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## Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 is Dodd-Frank

Passage of the TBA now is key – it expires on January 17th – kills future hopes of drilling

**Fox News, 3/10 –** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” <http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)//SDL>

¶ Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments.¶ SUMMARY¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.”¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year.¶ For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment.¶ “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.”¶ Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing.¶ If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty.¶ If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

If the TBA does pass, lack of leadership in the status quo means it will be the house version

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The United States and Mexico concluded a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement, officially titled the “Agreement between the United States and Mexico Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico,” (TBA) in February 2012. The agreement provides the United States substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement in April 2012. However, the U.S. Congress needs to enact implementing legislation to give the Department of Interior the authority to play its role in the agreement.¶ This otherwise uncontroversial agreement is now at risk. After nearly a year of benign neglect from the Obama administration, legislation is now being considered to implement TBA. The TBA is a new type of international agreement, and using proven tools for considering treaties and executive agreements, Congress has an important role to play in its interpretation. Regrettably, without strong leadership and engagement from the administration or Congressional leaders, the U.S. House of Representatives included an unnecessary “poison pill” in its June 27, 2013 version of the authorizing bill. The Senate can do better.

Only the senate version provides transparency over contracts with Mexico

**Boman, 13 –** (Karen Boman, Associated Press Staff Writer for RigZone. October 14, 2013. “Senate Passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact,” http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\_gas/a/129582/Senate\_Passes\_USMexico\_Drilling\_Pact)//SDL

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Saturday that would implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The Senate passed the bill by “unanimous consent”, avoiding a roll call vote, The Hill reported on Sunday. Last year, government officials from the two countries signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which would establish rules for developing oil and gas resources along the United States’ maritime border with Mexico. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act (H.R. 1613), which would enact the terms of the agreement signed by the Obama administration and Mexico to govern how to explore, develop, and share revenue from all oil and gas resources along the Gulf of Mexico’s maritime border. H.R. 1613 would lift the current moratorium on exploration and production along the Western Gap section of the boundary, opening up 1.5 million acres in the Gulf previously off limits due to border issues, and provide a framework for the safe management of oil and gas resources in the boundary area. While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported.

Even if Nieto passes reform, domestic legislation alone fails, clear and transparent US engagement on oil via the plan is key to solvency and broader Latin American relations

Abe Collier, Policy Analyst at Praemon, 13 [“The US Stake in Mexican Energy Reform,” Praemon—forecast and analysts from the brightest new minds, September 17,

In 1938, Mexico’s government made one¶ of the world’s most populist and radical¶ moves of the 20th century—nationalizing¶ the oil and gas industry. Foreign companies¶ from the United States and elsewhere¶ were paid as much as the Mexican¶ government could afford, but the companies¶ lost all permanent investments in¶ the country. Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexico’s¶ president at the time, was hailed as a hero¶ by the Mexican people—Mexico, long a¶ servant of foreign investors and governments,¶ was establishing itself as an international¶ force. Nearly eighty years later,¶ Mexico’s current president, Enrique Peña¶ Nieto, has proposed an energy reform¶ plan that would allow foreign companies¶ to take a significant part in the rich proceeds¶ from Mexican oil and gas for the¶ first time since 1938.1¶ The move makes practical sense. Pemex—the public Mexican company that performs all the explora-tion, drilling, and refining of oil within Mexican borders—has long been notorious for its corruption¶ and bureaucratic waste. It is frequently used as a cash source for politicians who sell high positions¶ in the publicly owned company, invest with inside information, or provide consulting services.2 The¶ company is twenty to thirty years behind industry leaders in management structure as well as technology¶ and expertise concerning deep-sea and shale drilling, which are seen by many as the future of the¶ industry.3 And many Mexicans agree that the company needs to be reformed, but less than 20% think¶ it should be done by allowing private investment.4 With such broad, bi-partisan opposition to privatization¶ of the oil and gas industry—along with bad memories from the privatization of the telecommunications¶ industry in the 1990s, when Carlos Slim and a few other business moguls ended up with a de¶ facto private monopoly—private investment in Pemex is an unlikely option for reform. To avoid this,¶ Peña Nieto and his party have proposed that the Mexican legislature allow private companies to form¶ joint ventures and partnerships with Pemex (taking fees but ceding all ownership rights of the oil to¶ the national firm). More liberal politicians, including the left-leaning PRD, have suggested that Mexico¶ continue its isolationist energy policy and attempt a complete overhaul of Pemex without any private¶ involvement.5¶ Peña Nieto’s proposition has several clear advantages for Mexico. The primary advantage for Mexico is¶ that change will come more quickly and efficiently if outside companies are involved; private firms usually¶ have more technical know-how and less time-wasting corruption. In addition, true to the intent of¶ the 1938 nationalization of the country’s oil and gas, the proposition permits reform without allowing¶ permanent private or foreign investment. Indeed, Pemex has already entered into some joint venture¶ projects outside of its national boundaries in order to begin acquiring the experience it needs.6 Additionally,¶ the ties created by work with foreign companies could well lead to increased foreign trade,¶ which has been the lifeblood of Mexico’s economic growth for decades.¶ But the US stands to gain much as well¶ if the centrist PRI plan is adopted. One¶ clear advantage is that large US oil companies—¶ such as ExxonMobil and Chevron—¶ will be afforded significant growth¶ and revenue opportunities as they work¶ with Pemex. Perhaps more important,¶ however, the two nations would likely¶ advance their working relationship a¶ great deal by international cooperative¶ ventures, even among private firms. The¶ troubled history between the two countries,¶ including a good deal of present¶ tension caused by the ongoing war on¶ drugs, could only be helped by friendly¶ business relationships. On a related note,¶ US foreign trade could be boosted by a¶ better relationship with Mexican firms,¶ and not just in Mexico—Central and¶ South American views of the United States are greatly affected by its behavior towards Mexico, and a¶ better US-Mexican relationship could increase trade from the Mexican border to the southern tip of Ar-gentina. Finally, if Pemex recovers fully, the increased revenues would markedly strengthen Mexico—an¶ important US ally—on the international stage and help further US interests in diplomacy and trade.¶ How, then, should the United States encourage Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan? Many Mexicans worry¶ that private and foreign companies, unhindered by labor laws and unions, would generally exploit¶ Mexican workers and care little about the country.7 Accordingly, the United States must first provide assurance¶ that any foreign involvement will be strictly monitored, perhaps by forming a bilateral monitoring¶ team with representatives from both nations to oversee the contracting, planning, and execution of¶ any joint ventures. Once both nations are satisfied that Mexican security and autonomy are not at risk,¶ US diplomats should collaborate with Pemex, representatives of the Mexican government, and private¶ energy companies to outline a long-term plan for growth in Mexico’s energy sector. This should include¶ details of how long domestic and foreign firms will be involved in the energy industry as well as an informational¶ campaign to promote the program among the Mexican public.¶ US politicians and businesspeople can no longer afford to stand by and let Mexico suffer poverty and¶ slow economic growth because it lacks information or options to make wise decisions. Limited intervention,¶ particularly as Mexico’s energy sector is currently striving to reinvent itself, has become both a¶ practical imperative and a humanitarian duty.

Additionally, the house waiver exemption gets modeled globally

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The House bill contains language that would introduce secrecy into payments made under the TBA by precluding the revenue transparency provisions of the so-called “Cardin-Lugar Amendment” (Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act) from applying to TBA implementation. The Cardin-Lugar Amendment requires oil, gas, and minerals companies to publicly disclose payments to governments, a U.S. requirement that has sparked similar laws in the European Union and are[r1] now under consideration in Canada and beyond. By targeting those bipartisan, robustly supported pro-openness provisions, opponents of transparency are creating opposition to the TBA where none need be present. In raw political terms, the TBA is important but not at the top of the oil and gas industry’s priority list for Congress whereas the proponents of transparency are well-organized and gaining momentum. Even the White House announced it could not support the House bill. Given that political dynamic, some proponents of the TBA are hurting their cause by encouraging the anti-transparency provision.

Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

**Clough, 10 -** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

¶ Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population.¶ ¶ Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.¶ ¶ Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

**Morgan, 7** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure – our evidence is Africa Specific

Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)//SDL

¶ “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.”¶ ¶ The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere **are** plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty.¶ ¶ A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China.¶ ¶ In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures.¶ ¶ “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC.¶ ¶ But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year.¶ ¶ “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

Corruption in Africa causes wars and instability – transparency key

**Diamond, 98**  (Larry Diamond, Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. January 1998. “Restoring Democracy in Africa,” http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20301225/restoring-democracy-in-africa )//SDL

¶ The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite.¶ ¶ In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no trust, institutions to facilitate cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups.¶ ¶ The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.¶ ¶ Given Africa's authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realizes that every type of dictatorship on the continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the predictability of a democratic constitution.¶ ¶ As Hoover Institution senior fellow Barry Weingast pointed out in the American Political Science Review, contending that ethnic groups will not trust and tolerate one another and cooperate for a larger national good unless there are credible limits on the state. Democracy can not be stable unless rulers see that it is in their interest to abide by the rules. What makes it in their interest is the overriding commitment of all major ethnic groups, parties, and interest organizations to a constitution.

African instability goes nuclear.

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

And there’s no disads to the senate bill

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

More importantly, the pro-secrecy exemption is not necessary on the merits. First, it has no relevance for activities on the U.S. side of the Gulf. In the U.S., royalties paid for offshore production are public knowledge. Indeed, as part of its efforts to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (),**EITI** the Obama Administration has offered – and industry and civil society welcomed – to unilaterally disclose 100% of payments received by the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) from industry for development of oil and gas concessions. ONRR receipts make up 95% of all U.S. government extractive revenues, including royalties, rents and bonuses.¶ Second, the claim that an anti-transparency exemption is necessary to protect U.S. competitiveness on the Mexican side of the border is without foundation. Some exemption supporters claim it is necessary because Mexico could create a legal framework prohibiting payment disclosure by foreign firms. Yet the transboundary agreement provides for certain information to be kept confidential unless national laws require disclosure. Thus, the U.S. and Mexico have already reached an understanding that national governments should decide whether payments disclosure should be required. As formal negotiations for the TBA began in September 2011, Mexico acceded to this arrangement more than one year after the Cardin-Lugar Amendment became U.S. law. In other words, the TBA protects companies that will be required to disclose payments under existing U.S. law. ¶ Third, while some proponents of the exemption fear U.S. disclosure laws will render PEMEX or the Mexican Government unwilling to cooperate with U.S. firms, that Mexican leaders took the political risks necessary to pass the TBA suggests otherwise. Only a handful of companies have the technology and capital to partner with PEMEX in the deep water area under jurisdiction of the TBA, the reality of which PEMEX leaders are keenly aware as they work to diversify production sources. Within Mexico’s political leadership, it would be antithetical to President Peña Nieto’s push for more transparency and in combating corruption for him to seek less openness in the oil sector, particularly considering that PEMEX itself is not under jurisdiction of Cardin-Lugar disclosure requirements. If anything, U.S. disclosure requirements will benefit the standing of U.S. companies in Mexico by helping overcome the deep distrust they have inherited. ¶ Fourth, the TBA gives the U.S. government a veto in order to protect U.S. interests, including commercial interests. No “unitization” agreement (essentially, a joint venture between PEMEX and private companies) to develop resources under the TBA can enter into force without the Department of Interior’s approval. Therefore, any discrimination against U.S. companies can be guarded against.

## Contention 2 Hegemony

Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

Three Internal Links:

The first internal link is oil dependence:

THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

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**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 3 is Drilling

Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

### Topicality

1. **Counter-interpretation—both conditional and unconditional engagement are topical**

Haass 2K (Richard Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, June 2000, <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>, zs)

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. Conditional engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, unconditional engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

1. Their interpretation bad—it allows more affs to be run because we could condition engagement on anything from other countries—that kills neg ground—they can’t sufficiently research each condition—unconditional engagement is better because they only have to research one part of the plan
2. We are core of the topic—topic paper proves

Bauschard 13 (Stefan, Director of Debate at Lakeland School district and Assistant debate coach at the Harvard Debate Council Assistant Debate Coach, [Harvard Debate Council](http://harvarddebate.org" \t "_blank), “Defining ‘Economic Engagement,’” <http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economic-engagement/>, Accessed: 7/1/13)

What issues can be covered by economic engagement? The core question here is how the term “economic” limits the topic beyond what would be true if the topic simply said “increase its engagement with…” Obviously, the term “economic” limits the type of engagement, but contextual usage evidence doesn’t suggest that there is too much of a limit. I’ve found contextual evidence that supports including all of the following in economic engagement - Trade - Information technology - Investment - General environmental issues - Forest and wetland conservation - Water and air quality - Small & Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - Health care - Clean energy, including renewable energy - Electricity production and transmission - Nuclear power - General energy security - Defense and security - Economic development - Intellectual property - Reducing corruption - Food regulation - Environmental regulation How does the US engage? As noted, this question is also related to the third question because whether or not engagement can (or should) include a quid pro quo is a how question related to engagement. I separated them because the conditionality question applies to all other how issues and is really a core question about the types of acceptable Negative counterplans. For example, the US might engage by providing foreign aid, but whether or not that aid can or should be delivered as part of a quid pro quo is a separate question. In terms of specific mechanisms for engagement, contextual evidence exists for engaging in all of the following ways – -Official contacts with the government -Academic exchanges -Two track dialogue(s) -Development programs (foreign aid) -Providing loans -Working through non-governmental organizations (NGOS) -Enabling International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to support work in the topic countries -Negotiating trade agreements and facilitating trade ties -Developing standards and practices for businesses -Using the US Agency for International Development (AID) to support business development -Encouraging other countries to reduce trade barriers -Providing visas to individuals in other countries (this was an entire college resolution!) -Supporting increased investment -Helping US companies navigate the business climate -Strengthening measures to protect intellectual property -Encouraging countries to invest in the US -Integrating countries into the global economic system -Reduction in sanctions and other trade barriers -Facilitating action by IFIs -Boosting capital investment -Supporting joint technology development -Providing technical cooperation on energy environment -Facilitating the development of regulation

### Dodd-Frank

### Hegemony

1. Heg collapse causes wild-fire proliferation-turns the link

Rosen 3 (Stephen Peter Rosen (PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University) Spring 2003 “An Empire, If you Can Keep It,” The National Interest, , LN Academic, UK: Fisher)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

1. Terrorism inevitable – heg prevents escalation

Brooks & Wohlforth, 2 (Stephen G.-, Assist. Prof. in the Dept. of Gov. @ Dartmouth , William C-, Assoc. Prof. in the Dept. of Gov. @ Dartmouth , July/ August, Foreign Affairs, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Lexis; Jacob)

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

### Drilling

The agreement includes increased safety regulations

Martin

13, University of California-San Diego Institute of the Americas Energy Program Director & Wood, Mexico Institute Director, 13

[Jeremy, Duncan, 3/3/2013 “U.S. Should Act Quickly on Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement With Mexico” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12923/u-s-should-act-quickly-on-transboundary-hydrocarbon-agreement-with-mexico>, date accessed 6/23/13] IGM

Second, this agreement makes clear that both nations are keenly aware of the energy potential of the Gulf**,** particularly along the maritime border. But it also firmly establishes the issue of increased regulation and standards for drilling in a bilateral agreement. Since the April 2010 Macondo accident, the largest oil spill in U.S. history, the U.S. has been more concerned with drilling safety not just in the U.S. but also in neighboring countries around the Gulf such as Cuba and Mexico. This agreement formalizes interaction in terms of regulation and any responses to incidents along the maritime border.

