# Round Report vs Westminster FS

## DA

Iran deal will succeed---but Obama needs capital to stop a second round of sanctions

Parsi 11/20 (Trita Parsi is founder and president of the National Iranian American Council and an expert on US-Iranian relations, Iranian foreign politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, “Negotiations with Iran show promise, but true test comes later,” http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/11/iran-us-negotiationsgenevanuclearprogram.html)

After objections by France caused a momentary disruption, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are once again united and meeting in Geneva this week with Iranian representatives to strike a deal on Iran's nuclear program. The prospects for success appear favorable. However, it is also clear that the real hurdles to an enduring deal will not be encountered now, but after the first agreement has been concluded. This is partly because Washington's ability to give concessions has not been truly tested yet. The misinformation spread by Israeli cabinet ministers and opponents of President Barack Obama in the U.S. Congress notwithstanding, most of concessions in the first phase of the deal currently being negotiated in Geneva will be provided by Tehran. In return, the United States and European Union are offering very little. The sanctions relief is minimal and carefully avoids congressional approval. Obama has spent a lot of political capital in the past two weeks simply to convince Congress not to adopt new sanctions. If a deal is reached this week in Geneva, Obama will be faced with the much taller order of getting Congress to actually roll back existing sanctions. Unfortunately, negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program have in the past passed the first hurdle, only to fall apart during the second step, when a final deal must be concluded. Eagerness and pressure to reach a first deal, combined with lack of common clarity on what exactly had been agreed upon, contributed to this.

#### Capital is key---its on the brink and failure risks middle east war

Merry 11/19 (Robert W. Merry is political editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy, “Obama and Netanyahu Go to War,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obama-netanyahu-go-war-9420?page=1)

President Obama finds himself in a weakened state. His health care law is sapping his political strength and generating intense anxiety among his Democratic troops in Congress. His performance rating is at an all-time low. His trust with the American people is deteriorating badly, as reflected in a recent Quinnipiac University poll. His political capital is ebbing. And into this dire political situation comes a new challenge that will test the president’s resolve and mettle in a big way. If he wants to save his high-stakes effort to foster a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, he must take on, directly, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israel lobby in the United States. If he doesn’t, Congress will kill his effort; the opportunity to find a peaceful solution will be lost; and chances for war with Iran will rise ominously. Indeed, administration officials have warned that the current congressional push for new sanctions on Iran, in the midst of his delicate efforts, would constitute "a march to war."

#### Negotiations failure triggers military strikes and regional proliferation-causes escalatory wars

**Cordesman, CSIS, 2013**

(Anthony, “Negotiating with Iran: The Strategic Case for Pragmatism and Real Progress”, 9-23, <http://csis.org/publication/negotiating-iran-strategic-case-pragmatism-and-real-progress>, ldg)

Nevertheless, it makes no sense at all to reject Hassan Rouhani’s opening or condemn the Obama Administration’s response. Iran’s nuclear programs have moved to the point where it is extremely doubtful that there will be another chance to begin what may be a long and difficult process for all nations involved, and an attempt at resolution is far better than any of the real world alternatives. As long as any negotiations that follow are realistic in terms of their content, and do not endorse indefinite delay in a U.S. response while Iran’s nuclear programs move forward, they offer what will be the last real hope of avoiding preventive strikes or a process of containment that would lock the region into an Iranian-Israeli nuclear arms race, a probable Saudi effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, and a U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. The Uncertain Outcome of Preventive Strikes The United States, Iran, and all the other nations involved need to be far more pragmatic about what will happen if time does run out and Iran does go nuclear. Iran may well face a series of preventive strikes – triggered by Israel or planned by the United States – that will destroy far more than its nuclear facilities. This may or may not actually halt the Iranian nuclear effort. A limited set of Israeli preventive strikes could either force the United States to follow up, or create a situation in which Iran rejects all arms control and UN inspection and carries out a massive new disperse nuclear program or a crash basis. It could also drive Iran to lash out into a new wave of confrontation with the United States and Iran’s neighbors. A U.S.-led set of preventive strikes would be more successful, but the United States could only be sure of suppressing a meaningful Iran nuclear effort if it quickly re-strikes any known target it fails to destroy the first time, carries out constant surveillance of Iran, and repeatedly and thoroughly strikes at the targets created by any new Iranian initiatives. The United States would need regional support to do this and probably prolonged regional agreement to U.S. basing. At a minimum, the result would be years more of a regional arms race, military tension, and Iranian efforts to find ways to attack or pressure the Arab states, Israel, and United States. As the current conflict in Syria makes all too clear, no one can predict how much support the United States will really get from any of its allies, its own U.S. Congress, and no one can predict the limits to Iran’s reactions, ability to use third parties, and willingness to confront the United States and the region with new nuclear, missile, and asymmetric threats. The United States would face an almost certain challenge in the UN from Russia and China, and there is no way any U.S. action against Iran could be separated from Iran’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon; Afghanistan, or any other issue where Iran could try to find some form of revenge. This is not an argument for not acting. The risk of a fully nuclear Iran is simply too great. It is a very strong argument for finding a good alternative if one can be negotiated on realistic terms. The Uncertain Outcome of Iran Nuclear Weapons and Containment: The Most Likely Outcome is a No Win Escalation Ladder Contest If there are no preventive strikes – or preventive strikes fail to halt Iran – what is now a largely quiet one-sided nuclear arms race would become far more threatening. At one level, this arms race would become one between Iran and any allies it could find and the United States and its Arab allies in or near the Gulf. A nuclear Iran could change the balance in terms of the credibility of U.S. and Arab willingness to engage against Iranian threats, intimidation, and use of its asymmetric forces. It would inevitably make Gulf petroleum exports the scene of an ongoing arms race and constant tension, and risk a clash that might escalate in untended ways. What is less apparent – and needs far more realistic attention in Iran and outside assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat – is the impact of Iran actually going nuclear. One or several crude nuclear devices do not create a nuclear force. Iran cannot produce enough capable nuclear forces for at least the next decade to pose more of an existential threat to Israel than Israel can pose to Iran. Israel would scarcely be passive, however, and Israel already has far more capable missiles than Iran. Israel also has thermonuclear weapons, rather than the early fission devices Iran will probably be limited to for at least the next half-decade. As a result Israel will pose more of an existentialist threat to an Iran as dependent on the survival of Tehran than Iran can pose to an Israel dependent on the survival of Tel Aviv. As the United States and former Soviet Union both learned during the Cold War, even Iranian parity or superiority would be meaningless. The problem with mutually assured destruction is that no state can ever win an existential strike contest. As for the rest of the Middle East, if Iran shows it is going nuclear to enhance its power and dominate the Gulf region – as may be Iran’s real motive – the resulting threat to world oil exports and the world economy is not likely to intimidate to any degree that will benefit Iran. It will push both the United States and Arab states into responding. The fact Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the level of deterrence of a direct invasion, but would not lead the United States, or surrounding Arab states to passively accept the result. The United States already is transferring more than ten times the value of Iran’s total arms imports to its Gulf allies. Its ties to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman already give the United States and its Gulf allies the ability to devastatingly defeat Iran in any direct military confrontation. Iran can only vastly increase the scale of the resulting destruction that the United States and its allies inflict if Iran ever actually escalates to the use of nuclear weapons. But the United States, the Arab allies, Israel, and other regional states will suffer as well – along with the global economy – if the end result is a major interruption in the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

Middle east war goes global and nuclear

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The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

## K

**They utilize depictions of mbargo a means to further their plan – this creates the world as standing reserve and legitimizes endless genocide – the only way to escape this cycle is to vote negative to affirm the infinite value of all forms of Being**

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(Lucas, “Ethics and the Speaking of Things,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 2009 vol 26 no 4, 25-46, dml)

