# Round Report vs. Technology AM – Bronx Rd 5

# 1nc

## DA

#### Economy is growing – reforms – oil income key to sustainability

Olga Kuvshinova 9/27 – Writer for Russia Beyond the Headlines,(“Investment in infrastructure to fuel economic growth”, <http://rbth.ru/business/2013/09/27/investment_in_infrastructure_to_fuel_economic_growth_30229.html>, AW)

The government has also completed a number of construction megaprojects, and government investment has decreased by 20 percent in real terms. Over the next year, there will be no such decline, and the "base effect" that had a negative impact on economic growth this year will, on the contrary, enhance growth. This effect in the second half of 2013 is predicted to improve growth in GDP to 2.2 percent, compared to 1.4 percent in the first half. Meanwhile, growth in private investment (excluding state-owned companies) is projected to slow down from 11 percent this year to 5 percent in 2014. Therefore, the Ministry expects a rather large contribution from quasi-budget projects — construction of roads using money from the National Welfare Fund (NWF). Related: Russian Railways invests $18.7 billion in Far East Russia dreams of creating an alternative to Suez High-speed trains to help address transport problems Infrastructure is an opportunity to increase potential growth, and the government should therefore actively participate in this," says Oleg Zasov, director of a department in the Ministry. However, budget rules impose restrictions, and, therefore, oil and gas income is the only source of funding available. An easing of the Central Bank's monetary policy is expected to maintain the high rates of growth in consumer lending — at least 20 percent per year, offsetting the slowdown of the growth in real incomes. As recently as a month ago, it was assumed that the latter, in 2014–2016, would be higher or at the level of 2013. This growth will be slowed down not so much because of the decision to index tariffs for the population in 2014 (their addition to the inflation rate will only be about 0.2 percentage points), but because of the pension reform that starts in 2015.

#### Engagement with Venezuela massively boosts oil production

Clarke, 13**-** (Kevin Clarke, Associated Press Staff Writer for America National Catholic Review. March 25, 2013. “Chavez Death Brings New Chance For U.S.-Venezuela Engagement,” http://americamagazine.org/issue/chavez-death-brings-new-chance-us-venezuela-engagement)//SDL

The passing of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela unleashed an epic outpouring of grief among his supporters in Venezuela, the likes of which may only be eventually paralleled with the passing of another larger-than-life figure in Latin American socialism, Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Matthew Carnes, S.J., assistant professor of government at Georgetown University, said Chávez will be remembered as a leader who had an “outsized impact in Venezuelan politics.”¶ Father Carnes said Chávez’s passing offers an opportunity for the United States, politically and economically, to revive its relationship with Venezuela. Occasionally “capricious and doctrinaire,” Chávez was “someone the United States had a hard time negotiating with,” according to Father Carnes.¶ Whether his designated political heir, Vice President Nicholas Maduro, or an opposition candidate, most likely Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor of the Venezuelan state of Miranda, is elected to replace Chávez, Father Carnes expects a more pragmatic and less confrontational leadership to emerge. That could mean improved ties not just with Venezuela but throughout the region, he said, and a possible opening for renewed U.S. investment and partnership with the Venezuelan state oil industry. Despite Chávez’s notorious distaste for U.S. political leaders, under his leadership Venezuela remained one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States. This is likely to continue.

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

**Russian economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior binding consultation with the relevant indigenous peoples of [country] over [plan]. The United States will advocate [the plan] throughout the process of consultation and implement the result.

#### Prior consultation with Latin American indigenous peoples over engagement is critical to avert cultural and physical annihilation

Kinnison, 11 – (Akilah Jenga Kinnison, J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law. 2011. “INDIGENOUS CONSENT: RETHINKING U.S. CONSULTATION POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,” http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/53-4/53arizlrev1301.pdf)//SDL

¶ Due to the nature of large-scale extractive activities, there seems to be a ¶ ¶ shift in the international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with ¶ ¶ indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultation–consent ¶ ¶ spectrum. Some argue that, where activities directly impact indigenous peoples’ ¶ ¶ right to “use, enjoy, control, and develop their traditional lands,” there is a norm ¶ ¶ developing that recognizes that full consent, rather than just meaningful ¶ ¶ consultation, is required.206 For instance, former Special Rapporteur on the ¶ ¶ Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People ¶ ¶ Rodolfo Stavenhagen has stated that “the free, informed and prior consent, as ¶ ¶ well as the right to self-determination of indigenous communities and peoples, ¶ ¶ must be considered as a necessary precondition” for “major development projects” ¶ ¶ affecting indigenous lands.207 Such “major development projects” include “the ¶ ¶ large scale exploitation of natural resources including subsoil resources.”208 ¶ ¶ Stavenhagen has argued that indigenous peoples have the “right to say no” to ¶ ¶ certain development projects.¶ ¶ Furthermore, there are strong arguments for why, even if such a norm has ¶ ¶ not yet crystallized, states should adopt this interpretation of FPIC for large-scale ¶ ¶ extractive activities. First, the power to withhold consent can be seen as necessary ¶ ¶ to enforce other important indigenous rights beyond rights of consultation and ¶ ¶ participation.210 This is particularly true in the context of extractive industries, ¶ ¶ whose projects implicate numerous other indigenous rights due to their ability to ¶ ¶ threaten indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival.211 For instance, the ¶ ¶ ability to withhold consent allows indigenous communities to enforce their ¶ ¶ community property rights, protect their sacred spaces, and maintain their culture ¶ ¶ and relationship with the land. ¶ Additionally, there are reservations about how “meaningful” indigenous ¶ ¶ participation can be in the absence of the power to withhold consent.212 As ¶ ¶ Professor Brant McGee comments: “Absent the ability to walk away from the ¶ ¶ bargaining table, indigenous groups would simply be participating in a ¶ ¶ meaningless exchange of views designed to fulfill a legal requirement.”213 Given ¶ ¶ the stakes and zero-sum potential of large-scale extractive projects, “[t]here is no ¶ ¶ such thing as partial consent in this context.”¶ ¶ 214 Therefore, indigenous peoples ¶ ¶ must be equipped with the ability to withhold consent in order to engage in ¶ ¶ meaningful negotiation. Special Rapporteur Anaya has stated: “[T]he principles of ¶ ¶ consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition of the will of one ¶ ¶ party over the other, and . . . instead striving for mutual understanding and ¶ ¶ consensual decision-making.”215 Yet without the power to withhold consent in ¶ ¶ zero-sum situations where destructive impacts on indigenous lands and culture are ¶ ¶ high, indigenous people are left with little bargaining power and therefore may be ¶ ¶ unable to participate in meaningful consultation. ¶ Promoting an interpretation of FPIC that gives indigenous peoples the ¶ ¶ right to withhold consent in the context of large-scale extractive projects is also ¶ ¶ good policy from the state and corporate perspectives because it can make projects ¶ ¶ more successful. Professor Lisa J. Laplante and attorney Suzanne A. Spears ¶ ¶ propose that extractive industries can diffuse costly opposition to projects by ¶ ¶ engaging in community “consent processes.”216 Conflicts with communities can create obstacles for a particular project as well as for the corporation itself.217 ¶ ¶ Global campaigns against particular companies have been waged—as exemplified ¶ ¶ by “ProtestBarrick.net,” which is a campaign entirely devoted to publicizing ¶ ¶ opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation.218 Such campaigns can damage a ¶ ¶ company’s reputation, which Laplante and Spears refer to as “an extractive ¶ ¶ industry company’s lifeblood.”219 Additionally, opposition can be costly due to the ¶ ¶ public relations campaigns corporations must launch in response to community ¶ ¶ opposition,220 legal costs to fend off efforts to shut down projects, and losses in ¶ ¶ profitability. For example, after the ¶ ¶ Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a limited ¶ ¶ injunction against Barrick in the Cortez Hills case, the company’s stock dropped ¶ ¶ 8.43%, despite the fact that the project did not ultimately shut down.¶ Thus, when states believe a development project is in the public interest, ¶ ¶ they should seek to engage the community in consent processes, rather than ¶ ¶ consultation processes, both to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and also to ¶ ¶ promote the long-term benefit of the project itself. As Laplante and Spears ¶ ¶ explained: ¶ Whereas consultation processes require only that extractive industry ¶ ¶ companies [or the state] hear the views of those potentially affected ¶ ¶ by a project and then take them into account when engaging in ¶ ¶ decision-making processes, consent processes require that host ¶ ¶ communities actually participate in decision-making processes. ¶ ¶ Consent processes give affected communities the leverage to ¶ ¶ negotiate mutually acceptable agreements under which projects may ¶ ¶ proceed¶ Interpreting FPIC as respecting the right of indigenous peoples to withhold consent ¶ ¶ for large-scale extractive projects, therefore, gives communities the tools necessary ¶ ¶ to protect their rights as well as to bargain with state and corporate actors in order ¶ ¶ to move forward with development projects on mutually beneficial terms. ¶ In sum, within the context of large-scale extractive industries, it is in the ¶ ¶ best interest of states to take a consent-based approach to operationalizing the ¶ ¶ principle of FPIC found in instruments such as the U.N. Declaration. ¶ The United States has articulated a commitment to the importance of ¶ ¶ indigenous consultation both through its endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on ¶ ¶ the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O. 13,175 ¶ ¶ and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation Memorandum. However, in order to ¶ ¶ fully realize this commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation standard. U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a minimum and with consent required in certain contexts, including large-scale extractive industries.

#### Cultural Genocide

Smith, 6 – (Andrea, Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, Appropriation of Native American Religious Traditions, Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America, Vol. 1, pg. 104-105)

Native spiritualities are land based — they are tied to the landbase from which they originate. When Native peoples fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are ultimately fighting for the landbase which grounds their spirituality and culture. For this reason, Native religions are generally not proselytizing. They are typically seen by Native peoples as relevant only to the particular landbase from which they originate; they are not necessarily applicable to peoples coming from different landbases. In addition, as many scholars have noted, Native religions are practice centered rather than belief centered. That is, Christianity is defined by belief in a certain set of doctrinal principles about Jesus, the Bible, etc. Evangelical Christianity holds that one is “saved” when one professes belief in Jesus Christ as one’s Lord and Savior. But what is of primary important in Native religions is not being able to articulate belief in a certain set of doctrines, but being able to take part in the spiritual practice of one’s community. In fact, it may be more important that a ceremony be done correctly than it is for everyone in that ceremony to know exactly why everything must be done in a certain way. As Vine Deloria (Dakota) notes, from a Native context, religion is “a way of life” rather than “a matter of proper exposition of doctrines.” Even if Christians do not have access to church, they continue to be Christians as long as they believe in Jesus. Native spiritualities, by contrast, may die if the people do not practice the ceremonies, even if the people continue to believe in their power. Native communities argue that Native peoples cannot be alienated from their land without committing cultural genocide. This argument underpins many sacred sites cases, although usually to no avail, before the courts. Most of the court rulings on sacred sites do not recognize this difference between belief-centered and practice-centered traditions or the significance of land-based spiritualities. For instance, in Fools Crow v. Gullet (1983), the Supreme Court ruled against the Lakota who were trying to halt the development of additional tourist facilities in the Black Hills. The Court ruled that this tourism was not an infringement on Indian religious freedom because, although it would hinder the ability of the Lakota to practice their beliefs, it did not force them to relinquish their beliefs. For the Lakota, however, stopping the practice of traditional beliefs destroys the belief systems themselves. Consequently, for the Lakota and Native nations in general, cultural genocide is the result when Native landbases are not protected. When we disconnect Native spiritual practices from their land bases, we undermine Native peoples’ claim that the protection of the land base is integral to the survival of Native peoples and hence undermine their claims to sovereignty. This practice of disconnecting Native spirituality from its land base is prevalent in a wide variety of practices of cultural and spiritual appropriation, from New Agers claiming to be Indian in a former life to Christians adopting Native spiritual forms to further their missionizing efforts. The message is that anyone can practice Indian spirituality anywhere. Hence there is no need to protect the specific Native communities and the lands that are the basis of their spiritual practices.

