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#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should implement the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States.

## Contention 1 Hegemony

#### Hegemony is sustainable – but the US must walk carefully – policy choices that endorse multilateral leadership are key

Beckley 2012, Michael Beckley, PHD Columbia, assistant professor of political science at Tufts University specializing in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, 2012, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited”, PDF, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDkQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fcatalog%2Fac%3A146399&ei=I1mZUaOnMMLk0gH9iICoCw&usg=AFQjCNGKp8jw7t-cvRknlrP0qcv6Z7M41w&sig2=EcwCKI0jGPs3NkMrxYYY5g&bvm=bv.46751780,d.dmQ>

The growing consensus in U.S. academic and policymaking circles is that unipolarity is a temporary aberration that soon will be swept away. The most recent National Intelligence Council report, for example, claims that “the international system...will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers” and “will be a global multipolar one.”6 Among academics, “it is widely perceived that the international political system is in flux and that the post-­‐ Cold War era of American preeminence is winding down.”7 Book stores are filled with titles such as The Post-­‐American World, The End of the American Era, When China Rules the World, and Becoming China’s Bitch. And opinion polls show that pluralities of people in most countries believe that China is already the world’s dominant economic power.8 If this conventional wisdom is correct, then the United States faces an extraordinary challenge. The Argument In the pages that follow, I argue that such declinist beliefs are exaggerated and that the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era. First, I show that the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and in some areas increased, its lead over other countries since 1991. Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as sufficient conditions for U.S. relative decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly. Second, I find that U.S. hegemony is profitable in certain areas. The United States delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling its own resources, and some of its allies resources, into enhancing its own military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War. Third, I conclude that globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States. Taken together, these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity. For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

#### Three Internal Links:

#### The first internal link is oil dependence:

#### THA eases Middle Eastern oil dependence

Committee on Natural Resources, 13 – (Senate Committee on Natural Resources. June 27, 2013. “House Votes to Approve Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement with Mexico,” http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=340794)//SDL

The bill would open up nearly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico that is estimated to contain as much as 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas. This would expand U.S. energy production, create new American jobs, lower energy prices, and generate tens of millions of dollars in new revenue. ¶ The bill would also put into place an important and transparent framework for future implementation of similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements with other nations.¶ “By passing this Transboundary Agreement, the House has furthered its commitment to create jobs though energy. This legislation implements a first of its kind agreement with the government of Mexico to develop shared resources located between our two countries in the Gulf. The legislation also opens roughly 1.5 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico for production, and would help create American jobs and grow our economy in the process,” said Rep. Jeff Duncan (SC-03). “According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the U.S. State Department, these areas are estimated to contain 172 million barrels of oil and 304 billion cubic feet of natural gas, a considerable amount that will lessen our dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil. The agreement also prioritizes safety by requiring that all operations in the region conform to U.S. safety standards, and establishes a framework for possible future arrangements with other neighboring countries like Canada. Simply put, this legislation is a win-win for our country, and I am proud that it received strong bipartisan support.” ¶ “These areas in the Gulf of Mexico are ready to be explored and developed and this bill will give U.S. job creators the certainty they need to move forward. Activity can begin once this agreement is enacted,” said Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings. “The Natural Resources Committee and Congressman Duncan have worked hard to advance this bill and get it signed into law. It’s important to American energy, American jobs and American energy security. And it is important to supporting a positive relationship with our neighbor to the south, Mexico.”

#### Oil dependence draws the US into Middle East conflicts and decimates US Hegemony

Josef Braml, editor-in-chief of the Yearbook on International Relations, 2007, The Washington Quarterly 30.4 (2007) 117-130, “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”

If the United States continues its overreliance on fossil fuels, it will become increasingly dependent on producing nations that are unstable and that pose a risk to its interests and could come into conflict with other consumer states. [End Page 118] Although the United States can still count on Canada and Mexico, which are its two most important petroleum providers, its tense relationship with Venezuela illustrates the challenges in securing energy resources even in its own backyard, let alone the Middle East and other volatile areas. Some observers of petropolitics go as far as to describe an "axis of oil" (Russia, China, and eventually Iran) at work that is "acting as a counterweight to American hegemony" and will deprive the United States of its oil supplies and strategic interests.6

**Oil wars cause extinction**

**Lendman 07 –** Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (Stephen Lendman, “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm)

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a** sustainable **supply of what we can't do without**. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, **wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **a**n extremist **US** administration **willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. ***At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it*** issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be **nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria** in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. **The threat is real** and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

#### Second internal link is US-Mexico relations:

#### Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 12   
Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports**.** Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### This is true for the entire globe – Mexico is a key pillar for U.S. hegemony

Smith 13   
Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

Third Internal Link is Dodd-Frank:

**Exemptions destroy multilateralism – it ruins US leadership on international transparency norms**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

¶ ¶ ¶ Cardin-Lugar disclosures will increase transparency in extractive development, fostering stable investment ¶ ¶ and operating environments for U.S. companies, and providing investors with high-quality, consistent ¶ ¶ information to assess companies’ risk exposure in oil, gas and mineral-rich countries. Transparency will also ¶ ¶ increase government accountability in these countries, which is critical to the U.S. foreign policy objective ¶ ¶ of reducing extreme poverty by combating corruption, fraud and waste in resource-rich developing ¶ ¶ countries, to end the so-called “resource-curse.” For this reason, Cardin-Lugar forms part of U.S. energy ¶ ¶ security and multilateral foreign policy, and has the support of the Administration. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The U.S. is not alone in this effort. Cardin-Lugar is the foundation of a global standard of extractives ¶ ¶ transparency being adopted by leading capital markets. In early June, the European Union voted to adopt ¶ ¶ equivalent reporting requirements for its 27 member states, Canada committed to adopt similar reporting ¶ ¶ requirements, and the G8 committed to adopt common standards for extractives transparency. In addition, ¶ ¶ the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative that operates in more than 35 ¶ ¶ countries and is supported the world’s largest oil, gas and mining companies, including Exxon Mobil, ¶ ¶ Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP, Shell and others, revised its rules in May to ensure its disclosure requirements ¶ ¶ are consistent with Cardin-Lugar and EU rules. ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The anti-transparency provision in H.R.1613 would therefore contradict this global effort and the interests ¶ ¶ of U.S. investors, while undermining U.S. energy security and foreign policy objectives. The provision reads ¶ ¶ as follows: ¶ ¶ ‘(d) EXEMPTION FROM RESOURCES EXTRACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Actions taken ¶ ¶ by a public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not ¶ ¶ constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of section ¶ ¶ 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157U.S.C. 78m(q)).