1. Resilience theory is deadwrong—studies prove

Wall ’11—

(Tim Wall is a contributor to *Discovery News.* “Lack of Spare Species Leave Ecosystems Flat.” *Discovery News.*  <http://news.discovery.com/earth/global-warming/lack-of-spare-species-leaves-ecosystems-flat.htm>. Jessica Whiteside is an Assistant Professor in Geological Sciences at Brown University. She has a BA from Mt. Holyoke College, an MA and a M. Phil in Earth and Environmental Sciences from Columbia University. She has a PhD from Columbia University from the Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory. 1/11/11. EJW.)

Having back-up plans and built-in redundancy features can save lives, whether it’s emergency flares in the trunk of the car or warning lights and alarms in the cockpit of an airplane. **For Earth, failures in redundancy can lead to catastrophe.**¶ In nature, **multiple species compete for the same resources,** something called [**ecological redundancy**](http://www.ecology.info/article.aspx?cid=10&id=68)**.** For example, several species of sharks may feed on the same prey fish. If one species disappeared, the other sharks would take up the slack on chowing down on the extra fish – keeping the system in balance. **But if multiple species** of shark **go extinct**, a situation that is currently playing out, **the system can veer toward collapse.¶** For the first time **researchers** **have made a direct connection between loss of redundancy and ecosystem collapse**. Their work, published recently in the journal Geology, shows that **during extinction events in the** [**Permian**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Permian_period.aspx) **and** [**Triassic**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Triassic_period.aspx) **periods, the Earth’s ancient oceans lost critical back-up species.¶ The research holds a dire warning** about humans activitiesin the oceansand points out **the importance of preserving whole ecosystems, not just individual species.¶** “It’s definitely a cautionary tale because we know it’s happened at least twice before,” **said** Jessica **Whiteside of Brown University**, the paper’s lead author in a [**press release**](http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2011/01/extinction). “And you have long periods of time before you have **reestablishment of ecological redundancy**.” In these cases, it **took 10 million years for nature to balance itself out again**, the team reported.¶ Many marine biologists worry that fisheries worldwide are in collapse. Overfishing of predatory species, like bluefin tuna, sharks, and swordfish has eliminated, not just competing species, but entire levels of the food chain.¶“It is difficult to evaluate what is going on at present, given that we don’t have the advantage of the long lens of geologic history, where we can see things play out over millions of years,” Whiteside wrote in an email to Discovery News. “But there is evidence that trophic (i.e. food-web) collapse is starting to occur in some marine ecosystems.”¶ One example of ecosystem collapse in the modern world can be seen off the coast of North Carolina, Whiteside said. The disappearance of the [**blacktip shark**](http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sharks/FS_blacktipshark.htm) allowed the [**cownose ray**](http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/gallery/descript/cownoseray/cownoseray.html)population to explode. This event, called a trophic cascade, collapsed the area’s century-old [**bay scallop**](http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/wdb/pub/species_profiles/82_11-012.pdf) industry.¶ Similar situations occurred 250 and 200 million years ago. Predators similar to the modern day[**nautilus**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/nautilus.aspx), called [**ammonites**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ammonite.aspx), were once common and diverse. But many species went extinct after[**massive volcanic eruptions**](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/supervolcano/others/others_07.html) in the Permian and Triassic caused devastation and atmospheric disruption. The resulting climate change reduced ammonites to only a few species.¶ **The result was a simplified food chain.** A few hardy species survived the extinctions and became common. Generalist species expanded and filled wide ranges of the food web, as opposed to locally adapted species filling specific niches. Other **research has suggested that homogeneous populations of generalist species** can actually **slow the divergence of new species and subsequently the ecosystem’s recovery**.¶ After the ancient extinctions, biodiversity and robust ecosystems slowly re-emerged. To understand this re-emergence, the ammonite researchers analyzed carbon isotopes in the fossils. The scientists were then able to measure the stability of the carbon cycle in the ancient oceans.¶ Disruptions, like the volcanic events of the Permian and Triassic, caused species numbers to plummet. After disturbances, it took up to 10 million years for fluctuations to settle down and a stable pattern to develop. Highest species diversities of ammonites were found when the carbon isotope values were stable.¶ “The take home message is that **biodiversity matters**,” Whiteside told Discovery News. Not just because it’s nice to look at a bunch of species, she said, but because **ecosystem functioning is reduced by biodiversity loss.**

### Ptx

1) Filibuster reform was a wrecking ball – no compromise on anything

**Berger, 11/22/13** (Judson, “Filibuster Fallout: Reid maneuver could send ‘wrecking ball’ through talks on key legislation” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/11/22/filibuster-fallout-reid-maneuver-could-send-wrecking-ball-through-talks-on-key/>)

Democrats who claimed victory -- including President Obama -- in stripping the Senate minority of its power to block nominations may have done so at the sacrifice of the president's legislative agenda.

Before Thursday, trust on Capitol Hill was frayed yet there was tentative hope following the bruising fight over the partial shutdown that Republicans and Democrats could find some spectrum of common ground for the rest of Obama's term. Maybe pass a few budgets, maybe do something lasting about that pesky deficit.

But the move to use a rare parliamentary tactic and overhaul Senate procedure making it easier for the majority party to approve presidential nominees has poisoned an already tainted well. Any prospect for compromise on big-ticket items ranging from immigration legislation to a fiscal deal to tax reform is now that much fainter.

"There's no question that the move by Harry Reid will make it much tougher to get anything done between now and 2014," GOP strategist and former long-time Senate aide John Ullyot told FoxNews.com.

"In the short-term, it's a wrecking ball through any efforts that were underway previously to have both parties work together on key bills."

Because of the rule change, non-Supreme Court judicial nominees and executive-office nominees can now be approved with just 51 votes, as opposed to 60.

In the first test of Senate relations following the filibuster change, Republicans united to block a critical defense policy bill. The bill failed in a vote late Thursday, nine votes short of the number needed to advance.

2) Obamacare thumps—makes Obama weak

Kelly **McParland 11/18**/13 11:08 AM ET Kelly McParland: Why the Obamacare debacle could be fatal to Keystone <http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/11/18/kelly-mcparland-why-the-obamacare-debacle-could-be-fatal-to-keystone/>