#### Extinction – each loss contributes to an invisible threshold

Stavenhagen, 90 – (Rodolfo, Professor @ the United Nations University, The Ethnic Question pg. 73)

The struggle for the preservation of the collective identity of culturally distinct peoples has further implications as well. The cultural diversity of the world’s peoples is a universal resource for all humankind. The diversity of the worlds cultural pool is like the diversity of the world’s biological gene pool. A culture that disappears due to ethnocide or cultural genocide represents a loss for all humankind. At a time when the classic development models of the post war era have failed to solve the major problems of mankind, people are again looking at so called traditional cultures for at least some of the answers. This is very clear, for example, as regards to agricultural and food production, traditional medicine, environmental management in rural areas, construction techniques, social solidarity in times of crises, etc. The world’s diverse cultures have much to offer our imperiled planet. Thus the defense of the collective rights of ethnic groups and indigenous peoples cannot be separated from the collective human rights of all human beings.

## DA

#### Venezuela rights abuses are systemic and flagrant.

El Universal 13 — El Universal—a newspaper published in Caracas, 2013 (“Human Rights Watch reports abuse of power by Venezuelan gov't,” January 31st, Available Online at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130131/human-rights-watch-reports-abuse-of-power-by-venezuelan-govt, Accessed 07-22-2013)

After almost 15 years in power, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has accumulated significant power, which has allowed the government to a series of "abuses" and "intimidation" of broad sectors of society, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in its annual report on human rights.¶ Under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez, both the accumulation of power and the weakening of human rights guarantees have allowed the Venezuelan Government to intimidate, censor, and prosecute Venezuelans who criticize or oppose to the president or his political agenda, the reports stated.¶ Chávez and his political supporters have relied on their power in different opportunities, thus negatively affecting the judicial branch, mass media, and human rights defenders, the report explained.¶ Although criticism of the Venezuelan Government continues, fear to retaliation has undermined judges' capacity to render rulings in cases with serious political implications, HRW added.¶ Similarly, journalists and human rights advocates have had no other choice but to weigh ponder the consequences of releasing information and critical opinions on the government, the organization remarked.¶ The report also stated that Chávez's government has extended and misused power to regulate mass media. Although criticism of the government continues in some media, in some others there is widespread self-censorship, in an attempt to avoid government retaliation.¶ Further, the report criticized the fact that Venezuela decided to withdraw from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) through denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights last September.¶ The organization regretted Venezuela's refusal to welcome international human rights observers.¶ HRW also expressed deep concerns about the level of violence in Venezuelan prisons and the significant number of police abuses. The report was released a few days after a new violent event in Uribana prison, northwest Venezuela, where 58 people died and over 95 were injured.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.¶ But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

## K

#### Security driven economic engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Security politics authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s security discourse – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

## Case

#### Venezuela Solves Drug Trade in the Status Quo

Venezuelan Embassy 5-1-13 (Venezuelan Embassy to the US, Venezuela’s Anti-Drug efforts, http://venezuela-us.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/05-24-2013-Venezuelas-Anti-drug-Efforts.pdf, )CTL

Annual seizures of drugs in Venezuela hovered around 30-40 metric tons in the early 2000s, and increased in 2005 to ¶ reach a total of 77.53 tons. For the rest of the decade, they averaged about 60 tons annually and in 2011 and 2012 ¶ they equaled 42.41 tons and 45.08 tons respectively.2¶ This shows that the country has taken appropriate action to ¶ halt the trafficking of drugs during the administrations of President Hugo Chávez and President Nicolás Maduro.¶ The progress continues; in the first four months of 2013, 19.7 tons of illegal drugs were seized, according to the ONA. ¶ The Public Ministry coordinated the incineration of 8.2 tons of those substances (mainly cocaine and marijuana).¶ Last year, Venezuela was responsible for capturing 20 high-profile drug traffickers including individuals sought by ¶ the U.S. and Interpol such as Daniel “El Loco” Barrera. When Barrera was caught through a coordinated effort with ¶ Venezuela, Colombia, and the U.S., Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos said: “I want to thank the Venezuelan ¶ government, President (Hugo) Chavez and his team, for this great collaboration that has produced this capture.”3¶ Barrera and many other criminals have been sent abroad to face justice ¶ in Colombia and the U.S. This is just one of the ways that Venezuela has ¶ demonstrated its commitment to working with partners abroad to stop ¶ drug trafficking. The country maintains 54 anti-drug accords with 39 ¶ different countries.4¶ This provides the basis for an intensive and ongoing ¶ collaboration on efforts to stop the flow of drugs in the region and the world.

### 1NC Oil

#### 1. Ambassador brouhaha undercut relations – they won’t say yes to investment

Metzker, 2013

(Jared, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” 6/17/2013, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/> accessed tm 7/7

Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels.¶ Nonetheless, **major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter** (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as “a small step**”) was not optimistic** that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ “I don’t think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas,” he said. “It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going.”¶

#### 2. No need for plan -- Refineries increasing in squo

**Oil and Gas Journal 2013** (“Contract let in [PDVSA](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T17727392749&returnToId=20_T17727403822&csi=8039&A=0.597916982103987&sourceCSI=3652&indexTerm=%23CC00028KH%23&searchTerm=PDVSA%20&indexType=C" \t "_parent) refinery upgrade” May 20, lexis accessed TM 7/3)

T**he prime contractor for an upgrade of th**e 180,000-b/d [Petroleos de Venezuela SA](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T17727392749&returnToId=20_T17727403822&csi=8039&A=0.597916982103987&sourceCSI=3652&indexTerm=%23CC00028KH%23&searchTerm=Petroleos%20de%20Venezuela%20SA%20&indexType=C" \t "_parent) refinery at Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela, **has let a contract for construction of key modularized units** to Wison Offshore & Marine Ltd. (OGJ Online, July 29, 2011).¶ **After completion** of the project, **the refinery,** which now runs light and medium crude oil, **will be able to process 210,000 b/d of heavy and extra-heavy crude oil from Venezuela'**s Orinoco region.¶ The project includes construction of a 50,000-b/d deep-conversion unit based on HDH Plus technology developed by Intevep, [PDVSA's](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T17727392749&returnToId=20_T17727403822&csi=8039&A=0.597916982103987&sourceCSI=3652&indexTerm=%23CC00028KH%23&searchTerm=PDVSA%27s%20&indexType=C" \t "_parent) research unit. It also includes a three-train sequential hydroprocessing unit, a 130,000-b/d three-train vacuum unit, upgrade of two atmospheric distillation units, auxiliary and service units, interconnections, and tanks.¶ Wison Offshore received the contract from Hyundai-Wison, a consortium of [Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co.](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/lnacui2api/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T17727392749&returnToId=20_T17727403822&csi=8039&A=0.597916982103987&sourceCSI=3652&indexTerm=%23CC000214F%23&searchTerm=Hyundai%20Engineering%20&%20Construction%20Co.%20&indexType=C" \t "_parent) Ltd., Hyundai Engineering Co. Ltd., and Wison Engineering Ltd. that holds the engineering, procurement, and construction contract.¶ **Wison Offshore**, for which the project represents a first in onshore module fabrication, **will provide pipe racks and equipment modules** weighing about 26,000 tonnes, handling fabrication design of the steel structures, material procurement, construction, precommissioning, and loadout. **Hyundai-Wison will provide the pipeline, equipment, and electric facilities and instrumentation.**

#### 3. Takes years to solve Venezuelan oil production

**Money Morning 3-19**-13 [“Oil Companies Hope for New Opportunity in Energy-Rich Venezuela,” <http://moneymorning.com/2013/03/19/oil-companies-hope-for-new-opportunity-in-energy-rich-venezuela/>]

**Due to years of not properly investing in its oil industry resources, production steadily declined by about 25%** in the 14 years Chavez was in power, and oil exports fell by nearly 50%. In fact, there were various points during the Chavez years that Venezuela was actually a net importer of crude.¶ “Venezuela’s clout on OPEC and on world oil prices has been greatly diminished because of its inability to exploit its enormous resources,” Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a consultancy, told The New York Times. “In the 1990s, their production was booming and they could thumb their nose at Saudi Arabia and get away with it, but now they have become OPEC’s poor cousin.”¶ That is to say **even with a regime change**, which does not appear imminent**, it will take years for output there to jump to the point where Venezuela makes a significant contribution** to reserves and profits **for major oil companies.**

#### 4. Venezuelan oil doesn’t cause price shocks

**Jegarajah 3-5**-13 [Sri, Market reporter for CNBC Asia Pacific, “Venezuela—The Next Risk for Oil Markets,” <http://www.cnbc.com/id/100520892>]

Meanwhile, a former executive at PDVSA told CNBC that Venezuela has lost its ability to influence global oil markets because years of under investment in the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) member's petroleum industry has constrained production.¶ "Venezuela is a weak OPEC hawk, as it has no sufficient production to influence prices," said Gustavo Coronel, a founding member of the board of state-oil firm Petroleos de Venezuela. "Venezuela is no longer a factor that can really upset the markets as it was the case 20 years ago."¶ Furthermore, the energy boom in the U.S. has helped cut dependence of Venezuelan net crude and oil products and exports to the U.S. have dropped to levels last seen nearly 30 years ago. "The U.S. would not miss Venezuelan oil very much," Coronel said. "Whatever disruption would be almost entirely psychologically induced."

