### Off

#### Paradoxes

#### First, [A] man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know[.] He cannot search for what he knows--since he knows it, there is no need to search--nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for."

#### Second, Must touch an infinite number of points to go from point A to point B, never reach point B, so movement is impossible

#### Vote negative on presumption

### Off

#### P-Spec

#### Aff doesn’t specify their parameters, it’s severance and intrinsic and a voter.

### Off

#### The affirmative has profaned life. The ascription of a telos to an imaginary “political community” reduces the energies of those that make of that community to tools. It becomes appropriated in an attempt to maximize production of the latest liberal goal. This reduces all Others to a standing reserve whose destruction means nothing.

Stoekl, 7

(Allan Stoekl is a Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Pennsylvania State University. “Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. 55-57) MG

The answer, I think, is to be found in the nature of the consumption itself. Bataille in effect makes the same mistake that traditional economists make concerning the origin of value: that it is to be found primarily in human labor. If, however, we see the skyrocketing of the creation of value in the last two centuries to be attributable not solely to inputs of human labor (muscle and brain power) but above all to the energy derived from fossil fuels (as Beaudreau [1999] claims), we will come to understand that the massive increase in mankind’s capacity to waste is attributable not only to, say, technical innovation, the more efficient application of human labor, genius, and so on, but to the very energy source itself. The Aztecs, like many other traditional societies, derived their energy from muscle power: that of animals, slaves, and, in warfare, nobles. Destruction, like production, entailed an expenditure of energy derived from very modest sources: calories derived from food (solar energy), transformed by muscle, and applied to a task. We might call this energy (to modify a Bataillean usage) and its destruction intimate: that is, its production and expenditure are on a human scale, and are directly tied to a close bodily relation with things. This relation implies a corporeal engagement with and through an energy that cannot be put to use, that fundamentally defies all appropriation. Just as intimacy for Bataille implies a passionate involvement with the thing—primarily its consumation, its burn -off, the intense relation with a thing that is not a thing (as opposed to consommation, in the sense of everyday purchase, use, and wastage)—so in this case, having to do with the production and destruction of value, my muscle power assures that my relation to what I make or destroy will be passionate. A hand tool’s use will entail physical effort, pain, pleasure, satisfaction, or anguish. It will be up close and personal. The same will go for the destruction of the utility of that tool; there will be a profound connection between “me” and the destruction of the thing -ness of the tool.27 By extension, the utility, “permanence,” and thus the servility of my self will be put in question through an intimate connection (“communication”) with the universe via the destroyed or perverted object or tool. Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then—muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy (in the Bataillean sense) can be envisaged through the mechanized expenditure of fossil fuels. The very use of fossil and nonorganic fuels—coal, oil, nuclear— implies the effort to maximize production through quantification, the augmentation of the sheer quantity of things. Raw material becomes, as Heidegger put it, a standing reserve, a measurable mass whose sole function is to be processed, used, and ultimately discarded.28 It is useful, nothing more (or less), at least for the moment before it is discarded; it is related to the self only as a way of aggrandizing the latter’s stability and position. There is no internal limit, no angoisse or pain before which we shudder; we deplete the earth’s energy reserves as blandly and indifferently as the French revolutionaries (according to Hegel) chopped off heads: as if one were cutting off a head of cabbage. “Good” duality has completely given way to “bad.” As energy sources become more efficiently usable—oil produces a lot more energy than does coal, in relation to the amount of energy needed to extract it, transport it, and dispose of waste (ash and slag)—more material can be treated, more people and things produced, handled, and dumped. Consequently more food can be produced, more humans will be born to eat it, and so on (the carrying capacity of the earth temporarily rises). And yet, under this inanimate fuels regime, the very nature of production and above all destruction changes. Even when things today are expended, they are wasted under the sign of efficiency, utility. This very abstract quantification is inseparable from the demand of an efficiency that bolsters the position of a closed and demanding subjectivity. We “need” cars and SUVs, we “need” to use up gas, waste landscapes, forests, and so on: it is all done in the name of the personal lifestyle we cannot live without, which is clearly the best ever developed in human history, the one everyone necessarily wants, the one we will fight for and use our products (weapons) to protect. We no longer destroy objects, render them intimate, in a very personal, confrontational potlatch; we simply leave items out for the trash haulers to pick up or have them hauled to the junkyard. Consumption (la consommation) in the era of the standing reserve, the frame - work (Ge - Stell), entails, in and through the stockpiling of energy, the stockpiling of the human: the self itself becomes an element of the standing reserve, a thing among other things. There can hardly be any intimacy in the contemporary cycle of production -consumption -destruction, the modern and degraded version of expenditure. As Bataille put it, concerning intimacy: Intimacy is expressed only under one condition by the thing [la chose]: that this thing fundamentally be the opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of merchandise: a burn -off [consumation] and a sacrifice. Since intimate feeling is a burn -off, it is burning -off that expresses it, not the thing, which is its negation. (OC, 7: 126; AS 132: italics Bataille’s) War, too, reflects this nonintimacy of the thing: fossil fuel and nuclear - powered explosives and delivery systems make possible the impersonal destruction of lives in great numbers and at a great distance. Human beings are now simply quantities of material to be processed and destroyed in wars (whose purpose is to assure the continued availability of fossil fuel resources). Killing in modern warfare is different in kind from that carried out by the Aztecs. All the sacrificial elements, the elements by which the person has been transformed in and through death, have disappeared

