, the only conflict raging in the Western Hemisphere was the ongoing civil war in Colombia, but even this conflict is far less severe today than it was ten years ago. Europe, which has in the past been the most war-prone of continents, is entirely calm, without even the threat of inter-state conflict. Little war planning now goes on among the European powers, a rather stark departure from previous eras.[22](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0022) Every one of the two billion or so people of the Pacific Rim is currently living in a society at peace. The brief but bloody Sri Lankan civil war was Asia's only conflict in 2009. In Africa, despite a variety of serious on-going challenges, levels of conflict are the lowest they have been in the centuries of written history we have about the continent. In the greater Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian issue continues to simmer, if at a relatively low level, as do the civil war in Yemen and the two counterinsurgency campaigns in which the United States and its allies currently find themselves bogged down. None of this is to suggest that these places are without problems, or that war is impossible. But given the rapid increase in the world's population and the number of countries (the League of Nations had 63 members at its peak between the wars, while the United Nations currently has 192), a pure extrapolation of historical trends might lead one to expect a great deal more warfare than there actually is. Conquest, it seems, is far less common today than it has been throughout history. Territorial disputes, the most common cause of warfare in the past, have dropped to record low levels, especially among the great powers. International borders have all but hardened. By any reasonable measure, the world is living in a golden age of peace and security, even if it may not always appear so.If indeed major war is all but obsolete, as an increasing number of prominent observers believe,[23](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0023) then surely even the most diehard pessimists can admit that the United States need not fear invasion and conquest. State survival, the key factor behind state behaviour according to 'defensive realists', is today all but assured for even the smallest states.[24](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0024) To be sure, throughout most of human history, the obliteration of political entities was a distinct possibility. Polities as diverse as Central Asian empires, Greek poleis and German 'princely states' were all at risk of conquest or absorption by powerful neighbours. That this no longer occurs is an under-appreciated break from the past. Since the Second World War, precisely zero UN members have been forcibly removed from the map.[25](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0025) Today, states are safe from complete annihilation. The stronger countries are even safer; the strongest is the safest. A variety of explanations have been proposed to account for this peaceful trend. Some realists take the view that nuclear weapons have thrust peace upon the otherwise conflictual system.[26](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0026) Liberal explanations include the expanding number of democracies, multilateral institutions and the deepening complexity of economic interdependence.[27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0027) Constructivists do not necessarily deny the importance of any of these factors, but give primary credit to a change in ideas in contemporary international society.[28](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0028) Those factors exogenous to the human mind are important only to the extent that they affect the way people think, and that society functions. It is ideational evolution, and the corresponding change in behavioural norms regarding conflict, that has been decisive in this view.All these explanations share one important factor: the change they describe is likely to be irreversible. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and no defence against their use is ever going to be completely foolproof. The pace of globalisation and economic interdependence shows no sign of slowing. Democracy seems to be firmly embedded in the cultural fabric of many of the places it currently exists, and may well be in the process of spreading to the places where it does not. The United Nations shows no signs of disappearing. Finally, normative progress, like that which brought an end to slavery and duelling, tends to be unidirectional. One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.[29](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0029) To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.[30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0030) And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

## – A2 – Heg Solves War

### Meta Framing Question – All of their evidence should be viewed with a lens of skepticism – it over-estimates the importance of the US and under estimates the power of external factors psychology studies – that’s Preble – even if their heg good args could be true they assume pre 9/11 heg

Lieven, 6 (Anatol, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment in the Global Policy Program, Demon in the Cellar, Carnegie, Prospect Magazine, March http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1467)

Because of a deep-rooted (and partly justified) belief in American exceptionalism, and the decline of the study of history, Americans are not used to studying their nationalism in a western historical context. It is important that they begin to do so. Nobody looking at the history of nationalist Europe in the century or so before 1945 would suggest that the US should follow such a path. In particular, American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism: that is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon. A relatively benign version of indirect American imperial dominance is by no means unacceptable to many people round the world - both because they often have neighbours whom they fear more than America, and because their leaders are increasingly integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of America. But American imperial power in the service of narrow American and Israeli nationalism is a very different matter, and an unstable base for hegemony. It involves power over the world without any responsibility for global problems and without any responsiveness to others' concerns. This is not a matter of sentimental or naive liberal humanism. The US, as unquestioned king of the international order, has a truly vital national and imperial interest in preserving and strengthening it with new rules and conventions. The us is in part simply an old European state which avoided the catastrophes that nationalism brought upon Europe in the 20th century. Its nationalism thus retains an intensity which Europeans have had kicked out of them by history. 72 per cent of Americans say they are "very proud" of their nationality, compared to 49 per cent of Britons, 39 per cent of Italians and just 20 per cent of the Dutch. But the dangers of unreflective nationalist sentiments remain all too obvious. Nationalism thrives on irrational hatreds, and the portrayal of other nations or ethno-religious groups as irredeemably wicked and hostile. Yesterday this was true of the attitudes of many American nationalists to the Soviet Union. Today it risks becoming the case with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to any country which defies American wishes. The run-up to the war in Iraq saw an astonishing explosion of chauvinism directed against France and Germany.

### Heg doesn’t solve war – nations who dislike the US will never listen – increasing power only increases resentment – nations who support the US will do so regardless of US power - that’s Peble 10’

### Empirics – War declines when the US cut its forces by 25 percent – no nation enhanced its military and no power vacuums occurred – the world acted as if internal war was not a possibility – that’s Fetwise 10’

### Prefer our evidence – their ev is overly hyperbolic and written by conservative hacks who aren’t even peer reviewed

Fettweis 11 [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### AND – Statistics prove heg increases the probability and magnitude of global warfare

Montiero 12 [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.