#### 5. Plan can’t solve investment – absence of rule of law discourages FDI

**Meacham**, Director of the CSIS Americas Program, **2013**

Carl, The Aftermath of Venezuela’s Election: Headed for a Default?”,

June 21, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/aftermath-venezuelas-election-headed-default, 7/1/13 JG

Furthermore, arbitrary legal decisions may further undermine investor confidence in Venezuelan institutions. As Capriles has pointed out, the Supreme Court is likely to rule in favor of President Maduro, despite evidence of electoral fraud. If the country’s highest court rushes to rule in favor of a controversial result without considering the evidence, it will further raise alarms about the independence of the Venezuelan judiciary. In general, **one of the major concerns of investors and debt issuers is the country’s ability to guarantee their rights and contracts in case of controversies. Many concerns have been raised regarding the checks and balances of the Venezuelan rule; a hasty decision by the Supreme Court will only reinforce them.**

#### Venezuelan oil is stable- reforms are unnecessary

**Parraga 3-8**-13 [Marianna, Reuters, “Exclusive: Venezuela to maintain oil industry framework under Maduro,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/09/us-venezuela-oil-idUSBRE92803720130309>]

Venezuela will maintain its oil industry tax and legal framework under the leadership of acting President Nicolas Maduro, the OPEC nation's oil minister said on Friday to reassure foreign investors after the death of President Hugo Chavez.¶ Rafael Ramirez told Reuters that Venezuela would continue to push for a minimum price of $100 per barrel at the next OPEC meeting, and that he did not expect Chavez's death to push up crude prices.¶ "The tax and legal framework were set out clearly by President Chavez," the oil minister said outside the National Assembly, where Maduro was being inaugurated as acting leader on Friday ahead of a new presidential election due in weeks.¶ "While our government is here and the people remain in charge, our oil policy will remain unchanged."¶ Ramirez said he expected the South American country to increase its oil output by 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, bringing its total production to 3.5 million bpd.¶ The government says it is pumping 3.0 million bpd, but many industry experts question those figures. Analysts say Venezuela produced just 2.34 million bpd last month.¶ Ramirez said state oil company PDVSA invested $22 billion in 2012, and expected to invest $25 billion this year.¶ He said foreign energy companies working with PDVSA in Venezuela sent condolences following Chavez's death after a two-year battle with cancer, but had expressed no concerns about the political situation in the country with the world's biggest oil reserves.¶ "Everything is normal in the oil industry. We're guaranteeing fuel supplies," Ramirez said. "We will keep our oil policy the same, internally and in OPEC ... we will defend a minimum price of $100 per barrel (at the next meeting)."¶ The next gathering of the oil producers' cartel is scheduled to take place in Vienna on May 31.

### Venezuela Funding Bad

#### Harms economy

#### Venezuelan energy revenue dependence wrecks their economy and causes war

Cassidy 2013 (John Cassidy, March 6, 2013, “VENEZUELA’S “RESOURCE CURSE” WILL OUTLIVE HUGO CHÁVEZ,” The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/03/venezuela-resource-curse-will-outlive-hugo-chavez.html)

Rather than generating peace and prosperity, the presence of mineral and oil wealth in countries that have been poor often leads to political conflict, corruption, and, in extreme cases, civil war. While Venezuela remains a very divided country, it didn’t fall to those depths. But with some estimates now showing Venezuela harboring bigger oil reserves than Saudi Arabia, the question of how to manage its immensely valuable natural resources may well cause even more intense conflict in the years ahead.¶ As for Chávez’s socialist experiment, there’s little consensus on how it fared. Reflecting the views of Washington’s economic-development establishment and Venezuela’s large émigré population, Moses Naim, a Venezuelan who served as trade and industry minister during the early nineteen nineties, and who is now at the Carnegie Endowment, argued at Businessweek.com that Chávez left behind “an economy in shambles … [with] one of the world’s largest fiscal deficits, highest inflation rates, worst misalignment of the exchange rate, fastest-growing debt, and one of the most precipitous drops in productive capacity—including that of the critical oil sector.” But Chávez had his defenders. Writing for Salon, David Sirota pointed to the fall in poverty rates under his rule, along with a surge in college enrollment and a substantial increase in access to medical care. “Indeed, as shown by some of the most significant indicators,” Sirota noted, “Chávez racked up an economic record that a legacy-obsessed American president could only dream of achieving.”¶ The problems of the Venezuelan economy are certainly real: inflation is high—more than twenty per cent—and so is the budget deficit, which stands at fifteen per cent of G.D.P. In an attempt to deal with rising prices, the government has resorted to price controls, which have led to shortages of certain goods. And in an effort to bolster the public finances, it recently devalued its currency, the bolivar, by a third. (Venezuela gets paid for its oil in dollars, which are now worth more in bolivars.)

#### Funds terrorism

#### An increase in Venezuelan oil money will be used to sponsor terrorism against the US.

Walser 10

Ray Walser (PhD. From UNC-Chapel Hill; Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation) “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to the List” The Heritage Foundation January 20, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list

Since January 2009, the Obama Administration's attempts to improve relations with the stridently anti-America Chávez have yielded little more than empty gestures. Although ambassadorial relations were restored in June 2009, Chávez has signaled renewed support for the narcoterrorism of the FARC, begun threatening and punishing Colombia for its defense cooperation agreement with the U.S., helped destabilize Honduras by backing former president Manuel Zelaya's illegal referendum, pushed ahead with major Russian arms acquisitions, and sealed ever closer ties, including joint nuclear ventures, with Iran. Venezuela plays an increasingly prominent role as a primary transit country for cocaine flowing from Colombia to the U.S., Europe, and West Africa. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration, according to the President's National Security Council adviser on Latin America, Dan Restrepo, does not consider Venezuela to be a challenge to U.S. national security: President Obama "does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security. There is no Cold War nor Hot War. Those things belong to the past."[2] This view is not optimistic--it is dangerous. The Administration needs to, as a recent bipartisan congressional resolution urges, adopt a genuinely tough-minded approach to dealing with Chávez and Venezuela. The Administration needs to develop a public diplomacy strategy to counter Chavista disinformation and a diplomatic strategy in the Americas that responds to growing threats of political destabilization. It also needs to recognize that under Chávez, Venezuela has become terrorism's most prominent supporter in the Western Hemisphere. The Obama Administration can begin to correct this policy of drift and inaction by placing Venezuela on the list of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran.

#### Destabilizes region

#### VZ oil revenues destroy democracy and destabilize Latin America

Crane 2009 (Keith Crane, Director Environment, Energy, and Economic Development Program, ISE RAND Corporation, Andreas Goldthau, Michael Toman, Thomas Light, Stuart E. Johnson, Alireza Nader, Angel Rabasa, Harun Dogo, “Imported Oil and U.S. National Security,” RAND, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\_MG838.pdf)

Implications for U.S. Security. Revenues from oil exports have enabled Chavez to pursue a number of policies that run counter to U.S. goals to create stable, peace- ful, economically dynamic democracies in Latin America. Within Venezuela, he has attempted to concentrate political power in the presidency, undercutting checks and balances. Higher oil revenues permitted him to provide subsidies to his core constitu- encies, shoring up domestic political support. He has pursued economic policies, and encouraged other countries to do so as well, that retard economic growth and burden government finances. The decline in oil prices in the second half of 2008 is already straining the budget. The Venezuelan government is in the process of reducing some subsidies and devaluing the currency so as to restore fiscal balance.¶ Chavez has provided campaign financing for presidential candidates in other countries in Latin America who also oppose U.S. policies. Most of these candidates have won recent elections. He has been an irritant to the United States in interna- tional forums, such as the United Nations. He has boosted military spending. He has also provided support for groups, such as FARC, that seek to overthrow neighboring governments.

#### Venezuela uses oil revenue to militarize--- causes war

Reuters 2008 (Reuters, June 6, 2008, “Venezuela Shows Off Military Might in Missile Test,” Epoch Times, http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/8-6-6/71522.html)

Venezuela test-fired missiles in the Caribbean Sea Friday in a display of military strength at a time of tense relations between Washington and leftist President Hugo Chavez.¶ Five Russian Sukhoi fighter jets swooped over the military base on the island of La Orchila, dropping a half-ton bomb and firing a KH-59 missile at a seaborne target. A patrol boat fired an Otomat surface-to-surface missile at the same target.¶ Air Force Commander Gen. Luis Jose Berroteran, said the newly acquired military equipment would help Venezuela ward off potential invasions.¶ "When you have (resources) that are desired by foreign powers, you have an obligation to your people to defend them," he said.¶ Chavez frequently accuses the United States of plotting his overthrow to snatch the OPEC nation's oil reserves, and in recent weeks has said the U.S. attitude toward Venezuela echoes U.S. "aggression" in Iran and Iraq.¶ The test was the first display of firepower purchased from Russia and China using profits from its record oil revenues.¶ Washington has criticized Chavez's military buildup, arguing it could destabilize the region. Chavez bought the Russian fighter jets after the United States blocked his efforts to buy planes with U.S. technology.¶ Venezuela has the fourth-largest military budget in Latin America, and analysts say its military spending is relatively low in relation to its GDP.¶ Tensions remain high between the United States, Venezuela and its neighbor, U.S.-ally Colombia, which accuses Chavez of helping Marxist insurgents fighting the government.

#### Turn: US🡪 L.A. instability

#### Turn - U.S. influence causes instability in Latin America – Venezuela and Columbia prove

**Avilés 05** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska (William, “The Democratic-Peace Thesis and U.S. Relations with Colombia and Venezuela,” LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 142, Vol. 32 No. 3, May 2005, http://faculty.unlv.edu/kfernandez/articles/aviles.pdf)//SS

The cases of the Samper and Chávez administrations raise important¶ questions about the nature of relations between democracies. Proponents of¶ the democratic-peace argument view the spread of democracy in Latin¶ America as a welcome change in the international system in that democracies¶ do not war with each other. Less sanguine observers have concluded that they¶ do fight each other in less dramatic ways.¶ The explanations given for various **U.S. interventions into the politics of**¶ **other democracies have stressed the “weakness” and “fragility” of the**¶ **democracies involved and/or pointed to evidence that intervention was**¶ **required to save them. Venezuela** and Colombia **were cited as models** by different U.S. governments as a democratic alternative to communist revolution¶ or right-wing authoritarianism during the cold war and were viewed as¶ democracies by the U.S. government well into the 1990s. Finally, both countries enjoyed substantial trade relations with the United States, with neoliberal economic reforms only strengthening those relations. Throughout the¶ Samper and Chávez administrations democracy was under assault. In both¶ cases the response of the U.S. government to threats to democratic control¶ was conditioned by their impact upon competing policy objectives such¶ as the maintenance of the drug war**,** the security of transnational capital’s¶ investments, and an oil policy consistent with the interests of transnational¶ corporations.¶ In the case of Venezuela, the United States stood almost alone among the¶ countries in the Western Hemisphere in supporting a military coup against a¶ democratic government. Both before and after the coup it financially supported the actors who directly challenged democratic control. In this case, the¶ OPEC politics of the Chávez administration, its open criticism of the U.S.¶ drug war and antiterrorism policies, and its opposition to neoliberalism all¶ ran counter to U.S. national interests and/or the interests of transnational corporations. In contrast, its support of the coup leader Pedro Carmona, who¶ immediately implemented policies consistent with the neoliberal agenda,¶ suggests that relations based on mutual trust and cooperation are contingent¶ upon similar policies.¶ In the Colombian case, the United States pursued a policy agenda that¶ contributed to destabilizing an elected leader in the hope of achieving gains¶ in the drug war, despite the threat to democratic institutions. However, U.S.¶ pressure stopped short of creating conditions that might have led to the overthrow of Samper because U.S.-based transnational corporations, Colombian¶ economic conglomerates, and representatives of Colombia’s export sector¶ played crucial roles in lessening the effect of U.S. policy.¶ In neither case did the U.S. engage in military intervention or war with¶ these two democracies, but the lack of military conflict between the two¶ states had little to do with shared norms or institutional checks upon executive power. The United States accomplished its goals in the Colombian case;¶ its government intensified the war on drugs while maintaining an economic¶ environment consistent with the needs of capitalist globalization. The future¶ of the Venezuelan case is less clear, because the Chávez administration¶ remains in place. It has not, however, eliminated all foreign investment in¶ Venezuela’s oil industry or made a complete break with neoliberalism. Further radicalization of Venezuela’s government may lead to an escalation of¶ U.S. efforts to isolate it and support a political opposition working for its¶ downfall, whether the country remains democratic or not.