#### The creation of a utopian ideal causes ascetic hatred of the world we have – this turns and outweighs the affirmative.

Turanli, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University).

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

#### Their goal for the protection of the future of a “political community” deprives us of sovereignty – only expenditure without the consideration of future beyond the present can preserve a community of sovereignty.

Biles 11 (Jeremy, Professor of Philosophy at the Illinois Institute of Art, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique, 52:2-3, 127-144, Taylor and Francis, MG)

All such expenditures – useless, diverted from any utilitarian ends – obviously ‘go against judgments that form the basis of a rational economy’ (Bataille 1991: 22). Indeed, the imperative to waste and the related glorious modes of expenditure that fascinate Bataille are inimical to the calculations that define a restricted economy based on the tenets of limited resources and concern for securing future interests. But it is this consideration of the future, of advantageous utility, that deprives humans of sovereignty. Sovereignty, by Bataille’s account, is linked with experience of the sacred, and refers to escape from the realm of work, subjugation to labour, calculation, and instrumental reason – in short, the realm of the profane. Following Emile Durkheim, Bataille posits a radical heterogeneity between the sacred and the profane, while also dividing the sacred between what subsequent scholars have called the right sacred – the powers of order, power, purity, eternity, and life – and the left sacred, aligned with the dangerous forces of corrosion, decay, impurity, time, and death (see Durkheim 1965: 455–6). Bataille argues that the divide between the sacred and the profane arises in conjunction with the advent of labour. He relates labour to the establishment of the subject/object dichotomy in human consciousness, suggesting that ‘the positing of the object [or the “thing”], which is not given in animality, occurs in the human use of tools’ (Bataille 1992a: 27). Subordinated to the one who uses it, a tool is assigned a utility, a telos beyond its immediate existence, and thus takes its place within a newly emergent sphere of ‘discontinuous’ objects that now includes oneself and others. ‘With work’, Michel Surya has written, ‘mankind discovered ends . . . . And all ends are a calculation speculating on the benefits of the future, . . . all ends separate humanity from itself’ (2002: 383).With the rise of self-consciousness, of oneself as a separate, distinct individual, also comes the fear of death and the corresponding desire for durable, even eternal, existence. Subjugated to mortal anxiety, ‘man becomes a thing’; gripped by the fear of death and the yearning to endure, humans are rendered servile – relegated, like tools, to the world of instrumental utility (Bataille 1993: 218). The desire for durable – even eternal – existence is thus vouchsafed to instrumental reason. Bataille identifies the realm of instrumental reason with the sphere of the profane; it is the realm of discontinuous objects and individuals. The sacred, on the other hand, is characterised by a sense of intimacy; it is the sphere of continuity, which objects, in their distinct forms, transcend. For Bataille, then, ‘existence is profane when it lives in the face of transcendence; it is sacred when it lives in immanence’, or continuity (Hollier 1998: 65).

#### Alternative: Vote Negative to Sacrifice the 1AC

#### The act of incessant sacrifice destroys the ethical value of the 1AC and strips it of its telos. Rendering the 1AC as merely another “thing” by sacrificing it creates the most intimate of communities.