**Counterplan turns the case – exemptions kill US international leadership**

**PWPC, 13 –** (PWYPC, coalition including Revenue Watch Institute, Global Financial Integrity, OxFam America, Global Witness, and Human Rights Watch. June 26, 2013. <http://www.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/TRANSPARENCY%20HR1613%20PWYP%20LETTER%20TO%20HOUSE_26JUNE2013.pdf)//SDL>

The exemption provision would weaken U.S. global leadership and influence. As mentioned above, Cardin-Lugar laid the foundations for a new global standard for excratives transparency. The EU disclosure rules and commitments on disclosure by Canada and the G8 are based on the precedent set by Cardin-Lugar. The EU rules match the U.S. law and do not allow for exemptions. Providing exemptions in the U.S. – Mexico THA would signal a retreat from transparency, and send a very poor message to our strongest allies. This could erode the faith of our international partners and undermine U.S. leadership. In conclusion, transparency promotes accountability and stability and improves the global business climate for economic growth and investment, which is good for American business and our national security. For these reasons, we urge Congress to keep America’s commitments and stand up for transparency by opposing HR. 1613 in its current form, and opposing inclusion of any version of the anti-transparency language included in any legislation considered or negotiated with the Senate to codify the U.S.-Mexico THA.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Statistics prove – Collapse of US leadership causes great power war and extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, CMR)

Events in Libya are a further reminder forAmericans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the** greatest force for peace the world has ever known. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires,** an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from** state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a** 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

#### Multilateral hegemony solves great power wars – the alternative is apolarity

Kempe 2012, Frederick Kempe, president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council, a foreign policy think tank and public policy group, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Atlantic Council since December 1, 2006, and is a Visiting Fellow at Oxford University's Saïd Business School, April 18, 2012, “Does America still want to lead the world?”, <http://blogs.reuters.com/thinking-global/2012/04/18/does-america-still-want-to-lead-the-world/>,)

For all their bitter differences, President Obama and Governor Romney share one overwhelming challenge. Whoever is elected will face the growing reality that the greatest risk to global stability over the next 20 years may be the nature of America itself. Nothing – not Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapons, not violent extremists or Mideast instability, not climate change or economic imbalances – will shape the world as profoundly as the ability of the United States to remain an effective and confident world player advocating its traditional global purpose of individual rights and open societies. That was the conclusion of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, a group of experts that was brought together by the World Economic Forum and that I have chaired. Even more intriguing, our group tested our views on, among others, a set of Chinese officials and experts, who worried that we would face a world overwhelmed by chaos if the U.S. – facing resource restraints, leadership fatigue and domestic political dysfunction – disengaged from its global responsibilities. U.S. leadership, with all its shortcomings and missteps, has been the glue and underwriter of global stability since World War Two – more than any other nation. Even with the world experiencing its greatest shift of economic and political power since the 19th century, no other country is emerging – or looks likely to emerge – that would be as prepared or equipped to exercise leadership on behalf of the global good. Yet many in the world are questioning the role of U.S. leadership, the governance architecture it helped create and even the values for which the U.S. stands. Weary from a decade of war and strained financially, Americans themselves are rethinking whether they can afford global purpose. The election campaign is unlikely to shed much light on these issues, yet both candidates face an inescapable truth: How the U.S. evolves over the next 15 to 20 years will be most important single variable (and the greatest uncertainty) hovering over the global future. And the two most important elements that will shape the U.S. course, in the view of the Global Agenda Council on the United States, will be American intentions and the capability to act on them. In short, will Americans continue to see as part of their identity the championing of values such as individual opportunity and open societies that have contributed so richly to the global commons? Second, can the U.S. sufficiently address its domestic challenges to assure its economic, political and societal strength while the world changes at unprecedented velocity? Consider this: It took Great Britain 155 years to double its gross domestic product per capita in the 18th and 19th centuries, when it was the world’s leading power. It took the U.S. 50 years to do the same by 1950, when its population was 152 million. Both India and China have achieved the same growth on a scale and at a pace never experienced before. Both countries have more than a hundred times the population of Britain during its heyday, yet they are achieving similar outcomes in a tenth of the time. Although China will likely surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2030, Americans retain distinct advantages that could allow them to remain the pivotal power. Think of Uncle Sam as a poker player sitting at a global table of cohorts, holding better cards than anyone else: a free and vibrant society, a history of technological innovation, an ability to attract capital and generate jobs, and a relatively young and regenerating population. However, it doesn’t matter how good your cards are if you’re playing them poorly. Put another way, the candidate who wins in November is going to be faced with the reality summed up by the cartoon character Pogo in 1971 as he was trying to make his way through a prickly primeval forest without proper footwear: “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Imagine two very different scenarios for the world, based on how America rises to its challenges. The positive scenario would require whoever is elected in November to be a unifier, someone who can rise above our current squabbles and galvanize not only the U.S. but also the world around a greater understanding of this historic moment. He would address the larger U.S. issues of failing infrastructure, falling educational standards, widening deficits and spiraling healthcare costs. He would partner more effectively with rising powers, and China in particular. And he would recognize and act upon the strategic stake the U.S. has in a politically confident, economically healthy Europe. The doubling of the global middle class by a billion people by 2030 plays into U.S. political and economic strengths, increasing demand for the products and services of information technology where the U.S. excels. Developments that improve the extraction of shale natural gas and oil provide the U.S. and some of its allies disproportionate benefits. Under this positive scenario, the U.S. could log growth rates of 2.7 percent or more each year, compared with 2.5 percent over the past 20 years. Average living standards could rise by 40 percent through 2030, keeping alive the American dream and restoring the global attractiveness of the U.S. model. The negative scenario results from a U.S. that fails to rise to its current challenges. Great powers decline when they fail to address the problems they recognize. U.S. growth could slow to an average of 1.5 percent per year, if that. The knock-on impact on the world economy could be a half-percent per year. The shift in the perception of the U.S. as a descending power would be more pronounced. This sort of United States would be increasingly incapable of leading and disinclined to try. It is an America that would be more likely to be protectionist and less likely to retool global institutions to make them more effective. One can already see hints of what such a world would look like. Middle Eastern diplomats in Washington say the failure of the U.S. to orchestrate a more coherent and generous transatlantic and international response to their region’s upheavals has resulted in a free-for-all for influence that is favoring some of the least enlightened players. Although the U.S. has responded to the euro zone crisis, as a result of its own economic fears, it hasn’t offered a larger vision for the transatlantic future that recognizes its enormous strategic stake in Europe’s future, given global shifts of influence. The U.S. played a dominant role in reconstructing the post-World War Two international order. The question is whether it will do so again or instead contribute to a dangerous global power vacuum that no one over the next two decades is willing or capable of filling.