#### Says no to U.S.

#### **Maduro says no—built up cred on America-bashing—can'**

O’Reilly 4-17

(“U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim.”

*Fox News Latino.* <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-maduro-experts-claim/#ixzz2e3IAFFZk>. Andrew O’Reilly. 4/17/13.)

While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that **relations between the U**nited **S**tates **and** the administration of President-elect Nicolás **Maduro will continue to be as tense** as under the late Hugo Chávez, experts said.¶ After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relations with the U.S. “in terms of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule.¶ These words followed a steady rhetoric on the campaign trail of **Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule**, including working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts. ¶ **Experts argue that given Maduro’s anti-American sentiments** leading up to the election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the polarization in Venezuela, **there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries.¶** “It’s hard to see [Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg, the **director of American University’s Center for Latin American** and Latino **Studies, told** Fox News Latino. “**Americans will insist on a level of respect that he is not going to give them.”**¶ The death of Hugo Chávez put Maduro and the rest of the Venezuelan left in a difficult position. Chávez’s charisma held the movement together and his social spending allowed him to skirt the dicey issues of rising inflation, high crime and a fledgling economy.¶ While the current election results are still being debated, how Maduro faces the country’s mounting problems – both politically and socially – are what will decide is he and Chavismo survive his six-year term.¶ In 2009, Chávez led a successful push for a constitutional referendum that abolished term limits for the offices of President, state governors, mayors and congress members. The previous provision established a three-term limit for deputies and a two-term limit for the other offices, but with the 2009 referendum, Chávez – or any other leader – could ostensibly stay in power indefinitely. ¶ Maduro does not have the charm or power to hold the Chavista movement together nor make Venezuelans forget about the problems plaguing their nation. If Sunday’s vote is any indication, Venezuela is torn between Chávez’s legacy and a dismal future, with the official results giving Maduro 51 percent of the vote to challenger Henrique Capriles’ 49 percent – although opposition sources showed Capriles winning by more than 300,000 votes.¶ “Chávez could overcome the detractors because he was viewed as a national hero, Maduro doesn’t have that,” said Larry Birns with the Council for Hemispheric Affairs.¶ **To** **maintain his credibility** within the Chavista movement and fend off opponents from within his own party, **Maduro needs to maintain his opposition to the U.S. and continue to paint Americans as imperialist intruders, experts said.¶** “He’s got to worry about the opponents that will pose a threat to his rule,” Birns said. “These are difficult times for Maduro and no one knows how the scenario will play out.”¶ For its part, **the U**nited **S**tates **is not in better shape when it comes to its relations with Venezuela** – or other Latin American nations. Diplomatic disputes with Venezuela and touchy relations with neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador have led to a schism between the United States and the countries in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.

#### Venezuela won’t allow U.S. investment – the U.S. will be locked out

Epperson & Domm 13(Sharon & Patti, ‘With Hugo Chavez gone, US oil industry eyes Venezuela’, Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0306/With-Hugo-Chavez-gone-US-oil-industry-eyes-Venezuela)//MJ

Venezuela has more oil reserves than any other country thanks to massive deposits of asphalt-like crude in what’s called the Orinoco oil belt. Development of these deposits is both technology- and capital-intensive.¶ **Chávez’s push for more national control over the oil sector in 2007 led Exxon Mobil Corp. and ConocoPhillips Co. to abandon big Orinoco projects.** Other international companies stayed, including firms from Russia, China and Vietnam, and the Orinoco now accounts for about 20 percent of Venezuela’s oil production.¶ Mark **McNabb, director of the Emerging Markets Research Center at UTD’s Naveen Jindal School of Management**, said in a phone interview that he **expects U.S. firms will remain on the outside looking in.¶ “We’re kind of frozen out for the next three to five years,”** he said.¶ **Venezuela’s oil sector has been in decline for a decade. In 2002, PDVSA employees went on strike and joined in an anti-Chávez movement that briefly ousted the president. When he regained power, Chávez fired many of his opponents in the firm and installed thousands of supporters.¶ “PDVSA’s been drained of its professionals,”** said Eric Farnsworth, a vice president with the Council of the Americas. “**It’s now a political group that pumps oil.”¶** Venezuela’s Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said Wednesday that PDVSA workers would remain on the job.¶ “The key to driving the oil industry is in the hands of the 100,000 valiant men and women who have shown their loyalty to Commander Chavez in everything we have been through,” he said, referring to PDVSA’s staff. “**That situation will not change.”**¶ Venezuela’s exports to the U.S. are under pressure from Canada, which produces a heavy type of crude oil from Alberta’s oil sands that is similar to Venezuela’s thick oil. Many Gulf Coast refineries prefer to use heavy oil because it can mean higher profits for gasoline, diesel and other refined products.

#### Venezuela will say no --- anti-Americanism is too entrenched

Drezner 13 --- professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (3/7/2013, Daniel W., “Why post-Chavez Venezuela won't be a U.S. ally anytime soon,” http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/category/wordpress\_tag/venezuela, JMP)

The passing of Hugo Chavez has prompted the usual 21st century cycle of news coverage and commentary that follows the death of a polarizing figure: the breaking news on Twitter, followed by the news obits, followed by the hosannahs from supporters, followed by denunciations of the figure, followed by official statements, followed by mealy-mouthed op-eds, followed by hysterical, unhinged criticism of standard diplomatic language. ¶ Now that the first news cycle has passed, we can get to the more interesting question of assessing Venezuela's future. There was always a fundamental irony to Hugo Chavez's foreign policy. Despite his best efforts to chart a course at odds with the United States, he could never escape a fundamental geopolitical fact of life: Venezuela's economic engine was based on exporting a kind of oil that could pretty much only be refined in the United States. ¶ So, with Chavez's passing, it would seem like a no-brainer for his successor to tamp down hostility with the United States. After all, Chavez's "Bolivarian" foreign policy was rather expensive -- energy subsidies to Cuba alone were equal to U.S. foreign aid to Israel, for example. With U.S. oil multinationals looking hopefully at Venezuela and Caracas in desperate need of foreign investment, could Chavez's successor re-align foreign relations closer to the U.S.A.? ¶I'm not betting on it, however, for one simple reason: Venezuela might be the most primed country in the world for anti-American conspiracy theories. ¶ International relations theory doesn't talk a lot about conspiracy thinking, but I've read up a bit on it, and I'd say post-Chavez Venezuela is the perfect breeding ground. Indeed, the day of Chavez's death his vice president/anointed successor was already accusing the United States of giving Chavez his cancer. ¶ Besides that, here's a recipe for creating a political climate that is just itching to believe any wild-ass theory involving a malevolent United States:¶ 1) Pick a country that possesses very high levels of national self-regard. ¶ 2) Make sure that the country's economic performance fails to match expectations.¶ 3) Create political institutions within the country that are semi-authoritarian or authoritarian. ¶ 4) Select a nation with a past history of U.S. interventions in the domestic body politic.¶ 5) Have the United States play a minor supporting role in a recent coup attempt. ¶ 6) Make sure the United States is closely allied with the enduring rival of the country in question.¶ 7) Inculcate a long history of accusations of nutty, American-led conspiracies from the political elite. ¶ 8) Finally, create a political transition in which the new leader is desperate to appropriate any popular tropes used by the previous leader. ¶ Venezuela is the perfect breeding ground for populist, anti-American conspiracy theories. And once a conspiratorial, anti-American culture is fomented, it sets like concrete. Only genuine political reform in Venezuela will cure it, and I don't expect that anytime soon.

# Block

## Shunning

### 2NC – Overview

#### YOU HAVE A MORAL DUTY TO SHUN – flagrant, persistant human rights violators demand shunning – refusal to do so constitutes a complacency within the system – causing global repression — comparatively outweighs the case – ontological damnation means death doesn’t matter and removes psychological barriers to genocide – only scenario for extinction – that’s Beverslius

### 2NC – Venezuela

#### Venezuela is a violator of human rights – reject their government statements – incentive to mask brutality — the Venezuelan government – slaughters dissenters – suppresses free speech – there is no justice – that’s El-Universal

#### Citizens confirm

AFP 13 – [AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 6-16-13, News Daily, “Capriles warns pope of rights violations in Venezuela”, <http://www.newsdaily.com/article/2279d31026a151f74485eb33a5765729/capriles-warns-pope-of-rights-violations-in-venezuela>, accessed 7/2]

Venezuela's opposition leader told Pope Francis that the government was violating basic democratic and human rights, just two days before President Nicolas Maduro visits the Vatican.¶ "We Venezuelans are subject to repeated human rights violations, without the government bodies in charge of guaranteeing and protecting those rights taking action, and quite often they are actually parties to the abuses," Henrique Capriles charged in a letter dated June 12.¶ Maduro was proclaimed the winner of Venezuela's April 14 presidential elections by a 1.5 percent margin hours after polls closed, but Capriles has refused to concede, saying the elections were stolen.¶ An audit of the results found no flaws in the snap vote to replace the late Hugo Chavez, the head of the National Electoral Commission reported Tuesday.¶ When he learned Maduro would travel to Rome for a UN meeting and to meet with the Argentine pope, Capriles said he would send Francis a report on the tense political situation in Venezuela.¶ Capriles charged that Maduro's government was violating rights, and undermining people's faith in democracy.¶ "A real democracy does not just arise from technically respecting the rules; it has to grow out of popular belief that the values that inspire democratic processes are being upheld," Capriles wrote in his letter.¶ Maduro's government is seeking to impose a "collectivist venture" disregarding democratic values, since it "makes everything conditional upon one's acceptance of what the government calls 'building socialism,'" Capriles charged.