Biles 11(Jeremy, Professor of Philosophy at the Illinois Institute of Art, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/Community, Culture, Theory and Critique, 52:2-3, 127-144, Taylor and Francis, aks)

The anxious desire for durability corresponds to a demeaning substantialisation of the sacred. According to Bataille, genuine sacrality is not a ‘substantial reality’, but is, on the contrary, ‘an element characterized by the impossibility of its enduring’ (Bataille 1985: 241). The ascendancy of reason, the fear of death, and the will to securing the future bring about a corresponding elevation of these profane concerns to the status of the ‘right’ sacred. Indeed, the profane world of utility is projected into an idea of God as a substantial and eternal being, transcending the sacred world of immanence and the lethal forces of time. It is for this reason that Bataille characterises the personal God as the ‘hypostasis of work’ and the ‘profanity of this world’ (1994: 82; Surya 2002: 384). ‘God’, Bataille claims, is ‘the end of things, is caught up in the game that makes each thing the means of another. In other words, God . . . becomes a thing insofar as he is named, a thing, put on the plane with all other things’ (1993: 383). Within Bataille’s thought, then, God is an expression of the fear of death and the corresponding will to shore up one’s individual self, attempting to procure, through reasoned calculations that would secure the future, a sense of enduringness, eternity. In making God the elevated figure of reason, duration, and eternity, Christianity, claims Bataille, ‘made the sacred substantial’– a mere thing (1985: 242). God becomes an expression not of the sacred, but rather a ‘tenacious obsession with the lastingness’ of our individual selves (Bataille 1986: 16). Understood this way, God represents an impediment to what Bataille refers to as communication, the intimacy afforded by the dissolution of the self in experiences of sovereign expenditure. It is thus this ‘God of reason’ – the God of salvation, of enduring forms, of eternal life – that must be the victim of an ‘incessant sacrifice’ that will restore sovereignty (Bataille 1988: 88; 1993: 378). Bataille’s theory of sacrifice illuminates this point. According to Bataille, the victim of a sacrifice is always something subjected to the ‘domination of labor’ – rendered a mere thing. The sacrificial object, whether human or animal, is drawn out ‘of the world of utility’ and restored to the realm of the sacred, for sacrifice annuls an object’s ‘ties of subordination’. Although sacrifice destroys the object it renders sacred, its aim is not mere obliteration. Bataille makes the crucial point that ‘the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thing – only the thing – is what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim’ (1992a: 43). This is to say that in being destroyed, what had been made servile, an instrument or tool within the realm of utility and reason, is rendered useless. In this sense, then, death is the realm of the sacred, of immanence, for it is in death that the boundaries that delineate and separate objects in the world are temporarily transgressed, destroyed, thus returning those objects to the intimate domain of continuity. The contagious force of sacrifice is such that its lethal effects extend from the victim to those who witness its immolation. Bataille argues that in sacrificial rituals, the consecrated sphere promotes a sense of heightened attention by which the participants in the ritual identify with the victim being put to death. At the moment that the throat of a sacrificial animal is slashed, for example, the witnesses to the sacrifice likewise undergo an experience ‘on the level of death’; their sense of enclosed subjectivity is, for a time, ruptured, and intimacy is restored in an experience of deep communication. ‘The individual identifies with the victim in the sudden movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy)’; he undergoes a fleeting experience of dissolution in the realm of the sacred.

### Case

#### Their use of narcocorrido’s implicates a falsely held sense of truth- this makes them epistemically suspect and their 1ac discursively dangerous

Villalobos 4 (Jose P. Villalobos, Associate Professor of Spanish at Texas A&M University, current interest deals with culture and ideals on the U.S./Mexico border, Corridos and la pura verdad: Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad, South Central Review, 2004, muse, anuss)