#### AND – American involvement is inevitable – decline causes lash out and great power wars

Brzezinski 12 Zbigniew, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, PHD, JAN/FEB, “After America”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>,)

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

## Contention 2 is Drilling

#### Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

**Shields, 12 –** (David, independent energy consultant. “QandA: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf?”, Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor, 2/20/2012, <http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL>. EJW.)

"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It is about defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil in the ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater ¶ agreement obliges both countries to work together and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its ¶ contractors have no experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just waiting to happen."

#### Gulf’s ecosystems on the brink—plan key to solve another accident

**Craig, 11 –** (Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University. “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133\_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDL

These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the ¶ Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as ¶ this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez¶ spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the ¶ oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. ¶ Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection ¶ with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans ¶ could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky ¶ substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many ¶ of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater ¶ ones (but even for shallower coral reefs**),** remains impossible. ¶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound ¶ was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of ¶ Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the ¶ remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, ¶ Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and ¶ biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not ¶ completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred ¶ in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also ¶ responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually ¶ cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea ¶ otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico ¶ is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude ¶ (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater ¶ Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at ¶ length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of ¶ protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a ¶ growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases ¶ from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this ¶ plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of ¶ resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone ¶ was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored ¶ resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and ¶ the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168¶ A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the ¶ legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon¶ platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater ¶ Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s ¶ “demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—¶ of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170¶ In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil ¶ spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall ¶ conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows **that** without ¶ effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will ¶ not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to ¶ respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, ¶ cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government ¶ oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s ¶ internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a ¶ fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173

#### Plan solves shortfalls in Mexico drilling safety resources—solves through straw effect, lack of experience, and uncoordinated spill plans

Philbin, et all ‘12

(“Q and A: Is Mexico Prepared for Deepwater Drilling in the Gulf.” Inter-American Dialogue’s Latin American Energy Advisor. John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy. John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera. David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence. 2/20/12. EJW.)