### 2NC – A2 Consequentialism/Util

#### Util is incoherent – infinite scenarios – especially true for policymakers

Read 9 — Rupert Read, Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, 2009 (“The difference principle is not action-guiding,” Available Online at http://www.rupertread.fastmail.co.uk/The%20difference%20principle%20is%20not%20action%20guiding.doc, Accessed 04-15-2011)

There is a flaw in Utilitarianism that is one step beyond the problem mentioned above. It is a deeper, more ‘constitutive’ version of the ‘no stable rules’ problem. It is one of the most widely-touted serious flaws in Utilitarianism (at least, in Act Utilitarianism ) that it is ultimately not merely liable to defy our moral intuitions and produce social uncertainty, but is not action-guiding at all. Any course of action can be justified, given uncertainties about others’ reactions, other’s expectations, and so forth, with a good enough story to tell, and a long enough view of the consequences. Utilitarianism, in other words, never rules out any choice since it makes permissibility always depend on consequences in a manner that is in-terminable. When agents are act-utilitarians, they need to undertake an endlessly iterable process of trying to determine how they will react to one another’s actions. ¶ This is a particular, very damaging version of the ‘calculation problem’ in Utilitarianism. How can we really calculate utility, when it depends upon the consequences of our actions, and these depend upon other people’s reactions to those? Gigantic, impenetrable co-ordination problems result.

#### Util is morally monstrous – never kill to save

Kramer 11 — Nicholas Kramer, author of *Taking Responsibility for Empire—*a blog about American foreign policy, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, 2011 (“Murdering Some to Save Others,” *Antiwar.com*, April 13th, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/, Accessed 04-15-2011)

In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching a series of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University’s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins the series by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the first, Sandel suggests that a surgeon has a choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or saving the one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almost unanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel’s second scenario, the choice is the same, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organs necessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost of the one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; although these future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales, the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all.¶ Murdering some people to save others is fundamentally immoral. When this principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel’s, it is easy to understand, even instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths, narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their own devices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism to the extreme of murdering another person even if that action would benefit many others. I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us know such murders to be wrong and would not participate in them.¶ If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of “moral” reasoning expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alike in favor of the “humanitarian” bombing of Libya? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either the interventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allows people to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor, he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, “Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes? Yet we dropped a single bomb on them, and those who lose sleep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.”¶ The simple and uncomfortable truth is that murder is murder, regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered via cruise missile or with a broadsword. As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows and perpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name. The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall “bad” folks can be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions. If we accept that otherwise “good” people cannot be relied upon to maintain their moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for “humanitarian” causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy. I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeons actively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking as it is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it is indeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoid committing murder.

## Oil DA

#### Russian collapse ensures nuclear war – two scenarios – FIRST is terrorist proliferation – scientists have an incentive to sell knowledge – SECOND is Russian lashout – economic decline breeds nationalism – political instability means Putin has an incentive to strike the US – proves we control Timeframe and Probability – that’s Filger

#### Accidental US/Russian nuclear war.

Stephen J. Cimbala, May 2007. Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. “Russia's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Realistic or Uncertain?” Comparative Strategy 26.3, Ebsco.

War between Russia and America is unlikely, but misunderstanding and misperception with respect to their military ends and means are not. U.S. nuclear modernization plans impact on Russian perceptions of their great-power status and vice versa. The U.S. has a shared interest with Russia in the avoidance of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation. This is **especially the case given Russia’s proclivities for nervous behavior during crises and its threat perceptions still blinkered by Cold War defeat and NATO expansion**. Reassurance is an important component of both American and Russian conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia must be reassured that NATO is not expanding for the purpose of shrinking Russia to pre-Petrine dimensions. As well, the U.S. has a security interest in maintaining a stable east and central Eurasia. That means, among other things, a viable Russian state not torn apart by regional or internal wars.

#### Magnitude - It’s the only existential risk

Nick Bostrum, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” 2002, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Perception Thumper

#### Plan triggers the link immediately **Brannon**3/29/**2012 (**Director of Economic Policy as well as the Director of Congressional Relations for the American Action Forum <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/294768/domestic-oil-policies-do-impact-oil-prices-ike-brannon>)

Oil speculation is essentially the process of betting on future prices. People who anticipate needing a good deal of oil in the future and want to guard against the uncertainty of higher prices can enter into a contract that — for a fee — allows them to lock in a price today. While some people use futures contracts to hedge against future prices, others actively offer to take the risk, and those people we call speculators. If a speculator expects prices to rise in the future, he will make large investments in oil today that he may then sell at the later, higher price. For those with the means, there is much money to be made in this way, and the actions of speculators can and do influence the world price of oil. The expectation of higher prices leads to greater consumption which, like any increase in demand, leads to higher prices, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy. It works the opposite way as well: If speculators began to anticipate prices falling in the future, they would want to sell their shares sooner rather than later, since delaying will force them to accept lower prices. This would result in an immediate increase in supply, which would in turn bring down prices today.

### Accidental War Thumper

#### High alert guarantees accidents – kills all life and happens 30 minutes

Helen **Caldicott**, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and former Nobel Peace Prize nominee, 200**2**, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, New Press: New York, p. 7-12

If launched from Russia, nuclear weapons would explode over American cities thirty minutes after takeoff. (China's twenty missiles are liquidfueled, not solid-fueled. They take many hours to fuel and could not be used in a surprise attack, but they would produce similar damage if launched. Other nuclear-armed nations, such as India and Pakistan, do not have the missile technology to attack the U.S.) It is assumed that most cities with a population over 100,000 people are targeted by Russia. During these thirty minutes, the U.S. early-warning infrared satellite detectors signal the attack to the strategic air command in Colorado. They in turn notify the president, who has approximately three minutes to decide whether or not to launch a counterattack. In the counterforce scenario the US. government currently embraces, he does launch, the missiles pass mid-space, and the whole operation is over within one hour. Landing at 20 times the speed of sound, nuclear weapons explode over cities, with heat equal to that inside the center of the sun. There is practically no warning, except the emergency broadcast system on radio or TV, which gives the public only minutes to reach the nearest fallout shelter, assuming there is one. There is no time to collect children or immediate family members. The bomb, or bombs-because most major cities will be hit with more than one explosion-will gouge out craters 200 feet deep and 1000 feet in diameter if they explode at ground level. Most, however, are programmed to produce an air burst, which increases the diameter of destruction, but creates a shallower crater. Half a mile from the epicenter all buildings will be destroyed, and at 1.7 miles only reinforced concrete buildings will remain. At 2.7 miles bare skeletons of buildings still stand, single-family residences have disappeared, 50 percent are dead and 40 percent severely injured.' Bricks and mortar are converted to missiles traveling at hundreds of miles an hour. Bodies have been sucked out of buildings and converted to missiles themselves, flying through the air at l00 miles per hour. Severe overpressures (pressure many times greater than normal atmospheric have popcorned windows, producing millions of shards of flying glass, causing decapitations and shocking lacerations. Overpressures have also entered the nose, mouth, and ears, inducing rupture of lungs and rupture of the tympanic membranes or eardrums. Most people will suffer severe burns. In Hiroshima, which was devastated by a very small bomb-13 kilotons compared to the current 1000 kilotons-a child actually disappeared, vaporized, leaving his shadow on the concrete pavement behind him. A mother was running, holding her baby, and both she and the baby were converted to a charcoal statue. The heat will be so intense that dry objects-furniture, clothes, and dry wood-will spontaneously ignite. Humans will become walking, flaming torches. Forty or fifty miles from the explosion people will instantly be blinded from retinal burns if they glance at the flash. Huge firestorms will engulf thousands of square miles, fanned by winds from the explosion that transiently exceed 1000 miles per hour. People in fallout shelters will be asphyxiated as fire sucks oxygen from the shelters. (This happened in Hamburg after the Allied bombing in WWII when temperatures within the shelters, caused by conventional bombs, reached 1472 degrees Fahrenheit.)" Most of the city and its people will be converted to radioactive dust shot up in the mushroom cloud. The area of lethal fallout from this cloud will depend upon the prevailing wind and weather conditions; it could cover thousands of square miles. Doses of 5000 rads (a rad is a measure of radiation dose) or more experienced by people close to the explosion-if they are still aliv-will produce acute encephalopathic syndrome. The cells of the brain will become so damaged that they would swell. Because the brain is enclosed in a fixed bony space, there is no room for swelling, so the pressure inside the skull rises, inducing symptoms of excitability, acute nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, severe headache, and seizures, followed by coma and death within twenty-four hours. A lower dose of 1000 rads causes death from gastrointestinal symptoms. The lining cells of the gut die, as do the cells in the bone marrow that fight infection and that cause blood clotting. Mouth ulcers, loss of appetite, severe colicky abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea occur within seven to fourteen days. Death follows severe fluid loss, infection, hemorrhage, and starvation. At 450 rads, 50 percent of the population dies. Hair drops out, vomiting and bloody diarrhea occurs, accompanied by bleeding under the skin and from the gums. Death occurs from internal hemorrhage, generalized septicemia, and infection. Severe trauma and injuries exacerbate the fallout symptoms, so patients die more readily from lower doses of radiation. Infants, children, and old people are more sensitive to radiation than healthy adults. Within bombed areas, fatalities will occur from a combination of trauma, burns, radiation sickness, and starvation. There will be virtually no medical care, even for the relief of pain, because most physicians work within The United States owns 103 nuclear power plants, plus many other dangerous radioactive facilities related to past activities of the cold war. A 1000- kiloton bomb (1 megaton) landing on a standard iooo megawatt reactor and its cooling pools, which contain intensely radioactive spent nuclear fuel, would permanently contaminate an .' area the size of western Germany3 The International Atomic Energy Agency now considers these facilities to be attractive terrorist targets, ' post-September 11,2001. Millions of decaying bodies-human and animal alike-will rot, infected with viruses and bacteria that will mutate in the radioactive-environment to become more lethal. Trillions of insects, naturally ' resistant to radiation-flies, fleas, cockroaches, and lice--will transmit disease from the dead to the living, to people whose immune mechanisms have been severely compromised by the high levels of background radiation. Rodents will multiply by the millions among the corpses and shattered sewerage systems. Epidemics of diseases now controlled by immunization and good hygiene will reappear: such as measles, polio, typhoid, cholera, whooping cough, diphtheria, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and hepatitis. Anyone who makes it to a fallout shelter and is not asphyxiated in it, will need to stay there for at least six months until the radiation decays sufficiently so outside survival is possible. It has been postulated that perhaps older people should be sent outside to scavenge for food because they will not live long enough to develop malignancies from the fallout (cancer and leukemia have long incubation periods ranging from five to sixty But any food that manages to grow will be toxic because plants concentrate radioactive elements.\*/ Finally, we must examine the systemic global effects of a nuclear . , war. Firestorms will consume oil wells, chemical facilities, cities, and forests, covering the earth with a blanket of thick, black, radioactive , I I ' smoke, reducing sunlight to 17 percent of normal. One year or more ' ) , will be required for light and temperature to return to normalper- "r haps supranormal values, as sunlight would return to more than its , , usual intensity, enhanced in the ultraviolet spectrum by depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Subfreezing temperatures could destroy the biological support system for civilization, resulting in massive starvation, thirst, and hypothermia.5 To quote a 1985 SCOPE document published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "the total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike . . . this vulnerability is an aspect not currently a part of the understanding of nuclear war; not only are the major combatant countries in danger, but virtually the entire human population is being held hostage to the large-scale use of nuclear weapons. . . .",! i The proposed START I11 treaty between Russia and America, even if it were implemented, would still allow 3000 to 5000 hydrogen bombs to be maintained on alert."the threshold for nuclear winter? One thousand loo-kiloton bombs blowing up loo cities7-a I c distinct possibility given current capabilities and targeting plans. On January 25,1995, military technicians at radar stations in northern Russia detected signals from an American missile that had just been launched off the coast of Norway carrying a US. scientific probe. Although the Russians had been previously notified of this launch, the alert had been forgotten or ignored. Aware that US. submarines could launch a missile containing eight deadly hydrogen bombs fifteen minutes from Moscow, Russian officials assumed that America had initiated a nuclear war. For the first time in history, the Russian computer containing nuclear launch codes was opened. President Boris Yeltsin, sitting at that computer being advised on how to launch a nuclear war by his military officers, had only a three minute interval to make a decision. At the last moment, the US. missile veered off course. He realized that Russia was not under attack.' If Russia had launched its missiles, the U.S. early-warning satellites would immediately have detected them, and radioed back to Cheyenne Mountain. This would have led to the notification of the president, who also would have had three minutes to make his launch decision, and America’s missiles would then have been fired from their silos. We were thus within minutes of global annihilation that day. Today, Russia’s early-warning and nuclear command systems are deteriorating. Russia’s early warning system fails to operate up to seven hours a day because only one-third of its radars are functional, and two of the nine global geographical areas are covered by its missile-warning satellites are not under surveillance for missile detection. To make matters worse, the equipment controlling nuclear weapons malfunctions frequently, and critical electronic devices and controllers sometimes switch to combat mode for no apparent reason. According to the CIA, seven times during the fall of 1996 operations at some Russian nuclear weapons facilities were severely disrupted when robbers tried to “mine” critical communications cables for their copper! This vulnerable Russian system could easily be stressed by an internal or international political crisis, when the danger of accidental or indeed intentional nuclear war would become very real. And the U.S. itself is not invulnerable to error. In August 1999, for example, when the National Imagery and Mapping Agency was installing a new computer to deal with the potential Y2K problems, this operation triggered a computer malfunction which rendered the agency “blind” for days; it took more than eight months for the defect to be fully repaired. As the New York Times reported, part of America’s nuclear early-warning system was rendered incompetent for almost a year. (At that time I was sitting at a meeting in the west wing of the White House discussing potentially dangerous Y2K nuclear weapons glitches. Several Pentagon officials blithely reassured me that everything would function normally during the roll-over. But in fact, their intelligence system had already been disabled.) Such a situation has the potential for catastrophe. If American cannot observe what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapons—or vice versa—especially during a serious international crisis they are likely to err on the side of “caution,” which could mean that something as benign as the launch of a weather satellite could actually trigger annihilation of the planet. This situation became even more significant after the September 11 attack.

