# 1AC

## Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 is Dodd-Frank

Passage of the TBA now is key – it expires on January 17th – kills future hopes of drilling

**Fox News, 3/10 –** (Associated Press Staff Writer for Fox News. October 3, 2010. “Joint U.S.-Mexico Gulf Oil Drilling Deal Held Up Over Disagreements In Congress,” [http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/)//SDL](http://www.reefrelieffounders.com/drilling/2013/10/04/fox-news-joint-u-s-mexico-gulf-oil-drilling-deal-held-up-over-disagreements-in-congress/%29//SDL)

¶ Along with the budget and immigration, one more thing that the Senate and House can’t mutually agree upon is the proposed joint U.S.-Mexico effort to develop offshore oil and gas fields along the two countries’ maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Both the Mexican government and many in Washington want to nail down the agreement soon, but its ratification by the U.S. Congress has been delayed by a dispute between the House and Senate over whether oil and gas producers should be required to publicly disclose their payments to foreign governments.¶ Mexico almost immediately ratified the treaty but the agreement has stalled on Capitol Hill as the House-passed version exempts oil and gas companies from disclosing their payments.¶ SUMMARY¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on, the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ “It is the hope that, through this Agreement and the proposed energy reforms in Mexico, the energy revolution the U.S. is currently experiencing can extend throughout the Western Hemisphere,” Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon said in a statement Tuesday during a meeting of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. “This would make our region more competitive and less reliant on politically tumultuous states for obtaining energy.”¶ The U.S. and Mexico have tried for decades to figure out a plan for divvying up the oil and gas resources in the Gulf, but a 2000 moratorium was placed on drilling in the region to allow time for the development of a joint plan. From that point on the U.S. began expanding its drilling operations closer and closer to the maritime border in the Gulf, as Mexico grew increasingly concerned that the U.S. could be siphoning from deposits located on their side of the border.¶ The joint agreement is meant to set explicit guidelines for where each country can drill and provide the United States “substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits, while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain,” the Brookings Institution stated earlier this year.¶ For Mexico, a ratified agreement would provide Latin America’s second-largest economy with new technology and investment needed to develop hard-to-reach regions along with giving a major boost to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s push for energy reform that includes opening the country’s state-run oil company -Pemex – to foreign investment.¶ “The motive for the U.S. is ‘We’re ready to drill, but we don’t want to drill ourselves into a legal nightmare,’” said George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence, an industry newsletter based in Houston, according to the Christian Science Monitor. “For Mexico, it’s ‘We want to make certain our oil rights are protected so that if they start drilling on the U.S. side – and discover crossborder oil – we have architecture in place to protect our interests.”¶ Besides the exemptions for oil and gas companies, the specter of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill looms heavy over drilling in the Gulf. Environmental activists argue that the U.S. and oil companies have not learned their lessons from the BP spill that left 11 people dead and dumped around 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.¶ “[O]ur continued emphasis on expanding offshore drilling is slowing the necessary investment in clean energy projects that will stimulate the economy without the attendant risks, and help to alleviate the worst impacts of climate change,” said Jacqueline Savitz, vice president for U.S. oceans at the conservation organization Oceana during Tuesday’s hearing.¶ If finally approved, the agreement will be the first major test to Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan. The Mexican leader has already taken heat for his proposal to open Pemex up to foreign investment – with opponents claiming the move is tantamount to Mexico losing its sovereignty.¶ If the agreement is not ratified by Congress by Jan. 17, 2014 then the moratorium in place will expire and it is unlikely that either country will drill in the region.

If the TBA does pass, lack of leadership in the status quo means it will be the house version

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The United States and Mexico concluded a transboundary hydrocarbons agreement, officially titled the “Agreement between the United States and Mexico Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico,” (TBA) in February 2012. The agreement provides the United States substantial geopolitical, energy security and environmental benefits while potentially helping the U.S. oil and gas industry gain access to a huge market that may offer jobs and gains across a long value chain. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement in April 2012. However, the U.S. Congress needs to enact implementing legislation to give the Department of Interior the authority to play its role in the agreement.¶ This otherwise uncontroversial agreement is now at risk. After nearly a year of benign neglect from the Obama administration, legislation is now being considered to implement TBA. The TBA is a new type of international agreement, and using proven tools for considering treaties and executive agreements, Congress has an important role to play in its interpretation. Regrettably, without strong leadership and engagement from the administration or Congressional leaders, the U.S. House of Representatives included an unnecessary “poison pill” in its June 27, 2013 version of the authorizing bill. The Senate can do better.

Only the senate version provides transparency over contracts with Mexico

**Boman, 13 –** (Karen Boman, Associated Press Staff Writer for RigZone. October 14, 2013. “Senate Passes US-Mexico Drilling Pact,” http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil\_gas/a/129582/Senate\_Passes\_USMexico\_Drilling\_Pact)//SDL

The U.S. Senate passed a bill Saturday that would implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The Senate passed the bill by “unanimous consent”, avoiding a roll call vote, The Hill reported on Sunday. Last year, government officials from the two countries signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which would establish rules for developing oil and gas resources along the United States’ maritime border with Mexico. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act (H.R. 1613), which would enact the terms of the agreement signed by the Obama administration and Mexico to govern how to explore, develop, and share revenue from all oil and gas resources along the Gulf of Mexico’s maritime border. H.R. 1613 would lift the current moratorium on exploration and production along the Western Gap section of the boundary, opening up 1.5 million acres in the Gulf previously off limits due to border issues, and provide a framework for the safe management of oil and gas resources in the boundary area. While the Senate bill has bipartisan support, the Senate bill differs from the version passed by the House in June. The House version grants waivers for companies under the pact from a Dodd-Frank law mandate to disclose payments to foreign governments, the Hill reported, while the Senate version does not offer such waivers, The Hill reported.

Even if Nieto passes reform, domestic legislation alone fails, clear and transparent US engagement on oil via the plan is key to solvency and broader Latin American relations

Abe Collier, Policy Analyst at Praemon, 13 [“The US Stake in Mexican Energy Reform,” Praemon—forecast and analysts from the brightest new minds, September 17,