So, the rational decision was to approve Keystone despite the political hit the President would have to take.  But **Obamacare** has **drastically** alteredthe equation, dramatically **weakening the President and** likely **leaving him less willing to pay the political price** approval for Keystone would entail. Mr. Obama’s approval ratings are at their lowest level since he took office, and while he doesn’t have to run for re-election, crucial mid-term elections take place next year. Approving Keystone now would be far more problematic for the White House than it would otherwise have been. The pain from Obamacare comes from the fact that it crosses political and income divides. The damage is so widespread it affects people of every economic class. Low-income Americans seeking healthcare for the first time are just as frustrated as middle-class families who wanted to hold onto their old coverage, but have been forced to switch. **The President’s promise** that people would be able to keep their old plan has become **a new nightmare**, as letters go out to millions of Americans cancelling their existing plans. The attempt to get **the web site** up **and** working is a **daily embarrassment** to the administration, which evidently has the know-how to tap the cellphone of Germany’s Chancellor, and can vacuum up the private information of anyone with a computer, but can’t find someone able to build a workable healthcare site. Mr. Obama’s legacy is on the line, along with control of Congress in next year’s elections. Democrats hoped to make gains on the back of public anger at the government shut-down that was widely blamed on the Republican party and its Tea Party faction. But the Obamacare debacle has overwhelmed anger at the shutdown and put the party on the defensive again. Democrats in Congress are questioning their own party, candidates are distancing themselves from the President, and former president Bill Clinton — whose wife Hillary is assumed to be planning a White House bid — publicly urged Mr. Obama to change the rules blocking people from keeping their own healthcare. With much of the party already grumbling openly about the lack of accomplishments from Mr. Obama’s second term, the prospect of upsetting the environmental faction will seem even less appetizing than previously. Given the bad odour he’s in at the moment, rejecting Keystone could serve as a chance for a cheap and easy bounce in the polls. And it would come at the expense of Canada, which can’t vote in the U.S. Last week U.S. figures showed that oil production exceeded imports for the first time in 18 years. The boom in shale oil means the U.S. will soon become the world’s biggest oil producer, passing Saudi Arabia and Russia and “realizing the American dream of net energy self-sufficiency,” according to the International Energy Agency. Though the boom will last only a few years and by 2020 the Middle East will again be on top, it gives Mr. Obama the excuse he needs to reject Keystone. If the U.S. doesn’t need the Saudis — at least for now — why would it need Alberta? “That’s a big deal,” the President said of the import picture. “That’s a tremendous step towards American energy independence.” Rejecting Keystone would be the wrong decision. It would put a partisan political boost ahead of long-term security concerns, and would be a direct snub at Canada, which has made clear that the pipeline is a major concern in relations with the U.S. The oil will move by rail anyway, and the oilsands will move ahead. A recent spate of project approvals means tens of billions of dollars will continue to pour into oilsands development. Rejecting the project would put short-term politics ahead of the long-term benefits and the value of relations with Canada. The net environmental impact would be minimal. But **when you’re as politically weakened as** Mr. **Obama**, **and desperate for a “victory**” wherever you can get it, **a project like Keystone** **makes** a pretty **juicy**-looking **target**. It would be bad decision-making by a failing president, but it looks more likely than it used to.

No compromise – each party holding the line

Williams 11/15 (David – staff writer, “House Republicans Should Reject Senate Farm Bill’s Fiscal Train Wreck” http://townhall.com/columnists/davidwilliams/2013/11/15/house-republicans-should-reject-senate-farm-bills-fiscal-train-wreck-n1746065/page/full)

Though neither version is perfect, it’s the Senate Farm Bill that would bankroll billions in mandatory spending, doing little to curtail wasteful subsidies and locking into place the status quo for another five years. The House bill, on the other hand, contains deep cuts to food stamps and, more importantly, makes subsidy spending discretionary rather than mandatory.

The Senate bill would cut food stamps by a mere $4.5 billion (in addition to $11 billion in already agreed-upon cuts), while the House proposal cuts an extra $40 billion - ten times that amount.

For conservatives, that's certainly a better place to start. Senate Democrats are reportedly insisting **they will not agree to cuts above $10 billion**, so Republicans in the conference committee are tasked with holding the line.

Beyond food stamps, the key difference between the House and Senate versions of the Farm Bill are their approach to subsidy programs under the energy title.

It’ll reach a deadlock – empirics

Ellis 11/15 (Stu, FarmGate writer “Farm bill: When and how will it be completed?” 11/15/2013, http://www.cattlenetwork.com/cattle-news/latest/Farm-bill-When-and-how-will-it-be-completed-232067501.html)

The Farm Bill has been in negotiation for the past three years. While it has reached the conference committee stage, there is no guarantee when an agreement will be reached **and whether that** agreement **will be approved by both houses of Congress**.

A look inside the effort is offered by Ohio State University ag economist Carl Zulauf and University of Illinois policy specialist Jonathan Coppess, until recently, the chief Senate ag committee staff member. They report that Senate Ag Committee Chair Debbie Stabenow and House Ag Committee Chair Frank Lucas lead strong majorities and have significant support for their policy positions. And they add, “Without a comprehensive agreement and significant compromise across key differences, or unexpected shifts in votes and positions of at least two conferees in either delegation, **the conference committee could easily** deadlock**, producing no final bill**.”

Zulauf and Coppess map out three potential outcomes that include most of the possibilities:

(1) The conference committee reaches an agreement that is enacted into law.

(2) The conference committee does not reach agreement and the current 2008 farm bill is extended for another year. A two-year extension could occur if Congress wants to avoid a farm bill debate in a Congressional election year. To help meet federal deficit reduction goals, an extension will likely include a reduction in direct payments at least equal to and probably larger than the current 8.5 percent cut under sequestration.

(3) The Conference Committee does not reach agreement and permanent law is repealed, ending farm commodity support programs. The farm safety net becomes the insurance program, meaning multiple-year losses would not be covered by the farm safety net.

Zulauf and Coppess say options 1 and 2 could both happen, but they have about the same chance of happening. Option three would not be good, but has a slim chance of passage. Options 2 and 3 would not typically be scenarios resulting in a Farm Bill but most of the politics surrounding the Farm Bill is keyed upon cutting spending. And they say if the conference committee meeting on the budget is quickly able to allocate funding for agriculture that may dictate when it included and not included in the Farm Bill. Zulauf and Coppess say another possibility would be elimination of the crop safety net programs. They report that while the popular belief is the disagreement over food stamps (SNAP), but they are quick to say the agreement over the Farm Safety net may be a major point of contention. They think there is a distinct possibility of the Budget committee striking first and telling the agriculture committee conference how much money they could spend.

Summary:

The Farm Bill conference committee has had one meeting **with** little accomplished. They are facing only 16 more legislative days before the end of the year, and a repeat of the dairy cliff that will require farmers be paid parity prices for their milk. **While there are some possibilities for an outcome,** they are not representative of typical Farm Bill deliberations.

Nutrition Title pounds

Hopkinson 11/15/13 (Jenny – Politico, http://www.politico.com/morningagriculture/1113/morningagriculture12238.html)

FARM BILL WATCH — **UNLIKELY BEFORE DECEMBER** EDITION: It seems agreement on a consolidated farm bill may not happen in time to make the conference leaders’ end of November deadline, based on the comments of Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass) during his Pro Ag launch interview with Editor Jason Huffman. “I don’t know if we will get it before thanksgiving but I think we will get one,” McGovern said, when pressed on timing. He added, however, “There is a desire to get this thing done.”

It should be no shock that **the biggest issue holding up an agreement is the nutrition title**, where lawmakers must reconcile a $36 billion difference between the two measures. Though McGovern, one of the biggest defenders of SNAP, implied there was a little room for compromise, Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa) told Pro’s Tarini Parti “at this point **I don’t think there is progress made on nutrition**.” But King also said the less controversial issues are being addressed first by both staff and lawmakers before the bigger issues are tackled.

Obama will veto House version

Brock 11/15 (Jim, “ Still little progress on Farm Bill “ http://www.therolladailynews.com/article/20131115/NEWS/131119319?tag=1)

The initial farm bill included $20 billion in cuts to the food stamp program. News reports stated that the $20 billion in cuts were not enough for House Republicans, while they were too steep for some Democrats.

"With the farm bill, we have to eliminate direct payments to farmers and replace it with crop insurance," Smith said. "That would provide certainty to the farmers. And we need to reform the food stamp program to where we're trying to get incentives to get people to get off the program instead of being reliant on it."