## 2NC – Uniqueness

### 2NC – PTX Tricks

#### **Oil prices high – speculation of Syria**

Reuters 9/6, Reuters Magazine, 9/6/13, (“Oil Prices Drift Higher; Jobs, Syria in Focus”, <http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2013/09/06/oil-prices-drift-higher-jobs-syria-in-focus/>, AW)

Global oil prices edged firmer above $115 a barrel on Friday, with investors looking to expected U.S. jobs data that could move the Federal Reserve closer to unwinding a massive stimulus programme that has boosted commodities.¶ Concern that a potential U.S. strike on Syria would spread unrest and further disrupt Middle East supplies had boosted oil prices in recent weeks and benchmark Brent crude oil is heading for a fourth straight weekly rise.¶ Gains have been limited, however, as U.S. President Barack Obama comes under growing pressure from other leaders not to order a military strike on Syria due to fears that it would hurt the global economy and push up oil prices.

### 2NC – Oil Prices Up

#### **Oil is at $114 – this is a factual claim**

The Nation 9/28 – The Nation Magazine, (“Petroleum products prices may rise by up to Rs4 a liter from Oct. 01”, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/business/23-Sep-2013/petroleum-products-prices-may-rise-by-up-to-rs4-a-liter-from-oct-01>, AW)

Prices of various petroleum products are likely to increase by up to Rs4 per liter from October 01. According to OGRA sources, the rise is expected because of rising oil prices in the international markets wherein crude oil prices have risen to $114 per barrel from $111 per barrel. In the local market, petrol prices are likely to increase by Rs4 per liter, kerosene oil by Rs2.50 per liter, diesel by Rs2 a liter and light diesel oil by Rs2.15 a liter. Sources said Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority will send the final summary on September 29 to the ministry of petroleum for approval in this regard.

### 2NC – Russia Econ Up

#### Russia economy increasing – government is implementing infrastructure reforms that solve in the long term – high oil revenue is key to continue reforms – that’s Kuvshinova

#### **Economic growth is stable – low prices crashes it**

World Bank 9/25 – The World Bank, (“Russian Economic Report 30: Structural Challenges to Growth Become Binding”, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/09/25/russian-economic-report-30>, AW)

Slowdown in consumption, stalled investment demand, and a continuing weak external environment led to the downward revision of the World Bank’s May growth projection for Russia from 2.3 percent to 1.8 percent in 2013. Despite the observed slowdown, the Russian economy is projected to accelerate to 3.1 percent growth in 2014, says the World Bank’s Russian Economic Report №30 launched today in Moscow. “The economy appears to be growing close to its capacity, constrained by feeble investment activities and a tight labor market,” said Birgit Hansl, World Bank Lead Economist and Country Sector Coordinator for Economic Policy in Russia and the main author of the Report. “Global recovery could result in an increase in Russian exports starting in the fourth quarter of 2013, while the World Bank projects oil prices to remain stable. Next year’s growth prospects will largely depend on the recovery in Russia's most important economic partner, the Euro Area, and the increased investment activities associated with the recently announced large state investment projects to be financed off-budget.” According to the report, this moderately positive outlook is subject to downside risks. “Russian exports could remain depressed if the recovery in global demand is further delayed,” said Hansl. “The tapering of quantitative easing policies, notably in the US, could temporarily negatively impact Russia's economy through lower oil prices, restricted access to international capital markets, and higher capital outflows. We note also vulnerability to increasing risks in regard to the quality of the credit portfolio given continuously high credit growth.” Some key points of the new Russian Economic Report are: Russia fared well compared to other high-income economies or EU emerging economies. Although high-income and EU emerging economies appear to be in a recovery mode, this seems not yet to be the case for Russia. The slowdown came as a result of weaker demand due to combination of external and domestic factors, some of which are cyclical and others structural. A large part of the cyclical component is related to Russia’s high dependence on oil and gas exports and. with it, its exposure to commodity-price volatility.

#### **$100 is the brink**

Ostrouckh and Marson 9/2 – Andrey Ostrouckh and James Marson, Senior Writers for the Wall Street Journal, 9/2/13, (“Slowdown Is Forcing Russia to Trim Spending, Says Putin”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432404579051040700939878.html>, AW)

Any cuts that hit the pocketbooks of Mr. Putin's main supporters—state workers and pensioners—"will spark growing discontent, which will ruin trust in Mr. Putin," said Lev Gudkov, head of the Levada Center.¶ The Kremlin has largely quelled political protests that sprang up in 2011-2012 amid accusations of vote fraud by Mr. Putin's United Russia party in a parliamentary election. The government has passed laws restricting public gatherings, at the same time as restarting direct regional elections.¶ A continued slowdown in Russia's economy could broaden anger outside Moscow, where those protests occurred, Mr. Gudkov said, leading Mr. Putin to intensify criticism of the West, which has sharpened in recent months.¶ Under pressure to reinvigorate the country's economy, Russia's government had proposed a multibillion-dollar stimulus plan of investments in roads and railways. That plan will be funded from the rainy-day fund of windfall oil revenues, which the Kremlin used to support the economy in 2008 and 2009.¶ The central bank has so far resisted calls from some officials and industrialists to cut interest rates to boost growth as long as inflation remains above its target of 6%.¶ Economists said the government could manage to fulfill the president's spending pledges by juggling expenditures and trimming in other areas. "But if economic slowdown continues and oil prices hover around $100 per barrel, then there might be a need to cut other spending," said Dmitry Polevoy, economist at ING Bank in Moscow

## Link

### 2NC – Oil Dependence

#### Decreasing oil dependence lowers oil prices

**Heinz, 12 –** (John Heinz, Associated Press Staff Writer for the Denver Post. April 2, 2012. “Why domestic drilling will lower gas prices,” http://blogs.denverpost.com/eletters/2012/04/02/domestic-drilling-gas-prices/17240/)//SDl

Will increased domestic drilling decrease the price of gasoline? Reps. Cory Gardner and Doug Lamborn were right in asserting that it will (“Is the Obama administration’s energy policy credible?” March 25 point-counterpoint articles).¶ While the price of oil is influenced by a global market, it is a commodity that must be transported from place to place, which leads to vastly different prices depending on location. All one has to do is look at the difference between Brent crude (the international benchmark price) at about $125 per barrel and West Texas Intermediate crude (the U.S. benchmark price) at about $100 per barrel. The U.S. oil costs 50 cents a gallon less. Looking even closer to home, the current price for Denver Basin oil is $80 per barrel.¶ So oil produced in Colorado costs $1 per gallon less than imported oil. Oil from Wyoming and North Dakota is even cheaper. That is why Colorado residents are paying less than the national average for gasoline.