In 1938, Mexico’s government made one¶ of the world’s most populist and radical¶ moves of the 20th century—nationalizing¶ the oil and gas industry. Foreign companies¶ from the United States and elsewhere¶ were paid as much as the Mexican¶ government could afford, but the companies¶ lost all permanent investments in¶ the country. Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexico’s¶ president at the time, was hailed as a hero¶ by the Mexican people—Mexico, long a¶ servant of foreign investors and governments,¶ was establishing itself as an international¶ force. Nearly eighty years later,¶ Mexico’s current president, Enrique Peña¶ Nieto, has proposed an energy reform¶ plan that would allow foreign companies¶ to take a significant part in the rich proceeds¶ from Mexican oil and gas for the¶ first time since 1938.1¶ The move makes practical sense. Pemex—the public Mexican company that performs all the explora-tion, drilling, and refining of oil within Mexican borders—has long been notorious for its corruption¶ and bureaucratic waste. It is frequently used as a cash source for politicians who sell high positions¶ in the publicly owned company, invest with inside information, or provide consulting services.2 The¶ company is twenty to thirty years behind industry leaders in management structure as well as technology¶ and expertise concerning deep-sea and shale drilling, which are seen by many as the future of the¶ industry.3 And many Mexicans agree that the company needs to be reformed, but less than 20% think¶ it should be done by allowing private investment.4 With such broad, bi-partisan opposition to privatization¶ of the oil and gas industry—along with bad memories from the privatization of the telecommunications¶ industry in the 1990s, when Carlos Slim and a few other business moguls ended up with a de¶ facto private monopoly—private investment in Pemex is an unlikely option for reform. To avoid this,¶ Peña Nieto and his party have proposed that the Mexican legislature allow private companies to form¶ joint ventures and partnerships with Pemex (taking fees but ceding all ownership rights of the oil to¶ the national firm). More liberal politicians, including the left-leaning PRD, have suggested that Mexico¶ continue its isolationist energy policy and attempt a complete overhaul of Pemex without any private¶ involvement.5¶ Peña Nieto’s proposition has several clear advantages for Mexico. The primary advantage for Mexico is¶ that change will come more quickly and efficiently if outside companies are involved; private firms usually¶ have more technical know-how and less time-wasting corruption. In addition, true to the intent of¶ the 1938 nationalization of the country’s oil and gas, the proposition permits reform without allowing¶ permanent private or foreign investment. Indeed, Pemex has already entered into some joint venture¶ projects outside of its national boundaries in order to begin acquiring the experience it needs.6 Additionally,¶ the ties created by work with foreign companies could well lead to increased foreign trade,¶ which has been the lifeblood of Mexico’s economic growth for decades.¶ But the US stands to gain much as well¶ if the centrist PRI plan is adopted. One¶ clear advantage is that large US oil companies—¶ such as ExxonMobil and Chevron—¶ will be afforded significant growth¶ and revenue opportunities as they work¶ with Pemex. Perhaps more important,¶ however, the two nations would likely¶ advance their working relationship a¶ great deal by international cooperative¶ ventures, even among private firms. The¶ troubled history between the two countries,¶ including a good deal of present¶ tension caused by the ongoing war on¶ drugs, could only be helped by friendly¶ business relationships. On a related note,¶ US foreign trade could be boosted by a¶ better relationship with Mexican firms,¶ and not just in Mexico—Central and¶ South American views of the United States are greatly affected by its behavior towards Mexico, and a¶ better US-Mexican relationship could increase trade from the Mexican border to the southern tip of Ar-gentina. Finally, if Pemex recovers fully, the increased revenues would markedly strengthen Mexico—an¶ important US ally—on the international stage and help further US interests in diplomacy and trade.¶ How, then, should the United States encourage Peña Nieto’s energy reform plan? Many Mexicans worry¶ that private and foreign companies, unhindered by labor laws and unions, would generally exploit¶ Mexican workers and care little about the country.7 Accordingly, the United States must first provide assurance¶ that any foreign involvement will be strictly monitored, perhaps by forming a bilateral monitoring¶ team with representatives from both nations to oversee the contracting, planning, and execution of¶ any joint ventures. Once both nations are satisfied that Mexican security and autonomy are not at risk,¶ US diplomats should collaborate with Pemex, representatives of the Mexican government, and private¶ energy companies to outline a long-term plan for growth in Mexico’s energy sector. This should include¶ details of how long domestic and foreign firms will be involved in the energy industry as well as an informational¶ campaign to promote the program among the Mexican public.¶ US politicians and businesspeople can no longer afford to stand by and let Mexico suffer poverty and¶ slow economic growth because it lacks information or options to make wise decisions. Limited intervention,¶ particularly as Mexico’s energy sector is currently striving to reinvent itself, has become both a¶ practical imperative and a humanitarian duty.

Additionally, the house waiver exemption gets modeled globally

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

The House bill contains language that would introduce secrecy into payments made under the TBA by precluding the revenue transparency provisions of the so-called “Cardin-Lugar Amendment” (Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act) from applying to TBA implementation. The Cardin-Lugar Amendment requires oil, gas, and minerals companies to publicly disclose payments to governments, a U.S. requirement that has sparked similar laws in the European Union and are[r1] now under consideration in Canada and beyond. By targeting those bipartisan, robustly supported pro-openness provisions, opponents of transparency are creating opposition to the TBA where none need be present. In raw political terms, the TBA is important but not at the top of the oil and gas industry’s priority list for Congress whereas the proponents of transparency are well-organized and gaining momentum. Even the White House announced it could not support the House bill. Given that political dynamic, some proponents of the TBA are hurting their cause by encouraging the anti-transparency provision.

Dodd-Frank solves corruption in Afghanistan - the impact is stability

**Clough, 10 -** (Christine, coordinator of the Task Force on Financial Integrity 26 Economic Development. August 3, 2010. Using Transparency to Avoid the Resource Curse in Afghanistan, Financial Transparency Coalition, p. http://www.financialtransparency.org/2010/08/03/using-transparency-to-avoid-the-resource-curse-in-afghanistan/)

¶ Additionally, the disclosure of corporate profits on a country-by-country-basis would aid civil society groups and donors in the fight against corruption and cronyism in Afghanistan. Extractive industry experts will be able to estimate whether the revenue figures disclosed by a corporation are accurate based on their knowledge of the deposits and the industry. Relatively accurate revenue figures will in turn support better estimates of government revenue, which outside parties can then compare to figures released by the government on its receipts and expenditures—as discrepancies between the two sources could suggest corruption. The net result of a country-by-country reporting standard is the potential for more of the wealth generated by Afghanistan’s mineral resources to actually reach and benefit the general population.¶ ¶ Transparent management and reporting of Afghanistan’s natural resources would be a win-win situation for all the parties involved. The central government will have more revenue, which can then be spent on development; infrastructure; and proper, timely payment of government employees (including the military and police). The happier, wealthier populous will generate greater legitimacy for political leaders, which contributes to improved government and social stability. Mining companies will, in turn, benefit from a stable and lawful environment in which to operate eventually improving their bottom line. Allied governments—and their people—would then transition from the role of donor to a desperate country into investors in a dynamic and rapidly developing country.¶ ¶ Significant progress was made towards country-by-country reporting this past month when the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The legislation included the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) provision, which requires all companies working in the extractive industries and registered with the SEC (i.e. 90% of all major international companies working in the extractive industries) to disclose all payments made to host governments on an on-going basis. That’s major progress, and it will significantly help curtail corruption in resource-rich countries like Afghanistan. However, it’s not until we report corporate profits on a country-by-country basis, that we’ll achieve full transparency in this crucial sector.

Afghanistan collapse escalates to global nuclear war

**Morgan, 7** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan21?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistanthan\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

Exemptions undermine transparency laws – they create a race to the bottom of non-disclosure – our evidence is Africa Specific

Geman, 11 – (Ben Geman, Associated Press Staff Writer for The Hill. March 1, 2011. “It’s George Soros versus Exxon in fight over oil payment disclosures,” http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/146749-its-george-soros-against-exxon-on-oil-payments-disclosure)//SDL

¶ “I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that in promulgating the U.S. regulations for Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the Commission will be setting the rules for much of the world. I urge the Commission to fulfill its responsibility in the strongest and clearest manner possible to fulfill the clear intent of the U.S. Congress to make these important financial flows between companies and governments fully transparent to investors and the general public, country by country and project by project.”¶ ¶ The provision in the Wall Street law is aimed at ending the “resource curse” in which some energy- and mineral-rich nations in Africa and elsewhere **are** plagued by high levels of corruption, conflict and poverty.¶ ¶ A suite of energy companies, in comments to the regulators, say they favor disclosure but warn that prescriptive rules would be burdensome and place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to certain state-backed oil companies from countries such as Russia and China.¶ ¶ In addition, Exxon and other companies are pushing the SEC to allow exemptions in cases where host countries or contracts don’t allow project-specific payment disclosures.¶ ¶ “[I]t is essential for the Commission to provide an exemption for disclosure that is prohibited by foreign governments or existing contracts in order to avoid irreparable harm to investors, efficiency, competition and capital formation,” Exxon wrote in late January comments to the SEC.¶ ¶ But Soros is pushing back against the industry push for such exemptions. The SEC asked for input on the question when floating draft rules last year.¶ ¶ “[The Commission should not allow exemptions where the laws of the host country prohibit disclosure. It is precisely in these countries, which prevent transparency and disclosure of information, where the greatest investment risk lies. Such an exemption would create an incentive for countries to create such laws, thereby undermining the purpose and intent of the statute to provide information to investors and promote international transparency,” Soros writes.