In the ethics of hybrids our ethical relationship with things is determined beforehand by us, it is anthropocentric. In this encounter with things we have already chosen, or presumed, the framework of values that will count in determining moral signiﬁcance. In this ethics, things are always and already ‘things-for-us’ – objects for our use, in our terms, for our purposes. They are always inscribed with our intentionality – they carry it in their ﬂesh, as it were. The deﬁning measure of the ethics of hybrids is the human being – the meaning of the Latin root of ‘man’ is measure. Indeed our concern for things is what they might do to us humans, as was suggested above. Our concern is not our instrumental use of them, the violence of our inscriptions in/on them, but that such scripts may ultimately harm us. As things-for-us, or ‘objects’ as we will refer to them, they have no moral signiﬁcance as such. In the value hierarchy of the modern ethical mind they are very far down the value line. What could be less morally signiﬁcant than an inanimate object? Their moral signiﬁcance is only a derivative of the way they may circulate the network as inscriptions for utility or enrolment. For example, they may become valuable if they can be sold in a market where they are valued, as is the case with works of art. The magnitude and diversity of our projects are mirrored in the magnitude and diversity of the objects that surround us. As things-for-us they are at our disposal – if they fail to be useful, or when our projects drift or shift, we ‘dump’ them. Images of endless ‘scrap’ heaps at the edges of our cities abound. Objects are made/inscribed, used and ﬁnally dumped. We can dispose of them because we author-ized them in the ﬁrst place. Increasingly we design them in such a way that we can dispose of them as effortlessly as possible. Ideally, their demise must be as invisible as possible. Their entire moral claim on our conscience is naught, it seems. One can legitimately ask why should we concern ourselves with things in a world where the ethical landscape is already overcrowded with grave and pressing matters such as untold human suffering, disappearing bio-diversity and ozone layers – to name but a few. It is our argument that our moral indifference to so many supposedly signiﬁcant beings (humans, animals, nature, etc.) starts with the idea that there are some beings that are less signiﬁcant or not signiﬁcant at all. More originally it starts with a metaphysics that has as its centre – the ultimate measure – us human beings – a metaphysics which has been at the heart of Western philosophy ever since Plato (Heidegger, 1977a). Thus, when we start our moral ordering we tend to value more highly things like us (sentient, organic/natural, alive, etc.) and less highly, or not at all, things most alien to us (non-sentient, synthetic/artiﬁcial, inanimate, etc.). It is our argument that one of the reasons why this anthropocentric ethics of things fails is because it assumes that we can, both in principle and in practice, draw a deﬁnitive boundary between the objects (them) and us. Social studies of science and technology have thrown severe doubt on such a possibility. If it is increasingly difﬁcult to draw the boundary between our objects and us, and if in this entangled network of humans and non-humans objects lack moral signiﬁcance from the start, then it is rather a small step to take for an ethics to emerge in which all things – human and non-human alike – circulate as object**s**: ‘things-for-the-purposes-of’ the network. In ordering society as assemblages of humans and objects we ultimately also become ordered as a ‘for-the-purposes-of’. Thus, the irony of an anthropocentric ethics of things is that ultimately we also become ‘objects’ in programmes and scripts, at the disposal of a higher logic (capital, state, community, environment, etc.). In the network, others and our objects ‘objectify’ us. For example, I cannot get my money out from the bank machine because I forgot my PIN number. Until I identify myself in its terms (as a ﬁve digit number) I am of no signiﬁcance to it. Equally, if I cannot prove my identity by presenting inscribed objects (passport, drivers licence) I cannot get a new PIN number. In Heidegger’s (1977b) words we have all become ‘standing reserve’, on ‘stand by’ for the purposes of the network – enframed (Gestell) by the calculative logic of our way of being. Enframed in a global network that has as its logic to control, manipulate and dominate: ‘Enframing is the gathering together which belongs to that setting-upon which challenges man and puts him in position to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve’ (Heidegger, 1977a: 305). The value hierarchy presumed in an anthropocentric ethics is in fact a dynamic network of values and interests – there never was a hierarchy. The fate of our objects becomes our fate. In the ethics of hybrids we are also already objects – indeed everything is already object. Instead of a hierarchy of values we ﬁnd a complete nihilism in which everything is leveled out, everything is potentially equally valuable/valueless; a nihilistic network in which ‘the highest values devaluate themselves’ (Nietzsche, 1967: 9). If this is so, then we would argue that we should not ‘extend’ our moral consideration to other things, such as inanimate objects – in a similar manner that we have done for animals and other living things, in environmental ethics for example. In other words we should not simply extend the reach of what is considered morally signiﬁcant to include more things. Rather, we should abandon all systems of moral valuing and admit, with Heidegger, that in ‘the characterisation of something as “a value” what is so valued is robbed of its worth’ and admit that ‘what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value’, furthermore, that ‘every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivising’ (Heidegger, 1977a: 228). We must abandon ethics for a clearing beyond ethics – to let beings be in their own terms. We must admit that any attempt at humanistic moral ordering – be it egocentric, anthropocentric, biocentric (Goodpaster, 1978; Singer, 1975) or even ecocentric (Leopold, 1966; Naess, 1995) – will fail. Any ethics based on us will eventually turn everything into our image, pure will to power (Heidegger, 1977a, 1977b). As Lingis (1994: 9) suggests: ‘The man-made species we are, which produces its own nature in an environment it produces, ﬁnds nothing within itself that is alien to itself, opaque and impervious to its own understanding’ (emphasis added). Instead of creating value systems in our own image, the absolute otherness of every other should be the only moral imperative. We need an ethics of things that is beyond the self-identical-ness of human beings. Such an ethics beyond metaphysics needs as its ‘ground’ not a system for comparison, but rather a recognition of the impossibility of any comparison – every comparison is already violent in its attempt to render equal what could never be equal (Levinas, 1991 [1974]). How might we encounter the other in its otherness? Levinas (1991 [1974], 1996, 1999) has argued for the radical singularity of our fellow human beings. But what about all other others? In the next section we will argue that Heidegger, especially as presented in the work of Harman (2002, 2005), might provide us with some hints towards the overcoming of ethics, towards an ethos of letting-be of all beings.

## DA

#### Plan kills Brazil’s sugar industry

**Miami Herald, 2 -** (Associated press staff writer for the Miami Herald. June 26, 2002. “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//SDL

4. The next reason in favor of doing away with the embargo runs as follows: Look here, there is money to be made in Cuba. Remember Coolidge’s, the "business of America is business?" If everything else fails, appeal to greed . There are some salivating mouths claiming that 6 billion dollars worth of goods and commodities could be sold to Cuba. But unless the U.S. takes the place of the Soviet Union and initially subsidizes the Cuban economy with credits and loans (coming out of American tax paying pockets), and rebuild its shattered infrastructure at a cost of billions upon billions of dollars, the U.S. would have to buy Cuban sugar produced by workers paid now 10 dollars per month in order to enable Cubans to have money to pay for all these goodies, without any guarantees that the large portion of the profits made would not go first to the apparatus of repression (armed forces, secret police and Communist Party cadres) and to the modernization of its weapons systems and only lastly, to the Cuban people. Moreover, one must ask: what happens to the sugar industry of Florida now producing 25% of the sugar consumed in the U.S.?. Furthermore, according to the American Sugar Alliance, 80-85% of the sugar produced in the U.S. is consumed here. The remainder 15% is imported from 40 foreign countries--about 1,5 million tons. Under WTO and NAFTA rules the U.S. is required to bring in AT LEAST that amount, even if the U.S. does not need it now! Any sale of Cuban sugar to a sugar producing country like the U.S. would mean that there would be less of the market for the American sugar industry to go around.¶ In addition, **what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market**, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: **Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices and bankrupting the domestic industry.** (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.**¶** Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

#### That causes Brazilian economic instability

**SC 12** (Sugarcane.org, June 19, 2012. “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//SDL

¶ The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.¶ Economic Contribution¶ In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).**¶** When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.¶ Good Jobs¶ The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

#### Nuclear war

**Shulz 2k** (Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

## CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior binding consultation with the relevant indigenous peoples of [Cuba] over [normalizing trade relations. The United States will advocate [normalizing trade relations ] throughout the process of consultation and implement the result.

#### Prior consultation with Latin American indigenous peoples over engagement is critical to avert cultural and physical annihilation

Kinnison, 11 – (Akilah Jenga Kinnison, J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law. 2011. “INDIGENOUS CONSENT: RETHINKING U.S. CONSULTATION POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,” http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/53-4/53arizlrev1301.pdf)//SDL

¶ Due to the nature of large-scale extractive activities, there seems to be a ¶ ¶ shift in the international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with ¶ ¶ indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultation–consent ¶ ¶ spectrum. Some argue that, where activities directly impact indigenous peoples’ ¶ ¶ right to “use, enjoy, control, and develop their traditional lands,” there is a norm ¶ ¶ developing that recognizes that full consent, rather than just meaningful ¶ ¶ consultation, is required.206 For instance, former Special Rapporteur on the ¶ ¶ Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People ¶ ¶ Rodolfo Stavenhagen has stated that “the free, informed and prior consent, as ¶ ¶ well as the right to self-determination of indigenous communities and peoples, ¶ ¶ must be considered as a necessary precondition” for “major development projects” ¶ ¶ affecting indigenous lands.207 Such “major development projects” include “the ¶ ¶ large scale exploitation of natural resources including subsoil resources.”208 ¶ ¶ Stavenhagen has argued that indigenous peoples have the “right to say no” to ¶ ¶ certain development projects.¶ ¶ Furthermore, there are strong arguments for why, even if such a norm has ¶ ¶ not yet crystallized, states should adopt this interpretation of FPIC for large-scale ¶ ¶ extractive activities. First, the power to withhold consent can be seen as necessary ¶ ¶ to enforce other important indigenous rights beyond rights of consultation and ¶ ¶ participation.210 This is particularly true in the context of extractive industries, ¶ ¶ whose projects implicate numerous other indigenous rights due to their ability to ¶ ¶ threaten indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival.211 For instance, the ¶ ¶ ability to withhold consent allows indigenous communities to enforce their ¶ ¶ community property rights, protect their sacred spaces, and maintain their culture ¶ ¶ and relationship with the land. ¶ Additionally, there are reservations about how “meaningful” indigenous ¶ ¶ participation can be in the absence of the power to withhold consent.212 As ¶ ¶ Professor Brant McGee comments: “Absent the ability to walk away from the ¶ ¶ bargaining table, indigenous groups would simply be participating in a ¶ ¶ meaningless exchange of views designed to fulfill a legal requirement.”213 Given ¶ ¶ the stakes and zero-sum potential of large-scale extractive projects, “[t]here is no ¶ ¶ such thing as partial consent in this context.”¶ ¶ 214 Therefore, indigenous peoples ¶ ¶ must be equipped with the ability to withhold consent in order to engage in ¶ ¶ meaningful negotiation. Special Rapporteur Anaya has stated: “[T]he principles of ¶ ¶ consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition of the will of one ¶ ¶ party over the other, and . . . instead striving for mutual understanding and ¶ ¶ consensual decision-making.”215 Yet without the power to withhold consent in ¶ ¶ zero-sum situations where destructive impacts on indigenous lands and culture are ¶ ¶ high, indigenous people are left with little bargaining power and therefore may be ¶ ¶ unable to participate in meaningful consultation. ¶ Promoting an interpretation of FPIC that gives indigenous peoples the ¶ ¶ right to withhold consent in the context of large-scale extractive projects is also ¶ ¶ good policy from the state and corporate perspectives because it can make projects ¶ ¶ more successful. Professor Lisa J. Laplante and attorney Suzanne A. Spears ¶ ¶ propose that extractive industries can diffuse costly opposition to projects by ¶ ¶ engaging in community “consent processes.”216 Conflicts with communities can create obstacles for a particular project as well as for the corporation itself.217 ¶ ¶ Global campaigns against particular companies have been waged—as exemplified ¶ ¶ by “ProtestBarrick.net,” which is a campaign entirely devoted to publicizing ¶ ¶ opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation.218 Such campaigns can damage a ¶ ¶ company’s reputation, which Laplante and Spears refer to as “an extractive ¶ ¶ industry company’s lifeblood.”219 Additionally, opposition can be costly due to the ¶ ¶ public relations campaigns corporations must launch in response to community ¶ ¶ opposition,220 legal costs to fend off efforts to shut down projects, and losses in ¶ ¶ profitability. For example, after the ¶ ¶ Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a limited ¶ ¶ injunction against Barrick in the Cortez Hills case, the company’s stock dropped ¶ ¶ 8.43%, despite the fact that the project did not ultimately shut down.¶ Thus, when states believe a development project is in the public interest, ¶ ¶ they should seek to engage the community in consent processes, rather than ¶ ¶ consultation processes, both to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and also to ¶ ¶ promote the long-term benefit of the project itself. As Laplante and Spears ¶ ¶ explained: ¶ Whereas consultation processes require only that extractive industry ¶ ¶ companies [or the state] hear the views of those potentially affected ¶ ¶ by a project and then take them into account when engaging in ¶ ¶ decision-making processes, consent processes require that host ¶ ¶ communities actually participate in decision-making processes. ¶ ¶ Consent processes give affected communities the leverage to ¶ ¶ negotiate mutually acceptable agreements under which projects may ¶ ¶ proceed¶ Interpreting FPIC as respecting the right of indigenous peoples to withhold consent ¶ ¶ for large-scale extractive projects, therefore, gives communities the tools necessary ¶ ¶ to protect their rights as well as to bargain with state and corporate actors in order ¶ ¶ to move forward with development projects on mutually beneficial terms. ¶ In sum, within the context of large-scale extractive industries, it is in the ¶ ¶ best interest of states to take a consent-based approach to operationalizing the ¶ ¶ principle of FPIC found in instruments such as the U.N. Declaration. ¶ The United States has articulated a commitment to the importance of ¶ ¶ indigenous consultation both through its endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on ¶ ¶ the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O. 13,175 ¶ ¶ and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation Memorandum. However, in order to ¶ ¶ fully realize this commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation standard. U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a minimum and with consent required in certain contexts, including large-scale extractive industries.

