### Off

#### Paradoxes

#### First, [A] man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know[.] He cannot search for what he knows--since he knows it, there is no need to search--nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for."

#### Second, Must touch an infinite number of points to go from point A to point B, never reach point B, so movement is impossible

#### Vote negative on presumption

### Off

#### P-Spec

#### Aff doesn’t specify their parameters, it’s severance and intrinsic and a voter.

#### And this arg is the tempt if you talk about it you lose

### Off

#### It’s impossible to change the state—Vote neg on presumption

Gilbert 9 (Jeremy, really weird guy, Deleuzian Politics? A Survey and Some Suggestions, pages 10-33, aks)

The key question which emerges here is one of the most vexed and contentious in the field of studies of Deleuzian politics: namely, Deleuze and Guattari’s attitude to democracy. While it is quite possible to read in their work an advocacy of that ‘plural radical democracy’ which Laclau and Mouffe have also famously advocated, it is equally possible to read in Deleuze an aristocratic distaste for democracy which he shares with Nietzsche and much of the philosophical tradition. This is the reading offered by Phillipe Mengue, and it is not difficult to understand his argument. Democracy necessarily implies government by majorities, and as we have seen, ‘majority’ is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a wholly negative term. Deleuze’s express distaste for ‘opinion’, for ‘discussion’, his consistent emphasis on the value of the new, the creative and the different, all seem to bespeak an avant-gardism which is ultimately inimical to any politics of popular sovereignty. On the other hand, as Paul Patton has argued in response to Mengue, most of Deleuze’s anti-democratic statements can easily be read as expressions of distaste with the inadequacy of actually-existing liberal democracy, informed by the desire for a ‘becoming-democratic’ which would exceed the self-evident limitations of current arrangements. Taking this further, I would argue that if any mode of self-government emerges as implicitly desirable from the perspective developed by Deleuze and Guattari, then it would clearly be one which was both democratic and pluralistic without being subject to the existing limitations of representative liberal democracy. Deleuze’s earlier work may occasionally be characterised by a Nietzschean aristocratic tone. However, where he expresses ‘anti-democratic’ sentiments in his work with Guattari, these only ever seem to spring from a commitment to that Marxian tradition which understands liberal democratic forms to be deeply imbricated with processes of capitalist exploitation. When weighing up the legacy of this tradition today, it is worth reflecting that the degradation of actually existing ‘democracy’ under neoliberal conditions in recent decades, especially in the years since the fall of the Berlin wall, has lent much weight to the hypothesis that a ‘democratic’ politics which has no anti-capitalist dimension can only ultimately fail, as the individualisation of the social sphere and the corporate control of politics progressively undermine the effectiveness of public institutions From such a perspective, the problems with existing forms of representative democracy are several. Firstly, in ceding legislative sovereignty to elected bodies for several years at a time, they rely on the artificial stabilisation of ‘majorities’ of opinion along party lines which do not actually express the complexity of popular desires in any meaningful way. While it is clearly true that democracy as such necessarily demands the temporary organisation of ‘molarities’ for the purpose of taking collective decisions, the existing set of relationships between individuals and parties does not enable these molarities to emerge with sufficient intensity to effect major change: for example, despite the vehemence of anti-war opinion in the UK in 2003, the government was effectively at liberty to pursue the invasion of Iraq, safe in the knowledge that this intensity would disperse before the next general election. At the same time, these relationships do not enable the emergence of sites of engagement and deliberation which would enable new ideas and practices to emerge, simply delegating political engagement to a class of professional politicians, journalists, and policy-specialists whose job is not to innovate, invent and transform existing relations of power, but to maintain them, and the arrangements which express them. Most crucially, they do not enable the new forms of collective becoming which a more participatory, decentralised, ‘molecular’ democracy would facilitate, preventing any meaningful institutional expression of those new forms of dynamic, mobile, cosmopolitan collectivity which ‘globalisation’ makes possible. Instead they seek to actualize that potential only in the politically ineffectual forms of a universalized liberalism or banal forms of multiculturalism, two complementary ‘grids’ which are imposed upon global flows within the parameters of either the nation state or legalistic supra-national institutions. The drive to find new forms of participative democracy which characterises the leading-edge of contemporary socialist practice, and which has informed not only the politics of the social forum movement but more broadly the entire history of radical democratic demands (including, for example, the Chartists’ demand for annual parliaments, or the Bolshevik cry for ‘all power to the soviets’), surely expresses just this desire for democratic forms not stymied by the apparatuses of majority and individualisation.

### Off

#### Laugh and laugh at the sun

#### at the nettles

#### at the stones

#### at the ducks

#### at the rain

#### at the pee-pee of the pope

#### at mommy

#### at a coffin full of shit.

(Georges Bataille, Laughter, http://glennwallis.wordpress.com/tag/georges-bataille/)

### Off

#### The first link is Restricted Economics – The affirmative is part of a rational and restricted economy that assumes the world exists insofar as it is quantifiable. This creates a lens of utility through which subjectivity can only be measured in terms of its usefulness. This makes life disposable and denies the possible of a general economy.