Corruption in Africa causes wars and instability – transparency key

**Diamond, 98**  (Larry Diamond, Senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. January 1998. “Restoring Democracy in Africa,” http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-20301225/restoring-democracy-in-africa )//SDL

¶ The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war, and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite.¶ ¶ In such circumstances, every political clique and ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no trust, institutions to facilitate cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding other groups.¶ ¶ The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one degree or another.¶ ¶ Given Africa's authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realizes that every type of dictatorship on the continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the predictability of a democratic constitution.¶ ¶ As Hoover Institution senior fellow Barry Weingast pointed out in the American Political Science Review, contending that ethnic groups will not trust and tolerate one another and cooperate for a larger national good unless there are credible limits on the state. Democracy can not be stable unless rulers see that it is in their interest to abide by the rules. What makes it in their interest is the overriding commitment of all major ethnic groups, parties, and interest organizations to a constitution.

African instability goes nuclear.

**Deutsch, 02** (Jeffrey, Founder of the Rabid Tigers Project, Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9, "The Nuclear Family Has Become Over-Extended," November 18, <http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html>)

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

And there’s no disads to the senate bill

Goldwyn et al 8/4/13

[David Goldwyn, president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, an international energy advisory consultancy, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution. State Department’s special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs from 2009-2011—conceived and developed the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative, led ministerial-level energy dialogues with Angola, Canada, China, India, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil, and co-chaired a regional biofuels initiative with Brazil, AND Neil R. Brown, Senior Advisor, Goldwyn Global Strategies, AND Cory R. Gill, Associate, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “Time to Implement the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement — Congress: Drop the Poison Pill,” Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill]

More importantly, the pro-secrecy exemption is not necessary on the merits. First, it has no relevance for activities on the U.S. side of the Gulf. In the U.S., royalties paid for offshore production are public knowledge. Indeed, as part of its efforts to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (),**EITI** the Obama Administration has offered – and industry and civil society welcomed – to unilaterally disclose 100% of payments received by the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) from industry for development of oil and gas concessions. ONRR receipts make up 95% of all U.S. government extractive revenues, including royalties, rents and bonuses.¶ Second, the claim that an anti-transparency exemption is necessary to protect U.S. competitiveness on the Mexican side of the border is without foundation. Some exemption supporters claim it is necessary because Mexico could create a legal framework prohibiting payment disclosure by foreign firms. Yet the transboundary agreement provides for certain information to be kept confidential unless national laws require disclosure. Thus, the U.S. and Mexico have already reached an understanding that national governments should decide whether payments disclosure should be required. As formal negotiations for the TBA began in September 2011, Mexico acceded to this arrangement more than one year after the Cardin-Lugar Amendment became U.S. law. In other words, the TBA protects companies that will be required to disclose payments under existing U.S. law. ¶ Third, while some proponents of the exemption fear U.S. disclosure laws will render PEMEX or the Mexican Government unwilling to cooperate with U.S. firms, that Mexican leaders took the political risks necessary to pass the TBA suggests otherwise. Only a handful of companies have the technology and capital to partner with PEMEX in the deep water area under jurisdiction of the TBA, the reality of which PEMEX leaders are keenly aware as they work to diversify production sources. Within Mexico’s political leadership, it would be antithetical to President Peña Nieto’s push for more transparency and in combating corruption for him to seek less openness in the oil sector, particularly considering that PEMEX itself is not under jurisdiction of Cardin-Lugar disclosure requirements. If anything, U.S. disclosure requirements will benefit the standing of U.S. companies in Mexico by helping overcome the deep distrust they have inherited. ¶ Fourth, the TBA gives the U.S. government a veto in order to protect U.S. interests, including commercial interests. No “unitization” agreement (essentially, a joint venture between PEMEX and private companies) to develop resources under the TBA can enter into force without the Department of Interior’s approval. Therefore, any discrimination against U.S. companies can be guarded against.

## Contention 2 Hegemony

Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

Three Internal Links:

The first internal link is oil dependence:

THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

1ac

**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. [http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE\_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL](http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf%29//SDL)

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. [http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE\_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL](http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf%29//SDL)

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 3 is Drilling

Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

Resilience theory is deadwrong—studies prove

Wall ’11—

(Tim Wall is a contributor to *Discovery News.* “Lack of Spare Species Leave Ecosystems Flat.” *Discovery News.*  <http://news.discovery.com/earth/global-warming/lack-of-spare-species-leaves-ecosystems-flat.htm>. Jessica Whiteside is an Assistant Professor in Geological Sciences at Brown University. She has a BA from Mt. Holyoke College, an MA and a M. Phil in Earth and Environmental Sciences from Columbia University. She has a PhD from Columbia University from the Lamont Doherty Earth Observatory. 1/11/11. EJW.)

Having back-up plans and built-in redundancy features can save lives, whether it’s emergency flares in the trunk of the car or warning lights and alarms in the cockpit of an airplane. **For Earth, failures in redundancy can lead to catastrophe.**¶ In nature, **multiple species compete for the same resources,** something called [**ecological redundancy**](http://www.ecology.info/article.aspx?cid=10&id=68)**.** For example, several species of sharks may feed on the same prey fish. If one species disappeared, the other sharks would take up the slack on chowing down on the extra fish – keeping the system in balance. **But if multiple species** of shark **go extinct**, a situation that is currently playing out, **the system can veer toward collapse.¶** For the first time **researchers** **have made a direct connection between loss of redundancy and ecosystem collapse**. Their work, published recently in the journal Geology, shows that **during extinction events in the** [**Permian**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Permian_period.aspx) **and** [**Triassic**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Triassic_period.aspx) **periods, the Earth’s ancient oceans lost critical back-up species.¶ The research holds a dire warning** about humans activitiesin the oceansand points out **the importance of preserving whole ecosystems, not just individual species.¶** “It’s definitely a cautionary tale because we know it’s happened at least twice before,” **said** Jessica **Whiteside of Brown University**, the paper’s lead author in a [**press release**](http://news.brown.edu/pressreleases/2011/01/extinction). “And you have long periods of time before you have **reestablishment of ecological redundancy**.” In these cases, it **took 10 million years for nature to balance itself out again**, the team reported.¶ Many marine biologists worry that fisheries worldwide are in collapse. Overfishing of predatory species, like bluefin tuna, sharks, and swordfish has eliminated, not just competing species, but entire levels of the food chain.¶“It is difficult to evaluate what is going on at present, given that we don’t have the advantage of the long lens of geologic history, where we can see things play out over millions of years,” Whiteside wrote in an email to Discovery News. “But there is evidence that trophic (i.e. food-web) collapse is starting to occur in some marine ecosystems.”¶ One example of ecosystem collapse in the modern world can be seen off the coast of North Carolina, Whiteside said. The disappearance of the [**blacktip shark**](http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sharks/FS_blacktipshark.htm) allowed the [**cownose ray**](http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/gallery/descript/cownoseray/cownoseray.html)population to explode. This event, called a trophic cascade, collapsed the area’s century-old [**bay scallop**](http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/wdb/pub/species_profiles/82_11-012.pdf) industry.¶ Similar situations occurred 250 and 200 million years ago. Predators similar to the modern day[**nautilus**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/nautilus.aspx), called [**ammonites**](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ammonite.aspx), were once common and diverse. But many species went extinct after[**massive volcanic eruptions**](http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/supervolcano/others/others_07.html) in the Permian and Triassic caused devastation and atmospheric disruption. The resulting climate change reduced ammonites to only a few species.¶ **The result was a simplified food chain.** A few hardy species survived the extinctions and became common. Generalist species expanded and filled wide ranges of the food web, as opposed to locally adapted species filling specific niches. Other **research has suggested that homogeneous populations of generalist species** can actually **slow the divergence of new species and subsequently the ecosystem’s recovery**.¶ After the ancient extinctions, biodiversity and robust ecosystems slowly re-emerged. To understand this re-emergence, the ammonite researchers analyzed carbon isotopes in the fossils. The scientists were then able to measure the stability of the carbon cycle in the ancient oceans.¶ Disruptions, like the volcanic events of the Permian and Triassic, caused species numbers to plummet. After disturbances, it took up to 10 million years for fluctuations to settle down and a stable pattern to develop. Highest species diversities of ammonites were found when the carbon isotope values were stable.¶ “The take home message is that **biodiversity matters**,” Whiteside told Discovery News. Not just because it’s nice to look at a bunch of species, she said, but because **ecosystem functioning is reduced by biodiversity loss.**

### Topicality

We meet – Economic engagement includes energy

Sullivan 8 (Daniel, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, 8-4-8, Scoop World News, “Addressing Energy Issues in the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0808/S00038.htm, accessed 7-1-13)

Our two countries have also benefited from a candid exchange of views on biofuels through other channels, including the U.S. - Brazil CEO Forum, and meetings of business people, academics, and citizens groups. With Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon, I co-chair an Economic Partnership Dialogue with Brazil. Other members of the economic team at the State Department also have traveled on numerous missions to Brazil to talk with government and business groups about the whole range of our economic engagement, including biofuels. The Deputy Secretary of Energy departs for Brazil shortly to continue this broad and deep engagement.