**Both** President Barack **Obama and** Democratic Sen. Harry **Reid are opposed to the House's cuts to the food stamp program. Obama has** stated openly **that he would veto any such legislation.**

Part of the budget OR capital isn’t key

Clausen 11/18

(Heidi, regional editor, “Farm-policy guru: Odds favor farm bill as part of budget deal “ http://www.thecountrytoday.com/front\_page/article\_5211c97c-5067-11e3-a760-001a4bcf887a.html)

Barry Flinchbaugh says the odds are 55-45 that the farm bill will be rolled into a budget deal at the end of this year.

“The will is there. That’s what the leaders want to do, **but**, especially **in the House, there’s no telling what they’ll do**,” said Flinchbaugh, a Kansas State University agricultural economics professor.

Flinchbaugh, who’s a renowned expert on farm policy, spoke Nov. 11 at the National Agricultural Bankers Conference in Minneapolis.

If the farm bill isn’t part of a year-end budget deal, he expects Congress to OK another extension of the 2008 bill, and it would be for two years.

Congress wouldn’t want to deal with the legislation next year when the entire House is up for re-election, he said.

“**So this hinges on a budget deal**,” he said, and if there’s no budget deal, there would be a debt-ceiling issue again in February.

Flinchbaugh strongly urges President Barack Obama to lead, **ignore** the “dysfunctional” **Congress** and “pay the bills.”

Alt causes

First, warming

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Global warming has already harmed the world's food production and has driven up food prices by as much as 20% over recent decades, new research has revealed. The drop in the productivity of crop plants around the world was not caused by changes in rainfall but was because higher temperatures can cause dehydration, prevent pollination and lead to slowed photosynthesis. Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, Washington DC, said the findings indicate a turning point: "Agriculture as it exists today evolved over 11,000 years of reasonably stable climate, but that climate system is no more." Adaptation is difficult because our knowledge of the future is not strong enough to drive new investments, he said, "so we just keep going, hoping for the best." The scientists say their work shows how crucial it is to find ways to adapt farming to a warmer world, to ensure that rises in global population are matched by rising food production. "It is vital," said Wolfram Schlenker, at Columbia University in New York and one of the research team. "If we continue to have the same seed varieties and temperatures continue to rise, then food prices will rise further. [Addressing] that is the big question." The new research joins a small number of studies in which the fingerprint of climate change has been separated from natural variations in weather and other factors, demonstrating that the effects of warming have already been felt in the world. Scientists have shown that the chance of the severe heatwave that killed thousands in Europe in 2003 was made twice as likely by global warming, while other work showed that the floods that caused £3.5bn of damage in England in 2000 were made two to three times more likely.

And weather

Tim **Schooley 11**, Pittsburgh Business Times, “Oil prices, bad weather send food prices skyward”, May 6, <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/print-edition/2011/05/06/oil-prices-weather-food-proces-skyward.html>

Along with fast-rising fuel prices, weather-induced crop shortfalls also are affecting food prices. Those in the food and restaurant industries say they haven’t seen the kind of business challenges they are now since the gas price spike and credit crisis of 2008. “I don’t think the weather instability has ever been as hostile in the last 100 years as it was in the last 12 months,” wrote Jeremy Grantham, chief investment officer of GMO Capital, an investment management firm, in a recent report. “If you were to read a one-paragraph summary of almost any agricultural commodity, you would see weather listed as one of the causes of the price rising.” The U.S. Department of AgriculturebizWatch U.S. Department of Agriculture Latest from The Business Journals Federal aid available for fire-damaged homes, communitiesHare Wynn secures 0M settlement in rice caseTwo DeKalb DFCS workers guilty of fraud Follow this company projects rising prices for a host of food commodities: Beef, up 6 percent to 8 percent; pork, up 7.5 percent. Corn prices have doubled since last year, and wheat prices remain at near record highs.

6) Winners win

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

11) Ideology statistically outweighs PC

Matthew N **Beckmann and** Vimal **Kumar 11**, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, econ prof at the Indian Institute of Tech, “Opportunism in Polarization”, Presidential Studies Quarterly; Sep 2011; 41, 3

First, as previous research has shown, the further away the pivotal voter's predisposition from the president's side, the lower his chances for prevailing on "key" contested Senate votes (b = -2.53, se = .79,p < -05). Holding everything else at its 2008 value, the president's predicted probability of winning a key, contested vote runs from .42 to .77 across the observed range of filibuster pivot predispositions (farthest to closest), with the median distance yielding a .56 predicted probability of presidential success. Plainly, the greater the ideological distance between the president and pivotal voter, the worse the president's prospects for winning an important, controversial floor vote in the Senate.

12) PC isn’t real

Edwards 9 – Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150]

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president's control and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on specific policies, and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

### 2AC Sea Turtles Conditions CP

1. Commitment to certainty is key to hegemony—this is solvency deficit to the CP

APSA 09 – American Political Science Organization, September 2009, (“US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, http://www.apsanet.org/media/pdfs/apsa\_tf\_usstanding\_long\_report.pdf)

But two additional factors have come into play that reflect on America itself: first, a growing sense that Washington is no longer a dependable “team player,” and second, a fear that Americans may be less committed to providing international public goods today than they were during the Cold War. It is clear is that when the United States is seen as acting as a “team player,” it can have positive repercussions for U.S. standing, whereas perceptions of U.S. unilateralism can have the opposite effect. Whether these perceptions of U.S. behavior are accurate is open to debate, but when it comes to America’s standing in the world, perceptions define the reality. When the United States fails to sign and ratify high-profile, widely accepted international agreements, for example, its international standing falls, as has been the case with the Kyoto Protocol.27 The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements, which is over twice as many as Canada and France and five times as many as Japan.28 Yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements . . . yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future American standing also falls when Washington violates international laws and norms and fails to comply with U.S. treaty commitments and values. For example, violations of highprofile agreements, such as the Geneva Convention on torture, have clearly hurt U.S. standing as measured by opinion polls, statements by foreign governments, and NGOs.29 Evidence of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo severely damaged the global esteem in which the U.S. was held, especially among its allies.30 U.S. reluctance to commit to new international legal obligations may in part be due to a generally strong compliance record with international law. Unlike some states, the U.S. is hesitant to sign agreements with which it knows it cannot comply. Nonetheless, a few highprofile cases wash out the effects of U.S. adherence to almost all of its other international treaty obligations. Perhaps perceived U.S. hypocrisy is more deleterious because we hold ourselves up—or others look to us—as a model. If the United States pursues controversial, high-profile policies through unilateral means when multilateral ones are expected, U.S. standing will likely suffer. This pattern seems apparent at the United Nations, where agreement with the United States increased significantly with the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This was the time when the United States had newfound relative material power as the sole remaining superpower. The United States was also trumpeting a new form of international community. As President George H. W. Bush put it, the United States would “pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.”31 It was a vision of a collaborative world in which the United States’ unchecked dominance would be used for jointly agreed ends.

1. Mexico says no to added conditions

Gonzalez 8 (Rosa Gonzalez, Department of sociology MA University, “Biofuels production in Mexico a complex problem”, 9/22/8, <https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/36934/Rosa_Luz_Gonzalez_Biofuels_Production.pdf?sequence=1>, zs)

In Mexico the possibility of producing biofuels has generated a wide range of political, economical and technical comments and opinions. This is due mainly to the fact that the oil industry has contributed heavily to the direct financing of the Mexican government for the last 70 years, in 2007 this income represented 37% of the total expenditure of the Government and any change to this situation is looked upon with great suspicion and so there are not clear strategies of how to bring renewable energies (v. gr. bioenergy) into Mexico. The analysis of the present and future of energy, especially oil, has become complex and difficult. Several points of view concerning biofuel production have created at least two groups: one that is in favor because bioenergetics are a better source of fuels, its renewable nature goes quite well with the notion of sustainable development and in some instances it is looked as a way to help and support rural development, particularly in poor areas; the second group opposes biofuel production considering that there will be a competition for resources between agriculture for food and feed purposes and energy, and that from the perspective of climatic change biofuels are not an answer in the long run; one of the main oppositions comes from the oil company, PEMEX, which has operated as a government monopoly and the production of the biofuels in some way will open up its structure and the company will have to share its enormous power. The major differences and discrepancies among groups are on the economic impact, where questions such as: who will pay for the subsidy required for biofuel production?, how will biofuel be introduced into the market?, what are the real and true benefits and problems associated with biofuels?. They have not been answered.