#### Cultural Genocide

Smith, 6 – (Andrea, Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, Appropriation of Native American Religious Traditions, Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America, Vol. 1, pg. 104-105)

Native spiritualities are land based — they are tied to the landbase from which they originate. When Native peoples fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are ultimately fighting for the landbase which grounds their spirituality and culture. For this reason, Native religions are generally not proselytizing. They are typically seen by Native peoples as relevant only to the particular landbase from which they originate; they are not necessarily applicable to peoples coming from different landbases. In addition, as many scholars have noted, Native religions are practice centered rather than belief centered. That is, Christianity is defined by belief in a certain set of doctrinal principles about Jesus, the Bible, etc. Evangelical Christianity holds that one is “saved” when one professes belief in Jesus Christ as one’s Lord and Savior. But what is of primary important in Native religions is not being able to articulate belief in a certain set of doctrines, but being able to take part in the spiritual practice of one’s community. In fact, it may be more important that a ceremony be done correctly than it is for everyone in that ceremony to know exactly why everything must be done in a certain way. As Vine Deloria (Dakota) notes, from a Native context, religion is “a way of life” rather than “a matter of proper exposition of doctrines.” Even if Christians do not have access to church, they continue to be Christians as long as they believe in Jesus. Native spiritualities, by contrast, may die if the people do not practice the ceremonies, even if the people continue to believe in their power. Native communities argue that Native peoples cannot be alienated from their land without committing cultural genocide. This argument underpins many sacred sites cases, although usually to no avail, before the courts. Most of the court rulings on sacred sites do not recognize this difference between belief-centered and practice-centered traditions or the significance of land-based spiritualities. For instance, in Fools Crow v. Gullet (1983), the Supreme Court ruled against the Lakota who were trying to halt the development of additional tourist facilities in the Black Hills. The Court ruled that this tourism was not an infringement on Indian religious freedom because, although it would hinder the ability of the Lakota to practice their beliefs, it did not force them to relinquish their beliefs. For the Lakota, however, stopping the practice of traditional beliefs destroys the belief systems themselves. Consequently, for the Lakota and Native nations in general, cultural genocide is the result when Native landbases are not protected. When we disconnect Native spiritual practices from their land bases, we undermine Native peoples’ claim that the protection of the land base is integral to the survival of Native peoples and hence undermine their claims to sovereignty. This practice of disconnecting Native spirituality from its land base is prevalent in a wide variety of practices of cultural and spiritual appropriation, from New Agers claiming to be Indian in a former life to Christians adopting Native spiritual forms to further their missionizing efforts. The message is that anyone can practice Indian spirituality anywhere. Hence there is no need to protect the specific Native communities and the lands that are the basis of their spiritual practices.

#### Extinction – each loss contributes to an invisible threshold

Stavenhagen, 90 – (Rodolfo, Professor @ the United Nations University, The Ethnic Question pg. 73)

The struggle for the preservation of the collective identity of culturally distinct peoples has further implications as well. The cultural diversity of the world’s peoples is a universal resource for all humankind. The diversity of the worlds cultural pool is like the diversity of the world’s biological gene pool. A culture that disappears due to ethnocide or cultural genocide represents a loss for all humankind. At a time when the classic development models of the post war era have failed to solve the major problems of mankind, people are again looking at so called traditional cultures for at least some of the answers. This is very clear, for example, as regards to agricultural and food production, traditional medicine, environmental management in rural areas, construction techniques, social solidarity in times of crises, etc. The world’s diverse cultures have much to offer our imperiled planet. Thus the defense of the collective rights of ethnic groups and indigenous peoples cannot be separated from the collective human rights of all human beings.

## Transition Adv

#### **Ending the embargo without massive concessions will fail**

Suchlicki 13 – (Jaime, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, What If…the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo? 2/26/13, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/what-if-the-u-s-ended-the-cuba-travel-ban-and-the-embargo/)

Trade All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very little credit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises. There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S. Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba’s major exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigar production is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an important export, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums. Investments In Cuba, foreign investors cannot partner with private Cuban citizens. They can only invest in the island through minority joint ventures with the government and its state enterprises. The dominant enterprise in the Cuban economy is the Grupo GAESA, controlled by the Cuban military. Most investments are done through or with GAESA. Therefore, American companies willing to invest in Cuba will have to partner mostly with the Cuban military. Cuba ranks 176 out of 177 countries in the world in terms of economic freedom. Outshined only by North Korea. It ranks as one of the most unattractive investments next to Iran, Zimbabwe, Libya, Mali, etc. Foreign investors cannot hire, fire, or pay workers directly. They must go through the Cuban government employment agency which selects the workers. Investors pay the government in dollars or euros and the government pays the workers a meager 10% in Cuban pesos. Corruption is pervasive, undermining equity and respect for the rule of law. Cuba does not have an independent/transparent legal system. All judges are appointed by the State and all lawyers are licensed by the State. In the last few years, European investors have had over $1 billion arbitrarily frozen by the government and several investments have been confiscated. Cuba’s Law 77 allows the State to expropriate foreign-invested assets for reason of “public utility” or “social interest.” In the last year, the CEOs of three companies with extensive dealings with the Cuban government were arrested without charges. (1) Conclusions If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now or the embargo is ended by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? These policies could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms. The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide meaningful and irreversible political and economic concessions or when there is a democratic government in place in the island.

#### Increases the regime’s power and turns case

Jorge 2k – (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

Let us ask one final time: Who would benefit from the abrogation of the legislation enabling the U.S. embargo on Cuba? Unquestionably, such a move would be greatly advantageous to Castro’s personal purposes and would also favor those who seek to obtain commercial gains from doing business in Cuba, heedless of the costs of their unbridled ambition to the Cuban people. What would constitute a gross deception, however, would be to advance the claim, as some do, that such a policy change would contribute to Cuba’s freedom or to its economic development. No doubt, Cuba after Castro will experience very serious difficulties in resuming its process of economic development and rejoining the world economy. Nothing short of a complete ideological turnaround and wholesale restructuring of its political, social, and economic systems would allow the country to begin to face the arduous tasks lying ahead. The Cuban nation has suffered enormously under Castro. The reconstruction process will inevitably be costly and laborious. The last thing the Cuban people need is to be visited by another plague. Spare them the sanctimonious chicanery and knavery of those who abuse and misuse the market for their own greed. Piñatas and mafias are not the way to build free and prosperous societies. Vide Nicaragua and Russia. Let Cuba not follow suit.

#### Castro influence is the problem, not the embargo

Jorge 2k – (Dr. Antonio, Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000).Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers.Paper 28. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28)

It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm,)

 ¶ Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion. ¶ If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should: ¶ before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it; ¶ ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...; ¶ recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and ¶ begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes. ¶ Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

#### No Terrorism

Richard Weitz 11, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. “Where are Latin America’s Terrorists?” 11-9-11http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-

 The Colombian army’s killing of Alfonso Cano, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will not eliminate that country’s largest guerrilla group anytime soon. But it does partly illustrate why international terrorism has not established a major presence in Latin America. Local security forces, bolstered by generous American assistance, have made the region a difficult place for foreign terrorists to set up operational cells – and other conditions also help to make Latin America less vulnerable. One reason why the FARC has survived repeated blows to its leadership is the support that it receives from various groups, perhaps including government officials, in neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. Fortunately, this backing appears to have declined in the last year or so, following improvement in Colombia’s relations with these countries. Another factor contributing to the FARC’s survival has been its transformation over the years from a revolutionary organization into a narco-terrorist group that uses violence to support its criminal operations. Many former terrorist and insurgent groups in the region have undergone similar transformations over the last two decades. These groups, some with transnational reach, mostly engage in narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping. At worst, they sometimes employ terrorist tactics (commonly defined as violence that deliberately targets civilians). In Colombia, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) finance their operations through drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. These groups might kill civilians, but their main targets are the police and security personnel who threaten their activities. Latin America is distinctive in the recurring and broad overlap of mass movements professing revolutionary goals with transnational criminal operations. The Internet and modern social media are allowing these mass criminal movements to expand their activities beyond kidnapping, extortion, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, to include fraud, piracy, information theft, hacking, and sabotage. Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence. Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists’ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting communist subversion, governments seek to fight “terrorist” threats at America’s expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin America’s powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