Counter interpretation – economic engagement with Mexico pertains to energy

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 12 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce “Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership” <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1204EnhancingtheUS-MexicoEconomicPartnership.pdf>, p. 3, accessed 6/26/13)

The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative (USMLI) was launched in May 2010, on the occasion of President Felipe Calderón’s state visit to Washington, DC. Corporate members of the Initiative work with public and private sector partners in Mexico and the United States to ensure that policymakers and legislators understand the importance of our countries’ economic ties, and to focus their attention on the considerable work that remains to be done to optimize the relationship. The goal of the USMLI is to move true economic partnership between the United States and Mexico from policy aspiration to reality by making both countries more competitive in global markets; raising living standards for workers in both countries; making the U.S.-Mexican border the most modern, streamlined, and secure in the world; promoting the continent’s energy independence while respecting our shared environment; and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation, all within a framework that fully respects and supports national sovereignty and interests.

We are core of the topic—topic paper proves

Bauschard 13 (Stefan, Director of Debate at Lakeland School district and Assistant debate coach at the Harvard Debate Council Assistant Debate Coach, [Harvard Debate Council](http://harvarddebate.org" \t "_blank), “Defining ‘Economic Engagement,’” <http://bauscharddebate.com/2013/03/defining-economic-engagement/>, Accessed: 7/1/13)

What issues can be covered by economic engagement? The core question here is how the term “economic” limits the topic beyond what would be true if the topic simply said “increase its engagement with…” Obviously, the term “economic” limits the type of engagement, but contextual usage evidence doesn’t suggest that there is too much of a limit. I’ve found contextual evidence that supports including all of the following in economic engagement - Trade - Information technology - Investment - General environmental issues - Forest and wetland conservation - Water and air quality - Small & Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) - Health care - Clean energy, including renewable energy - Electricity production and transmission - Nuclear power - General energy security - Defense and security - Economic development - Intellectual property - Reducing corruption - Food regulation - Environmental regulation How does the US engage? As noted, this question is also related to the third question because whether or not engagement can (or should) include a quid pro quo is a how question related to engagement. I separated them because the conditionality question applies to all other how issues and is really a core question about the types of acceptable Negative counterplans. For example, the US might engage by providing foreign aid, but whether or not that aid can or should be delivered as part of a quid pro quo is a separate question. In terms of specific mechanisms for engagement, contextual evidence exists for engaging in all of the following ways – -Official contacts with the government -Academic exchanges -Two track dialogue(s) -Development programs (foreign aid) -Providing loans -Working through non-governmental organizations (NGOS) -Enabling International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to support work in the topic countries -Negotiating trade agreements and facilitating trade ties -Developing standards and practices for businesses -Using the US Agency for International Development (AID) to support business development -Encouraging other countries to reduce trade barriers -Providing visas to individuals in other countries (this was an entire college resolution!) -Supporting increased investment -Helping US companies navigate the business climate -Strengthening measures to protect intellectual property -Encouraging countries to invest in the US -Integrating countries into the global economic system -Reduction in sanctions and other trade barriers -Facilitating action by IFIs -Boosting capital investment -Supporting joint technology development -Providing technical cooperation on energy environment -Facilitating the development of regulation

### K

Method focus causes scholarly stagnation – turns their framework

Patrick Thadeus Jackson, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, 11 [The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59]

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions. At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis. Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).¶ The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established. Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

No impact – democratic norms and civil society check totalitarianism and genocide

**Dickinson**, associate professor of history – UC Davis, **‘4**

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1) (gov’t modernity d/s lead to extinction, still HR)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

**This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

Empirics disprove their method – they reject empirical bases and substitute fragmented analysis – causes worse forms of repression - – calculative thought is essential to solvency

Antonio and Kellner, 1990 ( Robert, Kansas University Professor Sociology, Douglas, Columbia University Philosophy Professor, "Modernity, Modern Social Theory, and the Postmodern Critique," American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., August 1990. gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/modsoctheory80s.pdf )

Other modem social theorists had already developed a more critical conception of the social self contradicting conformist and homogeneous portrayals of the subject. For example Simmel and Mead held that socialization is an individuating as well as a homogenizing force (Mead 1967; Simmel 1964). In their view, modernity's highly differentiated social structure produces a highly articulated individuality capable of increasingly self-conscious self-assertion and voluntaristic patterns of association. Mead's view of the subject stands out from the sometimes simplistic, hyperrationalist, and conformist version implied by many other classical theorists. Here the postmodernist criticism points to serious deﬁciencies. However, they go too far in rejecting the individual's capacity for autonomy and rational action, substituting schizophrenically fragmented or robotized experience and behavior. Postmodernists seem to be amnesiac about the CounterEnlightenment reactionaries who used the alleged irrationality of the subject to justify the need for authoritarian moralism and social control. Despite its shortcomings, some current of classical theory suggested a more balanced view of the self abandoning the imperious vision of rationality and maintaining a conditioned idea of autonomy. Approaches that speak of the disappearance of, or radical fragmentation of, the subject cannot account for uncoerced collective action. Such extreme views are not only empirically misguided, but can easily be turned around to support the types of repression that postmodernists themselves oppose. Classical theorists saw the new types of mass social organization and consequent interdependences to be dialectically related with opposing forces producing social and cultural fragmentation. They produced standpoints for criticizing society and suggesting social changes from the interplay of these integrating and fragmenting conditions. In particular, the "immanent" criticism of social theorists emphasized the contradictions between emergent democratic ideals and possibilities of modernity and the new types of oppression, inequality, and polarization. As with their central metatheoretical assumptions, this historical method of social criticism sometimes resulted in dogmatic pseudosociological pronouncements (e.g. about the "inevitable" direction of history), and, at others, expressed critical sensitivity pointing to concrete resources and possibilities at the heart of nascent social struggles, as well as growing aspirations for a freer and more paciﬁed social life. In sum, classical social theorists provided languages for discussing societal development, the primary social structures and institutions of modern society, and the most signiﬁcant possibilities for progressive social change. Such theories provided a basis for cognitively mapping the social order which helps individuals situate themselves meaningfully in their emergent social order. They also encouraged an attitude that society can be understood and transformed through collective action and planning. Classical social theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Dewey exhibited a balanced concern for interdependence and fragmentation and argued that modem social arrangements contain their own historical bases for social criticism. It is true that these theorists sometimes spoke dogmatically about the path of societal development and its signiﬁcance for realizing freedom and justice. Although they claimed to abandon philosophical "grounds," classical theorists often treated the "progressive" features of modernity too optimistically, transforming them into transcendent warranties about a more democratic future. But postmodernists, overreacting to this tendency of classical theory, speak of overwhelming social and cultural fragmentation destroying the historical bases of immanent critique and the possibility of progressive social transformation. By dismissing the metatheoretical underpinnings and historical social criticism of modern social theory, postmodernists rule out the strong sociology needed to support their own extremely sweeping claims about a postmodern era, and the exhaustion of theory, collective action, and radical social transformation. They thus give up the analytic means for clarifying and elaborating the historical bases of their nonnative criticisms of modernity. In the end, postmodernists' totalizing claims continue in the tracks of classical social theory, but without the conceptual tools and analytic methods to provide a satisfactory account of the alleged postmodern condition