**Pemex is not prepared for risks such as a spill** or other serious accident **that could happen as it ¶ plans to drill** two wells **in ultradeep waters** of the Gulf of Mexico, **said** Juan Carlos Zepeda, the ¶ **head of Mexico's National Hydrocarbons Commission**, in a Feb. 15 interview with The Wall ¶ Street Journal. According to Zepeda, his agency's resources amount to about 2 percent the size of ¶ its U.S. counterpart's budget. Pemex officials, however, say that the company is capable of ¶ carrying out its plans safely. How prepared is Mexico to deal with a serious accident in the Gulf ¶ of Mexico? Is the company sacrificing safety in its bid to improve competitiveness and meet ¶ production goals? ¶ A: John P. Philbin, director of crisis management at Regester Larkin Energy: ¶ "Among the lessons **learned from** the **Deepwater Horizon** incident, two are **fundamental in ¶ determining response preparedness**. First **is the importance of having a consistent national ¶ doctrine at federal, state and local levels**. Significant gaps surfaced during the Macondo blowout ¶ response because the U.S. Coast Guard operated under the United States' National Contingency ¶ Plan (NCP), which uses a top-down approach to manage the response, while state, local and ¶ elected officials operated under the Stafford Act, which is a bottom-up approach. **The second** ¶ fundamental **concern** **is awareness and knowledge** of the doctrine for those with any role in ¶ preparedness and response. Response plans and procedures developed from national doctrine ¶ must account for the complexity that will ensue, involving many jurisdictions and response ¶ elements. Adequate resources and pre-agreed collaboration mechanisms among resource ¶ providers are equally important. Note that the U.S. Coast Guard deployed some 60 boats and 2 ¶ aircraft to assist in Macondo response efforts, along with over 3,000 other boats and 127 ¶ surveillance aircraft and hundreds of individuals involved in the command and control structure. ¶ Mexico's navy, with some 200 ships total, would be severely taxed to respond to an incident, ¶ despite having some doctrine in place to deal with a spill and despite some simulations. The fact ¶ that **the** United States and Mexico signed an **agreement** this week **to collaborate on safety and ¶ response mechanisms in the Gulf of Mexico is a critical step toward safer Gulf operations—for ¶ both Mexico and the U**nited **S**tates." : John D. Padilla, managing director at IPD Latin America: ¶ "The plan at issue is Pemex's intent to drill in the Perdido Foldbelt area, which abuts the U.S.- ¶ Mexico maritime border. Although the bulk of Pemex's offshore infrastructure is located in the ¶ southern Gulf of Mexico (i.e. near Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap), Perdido represents the ¶ company's most promising near-term commercial crude oil prospect. The 18 other deepwater ¶ wells Pemex has drilled have either been principally natural gas or heavy oil; those that will be ¶ brought online still await commercialization. Complicating the equation, Pemex is saddled with ¶ four latest- generation semisubmersible rigs that cost $500,000 per day. Because the company ¶ has been unable to drill in Perdido's ultra-deepwater, the rigs have been relegated to drilling in ¶ shallower water—work that less sophisticated technology could accomplish. Ongoing concerns ¶ over deepwater drilling in the wake of the Macondo incident, combined with memories of ¶ Pemex's less-than-aggressive response to its 1979 Ixtoc spill, have given authorities on both ¶ sides of the U.S.– Mexico border pause. An archaic constitutional ban that prevents the company ¶ from providing the proper balance of risk-reward incentives, coupled with declining production, ¶ leave Pemex few large-scale, near-term alternatives—other than forging into Perdido on its own. ¶ The accord signed by U.S. and Mexican authorities on Monday offers an elegant way to calm ¶ fears on both sides of the border. Whether joint ventures materialize or not, the accord would ¶ permit joint inspection teams the right to ensure compliance with safety and environmental ¶ laws.Will Mexico's Senate approve the accord?" ¶ A: Alejandra León, associate director for Latin America-downstream oil at IHS Cera: ¶ "**The lack of Pemex's experience in** deep and **ultradeep water operations creates a valid ¶ uncertainty about its capabilities to efficiently handle any** accident or crude **spill** in those types of ¶ operations. However, safe operations do not just depend on Pemex. Service providers play a ¶ critical role. As long as Pemex contracts highly qualified companies to develop deep and ¶ ultradeep water activities and the contracts are clear regarding environmental requirements and ¶ other responsibilities, the risk will be mitigated. In fact, prevention is the very first step in ¶ creating strategies for potential accidents or crude spills. In this sense, the role of the National ¶ Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) is critical. As a regulator, the CNH has created clear and ¶ strict rules for deepwater operations, aligning Mexican standards to the strictest international ¶ standards. This is a good first step to prevent any serious accident or crude spill. The next ¶ challenge is to ensure that the regulation will be upheld and here the question remains if the ¶ CNH has the sufficient authority and resources to oversee Pemex's operations and guarantee the ¶ rule of law." ¶ A: David Shields, independent energy consultant based in Mexico City: ¶ "They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders. ¶ That is probably how we should understand **Pemex's** **decision to drill** the Maximino-1 well in ¶ 3,000 meters of water **in the Perdido** Fold Belt, right **next to the shared maritime boundary** with ¶ the United States. It is a decision that does not make sense in terms of competitiveness or ¶ production goals. It **is about defending** the final frontier of **national sovereignty and** sticking the ¶ Mexican flag on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico **to advise U.S. companies that they have no right ¶ to drill for oil** in the ultradeep waters **on the Mexican side.** **The** recently signed deepwater ¶ **agreement obliges both countries to work together** and share the spoils of the development of Transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line with constitutional ¶ restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as **Pemex** and its ¶ contractors **have no experience in such harsh environments**. In fact, **Pemex has never produced ¶ oil commercially anywhere in deep water**. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case ¶ scenarios nor does it have emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not ¶ fully abide by existing Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced. ¶ On the U.S. side, prohibition of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon ¶ spill, has come and gone. **The next disaster is just waiting to happen."** ¶ A: George Baker, publisher of Mexico Energy Intelligence: ¶ "The serious issues of corporate governance and regulation in the shadow of the Macondo ¶ incident have not yet been addressed in the many post-accident studies that have been released. ¶ On April 20, 2010, a joint BP-Transocean safety audit team boarded the Deepwater Horizon for ¶ an inspection of the safety practices of the crew and the condition of the facilities. The nominal ¶ objective of the inspection was to identify issues and conditions that could result in damage to ¶ lives, facilities and the environment. Within hours after the safety audit team flew off by ¶ helicopter, the Macondo well blew out. How is it that this team of senior safety auditors missed ¶ all the evidence that a catastrophe was unfolding beneath their feet? This is a question on the ¶ level of seriousness as that of the integrity of the cement that failed. The facile answer to the ¶ question is that safety, as a discipline and a concern, is divided into two parts: occupational ¶ safety, dealing with the slips and falls of employees, and process, or industrial, safety, dealing ¶ with conditions that could put the entire crew and facilities at risk. What happened on the ¶ **Deepwater Horizon** is that members of the safety audit team focused their attention on the feelgood issues of occupational safety, chit-chatting with crew members, while they ignored the fact ¶ that a cement bond log had not been run, and that proof of cement integrity was problematic at ¶ best. One measure **to avoid a repetition of this situation** would be to order, **as a matter of ¶ regulation, safety audits of industrial safety and occupational safety to be carried out separately, ¶ by different teams."**

#### Gulf ecosystems are critical biodiversity hotspots and have a key effect on the world’s oceans

Brenner ‘8

(Jorge Brenner, “Guarding the Gulf of Mexico’s valuable resources”, SciDevNet, <http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html>. 3-14-2008. Jorge Brenner is postdoctoral research associate at the Harte Research Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi.¶ EJW.) \*\*The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats— only known nesting beach of Kemp’s Ridley most threatened sea-turtles and helps the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.\*\*

Scientific collaboration on the common resources of the Gulf of Mexico has been difficult since the United States placed an economic embargo on Cuba in 1962. Research is permitted for US scientists who have a special government licence and Mexican scientists are allowed to travel to Cuba, but the political deadlock means that only a few institutions have managed to develop collaborative projects among the three countries. As a result, efforts to conserve the Gulf's valuable species and resources are being thwarted.¶ The economic embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries.¶ This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons — owned by everyone and no one — has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.¶ Rich in biodiversity and habitats¶ **The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known** **nesting** beach **of** Kemp's Ridley, the **world's most endangered sea turtle**.¶ **The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importanc**e: **water** from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to **form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.¶**

#### Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

Craig 03

(Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003, “Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289250>)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that **many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system.** n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

# 2AC

## Hegemony

Unconditional engagement key to solve artic conflict

Goldwyn 8/14 (2013 David L. Goldwyn, nonresident senior fellow with the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution Neil R. Brown and Cory R. Gill, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/14-us-mexico-transboundary-hydrocarbon-goldwyn-brown-gill)

Finally, the exemption also overreaches in shaping the nature of not only the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary agreement, but also any future transboundary agreement. Should hydrocarbons development continue in the Arctic, future transboundary agreements with Russia or Canada may be required. Would it be in U.S. interests to facilitate revenue secrecy in Moscow? Given that the EU recently passed its own transparency measures similar to Section 1504 while Canada and Switzerland are considering similar laws, international norms regarding extractive industry transparency may be significantly different by the time agreements with Russia and Canada are negotiated.

Arctic conflict cause miscalculation and accidental nuclear war

Huebert 07(Rob, Associate Professor of Political Science & the Strategic Studies Program @ the University of Calgary, Appendix 4, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of Chapter 4 – “Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security.” <http://www.carc.org/calgary/a4.htm>)

The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but mis-communications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever. In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

## Drilling

## Consult Brazil CP

#### Brazil says no – they want to assert control over Latin American policy

Mar Guinot Aguado 8/6/12 – Research Associate at Council on Hemispheric Affairs (“BRAZIL: PLAYING CHESS IN LATIN AMERICA,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/brazil-playing-chess-in-latin-america/>)

Challenging U.S. historical influence in the region, Latin American leaders’ political and economic agendas now conform more closely to Brazilian interests. Although traditionally considered the backyard of the U.S., the continent is now becoming the Brazilian playground. Brazil aspires to set the region’s agenda through a dynamic and independent foreign policy that significantly differs from a Washington perspective.