Igrek 9 (Apple Zefelius Igrek, Professor in Philosophy at the University of Seattle, Modes of Luxurious Walking, September 2009, muse, aln)

The multi-layered, complex, book-length answer elaborated in Bataille's Peak cannot be given here. The shorter answer, however, can be stated in two parts. First, Bataillean expenditure should be modified by taking into consideration qualitative differences between docile and insubordinate forms of energy. The fact that the former is a finite, quickly disappearing resource implies that we can no longer afford to ignore, as Bataille could, the issues of energy depletion and cultural decline (Stoekl 42). Drawing from two Heidegger essays, "The Question concerning Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" (1977), Stoekl contextualizes weak, mechanized forms of expenditure by reference to fossil fuel consumption. Because we assume the world exists for us in a quantifiable way - to be conquered, stockpiled, and used up - we ourselves become a disposable thing or object: "Man the subject for whom the objective world exists as a resource is quickly reversed and becomes man the object who, under the right conditions, is examined, marshaled, and then releases a specific amount of energy before he himself is definitively depleted" (131). Docile energy, Stoekl surmises, makes for docile subjects. Only after we have acknowledged this contemporary fact are we able to complement the first part with a second: insubordinate forms of energy are essential to insubordinate forms of action. In the general movement of social ecstasy and expenditure, by way of which we transgress ourselves in moments of physical intimacy, we open the isolated self to an immensity which can be neither measured nor stockpiled. Nor can it be experienced through the timeless efficiency of the car: "As the ultimate common denominator, the car brings together, in the isolation of vapid subjectivity, social classes and identities. All are one on the freeway, mixing while not mixing, moving around the empty circuit of gutted urban space" (184). The simulacrum of freedom is achieved through speed, empty signifiers, and the indifferent reproduction of subjectivity. Excess is thus transformed into pure stream of consciousness, and our "cursed flesh" disappears as an abstract, useless obstacle to absolute technological freedom. By contrast, the inefficient movement, the clumsy and death-bound use of time, holds out the best promise for a post-sustainable future: walking, dancing, cycling, and spending oneself in a wounded but effervescent fusion of the self with the other (190). Passion and ecstatic movement in the post-fossil fuel era will therefore "be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm of desire)" (190). As opposed to a closed economy of the useful, practical self, in which every moment of loss is immediately sublimated as a higher purpose and function, Bataille's affirmation of an intimate relationship with the world and others necessarily subordinates the higher truth - and every mode of instant communication - to a formless substratum or base matter that will forever escape human domination. This twofold response helps Stoekl to resituate contemporary arguments on both Empire and the totalized city. Drawing from Michel de Certeau's "Walking in the City" (1980), Stoekl traces the historical loss of the body through the creation of a universal, albeit anonymous, modern subjectivity. The automobile, as already put forth, reframes reality so that everything is construed according to an "always but never changing image on the (wind)screen" (184). The car thus becomes a grand historical symbol of speed, freedom, transcendence, and the conquest of nature. But at the same time, none of this is possible without fuel. The same subject that manifests itself as pure movement and pure sovereignty is also a function of certain finite resources. Insofar as de Certeau fails to consider the role of cheap fossil fuel inputs in connection with the utopian and totalized city, he is unable to rethink the expenditure of energy as a mode of resistance to modern networks of conformity and surveillance. Stoekl, however, sees in de Certeau's walker an intimation of another kind of energy subversion. What is crucial at this historical juncture isn't only the unusual and peculiar connotations of the walker in contrast with the commodified autonomy of the driver, but furthermore the "spectacular waste of body energy" (188). This movement of intimate corporeal existence, wasting itself on a "grossly inefficient" effort (192), gestures toward something beyond the virtual reality of today's Empire. As the universal city is no longer restricted by space or time, even the speeding car is being outpaced and outdistanced by the ubiquitous circulation of signs, images, and capital. And as the global scale shrinks to the size of instantaneous communication, the old dualities of private and public, society and nature, real and artificial, are quickly vanishing. Yet this very dialectic, which seemingly overcomes itself in a new, bland form of media domination, cannot possibly exist without a specific relationship to labor. Stoekl observes that in this respect Hardt and Negri, who would reduce all natural phenomena to moments of history (196), remain firmly tethered to Marx and Kojève—at least inasmuch as the historical returns us to a concrete function of labor. But even human labor has its limits. It is no more autonomous than the myth of Man which it intermittently supports, for it produces nothing in the absence of fuel (x). And fossil fuels are a natural fact: "Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, 'harnessed' them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels into the earth" (197). There are, consequently, limits to Empire. And one of the most crucial limits, for us, is the imminent depletion of highly concentrated forms of energy. If the global spectacle is slowing down and a sustainable response is hardly sustainable (as Stoekl previously argued), it seems that we will have to rethink excess expenditure. Bataille's Peak performs this task on every page, and does so in the most formidable, difficult terms—by reminding us of the general finitude, exertion, madness, and jouissance of bodily economies.

#### Utility reduces life to a thing among other things – it creates a standing reserve that renders intimate destruction impossible. Turns the case.

Stoekl, 7

(Allan Stoekl is a Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Pennsylvania State University. “Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. 55-57) Henge