Perm: do the plan through modern social theory – endorses the postmodern criticism of classical theorists but maintains political and analytic methods necessary solving crises

Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen **since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

Political association is necessary to give life meaning beyond mere survival

Saurette 96 (Paul Saurette, PhD in Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Ottawa, 3/1/1996, “‘I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them’: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, Number 1)

The Human Condition and Political Action While Nietzsche traces the historical influence of the dominant philosophical foundations of the Will to Truth/Order, Arendt's thought can be interpreted as a sustained examination of the consequences of this tradition for our notions of political action. Like Nietzsche, Arendt traces the origin of the `modern' understanding of politics to the interpretative framework inaugurated by Socrates and Plato. Therefore, in order to understand Arendt's conception and critique of the traditional Western definition of politics, it is necessary to examine several of the classical distinctions through which she explores the nature and role of politics. In The Human Condition, Arendt characterises human activity and political life (the vita activa) as being composed of three distinct types of activity. The first of these, labour, is activity which directly responds to the need for biological survival. As such, Arendt states that the `human condition of labour is life itself." Labour is the automatic cycle of production and consumption which ends only with death and is therefore universal to all humanity. In contradistinction to labour, Arendt suggests that the activity of work involves the production of the `human artifice' and the durable material world where humans live." The primary characteristic of work is that it is the realm of violence in which force is used to manipulate natural material. It is a process of fabrication guided from start to finish by an idea or model, whose goal is simply the realisation of this form in the human physical world of appearance. The worker is the master of the entire process and conceives of a definite beginning and end through which the ideal is realised. As opposed to labour, then, work is the realm of mastery and control. Moreover, by erecting a durable, `objective', and relatively stable world of human artifacts, `homo faber rescues animal lahorans from the endless flow of biological life and transcends his own subjectivity by constructing a durable world of his own which stands apart from both the maker and the natural world'." Through homo faber, humanity both affirms and escapes the inexorable cycle of birth and death by fabricating a realm of objects in which the communal reification of memory is possible. Work is therefore a critical human activity which allows action to give human existence a sense of immortality, of `endurance in time, deathless life on this earth', and of meaning beyond simple survival. Despite the necessity of both labour and work, action is the most uniquely human activity because only through action can humanity realise the fundamental universality and individuality of human existence. According to Arendt, action is the activity that allows humanity to comprehend and reproduce the existential and irreducible human condition of plurality and natality. As Arendt suggests, `the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent is all human activities'." This inherent individuality creates human plurality as `the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live'.` While action is only possible because of the `human condition' of plurality and natality, action also reproduces it. In other words, only action can realise the potential plurality and natality of the human world. As James Knauer suggests, plurality is a potential given by the fact of natality, the birth of new human individuals, but it can be realized only through political association. It is in their acting and speaking together that unique individuals emerge out of the sameness and eternal recurrence of the species. And it is only when living together as acting beings in political association that human beings encounter other human beings, that plurality is realised 21 According to Arendt, then, the purpose of a public sphere is to create the condition of unmediated human interaction as the realisation of the human condition through political action.

Pure rejection fails – we need to make demands on the state

Peter **Hallward**, lecturer in the French department at King’s College, **2002**, online: http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm, accessed July 14, 2005

We know that Badiou’s early and unequivocally hostile attitude to the state has considerably evolved. Just how far it has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anti-consensual, anti-‘re-presentative’, and thus anti-democratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). ‘A philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the "democratic" submission to the world as it is’ (‘Entretien avec Alain Badiou’, 1999: 2). But he seems more willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repère. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign – for instance, electoral contests or petition movements – that operates as a ‘prisoner of the parliamentary space’ (LDP, 19-20.04.96: 2). It remains ‘an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm. The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics.’ On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that ‘their separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought’ (LDP, 6.05.93: 1).[24](http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22Note%2024) The OP now conceives itself in a tense, non-dialectical ‘vis-à-vis’ with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses ‘any antagonistic conception of their operation, any conception that smacks of classism.’ There is to no more choice to be made between the state or revolution; the ‘vis-à-vis demands the presence of the two terms and not the annihilation of one of the two’ (LDP, 11.01.95: 3-4). Indeed, at the height of the December ‘95 strikes, the OP recognised that the only contemporary movement of ‘désétatisation’ with any real power was the corporate-driven movement of partial de-statification in the interests of commercial flexibility and financial mobility. Unsurprisingly, ‘we are against this withdrawal of the state to the profit of capital, through general, systematic and brutal privatisation. The state is what can sometimes take account of people and their situations in other registers and by other modalities than those of profit. The state assures from this point of view the public space and the general interest. And capital does not incarnate the general interest’ (LDP, 15.12.96: 11). Coming from the author of Théorie de la contradiction, these are remarkable words. The next question is whether the very possibility of such prescription according to the general interest does not itself presuppose that same liberal-parliamentary realm upon whose systematic vilification its own critical distance depends. What kind of state can respond ‘responsibly’ to political prescriptions, if not one closely responsible to electoral pressure? Badiou maintains that the old socialist states, as states, were ‘more sensitive’ to workers’ strikes than are today’s parliamentary states – the great example being the Solidarity campaign in Poland (Letter to the author, 9.12.98).[25](http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22Note%2025) But when the OP ventures into the vexing domain of constitutional reform, it is to propose very explicitly parliamentary procedures: an end to a separately elected president (and so an end to the possibility of cohabitation); a purely cosmetic head of state; only one major forum for elections (a legislative chamber of deputies); assurance that the head of government is always the head of the dominant party; and finally, a guarantee ‘that there is always a dominant party’, thanks to some kind of first-past-the-post electoral system. The whole package is to be softened with calls for more open government and the rule of law (‘Proposition de réforme de la Constitution’, LDP, 12.02.95: 5-6). The once Maoist Organisation Politique now recommends something almost exactly like the British Constitution! At this point, the reader has to wonder if the OP’s policy of strict non-participation in the state really stands up. The OP declares with some pride that ‘we never vote’, just as ‘in the factories, we keep our distance from trade unionism’ (LDP, 12.02.95: 1).[26](http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22Note%2026) The OP consistently maintains that its politics of prescription requires a politics of ‘non-vote’. But why, now, this either/or? Once the state has been acknowledged as a possible figure of the general interest, then surely it matters who governs that figure. Regarding the central public issues of health and education, the OP maintains, like most mainstream socialists, that the ‘positive tasks on behalf of all are incumbent upon the state’ (LDP, 10.11.94: 1).[27](http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22Note%2027) That participation in the state should not replace a prescriptive externality to the state is obvious enough, but the stern either/or so often proclaimed in the pages of La Distance politique reads today like a displaced trace of the days when the choice of ‘state or revolution’ still figured as a genuine alternative.