#### Says no – Brazil wants to prevent US hegemony in the region

Mar Guinot Aguado 8/6/12 – Research Associate at Council on Hemispheric Affairs (“BRAZIL: PLAYING CHESS IN LATIN AMERICA,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/brazil-playing-chess-in-latin-america/>)

Half a century ago, a spirit of “what is good for the USA is also good for Brazil” defined the Brazilian government’s approach to foreign policy. Yet now Brazil is more aware of its power. As it seeks to expand its influence throughout and beyond Latin America, its foreign policy increasingly collides with the historically U.S.-dominated role in guiding issues such as trade and security matters. Since the 1990s, Brazil has risen as a regional power in Latin America by crafting political and economic alliances with its neighbors. Its attempts to influence the outcome of elections and develop economic exchanges in the region demonstrate its pursuit of a leadership role in Latin America—replacing the U.S. with a more likeable partner and perhaps a more agreeable mix.

#### Binding consultation crushes U.S. leadership

Carroll ‘9(James FF, Notes & Comments Editor – Emory International Law Review, J.D. with Honors – Emory University School of Law, “Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security”, Emory International Law Review, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, Lexis)

n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 12. This does not mean, however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.

#### Consult kills hegemony, which is a stronger internal link to relations

Krauthammer ‘2 (CHARLES, winner of the 1987 Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary, writes a nationally syndicated editorial page for the Washington Post. “American Unilateralism”, <http://www.byui.edu/onlinelearning/courses/hum/202/American%20Unilateralism.htm>)

So much for the moral argument that under­lies multilateralism. What are the practical arguments? There is a school of realists who agree that liberal internationalism is nonsense, but who argue plausibly that we need international or allied support, regardless. One of their arguments is that if a power consistently shares rulemaking with others, it is more likely to get aid and assistance from them. I have my doubts. The U.S. made an extraordinary effort during the Gulf War to get U.N. support, share decision-making and assemble a coalition. As I have pointed out, it even denied itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did this diminish anti-Americanism in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy - policy dictated by the original acquiescence to that coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordi­nate American hegemony. Yet resentments were hardly assuaged, because extremist rage against the U.S. is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by our management of it. Pragmatic realists value multilateralism in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that if you share decision-making, you enlist others in your own hegemony enterprise. As proponents of this school argued recently in Foreign Affairs, “Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on.” This is a pure cost-benefit analysis of multilateralism versus unilateralism. If the concern about unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed and that one needs to think long-term, hardly anybody will disagree. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. There's no need to. On some issues, such as membership in the World Trade Organization, where the long-term benefit both to the U.S. and to the global interest is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, however, free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Other agreements require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change, for example, would have had a disastrous effect on the American economy, while doing nothing for the global environment. Increased emissions from China, India and other third-world countries which are exempt from its provisions clearly would have overwhelmed and made up for whatever American cuts would have occurred. Kyoto was therefore rightly rejected by the Bush administration. It failed on its merits, but it was pushed very hard nonetheless, because the rest of the world supported it. The same case was made during the Clinton administration for chemical and biological weapons treaties, which they negotiated assiduously under the logic of, “Sure, they're useless or worse, but why not give in, in order to build good will for future needs?” The problem is that appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement only legitimizes it. Repeated acquiescence on provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus. This is not only a moral absurdity. It is injurious to the U.S., because it undermines any future ability of the U.S. to act unilaterally, if necessary. The key point I want to make about the new unilateralism is that we have to be guided by our own independent judgment, both about our own interests and about global interests. This is true especially on questions of national security, war making, and freedom of action in the deployment of power. America should neither defer nor contract out such decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve per­manent structural constrictions, such as those imposed by the International Criminal Court. Should we exercise prudence? Yes. There is no need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia, as there is in Afghanistan or in Iraq. There is no need to act the superpower on steel tariffs, as there is on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power calls for occasional concessions on non-vital issues, if only to maintain some psychological goodwill. There's no need for gratuitous high-handedness or arrogance. We shouldn't, however, delude ourselves as to what psychological goodwill can buy. Countries will cooperate with us first out of their own self­interest, and second out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's unipolar power. Warm feelings are a distant third. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism at home, and this was under an American administration that was obsessively multilateralist and accommodating. Yet today, under the most unilateralist American administration in memory, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not the result of a sudden attack of Yemeni goodwill, or of a quick re-reading of the Federalist Papers. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of recalcitrant states on the price of non-cooperation. Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand; they are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. It was when the first President Bush said that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not stand, and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that he created the Gulf War coalition.

#### No need for consultation – Relations are rising now

Anthony Boadle 2013 Fri May 31, 2013 “Biden says U.S. and Brazil ready for deeper relationship” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-brazil-usa-biden-idUSBRE94U14220130531> MT

"We're ready for a deeper, broader relationship across the board on everything from the military to education, trade and investment," Biden told reporters after meeting with Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. The White House announced on Wednesday that Rousseff will make a state visit to Washington on October 23, the only one that President Barack Obama is offering a foreign head of state this year, indicating the importance his administration is placing on closer ties with Latin America's largest nation. Biden praised Brazil for recently writing off $900 million in African debt, saying it showed the emergence of Brazil as a "responsible" nation on the world stage. During his three-day visit, Biden also commended Brazil for lifting millions of people from poverty over the last decade and showing the world that development and democracy are not incompatible. However, he also urged Brazil to open its economy more to foreign bushiness and to be more vocal in defense of democracy and free-market values. Relations between Washington and Brasilia have improved since Rousseff took office in 2011 and adopted a less ideological foreign policy than her predecessor, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who befriended Iran and drew Brazil closer to Venezuela's anti-U.S. government under the late Hugo Chavez. As the Brazilian economy surged on a commodity boom in the last decade, China displaced the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner due to its massive purchases of Brazilian iron ore and soy. Perceiving the advent of better ties between Brasilia and Washington, U.S. and Brazilian businesses are actively pushing for a strategic partnership between their countries that would allow for more flexible investment rules, a treaty to eliminate double taxation and a visa waiver program to make travel easier for tourists and executives. "The atmospherics are improving rapidly, in part because Brazil has taken a lower profile on some contentious global political issues like Iran," said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Americas Society, a business forum dedicated to fostering ties between the United States and Latin America.