The answer, I think, is to be found in the nature of the consumption itself. Bataille in effect makes the same mistake that traditional economists make concerning the origin of value: that it is to be found primarily in human labor. If, however, we see the skyrocketing of the creation of value in the last two centuries to be attributable not solely to inputs of human labor (muscle and brain power) but above all to the energy derived from fossil fuels (as Beaudreau [1999] claims), we will come to understand that the massive increase in mankind’s capacity to waste is attributable not only to, say, technical innovation, the more efficient application of human labor, genius, and so on, but to the very energy source itself. The Aztecs, like many other traditional societies, derived their energy from muscle power: that of animals, slaves, and, in warfare, nobles. Destruction, like production, entailed an expenditure of energy derived from very modest sources: calories derived from food (solar energy), transformed by muscle, and applied to a task. We might call this energy (to modify a Bataillean usage) and its destruction intimate: that is, its production and expenditure are on a human scale, and are directly tied to a close bodily relation with things. This relation implies a corporeal engagement with and through an energy that cannot be put to use, that fundamentally defies all appropriation. Just as intimacy for Bataille implies a passionate involvement with the thing—primarily its consumation, its burn -off, the intense relation with a thing that is not a thing (as opposed to consommation, in the sense of everyday purchase, use, and wastage)—so in this case, having to do with the production and destruction of value, my muscle power assures that my relation to what I make or destroy will be passionate. A hand tool’s use will entail physical effort, pain, pleasure, satisfaction, or anguish. It will be up close and personal. The same will go for the destruction of the utility of that tool; there will be a profound connection between “me” and the destruction of the thing -ness of the tool.27 By extension, the utility, “permanence,” and thus the servility of my self will be put in question through an intimate connection (“communication”) with the universe via the destroyed or perverted object or tool. Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then—muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy (in the Bataillean sense) can be envisaged through the mechanized expenditure of fossil fuels. The very use of fossil and nonorganic fuels—coal, oil, nuclear— implies the effort to maximize production through quantification, the augmentation of the sheer quantity of things. Raw material becomes, as Heidegger put it, a standing reserve, a measurable mass whose sole function is to be processed, used, and ultimately discarded.28 It is useful, nothing more (or less), at least for the moment before it is discarded; it is related to the self only as a way of aggrandizing the latter’s stability and position. There is no internal limit, no angoisse or pain before which we shudder; we deplete the earth’s energy reserves as blandly and indifferently as the French revolutionaries (according to Hegel) chopped off heads: as if one were cutting off a head of cabbage. “Good” duality has completely given way to “bad.” As energy sources become more efficiently usable—oil produces a lot more energy than does coal, in relation to the amount of energy needed to extract it, transport it, and dispose of waste (ash and slag)—more material can be treated, more people and things produced, handled, and dumped. Consequently more food can be produced, more humans will be born to eat it, and so on (the carrying capacity of the earth temporarily rises). And yet, under this inanimate fuels regime, the very nature of production and above all destruction changes. Even when things today are expended, they are wasted under the sign of efficiency, utility. This very abstract quantification is inseparable from the demand of an efficiency that bolsters the position of a closed and demanding subjectivity. We “need” cars and SUVs, we “need” to use up gas, waste landscapes, forests, and so on: it is all done in the name of the personal lifestyle we cannot live without, which is clearly the best ever developed in human history, the one everyone necessarily wants, the one we will fight for and use our products (weapons) to protect. We no longer destroy objects, render them intimate, in a very personal, confrontational potlatch; we simply leave items out for the trash haulers to pick up or have them hauled to the junkyard. Consumption (la consommation) in the era of the standing reserve, the frame - work (Ge - Stell), entails, in and through the stockpiling of energy, the stockpiling of the human: the self itself becomes an element of the standing reserve, a thing among other things. There can hardly be any intimacy in the contemporary cycle of production -consumption -destruction, the modern and degraded version of expenditure. As Bataille put it, concerning intimacy: Intimacy is expressed only under one condition by the thing [la chose]: that this thing fundamentally be the opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of merchandise: a burn -off [consumation] and a sacrifice. Since intimate feeling is a burn -off, it is burning -off that expresses it, not the thing, which is its negation. (OC, 7: 126; AS 132: italics Bataille’s) War, too, reflects this nonintimacy of the thing: fossil fuel and nuclear - powered explosives and delivery systems make possible the impersonal destruction of lives in great numbers and at a great distance. Human beings are now simply quantities of material to be processed and destroyed in wars (whose purpose is to assure the continued availability of fossil fuel resources). Killing in modern warfare is different in kind from that carried out by the Aztecs. All the sacrificial elements, the elements by which the person has been transformed in and through death, have disappeared.

#### The Second Link is Imaginative Politics – The creation of a utopian ideal causes ascetic hatred of the world that renders life unintelligible.

Turanli, 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University).

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

#### We are an explosion of energy, suffering is inevitable and temporal, we are dying from the day we are born – each moment devoted towards the ascetic liberal project is a sacrifice of sovereignty that destroys value to life.

Stoekl, 7

(Allan Stoekl is a Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Pennsylvania State University. “Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. 189-191) Henge