###  K 2

1. Neoliberalism is inevitable and sustainable

Peck 2—Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British Columbia. Former Honorary Professorial Fellow, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester. PhD in Geography. AND—Adam Tickell—Professor of Geography, University of Bristol. PhD (Jamie, Neoliberalizing space, Antipode 34 (3): 380-404)

In many respects, it would be tempting to conclude with a Ideological reading of neoliberalism, as if it were somehow locked on a course of increasing vulnerability to crisis. Yet this would be both politically complacent and theoretically erroneous. One of the most striking features of the recent history of neoliberalism is its quite remarkable transformative capacity To a greater extent than many would have predicted, including ourselves, neoliberalism has demonstrated an ability to absorb or displace crisis tendencies, to ride—and capitalize upon—the very economic cycles and localized policy failures that it was complicit in creating, and to erode the foundations upon which generalized or extralocal resistance might be constructed. The transformative potential—and consequent political durability—of neoliberalism has been repeatedly underestimated, and reports of its death correspondingly exaggerated. Although antiglobalization protests have clearly disrupted the functioning of "business as usual" for some sections of the neoliberal elite, the underlying power structures of neoliberalism remain substantially intact. What remains to be seen is how far these acts of resistance, asymmetrical though the power relations clearly are, serve to expose the true character of neoliberalism as a political project. In its own explicit politicization, then, the resistance movement may have the capacity to hold a mirror to the process

3) Transition fails and results in massive power wars—alt causes oppressive governments

Aligica 03(Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions. Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) is catastrophe-prone". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be solved only in a continuing growth environment. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

8) No impact—Growth empirically shields the environment – multiple reasons –wealth, democracy, tech development, trade

Norberg 3 Johan Norberg, MA in History Fellow at Timbro, MA with a focus in economics and philosophy, In Defense of Global Capitalism, p. 225-237

All over the world, economic progress and growth are moving hand in hand with intensified environmental protection. Four researchers who studied these connections found “a very strong, positive association between our [environmental] indicators and the level of economic development.” A country that is very poor is too preoccupied with lifting itself out of poverty to bother about the environment at all. Countries usually begin protecting their natural resources when they can afford to do so. When they grow richer, they start to regulate effluent emissions, and when they have still more resources they also begin regulating air quality. 19 A number of factors cause environment protection to increase with wealth and development. Environmental quality is unlikely to be a top priority for people who barely know where their next meal is coming from. Abating misery and subduing the pangs of hunger takes precedence over conservation. When our standard of living rises we start attaching importance to the environment and obtaining resources to improve it. Such was the case earlier in western Europe, and so it is in the developing countries today. Progress of this kind, however, requires that people live in democracies where they are able and allowed to mobilize opinion; otherwise, their preferences will have no impact. Environmental destruction is worst in dictatorships. But it is the fact of prosperity no less than a sense of responsibility that makes environmental protection easier in a wealthy society. A wealthier country can afford to tackle environmental problems; it can develop environmentally friendly technologies—wastewater and exhaust emission control, for example—and begin to rectify past mistakes. Global environmental development resembles not so much a race for the bottom as a race to the top, what we might call a “California effect.” The state of California's Clean Air Acts, first introduced in the 1970s and tightened since, were stringent emissions regulations that made rigorous demands on car manufacturers. Many prophets of doom predicted that firms and factories would move to other states, and California would soon be obliged to repeal its regulations. But instead the opposite happened: other states gradually tightened up their environmental stipulations. Because car companies needed the wealthy California market, manufacturers all over the United States were forced to develop new techniques for reducing emissions. Having done so, they could more easily comply with the exacting requirements of other states, whereupon those states again ratcheted up their requirements. Anti-globalists usually claim that the profit motive and free trade together cause businesses to entrap politicians in a race for the bottom. The California effect implies the opposite: free trade enables politicians to pull profit-hungry corporations along with them in a race to the top. This phenomenon occurs because compliance with environmental rules accounts for a very small proportion of most companies' expenditures. What firms are primarily after is a good business environment—a liberal economy and a skilled workforce— not a bad natural environment. A review of research in this field shows that there are no clear indications of national environmental rules leading to a diminution of exports or to fewer companies locating in the countries that pass the rules. 20 This finding undermines both the arguments put forward by companies against environmental regulations and those advanced by environmentalists maintaining that globalization has to be restrained for environmental reasons. Incipient signs of the California effect's race to the top are present all over the world, because globalization has caused different countries to absorb new techniques more rapidly, and the new techniques are generally far gentler on the environment. Researchers have investigated steel manufacturing in 50 different countries and concluded that countries with more open economies took the lead in introducing cleaner technology. Production in those countries generated almost 20 percent less emissions than the same production in closed countries. This process is being driven by multinational corporations because they have a lot to gain from uniform production with uniform technology. Because they are restructured more rapidly, they have more modern machinery. And they prefer assimilating the latest, most environmentally friendly technology immediately to retrofitting it, at great expense, when environmental regulations are tightened up. Brazil, Mexico, and China—the three biggest recipients of foreign investment—have followed a very clear pattern: the more investments they get, the better control they gain over air pollution. The worst forms of air pollution have diminished in their cities during the period of globalization. When Western companies start up in developing countries, their production is considerably more environment-friendly than the native production, and they are more willing to comply with environmental legislation, not least because they have brand images and reputations to protect. Only 30 percent of Indonesian companies comply with the country's environmental regulations, whereas no fewer than 80 percent of the multinationals do so. One out of every 10 foreign companies maintained a standard clearly superior to that of the regulations. This development would go faster if economies were more open and, in particular, if the governments of the world were to phase out the incomprehensible tariffs on environmentally friendly technology. 21 Sometimes one hears it said that, for environmental reasons, the poor countries of the South must not be allowed to grow as affluent as our countries in the North. For example, in a compilation of essays on Environmentally Significant Consumption published by the National Academy of Sciences, we find anthropologist Richard Wilk fretting that: If everyone develops a desire for the Western high-consumption lifestyle, the relentless growth in consumption, energy use, waste, and emissions may be disastrous. 22 But studies show this to be colossal misapprehension. On the contrary, it is in the developing countries that we find the gravest, most harmful environmental problems. In our affluent part of the world, more and more people are mindful of environmental problems such as endangered green areas. Every day in the developing countries, more than 6,000 people die from air pollution when using wood, dung, and agricultural waste in their homes as heating and cooking fuel. UNDP estimates that no fewer than 2.2 million people die every year from polluted indoor air. This result is already “disastrous” and far more destructive than atmospheric pollution and industrial emissions. Tying people down to that level of development means condemning millions to premature death every year. It is not true that pollution in the modern sense increases with growth. Instead, pollution follows an inverted U-curve. When growth in a very poor country gathers speed and the chimneys begin belching smoke, the environment suffers. But when prosperity has risen high enough, the environmental indicators show an improvement instead: emissions are reduced, and air and water show progressively lower concentrations of pollutants. The cities with the worst problems are not Stockholm, New York, and Zürich, but rather Beijing, Mexico City, and New Delhi. In addition to the factors already mentioned, this is also due to the economic structure changing from raw-material-intensive to knowledge-intensive production. In a modern economy, heavy, dirty industry is to a great extent superseded by service enterprises. Banks, consulting firms, and information technology corporations do not have the same environmental impact as old factories. According to one survey of available environmental data, the turning point generally comes before a country's per capita GDP has reached $8,000. At $10,000, the researchers found a positive connection between increased growth and better air and water quality. 23 That is roughly the level of prosperity of Argentina, South Korea, or Slovenia. In the United States, per capita GDP is about $36,300. Here as well, the environment has consistently improved since the 1970s, quite contrary to the picture one gets from the media. In the 1970s there was constant reference to smog in American cities, and rightly so: the air was judged to be unhealthy for 100–300 days a year. Today it is unhealthy for fewer than 10 days a year, with the exception of Los Angeles. There, the figure is roughly 80 days, but even that represents a 50 percent reduction in 10 years. 24 The same trend is noticeable in the rest of the affluent world—for example, in Tokyo, where, a few decades ago, doomsayers believed that oxygen masks would in the future have to be worn all around the city because of the bad air. Apart from its other positive effects on the developing countries, such as ameliorating hunger and sparing people the horror of watching their children die, prosperity beyond a certain critical point can improve the environment. What is more, this turning point is now occurring progressively earlier in the developing countries, because they can learn from more affluent countries' mistakes and use their superior technology. For example, air quality in the enormous cities of China, which are the most heavily polluted in the world, has steadied since the mid-1980s and in several cases has slowly improved. This improvement has coincided with uniquely rapid growth. Some years ago, the Danish statistician and Greenpeace member Bjørn Lomborg, with about 10 of his students, compiled statistics and facts about the world's environmental problems. To his astonishment, he found that what he himself had regarded as self-evident, the steady deterioration of the global environment, did not agree at all with official empirical data. He found instead that air pollution is diminishing, refuse problems are diminishing, resources are not running out, more people are eating their fill, and people are living longer. Lomborg gathered publicly available data from as many fields as he could find and published them in the book The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. The picture that emerges there is an important corrective to the general prophesies of doom that can so easily be imbibed from newspaper headlines. Lomborg shows that air pollution and emissions have been declining in the developed world during recent decades. Heavy metal emissions have been heavily reduced; nitrogen oxides have diminished by almost 30 percent and sulfur emissions by about 80 percent. Pollution and emission problems are still growing in the poor developing countries, but at every level of growth annual particle density has diminished by 2 percent in only 14 years. In the developed world, phosphorus emissions into the seas have declined drastically, and E. coli bacteria concentrations in coastal waters have plummeted, enabling closed swimming areas to reopen. Lomborg shows that, instead of large-scale deforestation, the world's forest acreage increased from 40.24 million to 43.04 million square kilometers between 1950 and 1994. He finds that there has never been any large-scale tree death caused by acid rain. The oft-quoted, but erroneous statement about 40,000 species going extinct every year is traced by Lomborg to its source—a 20-year-old estimate that has been circulating in environmentalist circles ever since. Lomborg thinks it is closer to 1,500 species a year, and possibly a bit more than that. The documented cases of extinction during the past 400 years total just over a thousand species, of which about 95 percent are insects, bacteria, and viruses. As for the problem of garbage, the next hundred years worth of Danish refuse could be accommodated in a 33-meter-deep pit with an area of three square kilometers, even without recycling. In addition, Lomborg illustrates how increased prosperity and improved technology can solve the problems that lie ahead of us. All the fresh water consumed in the world today could be produced by a single desalination plant, powered by solar cells and occupying 0.4 percent of the Sahara Desert. It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in presentday quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials.