**Cuba’s environment is protected now but normalizing trade relations leads to massive increase in investment and tourism in Cuba – devastates the unique ecological environment**

**Dean, 7** - science writer for the New York Times, taught seminars and courses at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and Vassar College, and the University of Rhode Island, member of the Corporation of Brown University, a founding member of the advisory board of the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting (Cornelia, “Published: Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo”, December 25, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)//ah

Through accidents of geography and history, **Cuba is a priceless ecological resource**. That is why many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo. The New York Times Cuba has **avoided much environmental degradation in recent decades,** but now hotel developments are seen extending into the water in Cayo Coco. More Photos > Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and animals, **some seen nowhere else.** And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated. Cuba has not been free of development, includig Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, **eager to exploit those landscapes.** Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss the island’s resources and how to continue to protect them. Cuba has done “what we should have done — identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them aside,” said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who attended the conference. In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws. But, he said in an interview, **“an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends.** By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends. “It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment. About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknell’s thrush, whose summer home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in Cuba on their way south for the winter. Zapata Swamp, on the island’s southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures. Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas. Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida Institute of Technology. Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cuba’s marine ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper. Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and destructive fishing practices. Diving in them “is like going back in time 50 years,” said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington. In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that “in dramatic contrast” to its island neighbors, Cuba’s beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved. **Their biggest threat**, the report said, was “th**e prospect of sudden and massive growth in mass tourism when the U.S. embargo lifts.”**

**Continued environmental degradation results in extinction**

**Birch, 12** - PhD, Emeritus Professor @ University of Sydney, Professor of Zoology, Professor of Biology, won the Templeton Prize in 1990, (Charles, "As Humans Send Earth Toward Extinction, " Feb. 29, http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/ecology/extinct.htm)//ahayes

Unlike Alston Chase, Charles Birch is a noted biologist and scientist. Birch argues that the growing human destruction of the Earth and the global environment threatens our future. He argues that our growing impact on the "life-support systems of the planet" threaten our extinction. Just as the dinosaurs became extinct because they couldn't adapt to their changing environment, **humanity faces extinction** if it can't adapt to a rapidly changing environment caused by our global industrial civilization. Like Wilson, Birch argues that "the sort of society we are building with the aid of science and technology has self-destructive features built into it." So how is our industrial civilization threatening its future? Birch argues that the increasing demands placed on the "limited resources of the Earth and the capacity of the planet to cope with air and water pollution" weaken the ability of the Earth to support our global industrial civilization. He argues that the rich nations--the developed nations--"high rate of consumption and pollution" have led scientists to develop the "impossibility theorem," which states that this level of consumption and pollution for rich nations is not possible for all the peoples of the world. Birch warns that "it is now widely believed that the industrialization of the whole world would be lethal to the planet." In fact, 20 percent of the global human population now consumes 80 percent of the resources and wealth, while the remaining 80 percent of the people consume only 20 percent of the resources and wealth. If we continue to try to bring up the underdeveloped peoples' standard of living to our level, Birch argues, we will destroy the ability of the Earth to support our industrial civilization. Birch concludes that we must reduce our impact on the global environment, reduce our levels of consumption and pollution, and try to preserve endangered environments and threatened species. But in order to do so we must undergo "a revolution in values, in lifestyles, in economic and political goals, and even in the nature of the science and technology we practice." But Birch leaves it open whether we can do this before our industrial civilization destroys the planet that supports and nourishes it. Like Wilson, and unlike Chase, Birch believes that human health and well-being depends on the existence of a healthy environment. Unlike Chase, Wilson is worried about species extinction. He warns: "If Homo Sapiens goes the way of the Dinosaurs, we have only ourselves to blame." Like Chase, Wilson recognizes that the environment evolves and changes and that species become extinct. Where he disagrees with Chase is over the rate of this evolution and species loss. Like Birch, Wilson argues that the scale of the increasing impact of industrial civilization on the Earth and the rate of change that this impact is having on the global environment is way beyond the natural levels of evolution. Wilson concludes that humanity has "become a geophysical force, swiftly changing the atmosphere and climate as well as the composition of the world's fauna and flora." He even declares that "the human species is an environmental abnormality," because our growing impact on the Earth is threatening to cause the collapse of our global industrial civilization and threaten our survival as a species. However, Wilson now pauses to assess the overall nature of the human impact on the Earth. He now asks: "Who can safely measure the human capacity to overcome the perceived limits of the Earth?....Are we **racing to the brink of an abyss**, or are we just gathering speed for a takeoff to a wonderful future." It is in how they answer these questions that Wilson and Chase and Julian Simon really differ. Recognizing critics like Chase and Simon, Wilson argues that there are two different perspectives on the human future: exemptionalism and environmentalism. The exemptionalists believe that humanity's intelligence and spirit allows it to transcend nature and the iron laws of ecology and life. They believe that "no matter now serious the problem, civilized human beings by ingenuity, force of will and--who knows--divine dispensation will find a solution."Instead of worrying about pollution, limited resources, species extinction, population growth, and the human future, exemptionalists argue that human intelligence, work, creativity, and determination will allow us to create a better, safer, more abundant future. Exemptionalists believe if there are current environmental problems they are minor, mainly the result of growing pain and ignorance, and with continued economic growth and advances in science and technology we will solve these problems. The environmentalists believe that "humanity is a biological species tightly dependent on the natural world....As formidable as our intellect may be and as fierce as our spirit, ...these qualities are not enough to free us from the constraints of the natural environment in which our human ancestry evolved." For environmentalists, human health depends on "sustaining the planet in a relatively unaltered state." They are not arguing that we have to keep the environment in a steady-state, constant and unchanging. What they mean is that humanity can't remake the Earth in its own image, replacing forests, grasslands, wetlands, and fisheries with human development, because we depend on these environments to support us. In the end, unlike the exemptionalists who believe that humanity can understand and control the global environment and nature, environmentalists argue that the Earth and the global environment is "too complex to understand, let alone replace, in the foreseeable future." The increasing human efforts to remake the Earth and control the global environment for human use, environmentalists argue, is causing such rapid, complex, and global changes in the environment that we cannot predict whether the Earth will be able to continue to support our global civilization, or even support the continued survival of the human race. Because Wilson, like Birch, holds the environmentalist perspective, he is worried that humanity is threatening to destroy the global environment that supports it. Wilson now asks the critical question: Does the drive to global environmental conquest, population growth, and human control over the environment demonstrate that "humanity is suicidal?" He argues that we aren't suicidal, we aren't doomed to destroy ourselves by destroying the ability of the global environment to support human life. Wilson argues that we "are smart enough and have time enough to avoid an environmental catastrophe of civilization-threatening dimensions." But if we are to save the environment, Wilson argues, we must recognize that "we have only a poor grasp of the ecosystem services by which other organisms cleanse the water, turn soil into a fertile living cover, and manufacture the very air we breathe." Challenging the exemptionalists, Wilson argues that the "world is too complicated to be turned into a garden....[And] to believe otherwise is to risk reducing a large part of the Earth to a wasteland." Wilson concludes that we have "perhaps 50 to 100 years" to stabilize the global environment and transform our values, our political and economic systems, and our development and use of science and technology. If we continue on the path of ever-accelerating human impacts on the global environment, we will probably cause the collapse of our global, industrial civilization. But what will it take to finally cause our global industrial civilization to recognize that it is facing a global environmental crisis that demands fundamental changes in our attitudes towards and our use of the environment? Wilson doesn't really answer this question. For it is such a daunting challenge because the stakes are so huge. We know that like the dinosaurs who dominated the earth for 165 million years and became extinct in a biological instant 65 million years ago, humanity could also fail to adapt to a rapidly changing Earth and become extinct too.

## Multilateralism Adv.

**There is no uniqueness to this advantage—no evidence that multilat is declining now—here’s evidence that says the opposite**

**Walt 11** (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem, GDI File)

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood whyleaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to **actually do it**.

Unilateralism is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable

Seldena, 13 – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

¶ Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts.¶ This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6¶ Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.

#### US unilateral action is inevitable – ideology – committing to multilateralism in one instance doesn’t solve

**Bass 9** (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, “Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach to Guiding America’s Future Foreign Policy,” Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p. 3-6, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)

According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, **America’s preference for unilateral engagement is explained by three inherent characteristics.** **First, a sense of “exceptionalism” that evolved from America’s founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.**5 As a champion for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, **American exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might infringe upon its sovereignty**.6 In fact, America’s preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for unilateralism throughout the 1900’s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements where it served national security.8 **Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a separation of powers that limits the government’s ability to endorse multilateral commitments**. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. **This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.**9 For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilson’s support.10 **Third, America’s current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power.** As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention. Here **it is helpful to note specific instances in which the three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues**. To begin with, **the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval**. While the US did attain UN approval for coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, America’s frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. **These interventions set a precedent for the future unilateral use of force**.12 Indeed, **the US demonstrated its most dramatic disregard for international institutions in March of 2003** when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003. America’s praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However, the “Bush Doctrine” and America’s failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In addition to declining peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning financial support during the 1990s.16 **The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global security issues.** Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure Russia’s cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19 **US lack of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats**. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea strategy.20 Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administration’s insistence on curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights, technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22 Nevertheless, the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23 **The US has also been reluctant to embrace conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming**, evidenced by the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

#### Multilat doesn’t solve anything – assumes every single one of their warrants – star this card

Held et al, 13 – Master of University College and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham, and Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy (David, “Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation,” ProQuest, 5/24/2013, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1355105016) // MS

Economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems - indeed it is - but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of 'governed globalization' that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O'Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the "supply" side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation.