In our reading of the corrido, we are not trying to find fault with the genre per se, nor are we attempting to portray it as a distrustful tool for [End Page 141] social or historical analysis or as a form that is guilty of intentionally misleading its audience.45 Of more relevance to us are the reasons why, despite this admission that the corrido—including the narcocorrido—can be more than transparent, there is still a constant push to portray it otherwise.46 In his long and unedited interview with Elijah Wald, Jorge Hernández, leader and founder of Los Tigres del Norte, repeatedly notes and reaffirms the need for verisimilitude to such a degree that it becomes a key factor in his band's music. First of all, Hernández makes clear that his own vocal style, regardless of what institutionalized music theory may dictate, is mandated by the need to speak naturally: ". . . call it what you want, but if I do it differently than the way I am speaking, different than who I am, you would see a falseness in me. And I don't, I speak like this here with you and that is how I will always converse with you, wherever we meet; because that's the way I am."47 After describing his vocal style as natural, Wald inserts the idea of honesty as it relates to the corrido into the conversation: E[lijah]: But above all else [your] music is for normal people, people of the streets that sincerely feel it is something honest. J[orge]: It's simply true, things are the way they are and there is no reason to subtract nor add to them, that's just the way it is.48 This apparent transparency, however, is undone in the course of the same interview as the process of creating a corrido is explained by Hernández. In the following quote, the leader of Los Tigres del Norte discusses how he approached corridista Paulino Vargas to work for the band: . . . I told him "I want you to compose a corrido that speaks the truth about things, as they are, as they were, how you saw them. . . . But put in the corrido what you saw, so that people find credibility in it, so they believe that what you are saying is true. And if you tell me that it's true, then it's true. . . . You have to express yourself to reach the public, if you don't express yourself, the public will not believe." . . . My goal is that they believe what I sing, that's the point, that they believe me. For me it's like conquering a woman, telling her that I like her and love her, she has to believe what I say so she can have affection for me. That's what a song is like for me: I have to know exactly how to express it so that they believe what I say.49 [End Page 142] The primary goal then, shrouded in a search for a truthful depiction of the events and people recorded in the corrido, is to make the audience believe. Though not outright, it is apparent that what Hernández wants most is a verisimilar depiction of the events and people he sings about, one that will make the listener judge him and the corrido as faithful to the truth and to say, as Hernández himself states, "What he is singing is true."50 So the question remains, why this need to be believed and to present both the corrido and the corridista as believable? Hernández's words express a degree of anxiety regarding the genre's trustworthiness that takes us back to the already quoted dialogue included in the Smithsonian exhibit's web page. While there is nothing on the website that directly links the exchange between the two male voices to its source, the dialogue is taken directly from the Tigres del Norte CD titled Jefe de jefes (Boss of Bosses, 1997) where, as in the Smithsonian web page, it likewise serves a prefatory function to the entire collection of corridos contained in the collection. It therefore sets up an expectation that the nineteen tracks—some of which are narcoballads—as well as the genre itself speak la pura verdad. This push toward such an understanding of the corrido as a source of transparency is best explained by understanding the mythical proportions that the corrido has acquired in recent years. Competing with academic definitions that could most certainly point to the discrepancies between both the official and the unofficial accounts of the subjects dealt with in a corrido, corridistas and their sympathizers often promote the romantic idea of its transparency. What matters most, in this case, is the representation of the corrido as verisimilar; or to refer back to Hernández, for its successful consumption the corrido must be perceived as sincere. Though this transparency may be in fact a fallacy, the corrido's popularity with its fans and perhaps with some of its critics may lie precisely in maintaining this ideal.51 Yes, corridos tell stories that stand on their own merit: wonderful, sad, tragic, sometimes funny, heroic, and celebratory. But as consumer, the corrido audience derives more from what it perceives to be a real story precisely because of the window to reality the genre offers. It is in the stories captured in a corrido that its consumers see their own lives mirrored, real lives that cannot be found documented in official repositories composed through exclusionary practices of who or what matters for posterity.

#### The state derives its power from the excess of its citizens—dreams of revolution fail if they restrict themselves to the terms of a clean break from the necessary heterogeneity of political life because the state adapts to survive the contradiction

Levinson ‘7 Brett Levinson, “In Theory, Politics Does not Exist,” Postmodern Culture, Vol. 18, No. 1, September 2007, Muse

Given the alienation of its constituents, state homogeneity can nonetheless not evade unrest and must call upon, in Bataille's terms, "imperative agencies." According to Bataille, the state as such is not a sovereign entity. It does not possess the rights or power of an actual sovereign, e.g., the nation, the king, or the army. The state is therefore dependent upon imperative agencies that, borrowing their power from the sovereign bodies, preserve unity and order. (One might think of a local police force.) As a consequence, the homogeneity constantly adapts to restrain strife. On the one hand, it shifts in order to assimilate the novel alienated constituents; on the other, it adjusts so as to incorporate the diverse--depending on the circumstances--imperative agents upon which it calls. The latter, in fact, eventually garner or are granted so much strength that they grow independent. Independence, in this context, has a very specific meaning. It refers to an imperative agent that emerges as useful to itself rather than to the homogeneity. For example, a rookie cop in a rogue police force can come to believe that he is useful to the force itself, and to himself as an individual who ascends the ranks, but not to the town or state the force is supposed to protect. Hence, the "independence" generates two distinct aims of production: imperative agencies (individual powers) and the state. The homogeneity, split in two, breaks down. Composed largely of the petty bourgeoisie, the agencies are now dissociated from the homogeneity. They thus materialize, in Bataille's parlance, as heterogeneous bodies. Another heterogeneity parallels them; it is composed of those who never, as themselves (as human beings, not producers), belonged to the homogeneity, namely, the proletariat. As heterogeneous or "other," both clusters are cast by the state as dangerous outsides, as taboo. One sits above the state, as the untouchable; the other below it, as dirt. When the loftier taboo, the dissociated--who reaped their original power from the sovereign--take on a military or paramilitary presence in order to assert or maintain independence, their leader or chief assumes the place of a sovereign (in fact, of the sovereign of the sovereign--as taboo, this body is pure exteriority, without peer, indeed, sacred and divine). The proletariat, no less heterogeneous, glimpses its own image in this peerless outside, in another other (the leader). Donning the military gala that symbolizes heroic inclusion within the reign of the new sovereign, the proletariat finds its place in or through that chief. Of course, in return the proletariat receives but more alienation. The uniformed men do not "become themselves," neither workers nor men, through their identification. In fact, they take their place in the new order as lowly, passive, subjugated soldiers. Nonetheless, the bubbling "effervescence" (Bataille repeatedly deploys this term) of the proletariat, the root of which is the perilous disintegration of the original homogeneity, has served a purpose. It has generated the popular energy that feeds the revolutionary authoritarianism and, in certain cases, fascism.