10) Neoliberalism solves inequality and poverty in Latin America

Haslam 12 – School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa (Paul Alexander Haslam, “Globalization in Latin America and Its Critics” International Studies Association, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 19 2012, Wiley Online Library)

After 30 years of liberal economic reforms and deeper integration into the world economy, is Latin America better-off? Many observers point to the poverty, exclusion, inequality, and disempowerment that continue to characterize the region. But the most recent figures suggest that the last decade has seen significant improvements in both poverty and inequality. In 1990, the percentage of indigent and non-indigent poor in Latin America stood at 48.3% of the population—some 200 million people. Twelve years later in 2002, the poor had declined to 44%, but due to population growth, the number of poor had increased to 221 million people. By 2009, the last year for which figures are available, the indigent and non-indigent poor had declined to 32.1% of the population, or 183 million people. These recent numbers are significantly lower, in percentage terms, than pre-crisis Latin America, circa 1980. Even the global financial crisis of 2008 only added 3 million more people to the ranks of the poor (Economic Commission for Latin America, the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010:11). Inequality has also declined over the 2002–2009 period, with the Gini coefficient falling slightly and the income gap narrowing in the vast majority of countries (ibid.:15). The story of the last decade, therefore, has been relatively effective poverty and inequality reduction in Latin America—at the same time that the region has deepened its integration with the world economy. The reasons for this turnaround, and the sustainability of the changes, are important subjects of debate. Something has changed in the region. Some cite the rise of the new left, macro-economic stability, and the commodity boom that has swelled government coffers. Others claim that politics has also become more authentically representative, social programs are being better targeted on the poor, and the education gap has diminished.

12) Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 (visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen **since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500

## Oil DA

Oil drilling should trigger the link

Klimasinska 12 (Katarzyna Klimasinska “Republicans Fault Obama’s Five-Year Oil Plan As Too Restrictive” 6/28/12 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-28/republicans-fault-obama-s-five-year-oil-plan-as-too-restrictive.html accessed on 6/28/12)

Republicans criticized the Obama administration’s latest five-year offshore oil-leasing plan for failing to open new areas for drilling, while environmentalists said the U.S. has put too many areas at risk. The Interior Department today scheduled 15 lease sales through 2017 in the Gulf of Mexico and Arctic waters, while keeping areas along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts off-limits. The agency also pushed back by two years a sale in Alaska’s Beaufort Sea to collect additional scientific information. “There is far too great of potential to put people back to work, improve the economy and make American more energy independent for President Obama to ignore America’s vast offshore energy resources,” House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings, a Washington Republican, said in a statement. “It’s extremely disappointing that the Obama administration continues to have such a narrow vision for American energy production.” President Barack Obama has set a target of reducing U.S. oil imports by a third by 2025 through more domestic oil production and increased use of natural gas and renewable resources. Republican challenger Mitt Romney has called for more extensive drilling. The five-year plan includes 12 sales in the Gulf of Mexico, an auction in Alaska’s Cook Inlet in 2016, in Chukchi Sea in 2016 and in the Beaufort Sea in 2017. The regions hold more than 75 percent of total undiscovered, recoverable oil, according to the agency

Oil drilling should trigger the link—already

No correlation between drilling and world market prices – 20 renowned economists cited—star this card!

Fong 12(Jocelyn Fong, writer for the MediaMatters For America Blog. March 22, 2013. “20 Experts Who Say Drilling Won't Lower Gas Prices,” http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/22/20-experts-who-say-drilling-wont-lower-gas-pric/184040)

In a pretty impressive act of journalism, the Associated Press recently conducted a "statistical analysis of 36 years of monthly, inflation-adjusted gasoline prices and U.S. domestic oil production." The result: "No statistical correlation between how much oil comes out of U.S. wells and the price at the pump." It's neat to see math cut through the talking points and get straight to the truth of the matter -- which is that expanding drilling is a fundamentally ineffectual response to gas price spikes. Given that changes in U.S. oil production don't move gasoline prices, it should be clear that U.S. government policies related to drilling are of even smaller consequence. Indeed, 92 percent of economists surveyed by the Chicago Booth School of Business agreed this week that "changes in U.S. gasoline prices over the past 10 years have predominantly been due to market factors rather than U.S. federal economic or energy policies. Still not convinced? How about another 20 economists and analysts from across the political spectrum who will tell you the same thing: Ken Green, American Enterprise Institute, "If the U.S. produced more of its own oil, it would probably reduce imports, but it's not likely that it would reduce prices ... We probably cannot produce so much oil to exert downward pressure on prices compared to the world market." Peter Van Doren and Jerry Taylor, Cato Institute: "Sure, more domestic oil creates the possibility of fewer refined imports tied to the price of Brent crude, but given that the price of Brent sets the price for crude generally, the result would be more profit for domestic crude producers rather than significantly lower gasoline prices for Americans (not that there's anything wrong with that)."¶ Doug Holtz-Eakin, American Action Forum: "Domestic action to increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market." Christopher Knittel, MIT economist: "There are not many markets where the United States can't impose its will on market outcomes ... This is one we can't, and it's hard for the average American to understand that and it's easy for politicians to feed off that."¶ Pinelopi Goldberg, Yale economist: "US domestic policy has only tiny effect on the world price of oil. US foreign policy is probably more relevant than energy policy." Steve Koonin, Institute for Defense Analyses: "When you hear the international oil companies advocating for energy independence, it's really about making money, which isn't a bad thing ... If they produce a million more barrels a day, they're not going to change the global price much. And since they know the global price is going up, they'll just make more money. There's nothing wrong with that, but it doesn't solve the price problem or the greenhouse gas problem."¶ Michael Levi, Council on Foreign Relations: "The amount of oil you produce at home doesn't affect the price ... You can lower your vulnerability to price by lowering your consumption of oil, but not by increasing your production." Severin Borenstein, UC Berkeley economist: "Producing more oil domestically will enrich the U.S. economy, particularly U.S. oil companies and their workers. With oil so valuable, it may be a good idea, though the value must be weighed against environmental consequences. But it will have no discernible impact on gas prices, because it will change the world's supply/demand balance for oil by less than 2 or 3 percent over a decade or more." David Peterson, Duke statistician: "U.S. production and demand have little to do with the price of gasoline in the U.S."¶ Edward Melnick, NYU statistician: When U.S. production goes up, the price of gas "is certainly not going down ... The data does not suggest that whatsoever." David Sandalow, former Brookings fellow: "Drilling offshore to lower oil prices is like walking an extra 20 feet per day to lose weight. ... It's just not going to make much of a difference."¶ Tom Kloza, Oil Price Information Service: "This drill drill drill thing is tired ... It's a simplistic way of looking for a solution that doesn't exist." Richard Newell, former Administrator of Energy Information Administration: "We do not project additional volumes of oil that could flow from greater access to oil resources on Federal lands to have a large impact on prices given the globally integrated nature of the world oil market." Dean Baker, Center for Economic and Policy Research: "There is almost no disagreement among economists that drilling everywhere all the time offshore will have almost no impact on the price of gas in the United States. The reason is that we have a world market for oil. The additional oil that might come from offshore drilling is a drop in the bucket in a world oil market of almost 90 million barrels a day." Lou Crandall, Wrightson ICAP LLC: "Higher oil prices today are a global phenomenon, and the additional supply from increased drilling by the U.S. would not alter the global balance of supply and demand greatly. Gasoline prices at the pump would be higher either way. The only difference is that a somewhat larger share of the revenue would accrue to domestic interests (governmental and private) rather than to foreign suppliers."¶ Paul Bledsoe, Bipartisan Policy Center: "The notion that somehow we can produce so much domestically that we will move the global price is incorrect." Tom O'Donnell, The New School: "The amount of extra oil that the U.S. would produce, as far as affecting the world price of oil, is almost insignificant."' Deborah Gordon, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "We can drill doggedly in our own backyards, but the price of gasoline will remain more a matter of speculation over externally-driven factors than tapping new sources of oil at home." Joseph Dukert, energy analyst: "Americans tend to exaggerate the price effects of fluctuations in domestic production in relation to the total amount of oil in global trade. On the larger stage, the perception of geopolitical risks is more important." Phyllis Martin, Energy Information Administration: "In 2009, the U.S. produced about 7 percent of what was produced in the entire world, so increasing the oil production in the U.S. is not going to make much of a difference in world markets and world prices ... It just gets lost. It's not that much." Even Fox's John Stossel acknowledged recently that U.S. energy policy "doesn't make that much of a difference" on gas prices, contrary to what others at Fox News are claiming.