## Brazil DA

#### US-Brazil Relations high now – trade, students abroad, commercial cooperation, and positive views

**FT, 5/16** – Financial Times (“Politics put to one side in sign of closer ties between Brazil and the US”, Financial Times, 5/16/13, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9f9d81c6-b883-11e2-869f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2b28hgOi3)//EX>

When the Brazilian diplomat Roberto Azevêdo clinched the biggest job in global trade last week – as director-general of the World Trade Organisation – he received a relatively warm response from Washington.¶ The US could not have been expected to do anything other than vote for Mr Azevêdo’s rival, Herminio Blanco, the former trade minister of Mexico.¶ But Washington’s decision to “join the consensus” when Mr Azevêdo was selected by the WTO and back the Brazilian candidate showed both respect for the man and for the emerging power he represents.¶ The growing sense of bonhomie between the two countries makes sense. For the US, Brazil is looking more than ever like a friendly face in an increasingly multipolar world, one that is tilting slowly towards east Asia. For Brazil, the US, with its technology, quality higher education and capital markets, is an ever more important partner in the effort to become more internationally competitive and escape the middle income trap in which it has languished for decades.¶ Perhaps for this reason, Barack Obama, the US president, is expected later this year to roll out the red carpet and offer Dilma Rousseff, his Brazilian counterpart, the first state visit for a leader of her country since 1995.¶ “It’s an important time between the US and Brazil,” says Eric Farnsworth, vice-president of the Council of Americas and Americas Society.¶ “Everything I see indicates that Washington views Brazil’s rise as a favourable development.”¶ Brazilian and US relations date back to 1824 when Washington became the first state to recognise the independence of the Latin American power to the south. Brazil was also the only South American country to send troops to fight on the allied side in the second world war.¶ Although the relationship has usually been cordial, it has been characterised by periods of indifference. Like two good enough neighbours, relations remain reasonably good as long as the conversation does not stray too much towards politics, a subject on which Brazil, with its social democratic leanings, mostly sits to the left of Washington.¶ In spite of this, Brazilian presidents in recent decades have got on well with their US counterparts. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, president during the 1990s and early 2000s, was very close to US president Bill Clinton. Former Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, though once a trade union firebrand, got on famously with his US counterpart, George W. Bush.¶ Ms Rousseff and Mr Obama are not seen to have the same rapport and both have been more preoccupied with domestic politics. But relations between them are warming.¶ On the policy side, things have not always been smooth. Mr Lula da Silva prompted US suspicion in 2010 when he tried to intervene alongside Turkey in the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. Mr Lula da Silva and Ms Rousseff’s ruling Workers party has been a traditional friend of regimes considered unpalatable by the US, such as Cuba and Venezuela under the recently deceased Hugo Chávez.¶ Brazil’s independent stance, not only on these countries but in seeking to establish alternative power blocs, has grated on Washington. Ms Rousseff’s first overseas trip, for instance, was to Beijing rather than to its western trading partners. “There is a certain frustration in Washington,” says Mr Farnsworth. “Brazil seems to be as interested in developing a relationship with China as they are with the US. I don’t think most people would suggest the Chinese and US models are compatible.”¶ Throughout it all, trade in goods has continued to grow. It increased from as little as $28bn in 2002 to nearly $77bn last year, with a $11.6bn surplus in favour of the US, according to the US Census Bureau.¶ Brazil is the kind of trading partner the US needs, and it supports about 300,000 jobs in its northerly neighbour. It also buys the types of products the US wants to sell more of – aircraft parts, machinery and plastics. US services exports to Brazil have also increased, more than tripling between 2002 and 2011 to nearly $20bn.¶ For Brazil, the US, with its transparent business practices and focus on innovation and intellectual property, is the kind of trading partner it prefers. After an initial honeymoon with Beijing in the first decade of this century, when China became its biggest trading partner, Brazil is growing frustrated with aspects of the business relationship.¶ An old developing world ally, China is importing Brazil’s iron ore and soyabeans but in return swamps the Latin American country with cheap imports. “We are a rare example of a country that holds a sizeable trade surplus with China – $11bn in 2011 – but it’s not the quality of trade that we would like to see sometimes,” says Antônio Patriota, foreign minister.¶ Mindful that US universities are one means of improving its competitiveness, Brazil is sending a large number of students under its R$3bn ($1.5bn) science without borders scholarship programme to colleges in the US.¶ Brazilian companies, meanwhile, are tapping the strengthened capital markets of the US for private sector investment.¶ Defence co-operation is improving, with the US maintaining an order for a group of Brazilian light attack aircraft, the country’s first such contract with the US military. Embraer, the Brazilian builder of the aircraft, has signed a co-operation agreement with Boeing to develop a jet-engined military transport aircraft. This has strengthened aspirations in Washington that the US might eventually win a contract to supply the Brazilian air force with fighters.¶ The growing relationship is leading to hopes that thorny technical issues may one day be worked out. These include visa-free access for Brazilians to the US and a tax treaty that would simplify business dealings between the two.¶ The two countries which are competitors on global soya, orange juice and other commodities markets, are occasionally at odds on trade.