**Oil dependence is key to US-Saudi relations**

Mouawad9 New York Times, “Saudi Blasts American Energy Policy”, <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/saudi-blasts-american-energy-policy/>

The question of American “energy independence” clearly rankles officials in Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, who seem increasingly puzzled by the energy policy of the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer. In a short and strongly-worded essay in Foreign Policy magazine, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to the United States and a nephew to King Abdullah, said that for American politicians, invoking energy independence “is now as essential as baby-kissing,” and accuses them of “demagoguery.” All the talk about energy independence, Mr. al-Faisal said, is “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” There is no technology on the horizon that can completely replace oil as the fuel for the United States’ massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs; any future, no matter how wishful, will include a mix of renewable and nonrenewable fuels. Considering this, efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia date back to the 1930s when American geologists first struck oil in the kingdom. While American companies built the Saudi oil industry, Americans have never shaken off their suspicions and mistrust of the kingdom since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. It’s not the first time a Saudi official has criticized American energy policy, or its growing reliance on renewable fuels. Many of Prince Turki’s arguments recycle Saudi Arabia’s position that for the past 30 years, the oil-rich kingdom has acted in a responsible manner to keep oil markets well supplied. Prince Turki correctly points at the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in recent years to increase its production to make up for lost production in Iraq or elsewhere in times of crisis, and invest close to $100 billion in new capacity over the past five years. On the other hand, he points out that four countries — Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela — failed to live up to expectations that they would raise their production over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including “a U.S. invasion” in the case of Iraq. The Saudis have genuine reasons to fear the effects of the Obama administration’s energy policy and its commitment to reducing oil consumption, as well as efforts to reduce carbon emissions. As Prince Turki points out himself, Saudi Arabia holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and would like to keep selling oil for several more decades. As such, the Saudis know that any attempt to reduce gasoline consumption is a threat to the future of the Saudi economy. It’s an old refrain: in his most famous remark, the former Saudi oil minister, Sheik Yamani, once said that the stone age didn’t end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. It will end when something replaces it. The trend has already started. Oil demand in the United States has peaked — instead of rising as it has since the dawn of the age of oil more than a century ago, the nation’s oil consumption has begun its long decline. The question is: how fast will the transition take?

Relations are key to stabilizing Iran and Pakistan

Levine 11 – adjunct professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he teaches energy and security in the Security Studies Program, contributing editor at Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb, Steve, Foreign Policy, “Frenemies forever”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/opening\_gambit\_frenemies\_forever?page=0,0, WEA)

Besides, Saudi Arabia isn't just a giant gas station with a flag. Saudi help is now essential for numerous top-shelf U.S. priorities, from containing Iran to countering terrorism to extricating U.S. troops from Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan stable. **Only Saudi Arabia**, with its carefully cultivated, behind-the-scenes links to countries and leaders who do not trust Washington, can play this role.

That goes nuclear – turns case

Morgan 10 **–**Labour Party Executive Committee, political writer, author of "The Mind of a Terrorist Fundamentalist - the Cult of Al Qaeda" (Stephen, “Better Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR,” 6/4, http://society.ezinemark.com/better-another-taliban-afghanistan-than-a-taliban-nuclear-pakistan-4d0ce18ba75.html)

The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

### **2NC – Venezuela**

#### Engagement with Venezuela allows for investment in their oil sector – paves the way for foreign investment – that massively increases production – that’s Clarke

#### Plan bolsters American access to reserves – massively boosts output

John Griffin (staff writer), THE CRIMSON, Apr. 3, 2013. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/

Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company.

#### That causes them to affect the global oil market

Krause 2013 [Clifford Krause March 8, 2013 New York Times “Dwindling Production Has Led to Lesser Role for Venezuela as Major Oil Power” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/americas/venezuelas-role-as-oil-power-diminished.html?\_r=0]

But Mr. Chávez’s death on Tuesday has had surprisingly little impact on global oil markets, highlighting how Venezuela’s dwindling crude production and exports have undercut its global power in recent years.¶ International oil prices have barely moved since Mr. Chávez died. OPEC has decided to increase shipments to the United States and Europe this month, using oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Oil company executives, long frustrated by Mr. Chávez’s nationalizations, are voicing only tepid hopes that they could possibly return in full force to what was once one of their crown jewels.¶ Venezuela’s annual oil production has declined since Mr. Chávez took office in 1999 by roughly a quarter, and oil exports have dropped by nearly a half, a major economic threat to a country that depends on oil for 95 percent of its exports and 45 percent of its federal budget revenues.¶ “Venezuela’s clout on OPEC and on world oil prices has been greatly diminished because of its inability to exploit its enormous resources,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a consultancy. “In the 1990s, their production was booming and they could thumb their nose at Saudi Arabia and get away with it, but now they have become OPEC’s poor cousin.”

#### Venezuela has the largest reserves in the world

Tom Gjelten, (staff writer), Apr. 11, 2013. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from http://www.npr.org/2013/04 /11/176843567/ venezuela-s-next-leader-faces-tough-choice-on-oil-program

As Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez thought in grandiose terms, and his country's vast oil riches enabled him to act on his vision. But Chavez died before he had to deal with the flaws in his model, and some hard choices await his successor.¶ Key to Chavez's notion of "21st Century Socialism" was the redistribution of Venezuela's oil earnings. The country's oil reserves — estimated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to be the largest in the world — are worth tens of billions of dollars a year in potential revenue.

## Case

### **No Oil Shocks Impact**

#### No impact to shocks- newest empirical study proves

Khadduri ’11 [Walid, Former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, "The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations," http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html]

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy.

#### Venezuela won’t cut imports and the impact would be quickly remedied

Arias, 09 --- M.A. Strategic Intelligence, B.A. Political Science (2/9/2009, Frances, “Venezuela’s Threats to U.S. Economic Security,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/02/09/venezuela%E2%80%99s-threats-to-us-economic-security/>, JMP)

The likelihood of Venezuela cutting oil exports is highly unlikely. “Venezuela beleaguered by food shortages, depends heavily on oil exports for about 90 percent of its export earnings and about half of the government revenue” (Mufson 2008, 1). The United States is Venezuela’s biggest customer. Halting crude sales would affect CITGO. “Halting crude sales to the U.S. would divert heavy feed from CITGO, which PDVSA owns and which has a total of 756,000 b/cd of deep-conversion capacity in three wholly owned U.S. refineries – 597,000 b/d of it on the Gulf Coast” (Oil & Gas Journal 2008, 21). According to Oil & Gas Journal, “If Chavez did lose his senses and halts sales of Venezuelan oil in the U.S., crude prices might jump in a trading panic but would quickly resettle as U.S. refineries found new sellers – probably the traders moving in to buy from PDSA” (Oil & Gas 2006, 21). Also, Venezuelans are importing more U.S. products such as construction machinery, cars, and computers. “Although it may be Chavez’s ultimate desire to end U.S.-Venezuelan interdependence, such close economic linkages cannot be easily dismantled” (Lapper 2006, 17).¶ Not only would the stopping of oil exports hurt Venezuela’s economy, it would affect U.S. foreign aid being sent there. “According to the State Department’s fiscal year 2007 budget, Venezuela will receive $1 million in Andean Counter Drug Initiative funds this year – a decrease of nearly $2 million since 2005 – and $1.5 million in Economic Support Funds to strengthen civil society and the rule of law” (Lapper 2006, 23).

## A2 LA instability

Latin American stability growing – Brazil leading

Xinhau 1-26-13 (Xinahu Times, “News Analysis: Latin America's economic stability arouses envy of EU”, January 26th, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-01/26/c\_132129380.htm)

Meanwhile, Latin America, led by Brazil, has experienced years of steady growth, though at lower levels than expected. Brazil had just two quarters of shrinking gross domestic product, both in 2008, when the world entered an economic tailspin following the financial crisis in the United States. It reported 0.6-percent growth in the last quarter of 2012.¶ Brazil has done a better job of supporting potentially fragile neighbors than Germany, whose demands of austerity have caused political turmoil in Greece and an unemployment spiral in Spain. Through its state banks, such as the National Development Bank, Brazil has been providing loans to shaky southern neighbor Argentina to keep its financial system stable and businesses in motion.¶ Chile, host nation of the first summit between the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the European Union, has done even better, ending last year with a 5.5-percent GDP growth, thanks in large part to high prices for copper, its major export.

## Security

#### Security politics destroys value to life, reducing humans to units of calculation.

Dillon 96 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, p. 26]

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterised by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further—the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible—and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics—the axioms of inter-State security relations, popularised, for example, through strategic discourse— even if the details have changed.

## 2NC – Perm – (0:40)

### The permutation continues their flawed epistemology – the result is militarization and failure

K.M FIERKE, PROF. OF IR @ ST ANDREWS, 2007, “CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY”, BOOK, KENTUCKY

BLUE

The third section of the book raises a question about what is at stake in analyzing security as a social construction. Critical scholars have asked what it means to be secure in an insecure world (Burke 2002:1). The question relates to an argument that perhaps too much emphasis is placed, in theory and in political practice, on removing insecurity from political life, as if this were possible. If only the cancer of communism could be removed, or the swamp of terrorism drained, we might all then enjoy a secure existence. The desire for perfect security, to be rid once and for all of the threats to our existence, some critical scholars argue is an illusory. It is illusory in so far as every subject is incomplete and thus insecurity is inherent in the nature of the world (Edkins 2003a: 366). The search for a perfect security is not merely illusory, but becomes part and parcel of the problem, that is it contributed to the production of insecurity and the construction of threats. Cox’s distinction between problem-solving and critical theory, mentioned earlier, is useful for clarifying what is at stake. Problem-solving theory seeks to fix the world in place, to accept it as it is and make necessary repairs. In the process, patterns of domination and war are reified and naturalized. Security as problem-solving presents the illusion that everything can be fixed while failing to recognize that the construction itself is flawed. In the process of repair, historical practice, and the unexamined assumptions on which they rest, contribute to the reproduction of war, and, with it, human trauma, insecurity and hierarchies of power. Critical approaches seek to remove the blinders, reveal the assumptions, and open a larger space for imagining different worlds. The question is whether we are overly mesmerized by the pursuit of security in what is fundamentally an insecure world. This question points less to the construction of threats than to the relationship between naming a threat and our response to it. The concern of the Copenhagen School, mentioned earlier and shared by others, is that extending the concept of security to arenas that have previously been understood in these terms may contribute to their militarization. In this light, one can question whether we need to use the word security, or ask what is gained in using it, in relation to problems such as climate change or poverty. To what extend does use of the word security contribute to emancipation from these problems or lead us towards military solutions? While come critical analysts seek emancipation from the everyday militarization of security practices, others are critical of the concept because of its links to liberal and Marxist meta-narratives and belief in progress. Any political formulation, including the emancipatory, they argue risks reification and can become a new structure of domination, as is evident from the communist eperiments in the former Soviet bloc. The best way to resist this reification is constant critique that pushes at the boundaries of existing assumptions. Most critical scholars probably come to the study of security with a desire to improve the lot of those who suffer from military violence, human rights abuse or environmental destruction. The question is how to do this. International responses to violence or suffering tend to assume a responsibility to ‘fix’ problems. If genocide occurs, states have a responsibility to act. If famine occurs, the international community should intervene with aid. These responses focus on the moment of crisis and constitute the possibility of agency by the international community vis-à-vis powerless victims. What is often ignored is a question about the relationship between historical structures of power / knowledge, on the one hand, and contemporary practices, which not only reproduce these hierarchies of power, but also contribute to the reproduction of war and insecurity. The critical task is to analyze the assumptions that underpin historically and culturally situated practices in which order to make way for greater agency, not least for those ‘victims’ who occupy the bottom rungs of the ladder.

## Consult Indigenous

#### Permutation do both fails --- Consultation must happen prior to exploration, exploitation, or relocation to prevent deliberate and inadvertent cultural destruction.