“Expenditure without return” is a floating concept, defined in opposition to the restrained economy whose possibility it opens but which it defies. As an end not leading outside itself, it could be anything; but what is most important is that with it there is a movement of “communication,” of the breaking of the narrow limits of the (ultimately illusory) self - interested individual, and no doubt as well some form of personal or collective transport, enthusiasm. This concern with a mouvement hors de soi can no doubt be traced to Sade, but it also derives from the French sociological tradition of Durkheim, where collective enthusiasm was seen to animate public life and give personal life a larger meaning.11 As Bataille puts it in L’économie à la mesure de l’univers (Economy on the Scale of the Universe): “You are only, and you must know it, an explosion of energy. You can’t change it. All these human works around you are only an overflow of vital energy. . . . You can’t deny it: the desire is in you, it’s intense; you could never separate it from mankind. Essentially, the human being has the responsibility here [a la charge ici] to spend, in glory, what is accumulated on the earth, what is scattered by the sun. Essentially, he’s a laugher, a dancer, a giver of festivals.” This is clearly the only serious language. (OC, 7: 15– 16) Bataille’s future, derived from Durkheim as well as Sade, entails a community united through common enthusiasm, effervescence, and in this sense there is some “good” glory—it is not a term that should be associated exclusively with rank or prestige. Certainly the Durkheimian model, much more orthodox and (French) Republican, favored an egalitarianism that would prevent, through its collective enthusiasm, the appearance of major social inequality. Bataille’s community would continue that tradition while arguing for a “communication” much more radical in that it puts in question stable human individuality and the subordination to it of all “resources.” On this score, at least, it is a radical Durkheimianism: the fusion envisaged is so complete that the very boundaries of the individual, not only of his or her personal interests but of the body as well, are ruptured in a community that would communicate through “sexual wounds.” De Certeau brings to any reading of Durkheim an awareness that the effervescence of a group, its potential for “communication,” is not so much a mass phenomenon, an event of social conformity and acceptance, but a “tactics” not only of resistance but of intimate burn -off and of an ecstatic movement “out of oneself.” If we are to think a “communication” in the post–fossil fuel era, it will be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions, and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm, of desire)—not one of mass or collective events that only involve a resurrection of a “higher” goal or justification and a concomitant subordination of expenditure. Yet there is nothing that is inherently excessive. Because waste can very easily contribute to a sense of rank, or can be subsumed as necessary investment/ consumption, no empirical verification could ever take place. Heterogeneous matter—or energy—eludes the scientific gaze without being “subjective.” This is the paradox of Bataille’s project: the very empiri-cism we would like to guarantee a “self -consciousness” and a pure dépense is itself a function of a closed economy of utility and conservation (the study of a stable object for the benefit and progress of mankind, etc.). Expenditure, dépense, intimacy (the terms are always sliding; they are inherently unstable, for good reason) are instead functions of difference, of the in - assimilable, but also, as we have seen on a number of occasions, of ethical judgment. It is a Bataillean ethics that valorizes the Marshall Plan over nuclear war and that determines that one is linked to sacrifice in all its forms, whereas the other is not. In the same way we can propose an ethics of bodily, “tactical” effort and loss. We can go so far as to say that expenditure is the determination of the social and energetic element that does not lead outside itself to some higher good or utility. Paradoxically this determination itself is ethical, because an insubordinate expenditure is an affirmation of a certain version of the posthuman as aftereffect, beyond the closed economy of the personal and beyond the social as guarantor of the personal. But such a determination does not depend on an “in -itself,” on a definitive set of classifications, on a taxonomy that will guarantee the status of a certain act or of a certain politics.

#### Vote negative to sacrifice the 1AC and make the 1AC meaningless

#### Sacrifice is an act of meaningless and infinite expenditure that frees us from the onward march of progress and restores expenditure to the real of sovereignty.

Stoekl, 7

(Allan Stoekl is a Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Pennsylvania State University. “Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. xvi-xvii) Henge

Bataille’s energy is inseparable from that which powers cars and raises elevators, but it is different as well. It is excess energy, and in that sense it is left over when a job is done, when the limits of growth are reached, or, in the current situation, when fossil fuels themselves reveal their profound limitations. Bataille’s energy is a transgression of the limit; it is what is left over in excess of what can be used within a fundamentally limited human field. As such, it is quite different from what can be used: it is not just left over in the sense of not being consumed; it is fundamentally unusable. At the point at which quantification reveals its finitude, energy asserts itself as the movement that cannot be stockpiled or quantified. It is the energy that by definition does not do work, that is insubordinate, that plays now rather than contributing to some effort that may mean something at some later date and that is devoted to some transcendent goal or principle. It is, as Bataille reminds us a number of times, the energy of the universe, the energy of stars and “celestial bodies” that do no work, whose fire contributes to nothing. On earth, it is the energy that traverses our bodies, that moves them in useless and time -consuming ways, that leads to nothing beyond death or pointless erotic expenditure, that defies quantification in measure: elapsed moments, dollars per hour, indulgences saved up for quicker entry into heaven. Energy is expended in social ritual that is pointless, that is tied not to the adhesion of a group or the security of the individual but to the loss of group and individual identity—sacrifice. Bataille’s religion is thus inseparable from Bataille’s energy. Sacrifice is the movement of the opening out, the “communication,” of self and community with death: the void of the universe, the dead God. These are not entities that can be known or studied, but sovereign moments, moments of unconditional expenditure. This entails the expenditure of certainties, of any attempt to establish a transcendent, unconditioned meaning that grounds all human activity, a referent such as Man or God. Precisely because it really is unconditioned, this meaning—God, if you will—is sovereign, dependent on nothing, and certainly not on Man and his petty desire or demands. Religion, in the orgiastic movement of the body, is the loss of transcendent meaning, the death of God as virulent force, the traversing of the body by an energy that overflows the limits it recognizes but does not affirm. If there is community, it is the unplanned aftereffect and not the essential meaning of this energy, of this movement of the death or void of God.

### Legitimacy

#### US leadership in Latin America won’t be exercised – and it empirically fails

Daremblum 11/25 Ambassador Jaime Daremblum is a Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and directs the Center for Latin American Studies, “Kerry's Confused Eulogy for the Monroe Doctrine,” Hudson Institute, 11/25/2013, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=9779