The plan surrenders – it emboldens global regimes and collapses US influence

Brooks ‘9 Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter – Heritage foundation “Keep the Embargo, O“ April 16, 2009 [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)//EB](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o%29//EB)

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

**Multilateralism fails – organizations fail and exclusion of countries is inevitable – the US is not key**

**Gallagher 10 –** leading Australian consultant on trade and public policy (Peter, “Plurilateralism… get used to it,” 12/20/10, [http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it)//AY](http://www.petergallagher.com.au/index.php/site/article/plurilateralism...-get-used-to-it%29//AY)

Those Orga­ni­za­tions will go on. So will mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism. This week is only another reminder that col­lab­o­ra­tive man­age­ment of the global com­mons (peace, trade… pos­si­bly emis­sions) is, and always has been, very dif­fi­cult to achieve. The ‘one-world, one vision’ approach endorsed by the U.N. in its cur­rent form and backed for sixty years by the U.S. and Europe (chiefly) may be too hard to sus­tain for the next lit­tle while. Dur­ing the past decade, the veil of mul­ti­lat­eral col­lab­o­ra­tion thrown over the inner-workings of the U.N./Bretton-Woods man­age­ment frame­work has grown thin­ner and thin­ner. **There has always been a cer­tain amount of stiff-arming** behind the veil. But, with appro­pri­ate restraint—including by Japan—it worked for a long time to deliver effec­tive global col­lab­o­ra­tion. After this week, it will never be quite the same. But there’s no need for panic. It’s a shame but no emer­gency that a U.N. meet­ing turns out to be another expen­sive dud. Just relax and try to enjoy the ride. Enjoy the rich­ness of greater global diver­sity, for one thing. The extra­or­di­nary thing about this week in Copen­hagen is not what we didn’t see (an agree­ment on emis­sions) but what we *did* see, clearly for the first time. The veil of mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism has fallen long enough to show the world the present real­i­ties behind it. First, of course, the expen­sive, chaotic sham of 192 nations in at least as many lim­ou­sines, from Tuvalu to the United States, try­ing to agree on 1 text with at least 2 tar­gets lubri­cated by a $100billion bribe (that turned out to be only a $10billion i.o.u.) Sec­ond, and more impor­tant, The Pres­i­dent of the United States being intro­duced to a meet­ing to which he not been invited—*at which he did not even have a seat*—to nego­ti­ate a nar­row deal, sav­ing the appear­ance of col­lab­o­ra­tion, with Brazil, China, India and South Africa. To enter the room, Obama had to leave Europe and Japan out in the cold. He had to work out a deal with four giant economies that col­lec­tively hold quite a few mark­ers on the future of the global com­mons, but most of whom are by any mea­sure still poor coun­tries. The [account](http://bit.ly/8172r2) of this meet­ing is a vision of the global frame­work for col­lab­o­ra­tion now and in the next few decades. What we now have as a frame­work for global orga­ni­za­tion is a roil­ing, argu­men­ta­tive, pluri­lat­er­al­ism where alliances and coali­tions slip and slide along a dozen dif­fer­ent planes of inter­na­tional endeav­our. Farewell to the old two-handed back-room brawls and staged con­sen­sus of the *pax atlantica*. In the new frame­work broad, top-down ‘solu­tions’ like Kyoto’s tar­gets and the WTO’s ‘Sin­gle Under­tak­ing’ cannnot be made to work by a fly­ing visit from the U.S. Pres­i­dent or alter­nate hand-wringing and blus­ter from Brussels. The bad news—if you’d like the world to be a set­tled place ruled by, say, a benef­i­cent dic­ta­tor (oxy­moron) from Wash­ing­ton or even Beijing—is that ‘global gov­er­nance’ now becomes a tricky mat­ter of rec­on­cil­ing and align­ing many dif­fer­ent, prob­a­bly autonomous, or at best regional attempts to deal with the man­age­ment of global com­mons. **Guar­an­teed to be messy.**

# Block

## K

**The question of this debate is one of competing ontologies. The affirmative staked out an ontology of calculative thinking. A competing ontology is the meditative thinking of the alt. As long as we leave their thought unquestioned we are doomed to the ethos of mastery – the alt is the only way out**

**Scheibler 2000** (Ingrid Scheibler, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Boston College, *76 Chi.Kent. L. Rev. 853,* 2000, pp. 862-864)

When Heidegger thematizes the Being question in relation to modern subjectivism, he seeks to effect a shift from representational thinking, which conceives truth and the locus of objectivity exclusively in the human subject, to what he calls a more meditative thinking (besinnliches Denken). Heidegger's discovery, the "alternative" to instrumental thinking and modern subjectivism, (1) displaces the rootedness in subjective states and (2) reconceives the strict subject/object distinction, and the objectification and domination of the object-domain that results from this. This can also be described as the effort to shift from a transcendentalist focus. This focus views truth in terms of the certainty of representation, rooted in subjectivity and, more generally, conceives the parameters of inquiry - awareness of a world of objects - from within the vantage point of the subject's own human "horizon." Heidegger seeks to reconceive the traditional conceptions of truth and Being, and shift our focus to an awareness of the ground, or field, of the human horizon. This antisubjectivist critique, made in the name of a **[\*865]** thematization and recognition of Being as the sustaining ground "in reference to which the diverse meanings of Being arise," has significant critical force. Heidegger's critique here can be placed along with other powerful critiques of modern instrumentalist calculative reason, like the efforts of the early Frankfurt School, Adorno, and Horkheimer n28 and, more recently, Habermas. n29 Heidegger powerfully examines the workings of this objectifying, calculative reason in examining the effects of its domination of things in the world and nature. That is to say, Heidegger's own explicit concern in these writings is with domination, the ethos of mastery, as it is deployed against things and nature. n30 To find an alternative, non-dominating and non-objectifying conception of our relation to the world, he does two things: First, he calls our attention to the way that human being is "in" the world in a more relational, rather than divisive, situation of belonging to the world, rather than standing over and against it, as subject over object, lord or master. Second, he calls for a recognition of Being as the ground of the human, transcendental horizon. This is his antisubjectivist thematization of the ground or field of human awareness. In my view, the antisubjectivist critique at the center of Heidegger's project has a powerful critical force, especially in analyzing the genesis and effects of environmental degradation. n31

# AT: Framework

**The K is an impact turn – they try to take a privileged stance to bracket off what debate should be – this system of enframing is the essence of calculative thought and ensures error replication – only our alternative can allow for true politics**

**Korous** **97** (Copeland winner, JD, Emory BA Philosophy, Yale Law Graduate, Become What you Are 1997 22-25)

The thought that inhabits critique is not bent on achieving quick and efficient solutions. Nor is critique simply a means for some eventual action; for Foucault, the distinction between theory and practice is shallow, as thought is a practice, and practice is always informed by thought. Yet despite the close relationship between thought and action, the practice of critique operates according to a mode of thought quite different from the calculative thinking that drives technological practices. This other mode of thinking is what Heidegger would call "meditative thought." Meditative thought is characterized by its disengagement from the technological imperative to react. 14 This is not to say that meditative thought does not result in action, but rather, thought is not reducible to action, as if its only function were to usher in a solution: "thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied" (LH 217). Thought has value in and of itself. It allows us to take stock of our ontological situation. As Foucault explains, Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather it is what allows one to step back away from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions, its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, and establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. (PPP 388)15 Heidegger echoes these sentiments when he writes, "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called into question. ,16 The calculative mode of engaging the world is forever asking, "What should I do?"; it is bent on producing immediate and practical solutions. Problems take on an urgency that demand quick action, and calculative thought eschews the task of thinking as a luxury that cannot be afforded. But as Heidegger points out, "All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe and destruction, are merely technological behavior. That behavior operates through the device of the enumerating of symptoms whose standing-reserve can be increased to infinity and always varied anew" (T 48). The call for action already operates with the understanding that the world is an ordered whole that can be manipulated as necessary to avoid immanent danger. As long as reality is problematized as one crisis after the other, action will always beat out thought as the preferred mode of engagement. For Heidegger and Foucault both, this knee jerk sense of action is systemically destined to produce nothing but more of the same. By failing to engage problems at the level of thought, that is, the level at which the problem is understood as a problem for thought, the imperative to act merely operates on superficial features of reality, applying band-aids to wounds when the real injury is festering way beneath the surface. The first step in overcoming the calculative understanding of reality is to recognize that it is only one understanding among many. This is much more difficult than it might sound. First of all, the calculative mode of revealing the world, Enframing, is something that conceals itself in the process of revealing the world (QT 27). The mode of revealing is so pervasive that it is invisible to us, unless we reflect on it. When we are mired in the concerns of the everyday, Enframing is not encountered, it is only lived. That is, as someone thinking technologically, reality reveals itself to me as a series of objects. I am attuned to that objectness when I am engaging with the world. Precisely because Enframing is not an object, but a mode of revealing, it itself will not show up within my observational field. In order for me to confront technological thought for what it is, a way of revealing, I have to be prepared to momentarily suspend my calculative mode of thinking and pursue ontological questions. Second, the continued successes of technological thought blinds us to the fact that it is only an interpretation of reality and not reality in itself. As Heidegger warns, "The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking “(DT 56). For every time that a scientific theory pans out, or technological planning achieves desired ends, we are less capable of viewing technology as only one of many different ways to reveal the world. Heidegger is not arguing that science is false or useless. In fact, he recognizes that technological representations of reality often do allow us to make correct determinations about the world: "In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a ceculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations; but precisely through these successes the danger can remain that in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw" (QT 26). While it might be the case that a river that can yield a calculable amount of hydropower, this does not mean that the river is, in its essence, a source of energy. But for every power plant built on a river it becomes increasingly more difficult to appreciate that rivers are not primarily stockpiles of potential energy waiting to be unleashed.