#### US-Brazil Relations high now – jobs, growth, and a plethora of trade

**Office of the Press Secretary, 12** – Office of the Press Secretary in the White House (“Fact Sheet: The U.S.-Brazil Economic Relationship”, whitehouse.gov, 4/09/12, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/09/fact-sheet-us-brazil-economic-relationship)//EX>

Strengthening Commercial Ties Contribute To Jobs and Growth¶ The United States and Brazil, the two largest economies and largest democracies in the Western Hemisphere, share one of the most important trade and economic relationships in the world. Brazil is our eighth largest goods trading partner. U.S. goods and services exports to Brazil totaled $63 billion in 2011 supporting approximately 300,000 U.S. jobs.¶ Brazil is an emerging global player and economic powerhouse. With a 2011 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of nearly $2.5 trillion, Brazil is the sixth largest economy in the world and accounts for more than 60 percent of South America’s total GDP. The United States is committed to deepening our bilateral economic relationship with Brazil, building on our mutual strengths, common interests, and input from our dynamic private sector stakeholders.¶ A Key Trading Partnership¶ Two-way goods and services trade between the United States and Brazil has nearly tripled in the past decade to more than $100 billion in 2011. In the past five years, goods and services exports from the United States to Brazil more than doubled, from $26.6 billion in 2006 to $62.7 billion in 2011.¶ With 195 million of the world’s consumers, and per-capita income expected to grow more than three percent per year during the next five years, Brazil’s demand for goods imports has more than tripled, from $47.2 billion in 2002 to $226.2 billion in 2011.¶ Since 2002, U.S. goods exports to Brazil have more than tripled, growing from $12.4 billion in 2002 to $42.9 billion in 2011. In 2011, U.S. goods exports to Brazil were up 21 percent from 2010. ¶ These exports were made up of goods from high-tech, value-producing industries. In 2011, the largest U.S. goods export category to Brazil was machinery, valued at $7.9 billion. Other top export categories included aircraft and parts ($5.4 billion), electric machinery ($4.6 billion), and plastics ($2.1 billion).¶ Exports to Brazil benefit businesses and entrepreneurs across the nation. In every year for the past 10 years, exporters in all 50 states have reported exports to Brazil. In 2011, nearly three-quarters of U.S. states (36 total) reported goods export shipments in excess of $100 million.¶ U.S. services exports to Brazil have also increased. From 2002 to 2011, U.S. services exports to Brazil more than tripled, increasing from $5.1 billion in 2002 to $19.9 billion in 2011. In 2010, these services included telecommunications services worth $2.1 billion, and business, professional, and technical services totaling $2.2 billion.¶ In 2011, 1.5 million Brazilians visited the United States, a 26 percent increase compared to 2010, and up about 400,000 in 2002. In 2011, Brazilians spent $6.8 billion on travel and tourism related goods in the United States, up 148 percent from 2009.¶

### US-Brazil Relations Inevitable

#### US-Brazil Relations Inevitable – trade increasing, World Cup, Olympics, and common interests

**Sotero, 12** – Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington (Paul, “Why United States and Brazil Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship”, Huffington Post, 11/09/12, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/why-united-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)//EX>

The growing presence of Brazilian global companies in the United Stated, complementing traditionally strong American investments in Brazil, has created a two-way street where common interests are more visible and pressure both governments to recognize the benefits of working together or risk paying a political price for not doing so.¶ Converging economic interests and similar challenges are emerging as the principal driver of United States-Brazil relations in the years ahead. A reelected President Barack Obama and President Dilma Rousseff, at the half mark of her government, are confronted with daunting tasks. Both need to significantly improve the economic performance of their countries in the face of political major obstacles at home, and an adverse economic outlook abroad. In both countries, sustainable growth will require investment in infrastructure, education and innovation more than consumption. How they respond will determine the success or failure of their administrations. It will also affect the two countries' bilateral relationship and their regional and global standing.¶ After four years of anemic recovery and a victory on November 6th without a clear political mandate,, President Obama has now to find a path of economic growth that reduces unemployment while avoiding the pitfalls of a fragile fiscal and financial situation, which, if mishandled, could easily throw the United States and the world economy back into recession.¶ Likewise, President Rousseff's challenge is to reverse the declining trend of economic growth that marked her first two years in office, while continuing to push for inclusion of poor Brazilians into the middle class. She has started working on it. In recent months, Rousseff announced a series of ambitious and, at times, contradictory initiatives, to dramatically improve the country's deficient infrastructure and industrial productivity. Implementation of such measures has been marred, however, by the government's poor management capacity and ideological considerations inherent to the President's Workers Party. The Brazilian executive still needs to tackle long-delayed reforms, first and foremost on taxation policy, which dramatically increases the cost of doing business in Brazil. This and other bottlenecks have reduced Brazilian domestic productivity and international competitiveness. Left unaddressed, they will continue to undermine the government's bold objectives and could very well compromise Brazil's future prosperity and relevance in a world in rapid transformation.¶ The 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, to take place in Brazil, and the country's need to continue to attract tens of billions of dollars of foreign investment offer ample opportunities for closer and more productive relations with the American government and its private sector. No longer Brazil's principal trading partner, a position occupied by China since 2009, the United States has remained nevertheless the country's largest source of foreign direct investment and technology and the biggest destination for Brazilian value-added manufacture exports, despite the loss of market share. Unresolved trade disputes and new frictions brought by monetary easing in the United States and growing protectionism in Brazil pose limitations to the expansion of bilateral trade, which doubled in the last ten years, reaching $75 billion at the end of 2011.

#### US-Brazil Relations Inevitable – multiple mechanisms of opportunities and increasing private sector industrial proliferation – gradualism is key

**Sotero, 12** – Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington (Paul, “Why United States and Brazil Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship”, Huffington Post, 11/09/12, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/why-united-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)//EX>

Whereas previous conversations between Brazilian and American policymakers might have been limited to a few areas of core interest, it is now all-encompassing. There are mechanisms for regular ministerial cooperation and consultation ranging from challenging topics such as trade, finance and defense, to 21st century concerns such as cyber security, open government, and innovation in science and technology, to issues that directly affect the average citizen such as education and social policies. People to people exchanges are on the rise, strengthening and expanding networks particularly in education and scientific research. Viewed by skeptics as window dressing and no substitute for concrete agreements on hard issues such as trade and taxation, the rapid increase in the breadth and depth of the bilateral dialogue and the Brazilian and American governments' efforts to maintain the doors open for a more productive and consequential relationship suggest, at a minimum, that they understand they need each other, benefit from working together and risk paying a political price for not doing so.¶ Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty that the two countries have talked about for four decades.¶ What was once an issue of interest only for U.S. companies in Brazil is now also a topic on the agenda of Brazilian firms operating in the U.S. market. Participants in the annual meeting of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, held last month in Brasília, say the political pressure generated by the new reality of Brazilian global companies in the United States has created momentum for the approval by the Brazilian Congress of a bilateral agreement on exchange of tax information that is seen as the first step for a treaty addressing double taxation.¶ Brazil and the U.S. have also taken on global challenges together, benefiting from Brazil's ability to wield soft power and newfound status in multilateral fora. The Open Government Initiative (OGI) that Brazil and the United States launched last year has attracted over forty countries committed to promoting transparency, fighting corruption and harnessing new technologies to make government more open, effective, and accountable.¶ As suggested by developments on taxation and the progress made in OGI, gradualism is the crucial ingredient in efforts to advance U.S.-Brazil relations.