1. Certainty to the TBA is key to solve Artic Conflict

Goldwyn 8/14 (2013 David L. Goldwyn, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution Neil R. Brown and Cory R. Gill, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill)

Finally, the exemption also overreaches in shaping the nature of not only the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary agreement, but also any future transboundary agreement. Should hydrocarbons development continue in the Arctic, future transboundary agreements with Russia or Canada may be required. Would it be in U.S. interests to facilitate revenue secrecy in Moscow? Given that the EU recently passed its own transparency measures similar to Section 1504 while Canada and Switzerland are considering similar laws, international norms regarding extractive industry transparency may be significantly different by the time agreements with Russia and Canada are negotiated.

1. Arctic conflict cause miscalculation and accidental nuclear war

Huebert 07(Rob, Associate Professor of Political Science & the Strategic Studies Program @ the University of Calgary, Appendix 4, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 – “Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security.” <http://www.carc.org/calgary/a4.htm>)

The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but mis-communications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever. In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

Certainty key to encourage collaborative development

Smart Energy Universe 12 (SEU, "U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement", <http://www.smartenergyuniverse.com/regulatory-update/13077-u-s-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement>, zs)

The United States and Mexico have signed an agreement concerning the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico. The Agreement is designed to enhance energy security in North America and support our shared duty to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards. Elements of the Agreement The United States and Mexico jointly announced their intention to negotiate a transborder hydrocarbons agreement on June 23, 2010, following the Joint Statement adopted by Presidents Obama and Calderon at the conclusion of President Calderon’s State Visit to Washington on May 19, 2010. Upon entry into force, the current moratorium on oil exploration and production in the Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico will end. The Agreement establishes a cooperative process for managing the maritime boundary region that promotes joint utilization of transboundary reservoirs. The Agreement provides a legal framework for possible commercial activities at the maritime boundary and sets clear guidelines for transboundary developments. It establishes incentives for oil and gas companies to voluntarily enter into arrangements to jointly develop any transboundary reservoirs. In the event such an arrangement is not achieved, the Agreement establishes a process by which U.S. companies and PEMEX can individually develop the resources on each side of the border while protecting each nation’s interests and resources. The legal certainty created by the Agreement will enable U.S. companies to explore new business opportunities and carry out collaborative projects with PEMEX. The Agreement also provides for joint inspections teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will review all plans for the development of any transboundary reservoirs.

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Reality outweighs representations

**Wendt, 1999**

Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security at Ohio State University, 1999, “Social theory of international politics,” gbooks

The effects of holding a relational theory of meaning on theorizing about world politics are apparent in **David Campbell's** provocative study of US foreign policy, which **shows** how the **threats** posed by the Soviets, immigration, drugs, and so on, **were constructed** out of US national security discourse.29 The book clearly shows that material things in the world did not force US decision-makers to have particular representations of them - the picture theory of reference does not hold. In so doing it highlights the discursive aspects of truth and reference, the sense in which objects are relationally "constructed."30 On the other hand, while emphasizing several times that he is not denying the reality of, for example, Soviet actions, he specifically eschews (p. 4) any attempt to assess the extent to which they caused US representations. Thus **he cannot address the extent to which US representations of the Soviet threat were accurate or true** (questions of correspondence). **He can only focus on the nature and consequences of the representations**.31 Of course, there is nothing in the social science rule book which requires an interest in causal questions, and the nature and consequences of representations are important questions. In the terms discussed below he is engaging in a constitutive rather than causal inquiry. However, I suspect **Campbell thinks that any attempt to assess the correspondence of discourse to reality is inherently pointless.** According to the relational theory of reference **we simply have no access to what the Soviet threat "really" was, and as such its truth is established entirely within discourse**, not by the latter's correspondence to an extra-discursive reality 32 **The main problem** with the relational theory of reference **is that it cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for representational failures or m/'sinterpretations**. Worldly resistance is most obvious in nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can't fly. But examples abound in society too. **In 1519 Montezuma faced the same kind of epistemological problem facing social scientists today: how to refer to people who, in his case, called themselves Spaniards. Many representations were conceivable**, and no doubt the one he chose - that they were **gods - drew on the discursive materials available to him. So why was he killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own**? The realist answer is that **Montezuma was simply wrong: the Spaniards were not gods, and had come instead to conquer his empire. Had Montezuma adopted this alternative representation of what the Spanish were, he might have prevented this outcome because that representation would have corresponded more to reality. The reality of the conquistadores did not force him to have a true representation**, as the picture theory of reference would claim, **but it did have certain effects - whether his discourse allowed them or not.** The external world to which we ostensibly lack access, in other words. often frustrates or penalizes representations. **Postmodernism gives us no insight into why this is so, and indeed, rejects the question altogether.33** The description theory of reference favored by empiricists focuses on sense-data in the mind while the relational theory of the postmoderns emphasizes relations among words, but they are similar in at least one crucial respect: neither grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content.34 Both privilege epistemology over ontology. What is needed is a theory of reference that takes account of the contribution of mind and language yet is anchored to external reality. The realist answer is the causal theory of reference. According to the causal theory the meaning of terms is determined by a two-stage process.35 First there is a "baptism/' in which some new referent in the environment (say, a previously unknown animal) is given a name; then this connection of thing-to-term is handed down a chain of speakers to contemporary speakers. Both stages are causal, the first because the referent impressed itself upon someone's senses in such a way that they were induced to give it a name, the second because the handing down of meanings is a causal process of imitation and social learning. Both stages allow discourse to affect meaning, and as such do not preclude a role for "difference" as posited by the relational theory. Theory is underdetermined by reality, and as such the causal theory is not a picture theory of reference. However, conceding these points does not mean that meaning is entirely socially or mentally constructed. In the realist view beliefs are determined by discourse and nature.36 This solves the key problems of the description and relational theories: our ability to refer to the same object even if our descriptions are different or change, and the resistance of the world to certain representations. **Mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world**.

The alt rejects deterrence which ensures endless war – Deterrence Ontology is best – creating a norm avoids war and protects identity – solves their offense

Amir Lupovici, Post-Doctoral Fellow-Munk Centre for International Studies, 08 [“Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still revalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse” Canadian Political Science Association annual conference, Vancouver June 4-6, 2008, pdf]

I suggest that one of the few options for escaping from the dilemma of ontological security is to implement practices of mutual deterrence, because, if implemented successfully, these may increase the physical security of the actors without posing grave threat to their identities. I argue that the study of deterrence as an idea and as a norm that evolved and was institutionalized in the international system provides an understanding not only of how deterrence ideas allowed for the regulation of non-violent behavior between the superpowers during the Cold War, but of how they constituted the superpowers’ mutual role identities of deterring (and deterred) actors.1 This identity of deterrer provided a substitute for the superpowers’ previous role identities of aggressive “enemy,” and in this way avoided a clash between “securing identity” and “physical security.” In other words, the institutionalization of the ideas of deterrence (MAD) during the 1970s in the SALT agreements demonstrated that actors could attain both physical and ontological security. However, I further argue that this is the reason—the residue of deterrence identity attached to America’s perception of itself as a superpower—that the perceived inability of the U.S. to deter al Qaeda became not only a physical security problem but an ontological one. I suggest that this threat to identity explains not only the American war in the Gulf following 9/11, but the contradictory discourse regarding the need and feasibility of restoring the American deterrent posture. This paper has four main parts. In the first, I briefly discuss the concept of the ontological security dilemma and I suggest mutual deterrence practices as a solution. In the second part, I introduce the concept of the deterrence norm and explain how it allows for a better understanding of the practices of mutual deterrence and contributes to the creation of deterrence identity, and therefore to the attainment of ontological security. In the third part, I use the norms life cycle model of Finnemore and Sikkink to show how the deterrence norm developed between the superpowers from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. I also show how this norm affected their relations and contributed to both their physical and their ontological security. I then present the case of the American war on terrorism to further illustrate the implications of the deterrence norm as well as the connections between ontological security and deterrence.