**And, here’s an external impact – calculative ontologies make endless warfare inevitable – only we create a genuine form of politics**

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(Anthony, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory & Event, 10:2)

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn19%22%20%5Co%20%22) The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,[20](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn20%22%20%5Co%20%22) the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. [21](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn21%22%20%5Co%20%22) What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and*intensities of claim* about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but *ontologises itself*in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' [22](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn22%22%20%5Co%20%22)

## A2 extinction first

**Risk assessment is a link**

O’Brien 2k — PhD, environmental scientist and activist

(Mary, “*Making Better Environmental Decisions: An Alternative to Risk Assessment*”, p. xvii-xviii)

This book is based on the understanding that it is not acceptable for people to tell you that the harms to which they will subject you and the world are safe or insignificant. You deserve to know good alternatives to those harms, and you deserve to help decide which alternative will be chosen. Underlying this book, however, is a less explicitly stated personal belief, namely that we humans will never dredge up enough will to alter our habitual, destructive ways of behaving toward each other and the world unless we simultaneously employ information and emotion and a sense of relationship to others—other species, other cultures, and other generations. Using information while divorced from emotion and using information while insulated from connection to a wide net of others are how destruction of the Earth is being accomplished. Risk assessment of narrow options is a classic example of using certain bits of information in such a way as to exclude feeling and to artificially sever connections of parts to the whole. Risk assessment rips you (and others) out of connection to the rest of the world and reduces you (if you are even considered at all in the risk assessment) to a number. You are then consigned to damage or death or “risk,” depending on how your number is shuffled around in models, assumptions, and formulas and during “risk management.” Assessment of the pros and cons of a range of reasonable alternatives allows the connections to remain. The cultural emotions connected to a given alternative, for instance, can be a pro or a con, and may be both, depending on which sector of the community you inhabit. An advantage or a disadvantage of a given alternative can be social, religious, economic, scientific, or political. Risk assessment is one of the major methods by which parts (corporations such as Monsanto or Hyundai, “private landowners,” industrial nations) can act on their wants at the expense of wholes (e.g., whole communities and countries, or the seventh generation from now) without appearing to be doing so. Risk assessment lets them appear simply “scientific” or “rational” as they numerically estimate whether or how many deaths or what birth defects will be caused, and ignore other regions of human experience that also matter to people. Always, some groups of humans will be trying to exercise their power at the expense of the whole. Decisions arrived at by risk assessment can be homicidal, biocidal, and suicidal, but they are made every day. Risk assessment is a premier process by which illegitimate exercise of power is justified. The stakes of installing alternatives to risk assessment, therefore, are the whole Earth (just as are the stakes of fashioning democratic control over corporations, or of requiring changes in behavior of those who have wreaked irreparable damage). Installing alternatives assessment is one step in the struggle to use information, feeling, and a sense of relationship to others to stop socioenvironmental madness.

## AT: Perm

**3. Perm can’t solve – incorporating technological thought allows it to dominate and coopt the alternative**

**Foltz 95** (Bruce V. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature, 1995, p. 166.

But what, after all, does Heidegger's understanding of "saving the earth" have to do with backyard gardens and compost heaps, with recycling aluminum foil and cans, with the saving of wilderness areas? A great deal, I believe. It is precisely the uncanny dominance of technology that enables it to co-opt and incorporate any attempts to stand outside the technological framework that are not derived from, and solidly rooted in, a thinking that approaches the earth poetically. Wilderness areas can be set aside as inventories for special sorts of recreation, which in turn allow for a more efficient output of job energies. Recycling can be undertaken from the point of view of consumption (and its opposite, waste) and hence incorporated into the stockpiling of inventories. And composting can be understood as merely a more clever and more efficient gardening technology, yielding a more constant availability of nutrients. Such efforts would serve only to enhance the reign of technology by increasing its range while obscuring its pervasiveness. Yet composting can also be a saving of the earth's own nourishment, which grants to it its darkness, heaviness, pungency, and pace. Recycling can be a reminder that even the aluminum can bears the pliant yet sustaining character of the earth itselfand hence can be a saving of that character along with the metal. And wilderness areas may be genuinely saved as those places of the earth where the mystery of self-seclusion consorts in splendor with the wonder of self-emergence. Everything depends on whether the saving arises from dwelling, and thus whether it is founded on the poetic.

## Link – Heg

The Affirmative’s defense of American power creates the conditions for oppression and devastation—all beings become subject to violent calculation and planning

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(Richard, © 2007, *Interpretation*, “Beyond Struggle and Power: Heidegger’s Secret Resistence,” <http://www.interpretationjournal.com/backissues/Vol_35-1.pdf>, RBatra)

Heidegger now develops an extensive interpretation of this essence and its implications (for a clear summary, see especially GA 69, §57). Power has become the contemporary meaning of being: beings are now essentially manifestations of power and occasions for the use of power (Dallmayr 2001). Power seeks to overpower itself, overcoming its current level and increasing without limit as it “mobilizes” everything, subjecting all beings to it (GA 66, 62–63, 176; this interpretation of power stems from Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s will to power—see “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics,” in Heidegger 1987, 195–96). This is the metaphysical root of contemporary phenomena such as “the ‘total’…the ‘imperial’…the ‘planetary’” (GA 66, 18). Heidegger expands the Contributions’ concept of machination and uses it to indicate “the makeability of beings, that makes and makes up everything” (GA 66, 16)—that is, the fact that beings appear as manipulable and producible objects. Machination empowers overpowering as the essence of power. The drive for overpowering creates oppression and devastation (GA 66, 20). Heidegger gives devastation a new meaning: it is not the destruction of objects, but the undermining of the possibility of decision: “beings no longer come into the decision of being” (GA 69, 48). We might hear an echo here of Kierkegaard’s critique of the present age: essential relationships have been reduced to “a reflective tension which leaves everything standing but makes the whole of life ambiguous: so that everything continues to exist factually whilst by a dialectical deceit, privatissime, it supplies a secret interpretation—that it does not exist” (Kierkegaard 1962, 42–43). Power thus destroys everything inceptive and all worth (GA 69, 74). It creates a “total organization” without true “commitment” (GA 69, 83). Under the sway of this organization, all beings and acts are viewed as subject to calculation and planning. However, the plans bring themselves into a wasteland that they cannot control, and necessarily run into the incalculable and unforeseeable (GA 69, 84). Power manifests itself as both “planetarism” and “idiotism,” where the first is the tendency to extend the rule of power over the entire Earth, while the second is a self-centered subjectivism that is turned in upon what is peculiar to it (idion) yet views all individuals through the same lens of the essence of modern subjectivity (GA 69, 74). The planet, we might say, is becoming one huge, greedy, anonymous subject. Heidegger resurrects a famous term from Being and Time and claims that this idiotic subject is “the unconditional essence of the ‘they’ in the history of be-ing” (GA 70, 35). Power knows no goals or standards other than itself; as violence, it uses itself to enhance itself (GA 69, 22, 75). This violence becomes a “brutality” that turns not only against other brutal forces but ultimately against itself (GA 69, 76–77). To call such machination “evil” would be to evade the genuine horror of it: it dissolves the very standards of good and evil, the very concept of a final goal (GA 69, 217). Heidegger is talking about political power, of course, but also about how being itself is manifested in terms of power, in everything from science to art. (Art is reduced to propaganda and kitsch—GA 66, 31, 174–75; the ideal of manliness becomes a muscle-bound figure with an empty, brutal face—GA 66, 34.) Even specifically political phenomena must be understood from a metaphysical, not political point of view (GA 69, 66). So Heidegger attributes little responsibility to dictators; we live under the “dictatorship” of power itself (GA 69, 20), not of persons such as Hitler. The so-called possessors of power cannot in fact get power within their grasp—instead, power possesses us (GA 69, 63–64). Those who appear to be free because they are powerful are in fact enslaved to power and warped by an interpretation of selfhood in terms of power. Because power destroys all moral and legal standards, the age of power must include the “planetary criminals”—unnamed individuals who Heidegger says can be counted on the fingers of one hand (GA 69, 77–78). Their destructiveness bursts the bounds of ethical judgment and legal punishment; “even Hell and the like is too small” for them (GA 69, 77). Power does not belong to the “powerful” tyrants, then, but neither does it belong to the people. The public face of power, its propaganda and pageantry, presents the power as belonging to society at large; but this “socialism” covers up the fact that the people is actually disempowered (GA 69, 82). The capacity for decision is obliterated by an atmosphere of declarations and commands (GA 66, 19); these create only a fanaticism that seizes on a ready-made appearance of salvation (GA 66, 119). Political action is then nothing but “calculating how to mobilize the masses as a whole” (Heidegger n.d., IX, §58a) or the “total planning of ‘life’ that is directed to self-securing” (GA 69, 100). The youth is particularly used and abused by this process, because young people are sufficiently ignorant and shameless to carry out “the planned destruction” without question (GA 66, 19). This entire so-called “struggle” is only the evasion of the “questionability of be-ing” (GA 66, 141).