Non-unique – Relations are low and collaboration is impossible

Hakim 10/22/2012 - president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue (Peter, Inter-American Dialogue,“Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States,”

<http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115>

The US and Brazil have not had an easy time with each other in recent years. Although relations between the two countries are by no means adversarial or even unfriendly, they have featured more discord than cooperation—both regionally and globally. And there is little reason to expect dramatic change any time soon.¶ At the 2005 summit meeting of hemispheric leaders, disagreements between the US and Brazil brought a halt to the faltering negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In 2009, it was largely US-Brazilian differences that delayed resolution of the Honduran political impasse for almost a year. Later in 2009, Brazil galvanized opposition across South America to block a US-Colombian military accord. Today, the two countries remain at loggerheads over Cuba’s participation in hemispheric affairs, disagree on how to manage relations with Paraguay in the aftermath of the impeachment and ouster of President Lugo, and continue to have sharply diverging views on the appropriate roles of the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Human Rights Commission. ¶ Even more unsettling for US-Brazilian relations have been the clashes over global issues. Washington has been especially troubled, and the bilateral relationship most bruised, by Brazil’s defense of Iran’s nuclear program and its opposition to UN sanctions on Iran. The two countries have also taken conflicting positions on nonproliferation questions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and international responses to the uprisings in Syria and Libya. World trade negotiations have long been a matter of contention for both nations.¶ Yet, despite their persistent disagreements, the US and Brazil are not antagonists or adversaries. The two countries have maintained friendly ties for years. US presidents and other senior officials are welcomed in Brazil, and Brazilian leaders are warmly received in Washington. The governments have consistently found ways to accommodate their differing views and defuse tensions and conflicts. For instance, only months after Brazil campaigned against a US-Colombia security pact, it signed its own, albeit modest, military accord with the US. Increasingly, Washington routinely defers to Brazil for leadership in South America—even on issues where the two countries differ. The US has supported and appreciated Brazil’s management of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti for the past seven years. President Obama even sought Brazilian help in dealing with the sensitive issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions—although it later regretted doing so when Brazil joined Turkey in a far more ambitious and public negotiating role than had been anticipated. ¶ Brazilian and US leaders often publicly assert that their bilateral relationship is as good or better than it has ever been, and claim that it is continuing to improve. Although more commonly expressed by US officials, it is not unusual for each of the two governments to refer to the other as a global or regional partner—and to suggest that the two nations are working toward a more robust, even strategic relationship. Yet, despite the continuing rhetoric, neither country has done much in recent years to advance the development of deeper, more cooperative ties.¶ Relations are not getting worse, but they are not getting better either. The two countries are not cooperating more today than they were a dozen years ago—and their differences have extended to a wider range of issues. They certainly have not found many areas for collaboration. The agreements they have reached seem mostly to be insubstantial or peripheral to the relationship, or they have not been effectively implemented. They have not led to any particularly productive collaboration. On most fronts, relations seem to be drifting, propelled largely by inertia, without much direction or decision.¶ Even when the two nations have identified shared objectives that would advance the interests of both, they have rarely developed the cooperation needed to pursue them. The US and Brazil clearly have an array of common economic interests. Yet, they have not signed a single major economic pact in more than two decades—a period when Washington has reached free trade accords with some 20 countries worldwide, 11 in Latin America alone. In 2007, the two countries, which produce nearly 90 percent of the world’s ethanol, agreed to work together to establish world markets for the fuel and develop improved technologies for its production. But they have made little progress on either front.

NSA scandal tanked relations

Miami Herald 7/10/13 (Jon Wyss, “Amid growing spying scandal, US allies in region join chorus of discontent,” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/10/3493523/colombia-asks-us-for-explanations.html)

BOGOTA, Colombia -- A growing number of Latin American nations are asking the United States to come clean about an alleged spying program that reputedly soaked up security and economic information from the region.¶ Chile, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina and others have demanded answers from Washington, in the latest fallout from NSA-leaker Edward Snowden.¶ “We reject acts of espionage that violate the right to privacy and international telecommunications agreements,” Colombia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement.¶ Chile said it “firmly and categorically condemned spying, regardless of its origins, nature or objectives.” And Mexico said it expected answers.¶ Such strong rebukes from some of the United States’ closest allies in the region are sign that “this is a crisis,” even if the allegations prove to be untrue, said Cynthia Arnson, the director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.¶ In countries like Argentina, Chile and Brazil “that made the transition from military dictatorships to democracy, the issue of wiretapping, spying and intelligence activities strike a very raw nerve,” she said. “The whole thing is very troubling in the region because of the weight of the historical legacy, particularly during the Cold War.”¶ The tensions come after Brazil’s O Globo newspaper reported that the United States had been engaged in mass surveillance of telephone and Internet communications throughout the hemisphere.¶ Citing National Security Agency documents, the newspaper also said that the U.S. operated surveillance bases, at least through 2002, in Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Panama and Mexico.¶ Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has said she will ask the United Nations to investigate the allegations, and Argentine President Christina Fernández said she will bring up the issue at the meeting of the Mercosur later this month.

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#### **They say NSA spy scandal affects relations – but it didn’t affect relations and won’t in the future**

Associated Press 7/10/13 (Leading Brazil congressman says disclosures of US spying will not affect relations Published July 10, 2013

The head of Brazil's joint congressional committee on intelligence says reports disclosures alleging that that the United States has collected data on billions of telephone and email conversations in Latin America's biggest country will not affect Brazil-U.S. relations. Congressman Nelson Pellegrino tells foreign correspondents in Brasilia that despite Brazil's strong repudiation of the U.S. information gathering activities in Brazil "the good relations we have with the United States will not be interrupted." Late last week, the O Globo newspaper reported that information released by National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden showed Brazil is the top target in Latin America for the NSA's massive intelligence-gathering effort aimed at monitoring communications around the world. The Brazilian government is investigating the disclosures and Congress has asked U.S. Ambassador Thomas Shannon for explanations.