Securitization good- Prefer our epistemology – the western and interventionary role is key to prevent extinction

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The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Realism is true - grounded in human nature

Thayer, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a consultant to the Rand Corporation, 4 [Thayer Bradley, Ph.D, Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a consultant to the Rand Corporation, "Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict"]

In chapter 2, I explain how evolutionary theory contributes to the realist theory of international relations and to rational choice analysis.  First, realism, like the Darwinian view of the natural world, submits that international relations is a competitive and dangerous realm, where statesmen must strive to protect the interests of their state before the interests of others or international society.  Traditional realist arguments rest principally on one of two discrete ultimate causes, or intellectual foundations of the theory.  The first is Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that humans are evil.  The second, anchored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and Hans Morgenthau, is that humans possess an innate animus dominandi - a drive to dominate.  From these foundations, Niebuhr and Morgenthau argue that what is true for the individual is also true of the state: because individuals are evil or possess a drive to dominate so too do states because their leaders are individuals who have these motivations.   argue that realists have a much stronger foundation for the realist argument than that used by either Morgenthau or Niebuhr.  My intent is to present an alternative ultimate cause of classical realism: evolutionary theory.  The use of evolutionary theory allows realism to be scientifically grounded for the first time, because evolution explains egoism.  Thus a scientific explanation provides a better foundation for their arguments than either theology or metaphysics.  Moreover, evolutionary theory can anchor the branch of realism termed offensive realism and advanced most forcefully by John Mearsheimer.  He argues that the anarchy of the international system, the fact that there is no world government, forces leaders of states to strive to maximize their relative power in order to be secure.  I argue that theorists of international relations must recognize that human evolution occurred in an anarchic environment and that this explains why leaders act as offensive realism predicts.  Humans evolved in anarchic conditions, and the implications of this are profound for theories of human behavior.  It is also important to note at this point that my argument does not depend upon "anarchy" as it is traditionally used in the discipline - as the ordering principle of the post-1648 Westphalian state system.  When human evolution is used to ground offensive realism, it immediately becomes a more powerful theory than is currently recognized.  It explains more than just state behavior; it begins to explain human behavior.  It applies equally to non-state actors, be they individuals, tribes, or organizations.  Moreover, it explains this behavior before the creation of the modern state system.  Offensive realists do not need an anarchic state system to advance their argument.  They only need humans.  Thus, their argument applies equally well before or after 1648, whenever humans form groups, be they tribes in Papua New Guinea, conflicting city-states in ancient Greece, organizations like the Catholic Church, or contemporary states in international relations.

The alt doesn’t spillover, but the perm solves

Robert Keohane, IR Prof - Duke University, 98 [“Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory,” International Studies Quarterly Volume 42, Issue 1, pages 193–197, March 1998, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076/pdf>]

Since we know that intentionality and consequences are not tightly linked in international relations, we should not assume that the consequences in international relations of more egalitarian practices within some societies will necessarily be benign. Supposing that increased gender equality leads to less aggression, we might well expect that countries with relatively less hierarchical internal structures would not fight each other. But their relationships with states with more inegalitarian gender relationships would need to be investigated. Perhaps states with less gender hierarchy could resolve conflict more easily; but it is also possible that they would be more easily bullied, or would become more moralistic, leading eventually to more serious crises and perhaps warfare. To continue with the democracy analog)', democracies are quite warlike toward nondemocracies, although they are disinclined to fight other democracies. It would be worthwhile to explore such questions, with an open mind about what the answers will be.

Comparable questions could be posed about transnational relations. To what extent do gendered inequalities within societies extend to transnational relations—as, for instance, in tolerating or even encouraging the operation of brothels near military bases, or in the hiring practices of Japanese-based multinational enterprises operating in the United States? Once again, however, questions will not be enough: feminist IR scholars will need to supply answers that will convince others—including those not ideologically predisposed to being convinced. Specifying their propositions, and providing systematically gathered evidence to test these propositions, will be essential: scientific method, in the broadest sense, is the best path toward convincing current nonbelievers of the validity of the message that feminists are seeking to deliver. We will only "understand" each other if IR scholars are open to the important questions that feminist theories raise, and if feminists are willing to formulate their hypotheses in ways that are testable—and falsifiable—with evidence.

**AND – Utopian alts are bad – not real world and fairness**

**AND – Not root cause – focus risks extinction**

**Boggs 93** [Carl, Intellectuals and the crisis of Modernity P. 138-140, net library]

The search for universal microfoundations of political action is surely futile, since the “foundations” typically rest upon rather arbitrary, static, and ultimately problematic notions confined to the sphere of observable phenomena are, of course, embedded in the very institutional and ideological fabric of the given {thus not=yet-transformed) world. It is probably safe to assume that any process of social transformation will give rise to novel, divergent, and perhaps even contradictory motivational impulses. Emergent social forces and movements are likely to create numerous “choice” modalities that enter into collective action: nationalism, religion, ethnicity and race, gender, culture, and so forth. They also involve actors other than workers at the point of production. Instead of an abstract microfoundations, therefore, what is required is an understanding of historical conditions and collective responses to them as filtered through different social contradictions and different forms of ideological hegemony. While Przeworksi at times refers to such concerns, they never become a matter of theoretical interest. It is striking that Przeworski’s familiarity with Gramsci did not sensitize him to the concept of “social bloc.” Employed frequently through the Prison Notebooks, this concept referred to a unique merging of objective conitions and subjective forces in the growth of movements and parties- for example, the role of nationalism in galvanizing radical opposition at certain historical junctures. Borrowing from Gramsci, it can be argued that nationalism was a vital mobilizing force behind virtually all twentieth-century Communist revolutions- from Russia to China, from Yugoslavia to Cuba. The postwar successes of the Italian Communists are inexplicable without taking into account the durable implant of the patriotic Resistance movement of 1943-1945, which transformed the PCI from a marginal force into a mass party. More recent developments- Polish Solidarity, the rise of Islamic radicalism, the role of liberation theology in Latin America- attest to the enormous mobilizing power of both nationalism and religion. In none of these cases, moreover, has popular support come strictly from labor; it has been multiclass in both its appeals and social base. The point is that collective motivational impulses toward social change are best understood as an expression of concrete historical forces rather than as a disparate set of personal choices. Rational-choice theory only serves to obscure that understanding. The question for an all-encompassing social-psychological pattern applicable to every form of social change is illusory

# 1AR

#### Heg sustainable – China will **never** overtake the United States economy – their evidence relies on flawed analysis

**Cheng and Scissors, 13 –** (Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, Derek M. Scissors, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. November 6, 2013. “Five Myths About China,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-myths-about-china-9366?page=4)//SDL