Last week, Secretary of State John Kerry made headlines with an eight-word pronouncement concerning U.S. policy in Latin America: "The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over." Kerry's remark drew applause from his audience at the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington. "That's worth applauding," he said. "That's not a bad thing." He then added: "The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It's about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to advance the values and the interests that we share." Kerry's repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine quickly became a major news story in Latin America. Yet most people failed to grasp the larger significance of his speech. For those unfamiliar with its origins, the Monroe Doctrine refers to a passage in President James Monroe's December 1823 message to Congress that expressed U.S. opposition to new European colonies or dependencies anywhere in the Americas. At the time of its adoption, the policy was broadly popular in Latin America, which is understandable, given its anti-imperial character. Though U.S. officials often cited the doctrine during the Cold War -- when the Soviet Union was trying to establish strategic beachheads throughout the Western Hemisphere -- it has long been a relic of history. Even before Kerry delivered his November 18 speech, no serious person expected the United States to launch a military intervention in Latin America in hopes of defending a sphere of influence from foreign encroachment. These days, the term "Monroe Doctrine" is most commonly invoked by Latin America's populist demagogues, such as the late Hugo Chavez, in hopes of stirring up anti-U.S. passions. On the other hand, by publicly renouncing the Monroe Doctrine, Kerry was effectively apologizing for decades of U.S. foreign policy. He was also indicating that the Obama administration is uncomfortable with strong U.S. leadership in Latin America. In that sense, his speech conveyed the wrong signals both to U.S. partners and to U.S. adversaries. If we review Kerry's record as a senator, it's not surprising that he would implicitly criticize past U.S. actions in the region. After all, he fiercely opposed President Reagan's Central America policies, including aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and support for governments battling communist insurgencies. (In a 2004 National Review article, Jay Nordlinger noted that Kerry "was the only senator to vote against money for police training in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica" in December 1985.) In 1983, he dismissed the U.S. liberation of Grenada as "a bully's show of force against a weak Third World nation." But even Kerry has to acknowledge that such Cold War-era issues look different from the standpoint of 2013. By supporting the Contras, the United States ultimately compelled the communist Sandinistas to allow a free election, which they lost. By supporting the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments in their struggles against communist guerrillas, the U.S. helped prevent the guerrillas from establishing Cuban-style dictatorships. For that matter, U.S. intervention in Grenada replaced a pro-Soviet communist regime with a pro-Western democracy. More recently, it was U.S. support, combined with the courageous leadership of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, that helped save Latin America's third-biggest country from becoming a failed state. (In 2009, then-U.S. ambassador William Brownfield described Colombia as "the most successful nation-building exercise by the United States in this century.") We might also recall that, at the start of the Bush administration, the United States orchestrated crucial financial assistance for Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, each of which was experiencing an economic crisis. In the years that followed, the administration signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia and Panama. In short: While Washington has obviously made plenty of mistakes in Latin America, its pre-Obama record is far more admirable than Kerry suggested. And what about the Obama record? As I have pointed out numerous times, Presidents Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton and Bush 43 all spearheaded at least one original, large-scale hemispheric initiative; President Obama has not. In fact, all of his most impressive accomplishments in the region -- from free trade to enhanced security cooperation with Mexico -- have stemmed from Bush-era initiatives. The story of Obama's Latin America approach is a story of misplaced priorities. In 2009 and 2010, his administration worked to improve relations with leftist, anti-U.S. governments in Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. These efforts were predictably unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the administration provoked a trade fight with Mexico by canceling a NAFTA-inspired trucking program and waited until October 2011 -- nearly three years after Obama took office -- before sending to Congress the final versions of the Colombia and Panama FTAs, which had first been signed by the Bush administration in 2006 and 2007, respectively. In April 2011, six months before Obama sent the U.S.-Colombia FTA for congressional approval, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos complained to an audience at Brown University that U.S. policy in Latin America was "passive" and "disengaged." A year after that, Uruguayan President Jose Mujica told an interviewer: "I do not think that the current administration in Washington is interested in FTAs at this moment." Throughout his presidency, Obama has been reluctant to speak out against Latin America's new generation of authoritarian populists; Kerry appears to share this reluctance. In his speech to the OAS, he made the following comment about the state of democratic government across the region: "The Western Hemisphere is unified in its commitment to pursuing successful democracies in the way that I describe. But one exception, of course, remains: Cuba." Sadly, Cuba is not the only exception.

#### Single instances of action do not change international perceptions of the United States.

Fettweis 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

#### Multilateralism is counterproductive—Strategic vagueness, ignores realities, take too long to initiate action, no motivation, and are built upon fiction

Brooks 11 (David, Writer for the New York Times, Author of several books, 3/21/11, The Problem With Partners, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/opinion/22brooks.html?_r=0> aks)