# 1AR

## euro

Inevitability doesn’t justify extinction in the short term – future generations are intrinsically valuable and might solve the impacts anyway

Jason **Matheny**, Department of Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. **‘7**. Risk Analysis, Volume 27, Number 5, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction.” <http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html>

An extinction event today could cause the loss of thousands of generations. This matters to the extent we value future lives. Society places some value on future lives when it accepts the costs of long-term environmental policies or hazardous waste storage. Individuals place some value on future lives when they adopt measures, such as screening for genetic diseases, to ensure the health of children who do not yet exist. Disagreement, then, does not center on whether future lives matter, but on how much they matter.6 Valuing future lives less than current ones (“intergenerational discounting”) has been justified by arguments about time preference, growth in consumption, uncertainty about future existence, and opportunity costs. I will argue that none of these justifications applies to the benefits of delaying human extinction. Under time preference, a good enjoyed in the future is worth less, intrinsically, than a good enjoyed now. The typical justification for time preference is descriptive—most people make decisions that suggest that they value current goods more than future ones. However, it may be that people’s time preference applies only to instrumental goods, like money, whose value predictably decreases in time. In fact, it would be difficult to design an experiment in which time preference for an intrinsic good (like happiness), rather than an instrumental good (like money), is separated from the other forms of discounting discussed below. But even supposing individuals exhibit time preference within their own lives, it is not clear how this would ethically justify discounting across different lives and generations (Frederick, 2006; Schelling, 2000). In practice, discounting the value of future lives would lead to results few of us would accept as being ethical. For instance, if we discounted lives at a 5% annual rate, a life today would have greater intrinsic value than a billion lives 400 years hence (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Broome (1994) suggests most economists and philosophers recognize that this preference for ourselves over our descendents is unjustifiable and agree that ethical impartiality requires setting the intergenerational discount rate to zero. After all, if we reject spatial discounting and assign equal value to contemporary human lives, whatever their physical distance from us, we have similar reasons to reject temporal discounting, and assign equal value to human lives, whatever their temporal distance from us. I Parfit (1984), Cowen (1992), and Blackorby et al. (1995) have similarly argued that time preference across generations is not ethically defensible.7 There could still be other reasons to discount future generations. A common justification for discounting economic goods is that their abundance generally increases with time. Because there is diminishing marginal utility from consumption, future generations may gain less satisfaction from a dollar than we will (Schelling, 2000). This principle makes sense for intergenerational transfers of most economic goods but not for intergenerational transfers of existence. There is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed. There is no reason to believe existence matters less to a person 1,000 years hence than it does to a person 10 years hence. Discounting could be justified by our uncertainty about future generations’ existence. If we knew for certain that we would all die in 10 years, it would not make sense for us to spend money on asteroid defense. It would make more sense to live it up, until we become extinct. A discount scheme would be justified that devalued (to zero) anything beyond 10 years. Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 261–262) defend discounting on these grounds—we are uncertain about humanity’s long-term survival, so planning too far ahead is imprudent.8 Discounting is an approximate way to account for our uncertainty about survival (Ponthiere, 2003). But it is unnecessary—an analysis of extinction risk should equate the value of averting extinction at any given time with the expected value of humanity’s future from that moment forward, which includes the probabilities of extinction in all subsequent periods (Ng, 2005). If we discounted the expected value of humanity’s future, we would count future extinction risks twice—once in the discount rate and once in the undiscounted expected value—and underestimate the value of reducing current risks. In any case, Dasgupta and Heal’s argument does not justify traditional discounting at a constant rate, as the probability of human extinction is unlikely to be uniform in time.9 Because of nuclear and biological weapons, the probability of human extinction could be higher today than it was a century ago; and if humanity colonizes other planets, the probability of human extinction could be lower then than it is today. Even Rees’s (2003) pessimistic 50-50 odds on human extinction by 2100 would be equivalent to an annual discount rate under 1% for this century. (If we are 100% certain of a good’s existence in 2007 but only 50% certain of a good’s existence in 2100, then the expected value of the good decreases by 50% over 94 years, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 0.75%.) As Ng (1989) has pointed out, a constant annual discount rate of 1% implies that we are more than 99.99% certain of not surviving the next 1,000 years. Such pessimism seems unwarranted. A last argument for intergenerational discounting is from opportunity costs: without discounting, we would always invest our money rather than spend it now on important projects (Broome, 1994). For instance, if we invest our money now in a stock market with an average5%real annual return, in a century we will have 130 times more money to spend on extinction countermeasures (assuming we survive the century). This reasoning could be extended indefinitely (as long as we survive). This could be an argument for investing in stocks rather than extinction countermeasures if: the rate of return on capital is exogenous to the rate of social savings, the average rate of return on capital is higher than the rate of technological change in extinction countermeasures, and the marginal cost effectiveness of extinction countermeasures does not decrease at a rate equal to or greater than the return on capital. First, the assumption of exogeneity can be rejected. Funding extinction countermeasures would require spending large sums; if, instead, we invested those sums in the stock market, they would affect the average market rate of return (Cowen & Parfit, 1992). Second, some spending on countermeasures, such as research on biodefense, has its own rate of return, since learning tends to accelerate as a knowledge base expands. This rate could be higher than the average rate of return on capital. Third, if the probability of human extinction significantly decreases after space colonization, there may be a small window of reducible risk: the period of maximum marginal cost effectiveness may be limited to the next few centuries. Discounting would be a crude way of accounting for opportunity costs, as cost effectiveness is probably not constant. A more precise approach would identify the optimal invest-and-spend path based on estimates of current and future extinction risks, the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, and market returns. In summary, there are good reasons not to discount the benefits of extinction countermeasures. Time preference is not justifiable in intergenerational problems, there is no diminishing marginal utility from having ever existed, and uncertainties about human existence should be represented by expected values. I thus assume that the value of future lives cannot be discounted. Since this position is controversial, I later show how acceptance of discounting would affect our conclusions.

## neolib

## t

## oil