The third plenum of Chinese Communist Party Congresses is often the time when the country’s rulers introduce major policy shifts. The Eighteenth Party Congress in November and, crucially, implementation over time of policies announced there offers the U.S. an opportunity to reassess China, to see whether top leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are interested in pursuing reform or will hew to the course of their predecessors.¶ This opportunity could be wasted if the persistent myths that have long plagued American views of China are not dispelled. The key myths feature overstating Chinese economic prowess and understating clashing security interests between the China and the U.S.¶ Myth #1: China is well on its way to surpassing the U.S. economically¶ Reality: China is far from surpassing the U.S. and can do so only if helped by our failures.¶ This is the generative myth, from which the others flow. In less than a generation, the world economy is supposed to have a new leader. China will purportedly be bigger than the U.S., the first time the American economy has not topped the world in well over a century. This is said to follow just by projecting Chinese and American GDP growth forward.¶ This is wrong on multiple counts. First, GDP is not nearly as important as commonly thought. It is not a measure of economic well being, it is misleading measure of annual domestic output. It discounts imports, no matter how vital they are, and counts government borrowing as always positive, because only the current year is relevant. Because it is merely an accounting device, changes in GDP do not cause anything—employment, inflation, nothing.¶ One year of production is not “the economy.” A much superior notion of “the economy” is the stock of national wealth—all the assets we have accumulated over time. The stock of American private wealth in 2012 was about $70 trillion. Using the same methods as with American wealth, the stock of Chinese wealth is $20-25 trillion, through government ownership of assets and control of prices make that a very rough estimate. The absolute size of the gap between the U.S. and China may approach $50 trillion. It would take decades to erase.¶ Or never. The other part of China passing the U.S. is extrapolation. China’s economic performance from 1945-1978 meant very little to its economic performance from 1979-2012. And 1979-2012 is likely to mean very little to 2013-2046.¶ One obvious reason is demography. China was a young country with an expanding labor force when market-oriented reform was initiated in 1978. The two factors fed each other: the market found opportunities for all and the raw number of workers pushed the rate of economic expansion higher. Now China is middle-aged and headed quickly toward old. The number of people age 60 or higher is expected to double from 2010 to 2030, past 350 million. Even the most brilliant policies will be less successful under these conditions.¶ The same is true for physical resources. Relentless demands from urban development and heavy industry have erased arable land, polluted water, and overwhelmed local supply of energy and metals. Imports are available, but China’s own stock of resources has been depleted and water shortages, especially, cast a shadow over sustainability.¶ Other sources of economic growth are capital and innovation. China reports investment spending $1.5 trillion higher than the amount of investment that actually contributes to annual GDP. Some of that is due to accounting differences but hundreds of billions of dollars are wasted annually. Across a range of sectors, Beijing mandates that state-owned enterprises must lead. This leaves neither them nor the small private firms that might challenge them much incentive to innovate.

## Kritik

1. **No root cause of war – Mono-causal explanations are oversimplifications**

Holland 6 (Joshua, “About those real reasons for the invasion of Iraq …” March 20, 2006, Alternet, <http://www.alternet.org/blogs/echochamber/33790/>)

That's because there is almost never one "real" cause of any foreign policy action. Look seriously at foreign policy formation and you'll see that FoPo is an extension of domestic politics, with all its varied constituents and interest groups. That's why all of the reasons thrown about for this war are correct, except the ones that the administration that started it have peddled. So, yes, the guys at Lockheed and Boeing and Northrop Grumman and Raytheon and General Dynamics wanted this war because all wars are good for business. And, yes, Bush's oil buddies wanted access to a big chunk of the world's petroleum reserves. (Because I like accuracy, I replaced my 'No Blood For Oil' bumper sticker with a bumper-length banner reading: 'No blood for assuring a stable energy supply-chain to a global economy in which we're heavily invested.') Yes, there were various stripes of Neo-cons and democratic imperialists and other PNAC-type ideologues who wanted to enforce a global 'rule set' centered around American hegemony. And, yes, there were the boys from Halliburton and Bechtel and Dyncorp and Caci and Titan who wanted fat contracts to rebuild Iraq (which they've totally fucked up). No doubt that there were good ole' boys from the Chamber of Commerce and AEI who George saw on the links or in the clubhouse and who told him how marvelous it would be to see what a fully privatized neo-liberal laboratory would look like in action. I'm sure, too, that there were various Fundie Christian extremists who thought a big conflagration in the Middle East would set off the rapture.

Role-playing is good—key to democratic engagement and peace

Rawls 99 John Rawls, bad-ass, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p. 56-57

To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

Political action is necessary to give life meaning beyond mere survival

Saurette 96 (Paul Saurette, PhD in Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, 3/1/1996, “‘I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 1)

The Human Condition and Political Action While Nietzsche traces the historical influence of the dominant philosophical foundations of the Will to Truth/Order, Arendt's thought can be interpreted as a sustained examination of the consequences of this tradition for our notions of political action. Like Nietzsche, Arendt traces the origin of the `modern' understanding of politics to the interpretative framework inaugurated by Socrates and Plato. Therefore, in order to understand Arendt's conception and critique of the traditional Western definition of politics, it is necessary to examine several of the classical distinctions through which she explores the nature and role of politics. In The Human Condition, Arendt characterises human activity and political life (the vita activa) as being composed of three distinct types of activity. The first of these, labour, is activity which directly responds to the need for biological survival. As such, Arendt states that the `human condition of labour is life itself." Labour is the automatic cycle of production and consumption which ends only with death and is therefore universal to all humanity. In contradistinction to labour, Arendt suggests that the activity of work involves the production of the `human artifice' and the durable material world where humans live." The primary characteristic of work is that it is the realm of violence in which force is used to manipulate natural material. It is a process of fabrication guided from start to finish by an idea or model, whose goal is simply the realisation of this form in the human physical world of appearance. The worker is the master of the entire process and conceives of a definite beginning and end through which the ideal is realised. As opposed to labour, then, work is the realm of mastery and control. Moreover, by erecting a durable, `objective', and relatively stable world of human artifacts, `homo faber rescues animal lahorans from the endless flow of biological life and transcends his own subjectivity by constructing a durable world of his own which stands apart from both the maker and the natural world'." Through homo faber, humanity both affirms and escapes the inexorable cycle of birth and death by fabricating a realm of objects in which the communal reification of memory is possible. Work is therefore a critical human activity which allows action to give human existence a sense of immortality, of `endurance in time, deathless life on this earth', and of meaning beyond simple survival. Despite the necessity of both labour and work, action is the most uniquely human activity because only through action can humanity realise the fundamental universality and individuality of human existence. According to Arendt, action is the activity that allows humanity to comprehend and reproduce the existential and irreducible human condition of plurality and natality. As Arendt suggests, `the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent is all human activities'." This inherent individuality creates human plurality as `the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live'.` While action is only possible because of the `human condition' of plurality and natality, action also reproduces it. In other words, only action can realise the potential plurality and natality of the human world. As James Knauer suggests, plurality is a potential given by the fact of natality, the birth of new human individuals, but it can be realized only through political association. It is in their acting and speaking together that unique individuals emerge out of the sameness and eternal recurrence of the species. And it is only when living together as acting beings in political association that human beings encounter other human beings, that plurality is realised 21 According to Arendt, then, the purpose of a public sphere is to create the condition of unmediated human interaction as the realisation of the human condition through political action.

No serial policy failire- prefer our specific internal links than their generic ones

Kurasawa ‘4 (Constellations Volume 11 Number 4, 2004)

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

Discursive focus ignores material conditions and structures – this turns the K – only a more pragmatic approach solves

**Rigakos and Law 9** (George, Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University, and Alexandra, Carleton University, “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance”, Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they: query why subversive ‘assertions of self ’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227) Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity. Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class. Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration: [T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes. In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.