These days we are all co-religionists in the church of multilateralism. The Iraq war reminded everybody not to embark on an international effort without a broad coalition. Yet today, as an impeccably crafted multilateral force intervenes in Libya, certain old feelings are coming back to the surface. These feelings have been buried since the 1990s, when multilateral efforts failed in Kosovo, Rwanda and Iraq. They concern the structural weaknesses that bedevil multilateral efforts. They remind us that unilateralism may be no walk in the park, but multilateralism has its own characteristic problems, which are showing up already in Libya. First, multilateral efforts are marked by opaque decision-making and strategic vagueness. It is hard to get leaders from different nations with different values to agree on a common course of action. When diplomats do achieve this, it is usually because they have arrived at artful fudges that allow leaders from different countries to read the same words in a U.N. resolution and understand them in different ways. The negotiation process to arrive at these fudges involves a long chain of secret discussions and it necessarily involves eliding issues that might blow everything up. Sure enough, the decision-making process that led to the Libyan intervention was remarkably opaque. (It is still not clear why the Obama administration flipped from skepticism to resolve.) More important, the nations have not really defined what they hope to achieve. Is the coalition trying to depose Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi? Are coalition forces trying to halt Qaddafi’s advances or weaken his government? Would the coalition allow Qaddafi to win so long as he didn’t massacre more civilians? Is it trying to create a partitioned Libya? Are we there to help the democratic tide across the region? The members of the coalition could not agree on answers to any of these questions, so the purpose of the enterprise was left vague. Second, leaders in multilateral efforts often obsess about the diplomatic process and ignore the realities on the ground. The reports describing how the Libyan intervention came about are filled with palace intrigue. They describe the different factions within the Obama administration, the jostling by France and Britain, the efforts to win over the Arab League. It’s not clear who was thinking about the realities in Libya. Who are the rebels we are supporting? How weak is the Qaddafi government? How will Libyans react to a Western bombing campaign? Why should we think a no-fly zone will protect civilians when they never have in the past? In this, as in so many previous multilateral efforts, the process blots out the substance. Diplomats become more interested in serving the global architecture than in engaging the actual facts on the ground. Third, multilateral efforts are retarded and often immobilized by dispersed authority and a complicated decision-making process. They are slow to get off the ground because they have to get their most reluctant members on board. Once under way, they are slow to adapt to changing circumstances. Sure enough, the world fiddled for weeks while Qaddafi mounted his successful counterinsurgency campaign. The coalition attacks are only days old, but already fissures are appearing. The Arab League is criticizing the early results. The French are not coordinating well with their allies. NATO leaders are even now embroiled in a debate about the operational command structure. Fourth, multilateral forces often lose the war of morale and motivation. Most wars are fought by nations — by people aroused not only by common interests but by common passions, moralities and group loyalties. Multilateral campaigns rarely, on the other hand, arouse people. They are organized by elites, and propelled by calculation, not patriotism. No one wants to die for the Arab League, the United Nations or some temporary coalition of the willing. In the Libyan campaign, Qaddafi’s defenders will be fighting for land, home, God and country. The multinational force will be organized by an acronym and motivated by a calibrated calculus to achieve a humanitarian end. Finally, multilateral efforts are built around a fiction. The people who organize coalitions pretend that all the parties are sharing the burdens. In reality, only the U.S. can do many of the tasks. If the other nations falter, the U.S. will have to leap in and assume the entire burden. America’s partners go in knowing they do not bear ultimate responsibility for success or failure. Americans do.

#### Multilateralism can’t solve-Asia proves

Bisley 11 (Nick, Professor of IR at La Trobe University, 5/19/11, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/?d=D%20-%20Multilateralism%20and%20its%20critics> aks)

But the success of multilateral institutions in the post-war era should not make us assume that such an approach will always deliver the international policy goods. Michael Wesley has helped kick-start a long-overdue debate – just how useful are multilateral institutions to 21st century world politics? It is clear that many of the key multilateral institutions in the world today have problems. Whether it is the perennially stalled Doha Round, legitimacy and quota problems at the IMF, serious anachronism at the UN Security Council, APEC's on-going existential crisis, or the inability of states to craft a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol (to say nothing of the only institution whose acronym largely describes its existential state, SAARC), wherever one cares to look, there seems to be a lot wrong with multilateral institutions. This is of course well recognised. In the near permanent efforts to reform the UN or in the seemingly never-ending (and entirely unrealistic) desire to create the 'right' Asian security architecture, one sees examples of well-intentioned folk trying to improve the situation. Yet few pause to ask whether the problem is not with the specific features of the institutions and their individual shortcomings but with multilateral institutions as such. Why are multilateral institutions of limited use under contemporary circumstances? Michael has set out five big problems; let me add several more: Participants: Multilateralism involves states trying to act collectively. Heroin lies a really big problem. One doesn't have to buy the hyperglobalist argument that states are being utterly denuded by globalisation to realise that states can only do so much in a globalised world. If the multifaceted problems that states and societies face today (such as financial crises, infectious disease or climate change) are to be managed, then a much broader array of actors needs to be brought to the table of collective endeavour. These complex problems require not just states but firms, NGOs, individuals, markets and an array of civil society bodies to be part of the story Problems, not process: Multilateralism puts a high premium on process, indeed momentum and the appearance of diplomatic movement is often thought to be sufficient for success to be declared. More importantly, multilateral institutions too often do not put problems at the heart of their purpose. Moreover, institutions take on a life of their own that can distort even the best designed mechanism. Contemporary circumstances warrant a more fluid and ad hoc approach to cooperative activity. This would involve networks of states, firms and other entities coalescing around an issue or a problem and then moving on after the collective endeavour is complete. Papering over the cracks: One of the greatest risks of multilateralism is the complacency that the pretence of action can breed. Asia's recent embrace of security multilateralism is a case in point. At present there are 13 different intergovernmental institutions and processes that discuss regional security concerns and in 2009 there were over 270 Track II meetings dealing with matters of regional security. Yet few in the region feel secure. Indeed, if anything, the reverse is true. The appearance of multilateralism belies a region very ill at ease. More worrying, policy-makers the region over seem to think that adding yet more institutions will make things better. Not only do they rarely do so, they can lead to worse outcomes as the underlying problems are papered over by a thin veneer of cooperation. It's time to recognise that, while multilateralism may still have a role to play, that this role is more limited than in the past. More importantly, the collective action problems it was intended to resolve require newer, more nimble and more diffuse mechanisms. Unless we realise this and begin to seriously redesign many entities, do not expect the current international policy malaise to pass.