#### Biopower is inevitable

Wright, 2008 - Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy (Nathan,“Camp as Paradigm: Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben”, http://ccjournal.cgu.edu/past\_issues/nathan\_wright.html)//dm

Perhaps the one failure of Foucault’s that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to state-sanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, “How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem.” It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucault’s failure to solve the problem of state racism and to “elaborate a unitary theory of power” (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio-politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism.

#### Biopolitics creates a better life- benefits outweigh the costs

**Dickison**, **2004** - associate professor of history at UC Davis (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity””, accessed from JSTOR on 7/4/12)//BZ

It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old ***Sonderweg*** model. In that older model, pre­modern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern­ization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.[[1]](#footnote-1) And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that par­takes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of— or at least discussed in any detail — as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.[[2]](#footnote-2) The expansion of infant health programs — an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project — had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical moder­nity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonish­ing this achievement — and any number of others like it — really was. There was a reason for the “***Machbarkeitswahn”*** of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming ***machbar.*** In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a “ ***Wahn***” (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the “inevitable” frustration of “delusions” of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

####  Democracy checks radicalization of biopolitics—empirically proven.

**Dickinson 04** (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of California-Davis, “ Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity"”, in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004), pg 18-19.)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault's ideas have "fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state ... and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its 'microphysics.'"48 The "broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus" on "technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science" was the focus of his interest.49 But the "power-producing effects in Foucault's 'microphysical' sense" (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of "an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice" (Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the volkisch state. **In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management.** This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s. Indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism, mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the "defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such poli? cies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### Attempts to emancipate biopolitical subjects only reinforces biopolitical regulation – illusions of liberation and free thought deter action.

Zizek, Slavoj. 2002. [Senior Researcher at the University of Ljubljana, Ph. D in kicking your ass. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. p. 2]

Is this not the matrix of an efficient critique of ideology – not only in totalitarian conditions of censorship but, perhaps even more, in the more refined conditions of liberal censorship? One starts by agreeing that one has all the freedom one wants – then one merely adds that the only thing missing is the ‘red ink’: we ‘feel free’ because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom. What this lack of red ink means is that, today, all the main terms we use to designate the present conflict – ‘war on terrorism’, ‘democracy and freedom’, ‘human rights’, and so on – are false terms, mystifying our perception of the freedom instead of allowing us to think it. In this precise sense, our ‘freedoms’ themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom. A hundred years ago, in his emphasis on the acceptance of some fixed dogma as the condition of (demanding) actual freedom, Gilbert Keith Chesterton perspicuously detected the antidemocratic potential of the very principle of freedom of thought: “We may say broadly that free thought is the best of all safeguards against freedom. Managed in modern style, the emancipation of the slaves mind is the best way to prevent the emancipation of the slave. Teach him to worry about whether he wants to be free, and he will not free himself”Is this not emphatically true of our ‘postmodern’ time, with its freedom to deconstruct, doubt, distantiate oneself? We should not forget that Chesterton makes exactly same claim as Kant in his ‘What is Enlightenment’: ‘Think as much as you like, and as freely as you like, just obey!’

1. See for example Usborne, **The Politics** and Grossmann, **Reforming Sex.** [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. MB. R. Mitchell, **European Historical Statistics, 1750—1970** (New York, 1975), 130. By 1969 it had fallen to 2.3 percent (132). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)