## Multilateralism

#### 1) Implementation – it’s good in theory but not practice

**Multilat fails**

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The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently **leading to institutional paralysis** when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[1] Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[2] when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[3] If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. **It requires the political will and diplomatic skill** of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in Foreign Affairs.[4] Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[5] for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[6] The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[7] all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions. This one-country, one-vote principle makes the U.N. an extremely difficult venue in which to wage successful multilateral diplomacy. In this environment, multilateralism becomes a double-edged sword. It can sometimes speed up global responses to global problems, as with the avian flu outbreak and the Asian tsunami. At other times, it can slow or prevent timely responses, as with halting Iran’s nuclear weapons program and stopping genocide in Darfur. Too often, multilateralism at the U.N. is the political means by which other countries and regional blocs constrain or block action. Groups of small nations can join together to outvote the great powers on key issues, and this situation can often lead to bizarre outcomes and compromises. Even seemingly noncontroversial issues, such as improving auditing of U.N. expenditures, require days of skillful, almost nonstop negotiations. The U.N. is simply too poorly primed for American multilateralism. It is a vast labyrinth of agencies, offices, committees, commissions, programs, and funds, often with overlapping and duplicative missions.[8] Lines of accountability and responsibility for specific issues or efforts are complex, confused, and often indecipherable. For example, dozens of U.N. bodies focus on development, the environment, and children’s and women’s issues. Coordination is minimal. Reliable means to assess the effectiveness of the bodies’ independent activities is practically nonexistent. Although institutional fiefdoms and bureaucratic interests strongly influence the formulation of U.N. policy, programs, and resolutions, the most powerful actors remain the member states. Each tries to persuade the U.N. as an institution to advocate and adopt its positions on the matters most important to it. The chaos of conflicting priorities rarely results in consensus for decisive action. The most common result is inaction or a lowest-common-denominator outcome. Too often, the United States also finds that other countries’ positions on an issue have been predetermined in their regional or political groupings. These groupings include the European Union; the G-77, or Group of 77 (which is really a caucus of some 130 countries, including China, Iran, and Cuba); the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the African Union (AU); the Arab League; and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Some countries participate in several of these blocs. Added to this mix is heavy lobbying by “civil society” special interest groups, especially on contentious causes, which helps to explain why the United States faces an uphill battle in successfully husbanding any policy proposal through the U.N. system. Perhaps the most stunning example came under President Bill Clinton, when the United States was trying to negotiate changes to the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), so that the United States could sign it. Intense lobbying by nongovernmental organizations at the proceedings culminated in dramatic cheering when 120 countries voted in favor of the statute despite U.S. objections.[9] Of course, the most difficult forum for negotiating multilateral solutions is the Security Council, where the most serious security matters are raised and the greatest failures of multilateralism have occurred. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union largely shut down the council with its veto. As a result, the United States conducted most of its international affairs outside of the U.N., yet very few complaints of unilateralism were heard. That changed when the Soviet Union dissolved, and the hope was that the U.N. would at last become a force for good in the world. Instead, new rivalries have emerged that undermine its effectiveness. Perhaps the most frustrating development for U.S. multilateralism at the U.N. in the post–Cold War era has been the inability of the United States to develop a shared position with some of its best friends in Europe. Often, the allies say that they cannot negotiate with the United States until the European Union has taken a “common European position.” Yet after that common position has been adopted, individual European countries claim far less flexibility to negotiate. The EU also has been known to strong-arm its allies as well as its member states to oppose U.S. positions. For example, on the issue of genocide in Darfur, I witnessed the EU’s most visible leaders pressing the United States to accept the ICC as the international judicial authority to try war crimes committed in Sudan, rather than setting up an ad hoc tribunal. Furthermore, they leaned on Romania to go along with their position, even threatening Romania with punitive action if it did not. Countries hostile to the United States and to economic and political freedoms can and do take full advantage of this crack in the West’s once-unified front. Sometimes, though, the United States is its own worst enemy. Intense interagency discussions must take place before the State Department sends out any instruction cable to its negotiators at the U.N. and diplomats in capitals. Such delays can be costly because they give other countries time to sway votes against the U.S. position, leaving U.S. negotiators with little time to convince others to change their minds. For U.S. negotiators, this process can blur not only the clarity of purpose, but also policy objectives. Even after the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council hammer out a policy, U.S. diplomats are sometimes simply unable to advance it. Many who are fairly new to the negotiations must deal with counterparts from other countries who have worked the same issue in international settings for years. Some U.S. diplomats would rather settle for consensus than work for an outcome in which the U.S. will be isolated and which places America alongside pariah states such as Zimbabwe or Sudan, even if those countries voted with the United States for starkly different reasons.

#### The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine — that dies out with Maduro

Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida Ghitis, *World Politics Review*, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez>, Accessed 06-30-2013)

During almost 14 years in office, Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time. Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery, Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet, there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez. There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo. A close relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela.

# 2nr

All they go for is winners win on the DA –

Many reasons they can’t win with this argument

First is that political capital is finite – that was in analysis of the 1nc and 1nr - the only thing that happens in congress

Link – controversial policies drain PC – burke 9 – Obama’s controversial agenda didn’t bring him legislative success – just a reason that our plan unpopular arguments disprove winners win - if we win the link debate, it means that an unpopular policy would result in the impact of the politics da

#### No no link arguments here, means you grant 100% risk of that the plan links to DA—Cuba causes a huge political fight---Cuban vocal minority in the swing state of FL

Our card about winners win theory is about obama’s second term – from 2010

#### **Winners win isn’t true for Obama**

Galston, Brookings, Governance Studies, Senior Fellow 10

(William, 11-4-10, “President Barack Obama’s Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties”, Brookings , <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/04-obama-galston>, accessed 7-9-12 FFF)

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and-trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.

New 1ar winners win cards justify a new 2nr card:

**Health care fight proves winner’s win isn’t true for Obama**

William GALSTON 11-4-10 [William, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings, “President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties” Brookings Institute -- Nov 4]

From the beginning, the administration operated on two fundamental political premises that turned out to be mistaken. The first was that the economic collapse had opened the door to the comprehensive change Obama had promised. As incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel famously put it, “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” In fact, as Emanuel himself came to realize, there was a tension between the steps needed to arrest the economic decline and the measures needed to actualize the president’s vision of fundamental change. The financial bailout and the stimulus package made it harder, not easier, to pass comprehensive health reform.

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and- trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.

The legislative process that produced the health care bill was especially damaging. It lasted much too long and featured side-deals with interest groups and individual senators, made in full public view. Much of the public was dismayed by what it saw. Worse, the seemingly endless health care debate strengthened the view that the president’s agenda was poorly aligned with the economic concerns of the American people. Because the administration never persuaded the public that health reform was vital to our economic future, the entire effort came to be seen as diversionary, even anti-democratic. The health reform bill was surely a moral success; it may turn out to be a policy success; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was—and remains—a political liability.

## Politics

### O/V

#### Disad outweighs; failure of negotiations causes Middle East war which is uniquely more probably than any other conflict because of historical and religious disputes; unparalleled in its chances of going global, that’s Primokov

Middle east war goes global and nuclear

Primakov 9 - Doctor of Economics, Professor, executive member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Head of the Center for Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences

Yevgeny Primakov is President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. The Fundamental Conflict: The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations. Russia in Global Affairs Vol 7 No 3. 2009. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/105702/ichaptersection\_singledocument/71a40dca-23cb-411d-9c5d-a7ce495e2522/en/12.pdf

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

#### Try or die neg---failing negotiations make nuclear war inevitable

IBT 11-15 (International Business Times,- quoting senior editor of Executive Intelligence Review, Jeff Steinberg http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/522412/20131115/iran-nuclear-programme-geneva-talks-p5-1.htm#.Uofz55Fqc6J)

If talks of Iran's, nuclear programme fail, fears are that it could lead to a global nuclear confrontation involving the U.S., Russia and China. With the plausible use of nuclear arsenals, it could lead to an imminent doomsday catastrophe. Iran's Press TV quoted analyst and senior editor of Executive Intelligence Review, Jeff Steinberg on Wednesday saying, that if the talks fail, international pressure will drive the U.S. to a conflict with Iran. Driving towards conflict "If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that's a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of," Mr Steinberg said. "The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar," Mr Steinberg, quoted by Press TV pointed out. "So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don't go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that's got to be avoided at all costs when you've got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with" their arsenals of "nuclear weapons," he warned. The warning from Mr Steinberg comes as the Obama administration made it clear to Congress that, imposing new sanctions on Iran could lead to the failure of talks.

#### New round of sanctions would threaten broad enforcement of extraterritorial sanctions

Kahl-Director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security-11/13/13

<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20131113/101478/HHRG-113-FA00-Wstate-KahlC-20131113.pdf>

Second, and somewhat paradoxically, escalating sanctions at this moment could actually end up weakening international pressure on Iran. For better or worse, Rouhani has already succeeded in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than Iran, comes across as the intransigent party, it will become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating Tehran. In particular, if negotiations on a comprehensive framework collapse because of Washington’s unwillingness to make a deal on limited enrichment – a deal Russia and China and numerous other European and Asian nations support – it will likely become much harder to enforce sanctions. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable position of choosing between imposing extraterritorial sanctions on banks and companies in China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and elsewhere, or acquiescing to the erosion of the comprehensive sanctions regime.

#### That undermines US trade leadership and Sino-US relations

Leverett-professor at Pennsylvania State University's School of International Affairs-2/25/13

Imposing secondary sanctions on non-US entities transacting with Iran could backfire on Washington if implemented.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322584515426148.html>

Secondary sanctions Secondary sanctions are a legal and political house of cards. They almost certainly violate American commitments under the World Trade Organisation, which allows members to cut trade with states they deem national security threats but not to sanction other members over lawful business conducted in third countries. If challenged on the issue in the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, Washington would surely lose. India aims to cash in on Iran sanctions Consequently, US administrations have been reluctant to impose secondary sanctions on non-US entities transacting with Iran. In 1998, the Clinton administration waived sanctions against a consortium of European, Russian and Asian companies developing an Iranian gas field; over the next decade, Washington declined to make determinations whether other non-US companies' Iranian activities were sanctionable. The Obama administration now issues blanket waivers for countries continuing to buy Iranian oil, even when it is questionable they are really reducing their purchases. Still, legal and reputational risks posed by the threat of US secondary sanctions have reduced the willingness of companies and banks in many countries to transact with Iran, with negative consequences for its oil export volumes, the value of its currency and other dimensions of its economic life. Last year, the European Union - which for years had condemned America's prospective "extraterritorial" application of national trade law and warned it would go to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism if Washington ever sanctioned European firms over Iran-related business - finally subordinated its Iran policy to American preferences, banning Iranian oil and imposing close to a comprehensive economic embargo against the Islamic Republic. In recent weeks, however, Europe's General Court overturned European sanctions against two of Iran's biggest banks, ruling that the EU never substantiated its claims that the banks provided "financial services for entities procuring on behalf of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes". The European Council has two months to respond - but removing sanctions against the banks would severely weaken Europe's sanctions regime. Other major players in Iran's economy, including the Central Bank of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company, are now challenging their own sanctioned status. On the other side of the world, America is on a collision course with China over sanctions. In recent years, Beijing has tried to accommodate US concerns about Iran. It has not developed trade and investment positions there as rapidly as it might have, and has shifted some Iran-related transactional flows into renminbito to help the Obama administration avoid sanctioning Chinese banks (similarly, India now pays for some Iranian oil imports in rupees). Whether Beijing has really lowered its aggregate imports of Iranian oil is unclear - but it clearly reduces them when the administration is deciding about six-month sanctions waivers for countries buying Iranian crude. The administration is taking its own steps to forestall a Sino-American conflict over sanctions. Besides issuing waivers for oil imports, the one Chinese bank Washington has barred from the US financial system for Iran-related transactions is a subsidiary of a Chinese energy company - a subsidiary with no business in the US. However, as Congress enacts additional layers of secondary sanctions, President Obama's room to manoeuver is being progressively reduced. Therein lies the looming policy train wreck.