#### Heg decline is ongoing and irreversible

Engelhardt ’13 Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, The End of Victory Culture, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com, “Imperial Gigantism and the Decline of Planet Earth,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 5/9/2013, http://www.fpif.org/articles/imperial\_gigantism\_and\_the\_decline\_of\_planet\_earth?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+FPIF+%28Foreign+Policy+In+Focus+%28All+News%29%29

On the how-much front: Washington’s dreams of military glory ran aground with remarkable speed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, in 2007, the transcendent empire of capital came close to imploding as well, as a unipolar financial disaster spread across the planet. It led people to begin to wonder whether the globe’s greatest power might not, in fact, be too big to fail, and we were suddenly -- so everyone said -- plunged into a “multipolar world.” Meanwhile, the Greater Middle East descended into protest, rebellion, civil war, and chaos without a Pax Americana in sight, as a Washington-controlled Cold War system in the region shuddered without (yet) collapsing. The ability of Washington to impose its will on the planet looked ever more like the wildest of fantasies, while every sign, including the hemorrhaging of national treasure into losing trillion-dollar wars, reflected not ascendancy but possible decline. And yet, in the how-little category: the Europeans and Japanese remained nestled under that American “umbrella,” their territories still filled with U.S. bases. In the Euro Zone, governments continued to cut back on their investments in both NATO and their own militaries. Russia remained a country with a sizeable nuclear arsenal and a reduced but still large military. Yet it showed no signs of “superpower” pretensions. Other regional powers challenged unipolarity economically -- Turkey and Brazil, to name two -- but not militarily, and none showed an urge either singly or in blocs to compete in an imperial sense with the U.S. Washington’s enemies in the world remained remarkably modest-sized (though blown to enormous proportions in the American media echo-chamber). They included a couple of rickety regional powers (Iran and North Korea), a minority insurgency or two, and relatively small groups of Islamist “terrorists.” Otherwise, as one gauge of power on the planet, no more than a handful of other countries had even a handful of military bases outside their territory. Under the circumstances, nothing could have been stranger than this: in its moment of total ascendancy, the Earth’s sole superpower with a military of staggering destructive potential and technological sophistication couldn’t win a war against minimally armed guerillas. Even more strikingly, despite having no serious opponents anywhere, it seemed not on the rise but on the decline, its infrastructure rotting out, its populace economically depressed, its wealth ever more unequally divided, its Congress seemingly beyond repair, while the great sucking sound that could be heard was money and power heading toward the national security state. Sooner or later, all empires fall, but this moment was proving curious indeed. And then, of course, there was China. On the planet that humanity has inhabited these last several thousand years, can there be any question that China would have been the obvious pick to challenge, sooner or later, the dominion of the reigning great power of the moment? Estimates are that it will surpass the U.S. as the globe’s number one economy by perhaps 2030.

#### Hegemony makes efficient exercise of power impossible—causes blowback and overextension

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute, Ph.D in Political Science from Brown University, *Orbis*, 55(1), Winter, jam)

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power-military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America's preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America's unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States' relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China's, now the world's second-largestnational economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America's next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is oneseventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcome. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance - material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather American *predominance*. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries' own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy-the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly-is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world-both at home and internationally-could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the "post-unipolar" world.

#### Global leadership causes free-riding and diminishes strategic versatility—detachment more effectively guarantees security

Walt ’12 Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “On "Leading from the Front",” 8/31/2012, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/31/on\_leading\_from\_the\_front

In fact, the idea that the United States should always try to "lead" is completely bone-headed. "Exerting leadership" is not the central objective of foreign policy; it is a means to an end but not an end in itself. The central purpose of foreign policy is to maximize the nation's security and well-being. If exerting "leadership" contributes to these ends, fine, but there will be many occasions when the smart strategy is to hold back and pass the buck to someone else. Blindly declaring that the United States must always go to enormous lengths to lead, and must constantly strive to reassure allies who need us far more than we need them, is mere jingoistic hubris. It's an applause line, but not a strategy. The United States would be well-served by a more selective approach to "global leadership." It is not a foreign policy achievement when the United States gets stuck dealing with an intractable quagmire like Afghanistan -- at a cost of a half a trillion dollars and 2,000 lives -- or when it finds itself waging drone wars in half a dozen countries. A real achievement would have been to find a way to shift the burden of this problem onto others, and especially onto the backs of potential U.S. adversaries. We congratulate ourselves on finally tracking down Osama bin Laden, but the real winners over the past decade have been countries like China, which have concentrated on building up power at home while the United States bled itself white in a series of pointless foreign adventures. Furthermore, America's reflexive urge to be in charge has other negative consequences. It has allowed our most important allies to free-ride for decades, to the point that they are increasingly liabilities rather than assets. NATO's European members spend a mere 1.7 percent on average on defense these days (and that number is going down), and none of these countries can mount a serious military operation anywhere without a lot of American help. Why? Because Uncle Sucker has spent the last 50 years doing it for them. Much the same story is true in Asia, where countries like Japan want lots of American protection but don't want to spend any money defending themselves. Washington ends up with not with allies but with dependents, and we see it as a victory whenever some new country requires our protection. This demand that the United States constantly "lead from the front" also makes it easier for other states to drag us into their quarrels. Georgia tried to sucker us into its dispute with Russia a few years ago (and if McCain had been in charge, it would have succeeded), and Israel is still trying to get America to bomb Iran on its behalf. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are trying to push the United States to confront China over issues like the South China Sea, and everybody seems to think the United States should "do something" about Syria. Perhaps we should, but first you need to explain why doing any of these things will make Americans safer or more prosperous here at home, and then you need to convince me that the countries who have a lot more at stake aren't up to the task. And if some other country wants me to spend American money and risk American lives, they'd better have a lot of skin in the game, too. Finally, if weaker countries want to demand my protection, they'd better be willing to follow my advice on other issues. Otherwise, they're on their own. Don't get me wrong: in some cases the United States should be actively involved and it should exercise a leadership role. It is still the world's most powerful country, and a return to isolationism would have destabilizing consequences in some areas. But our overall approach to grand strategy should begin by recognizing that the United States is remarkably secure, with no great powers nearby, and most of our current adversaries are much, much weaker. This favorable geopolitical position is an enormous asset; it means that other states tend to worry more about each other than they do about us, and it means many countries will remain eager for U.S. support. Which in turn allows Washington to "play hard to get," and extract lots of concessions from others in exchange for our help. Those who pompously insist that America must always take the lead are throwing this diplomatic asset out the window, and guaranteeing that other states will take advantage of us instead of the other way around. And it should enable us to spend a lot less on national security, thereby easing our budget problems and allowing investments that will ensure our long-term productivity. It is worth remembering that the United States rose to great-power status by staying out of trouble abroad and by concentrating on building a powerful economy here at home (which is what China is doing today). It also helped that the other great powers bankrupted themselves through several ruinous wars. The United States fought in two of those wars, but we got in late, suffered far fewer losses, and were in a better position to "win the peace" afterwards. The world has changed somewhat since then, and America's global role is and should be more substantial, but there is still a valuable lesson there. But don't expect Romney & Co. to absorb it.