Tamang 05 (Parsuharm. Indigenous expert, UN member. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. January 17-19, 2005. <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.org%2Fesa%2Fsocdev%2Funpfii%2Fdocuments%2Fworkshop_FPIC_tamang.doc&ei=fWX1UbzpAYWWrgHzmICYDw&usg=AFQjCNF5rEZ6DyHFYN3q6mSr9dcoV-LVeQ&sig2=2afHkknmQTU37Lc2nW7fQA&bvm=bv.49784469,d.aWM> ) Ji

ILO convention (Human Rights Law):¶ 29. ILO 169/1989 refers to the principles of FPIC: Article 6, 7, 16, 16 and 22 provides that the government shall:¶ (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures ¶ (b). in particular through their representative institutions; establish means by which these peoples can freely participate to at least the same extent as other sectors of population;¶ (C) assist these peoples’ own institutions and initiatives and in appropriate cases provide the resources for these purposes.¶ 30. In general the Convention specifies that consultation should take place specifically in the following circumstances:¶ (a) When considering legislative or administrative measures that are likely to affect indigenous and tribal peoples {article 6.1 (a)};¶ (b) Prior to exploration or exploitation of sub-surface resources (article 15.2);¶ ( c). When any consideration is being given to indigenous and tribal peoples’ capacity to alienate their lands or to transmit them outside their own communities (article 17);¶ (d). Prior to relocation, which should take place only with the FPIC of IPs (article 16);¶ (e). On the organisation and operation of special vocational training programmes (article 22).¶

#### Prior consultation with indigenous peoples over energy engagement in Latin America is critical to protect against the destruction of key religious and cultural sites that threatens their continued survival.

Latinamerica Press ‘11

(Comunicaciones Aliadas, governmental organization that produces reliable information and analysis, Latinamerica press, 7/30/13, <http://alainet.org/images/14PI_consultation_lp.pdf>) bcho

Why is prior consultation a fundamental right for indigenous peoples? In Latin America, social conflicts related to the exploitation of natural resources on indigenous lands are becoming more frequent. The revenue from natural resource exportation is an important factor in Latin American countries’ economic growth. In light of this “national interest”, states grant concessions on indigenous lands to extractive firms without taking into account how those activities affect their way of life. States argue that investments in mining, petroleum, hydrocarbons, and timber bring development to the country, but this isn’t necessarily true, since the majority of the time development does not benefit the indigenous com-munities living on lands where the extractive activities are happening. **Not only do they not benefit, but their habitat is destroyed, the land that they consider their pharmacy, their market, their hardware store, their space to connect with their beliefs, spirituality and culture.** Is it that national interest takes precedence over the right to existence of a human collective, an indigenous people? Or is it perhaps not the obligation of states to protect the existence of all of its inhabitants? When extractive activities alter the way of life for indigenous peoples, it endangers their very existence, to the point that they feel it necessary to take dramatic measures in order to be heard and respected. Unfortunately, those measures sometimes turn into clashes with law enforcement and result in deaths or injuries. In this context, free and informed prior consultation with indigenous communities, before taking any decision that would affect them directly, would avoid the proliferation of these conflicts, as well as so much death and resentment. **Prior consultation is one of the fundamental rights included in the international legal framework, such as the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples — which has constitutional status in the countries that have ratified it — and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.** And prior consultation is fundamental in that it recognizes the right of a people to make decisions that could affect its existence. The communities have the power to say “we don’t want this activity that is going to affect our way of life and our basic rights, that is going to produce toxic waste, that is going to contaminate the water, that is going to flood our land.” No community is obligated to commit suicide in the name of “national interest.” Likewise, a state does not have the authority to conduct an activity that will be at the expense of a community’s basic rights. Recognizing the importance of the application of prior consultation with indigenous communities, Comunicaciones Aliadas, with the support of the American Jewish World Service, or AJWS, has prepared this special report that addresses the status of this right in nine countries in Latin America.

#### Consultation Solves

#### Consultation creates procedural norms and cultural protections that the difference between life and death for indigenous peoples

Rodriguez-Garavito 2010

Cesar, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Program on Global Justice and Human Rights, University of the Andes (Colombia); Hauser Global Fellow, New York University Law School; Founding member, Center for Law, Justice, and Society, Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 18 #1 (Winter), http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/Public%20Sociology,%20Live/Rodriguez.Global%20Governance.pdf

The reverse of the domination effect consists in the emancipatory possibilities presented by consultation processes. In practice, consultation is simultaneously a means to both perpetuate and challenge profound inequalities among actors situated in minefields. While they dilute indigenous political demands, procedural norms also create precious opportunities and tools—sometimes the only ones available—for halting (or at least postponing) irreversible cultural and environmental harm and founding or re-founding processes of collective mobilization. The ethnographic evidence demonstrates that consultation’s emancipatory effect can be direct or indirect. The effect is direct when subaltern actors—indigenous communities and their allies—demand compliance with procedural norms and propose interpretations of them that mitigate power asymmetries vis-à-vis consultation’s dominant actors. The process itself has emancipatory potential, to the extent that it establishes strict requirements that reduce the gap between the conditions of actual consultations, on the one hand, and those necessary for genuine deliberation, on the other. As we saw earlier, procedural regulations are not irrelevant. Once they are put into operation, they make a difference that can be, literally, a difference between life and death. For example, an indigenous people’s survival can depend on the possibility that not only do their members have standing to participate in consultation, but so do allied national indigenous organizations who—due to their legal expertise or experience in other consultations—can help balance out power relations. As the U.N. Rapporteurship and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have recognized, whether the standard of consultation or the standard of consent is applied can determine the fate of an indigenous people affected by a large-scale economic project. The Embera of northern Colombia have experienced this difference between life and death literally.

#### The land has traditional, cultural, and spiritual meaning to indigenous people – lack of prior consultation could lead to human rights violation and massacres

Pasqualucci, 2006 (Jo., Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law, S.J.D, George Washington University Law School; J.D., University of Wisconsin School of Law, “The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System <http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2089.7/Garcia%20Sayan/fn131.garciasayan.pdf>) Harbeck

When peoples hold their ancestral¶ land communally and have a close spiritual and cultural relationship with that¶ land, the Inter-American Court will apply its jurisprudence on indigenous land¶ rights and other related rights.58¶ In the Moiwana v Suriname case, the Court applied the case law that it¶ developed in indigenous rights cases to the peoples of the N’djuka Maroon¶ community who had been driven from their traditional land by a massacre¶ perpetrated by the Surinamese military.59 The ancestors of the inhabitants¶ of this community had been brought to the territory, which is now Suriname,¶ in the 17th century as African slaves.60 Over time, many of them escaped to the¶ rainforest, where they established autonomous communities and came to¶ be known as Maroons.61 The N’djuka People, whose village was massacred,¶ are one of the six Maroon communities having their own language, history,¶ cultural traditions and religion.62 The villagers have not been able to¶ return to their traditional lands since the 1986 massacre and are living as¶ internally displaced people in Suriname or as refugees in French Guiana.63¶ Although they are not technically indigenous to the area, the Court applied¶ its jurisprudence on indigenous land rights to the N’djuka ‘tribal people’¶ in accordance with international law.64 Their tradition of sharing land¶ communally, their relationship to the land and the pre-eminent role¶ they accord custom and common religious and spiritual practices is¶ sufficiently similar to the practices and customs of the indigenous peoples¶ for them to merit similar protection. The diversity of a democratic society¶ is equally enhanced by protection of the life style and values of peoples such as¶ the N’djuka.¶ E. ContinuingViolations of Indigenous Rights¶ Generally, an international human rights court has jurisdiction ratione temporis¶ if the alleged violation takes place during a time when the court has jurisdiction¶ over the State. States may file preliminary objections to the court’s jurisdiction¶ 57 Moiwana Community v SurinameIACtHR Series C 124 (2005) at para. 133.¶ 58 Ibid. at paras 131^4.¶ 59 Ibid.¶ 60 Ibid. at para. 86.1. The N’djuka Community now numbers approximately 49,000 people. (Ibid.¶ at para. 86.3.)¶ 61 Ibid. at para. 86.1.¶ 62 Ibid. at paras 86.1 and 86.4.¶ 63 Ibid. at paras 86.19, 86.27 and 86.43.¶ 64 Ibid. at paras 133^5.¶ Evolution of International Indigenous Rights 291¶ at University of Texas at Austin on March 14, 2011 hrlr.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from because the violation occurred before the entry into force of the treaty for¶ that State or before the State accepted the jurisdiction of the tribunal.65¶ Many violations of indigenous rights, especially land rights, took place before¶ the American Convention entered into force for any State or before the 1980s¶ and 1990s when most States Parties to the Convention accepted the jurisdiction¶ of the Inter-American Court. Thus, were there no exceptions to this principle,¶ even the current continuing effects of these violations would be beyond the¶ jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court and other international adjudicative¶ bodies.¶

#### Empirics prove prior consultation key—no consultation towards indigenous people lead to no values or benefits

**Fajardo 11** (Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, vice president of the international institute on law and society, extensive experience with indigenous rights, prior consultation: a fundamental right for indigenous people, lpspecialreport, June 2011, <http://www.latinamericapress.org/objetos/informe/14PI_consultation_lp.pdf>)

The indigenous leader Mónica Chuji, ¶ who chaired the Natural Resources Board ¶ in the Constituent Assembly that drafted ¶ the 2008 Constitution, remembers the ¶ first confrontation that occurred within ¶ the ruling party’s assembly members.¶ “Those of us who were linked to the ¶ indigenous population demanded that the ¶ Constitution establish the requirement ¶ that indigenous peoples give their consent ¶ before implementing government programs in their territories, and not merely ¶ be consulted,” said Chuji.¶ ECUAdoR¶ Luis Ángel Saavedra in Quito¶ Consultation or prior consent?¶ The confrontation of concepts, at first ¶ glance, was a response to what had been ¶ happening with the 1998 Constitution, ¶ which provided for prior consultation ¶ as the only requirement before intervention in indigenous territories. But little ¶ to nothing of value resulted from these ¶ consultations, since community decisions ¶ were not taken into account.¶ Governments and companies interested in extracting resources from ¶ indigenous lands essentially resorted to ¶ a number of ruses to ensure that they ¶ complied with the requirement within ¶ prior consultation.¶ One of the most used was to call community assemblies in which they were ¶ informed about the upcoming plans, but ¶ at no time were they asked if they accepted ¶ — or not — the proposed plans.¶ “To convene a meeting of the community, or to call together certain leaders, ¶ to inform them about government plans ¶ is not a consultation, since there was ¶ no opportunity for the community to ¶ express their agreement or disagreement ¶ with the proposal; thus we demand that ¶ the Constitution speak of prior consent,” ¶ said Chuji.¶ Prior informed consent implies that ¶ the community agrees with the intervention in its lands. This in turn requires that ¶ the outcome of the prior consultation be ¶ binding. Neither consent nor the requirement to comply with the outcome of any ¶ prior consultation was incorporated into ¶ the 2008 Constitution.