Group the thumpers

#### Iran and foreign policy separated from domestic issues---their uniqueness arguments aren’t relevant but the plan is

**Hammond, Oxford Analytica geopolitical analyst, 11-14-13**

(Andrew, “Iranian diplomacy underscores Obama's search for legacy”, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/13/opinion/iran-obama-legacy-hammond/>, ldg)

Despite the concerns of regional U.S. allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and also a significant number of legislators in the U.S. Congress, it is clear that the Obama administration is pushing strongly for deal as part of its wider Middle Eastern strategy. Indeed, Kerry has now spent more time negotiating with counterpart Iranian officials than any other U.S. high-level engagement for perhaps three decades. The seriousness of negotiations was emphasized by the fact that, as well as Kerry and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif, foreign ministers from Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and the Chinese deputy foreign minister, came together. If agreement can be reached, an interim deal (potentially setting the ground for a later comprehensive agreement) would reportedly see Iran's nuclear capacity capped for six months and opened up to U.N. inspections. In exchange, Iran would be given limited, sequenced relief from sanctions. Remaining disagreements reportedly include the status of the Arak heavy-water reactor, and production of highly enriched uranium -- both processes, that can potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons. A second problem to resolve is how to handle the existing Iranian stockpile of uranium that Iran enriched to 20%. Progress in nuclear diplomacy with Iran, combined with continued uncertainty in Syria and Egypt, has refocused Washington's attention towards the Middle East in a manner unanticipated by Obama only a few months ago. In addition to Syria and Egypt, the administration has spent significant political capital resuming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The urgency of U.S. focus there reflects growing international conviction that, 20 years after the Oslo Process began, the "window of opportunity" for securing a two-state solution may be receding. Intensified U.S. focus on the Middle East has accentuated a shift, common to many recent re-elected presidents, of increased focus on foreign policy in second terms of office. In part, this reflects the fact that presidents often see foreign policy as key to the legacy they wish to build. For instance, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush sought to spread his freedom agenda across the Middle East. Bill Clinton also devoted significant time to trying to secure a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. As important as an Iran nuclear agreement might prove to be, the Middle East is one of only two regions in which Obama is looking for legacy. Since he was elected in 2008, Asia in general, and China in particular, has assumed greater importance in U.S. policy. To this end, Obama is seeking to continue the so-called pivot towards Asia-Pacific through landmark initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Key threats, however, remain on the horizon to securing this re-orientation. These include a dramatic, sustained escalation of tension in the Middle East (perhaps in Syria or Egypt); and/or the remaining possibility of further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. As well as legacy-building, the likelihood of Obama concentrating more on foreign policy also reflects domestic U.S. politics. Particularly the intense polarization and gridlock of Washington. Since re-election, Obama has achieved little domestic policy success. His gun control bill was defeated, immigration reform faces significant opposition in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, and the prospect of a long-term federal budgetary "grand bargain" with Congress looks unlikely. Moreover, implementation of his landmark healthcare initiative has been botched. Many re-elected presidents in the post-war era have, like Obama, found it difficult to acquire domestic policy momentum. In part, this is because the party of re-elected presidents, as with the Democrats now, often hold a weaker position in Congress. Thus Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, Richard Nixon in 1972, and Bill Clinton in 1996 were all re-elected alongside Congresses where both the House and Senate were controlled by their partisan opponents. Another factor encouraging foreign policy focus in second terms is the fact that re-elected presidents have often been impacted by domestic scandals in recent decades. Thus, Watergate ended the Nixon administration in 1974, Iran-Contra badly damaged the Reagan White House, and the Lewinsky scandal led to Clinton being impeached. Since Obama's re-election, a series of problems have hit the administration. These include revelations that the Internal Revenue Service targeted some conservative groups for special scrutiny; and the Department of Justice's secret subpoenaing of private phone records of several Associated Press reporters and editors in the wake of a terrorist plot leak. Even if Obama escapes further significant problems, he will not be able to avoid the "lame-duck" factor. That is, as a president cannot seek more than two terms, political focus will refocus elsewhere, particularly after the November 2014 congressional ballots when the 2016 presidential election campaign kicks into gear. Taken overall, Iranian diplomatic progress and wider recent events in the Middle East are therefore likely to accentuate the incentives for Obama to place increasing emphasis on foreign policy -- which Congress has less latitude over -- in his remaining period of office. And, this shift is only likely to be reinforced if, as anticipated, the U.S. economic recovery continues to build up steam in 2014.

### Link debate

#### Controversial policies drain political capital

Burke, University of Vermont political science professor, 9

(John P., Presidential Studies Quarterly 39.3 (Sept 2009), “The Contemporary Presidency: The Obama Presidential Transition: An Early Assessment”, p574(31). Academic One; accessed 7-15-10)

President Obama signaled his intention to make a clean break from the unpopular Bush presidency with his executive orders and early policy and budget proposals. At the same time, he also sought to tamp down public expectations for quick results on the economy. Early--and ambitious--actions were taken, but as he cautioned in his inaugural address, "the challenges we face are real" and they "will not be met easily or in a short span of time." His initial political capital seemed high.

But was the right course of action chosen? The decision was made to embrace a broad range of policy reforms, not just to focus on the economy. Moreover, it was a controversial agenda. His early efforts to gain bipartisan support in Congress--much like those of his predecessors--seem largely for naught and forced the administration to rely on narrow partisan majorities. The question that remains is whether his political capital, both in Congress and with the public, will bring him legislative--and ultimately policy--success. Good transition planning is propitious, but it offers no guarantees. Still, without it, political and policy disaster likely awaits. So far, President Obama seems to reside largely on the positive side of the equation. But what the future might portend remains another matter.

### PC Key

#### Tough fight, but doable-the plan ruins momentum.

**Karam, International Peace and Conflict Resolution MA, 11-14-13**

(Joyce, “Obama’s complicated path to a deal with Iran”, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/11/14/Obama-s-complicated-path-to-a-deal-with-Iran.html>, ldg)

France’s last-minute obstruction of the proposed deal is forcing the Obama administration to rethink its whole strategy, and work more diligently to avoid new setbacks or legislative surprises. The administration is refocusing on Congress and reassuring regional allies, while at the same time racing against the clock to strike a deal. Inside Congress Perhaps not since France gave the Statue of Liberty to the U.S. in 1886 has the Republican party in the United States been so enchanted with French foreign policy. “Vive la France” is a slogan that has been echoing all across Congress this week, quickly overtaking the anti-French sentiment that followed the Iraq war in 2003. Back then, Republicans in Congress reintroduced “freedom fries” to replace “French fries” and chastised the “cheese-eating surrender monkeys” for opposing the war. But all of that is history now. Congress members from both parties cheered the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius as he pushed the U.S. diplomatic train off track and ended the marathon talks on Iran without a deal. In real terms, Fabius validated the concerns of many in the legislative branch about the risk of Obama being too soft on Iran, and giving away leverage in return for a few concessions from Tehran. The fact that the French diplomats were the ones to push the shutting down the Arak heavy water reactor reflected badly on the administration in Capitol Hill, and has reenergized calls into ignoring the White House and increasing sanctions on Tehran. Even with Secretary of State John Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden going to Congress yesterday to urge a longer pause on imposing new sanctions, the mood in the Senate is growing impatient with the administration and is unlikely to wait too long or agree to loosen the sanctions noose on Tehran. If the Senators decide to ignore the White House and tighten sanctions, however, it could hijack the diplomatic process and kill any chances for a deal. Regional allies The regional anxieties about Iran especially in the Gulf and in Israel add to the hurdles that Washington is encountering during the negotiations. Kerry’s visit to Saudi Arabia, while was helpful in averting a crisis, it was quickly overshadowed by his unexpected rush to be in Geneva days later and holding talks with his Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif. Washington is perceived by many as too eager to get a deal with Iran, whereas France is seen as more committed to its traditional allies. Saudi Arabia already has concerns about the Obama administration abandoning its allies. It is no news that Riyadh was unhappy with Obama pressuring former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down in 2011, or in later backing away from supporting the rebels in Syria with lethal equipment or punishing the Syrian regime for the use of chemical weapons. This trust deficit is quickly rising between Washington and the Gulf allies. Obama has not visited the Gulf since 2009, and at a time of heightened anxiety about U.S. security commitment, a presidential or a vice-presidential visit will be more reassuring than trips by members of the cabinet. Addressing regional concerns about Iran, and not exclusively the nuclear file, is also important to Tehran’s neighbors. It is Iran’s influence and role through its proxies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen that triggers the day-to-day fears in the region. Stricter Proposal The political pressure on the administration is changing the atmospherics and expectations around a potential deal. The bar is higher for the Obama team regarding what terms will be acceptable to the P5+1, especially the French, and that Washington will be able to sell to its regional allies and the Congress. These factors narrow Obama’s field for maneuvering with Iran, and make the prospect of a deal - while still foreseeable in the coming few weeks - harder.

### AT WW

#### **Winners win isn’t true for Obama**

Galston, Brookings, Governance Studies, Senior Fellow 10

(William, 11-4-10, “President Barack Obama’s Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties”, Brookings , <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/04-obama-galston>, accessed 7-9-12 FFF)

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and-trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.