#### Heg impacts are exaggerated to mobilize domestic support

Layne ’97 Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” International Security, Summer 1997

The security/interdependence nexus results in the exaggeration of threats to American strategic interests because it requires the United States to defend its core interests by intervening in the peripheries. There are three reasons for this. First, as Johnson points out, order-maintenance strategies are biased inherently toward threat exaggeration. Threats to order generate an anxiety “that has at its center the fear of the unknown. It is not just security, but the pattern of order upon which the sense of security depends that is threatened.”4’ Second, because the strategy of preponderance requires U.S. intervention in places that concededly have no intrinsic strategic value, U.S. policymakers are compelled to overstate the dangers to American interests to mobilize domestic support for their policies.42 Third, the tendency to exaggerate threats is tightly linked to the strategy of preponderance’s concern with maintaining U.S. credibility. The diplomatic historian Robert J. McMahon has observed that since 1945 U.S. policymakers consistently have asserted that American credibility is “among the most critical of all foreign policy objectives.” As Khalilzad makes clear, they still are obsessed with the need to preserve America’s reputation for honoring its security commitments: “The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies, such as Germany and Japan, believe that the current. arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as lacking the will or capability to lead in protecting their interests.” Credibility is believed to be crucial if the extended deterrence guarantees on which the strategy of preponderance rests are to remain robust. Preponderance’s concern with credibility leads to the belief that U.S. commitments are interdependent. As Thomas C. Schelling has put it: “Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves. but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one’s commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times.”45 If others perceive that the United States has acted irresolutely in a specific crisis, they will conclude that it will not honor its commitments in future crises. Hence, as happened repeatedly in the Cold War, the United States has taken military action in peripheral areas to demonstrate—both to allies and potential adversaries—that it will uphold its security obligations in core areas.

#### Transition is peaceful—empirics and structural theory

MacDonald and Parent ’11 Paul K. MacDonald, professor of political science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, “Graceful Decline?” International Security, Vol. 35, Iss. 4, Spring 2011

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by deªnition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

#### Multipolarity reinforces global incentives for responsible action—best limits aggression and miscalc

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute, Ph.D in Political Science from Brown University, *Orbis*, 55(1), Winter)

Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more. 13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image. 14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers' control.

#### Primacy increases the likelihood of your nuclear escalation warrants – but no threat exists otherwise

Freidman et al. ’13 Benjamin H. Friedman is a Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute, Brendan Rittenhouse Green is the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College, Justin Logan is Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 38.2, Fall 2013, pp. 181-199

Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today. Brooks et al. argue that “China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term” (p. 38). That possibility is remote, even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia’s other regional powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions. Brooks et al. warn that a variety of states would develop nuclear weapons absent U.S. protection. We agree that a proliferation cascade would create danger and that restraint may cause some new states to seek nuclear weapons. Proliferation cascades are nonetheless an unconvincing rationale for primacy. Primacy likely causes more proliferation among adversaries than it prevents among allies. States crosswise with the United States realize that nuclear arsenals deter U.S. attack and diminish its coercive power. U.S. protection, meanwhile, does not reliably stop allied and friendly states from building nuclear weapons. Witness British, French, and Israeli decisionmaking. Proliferation cascades were frequently predicted but never realized during the Cold War, when security was scarcer.15 New research argues that security considerations are [End Page 186] often a secondary factor in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that states with the strongest appetites for proliferation often lack the technical and managerial capacities to acquire the bomb.16 Finally, even if proliferation cascades occur, they do not threaten U.S. security. Few, if any, states would be irrational enough to court destruction at the hands of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, especially if the United States is not enmeshed in their conflicts.

#### Trade doesn’t solve conflict

Martin et al. ‘8 Philippe Martin, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Thierry Mayer, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, and Matthias Thoenig, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, Review of Economic Studies (2008) 75, pp. 865-900, http://econ.sciences-po.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

#### Prefer our models—their ev systemically ignores negative effects

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Our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to highlight the opposite effects of bilateral and multilateral trade on the probability of war and to base the empirical analysis on testable predictions generated by a theoretical model. Our results are somewhat pessimistic on the impact of trade and more generally of globalization on the prevalence and the nature of war. We have shown that even in a model where trade increases welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not lead to more peaceful relations. The intuition that trade promotes peace is only partially right: bilateral trade, because it increases the opportunity cost of bilateral war indeed deters bilateral war. However, multilateral trade openness, because it reduces this opportunity cost with any given country, weakens the incentive to make concessions during negotiations to avert escalation and therefore increases the probability of war between any given pair of country. From this point of view, an increase in trade between two countries pacifies relations between these two countries but increases the probability of conflict with other countries. Trade globalization also affects the nature of war: multilateral trade openness increases the probability of local wars but deters global conflicts. This last point is important: our paper should not be interpreted as suggesting that trade globalization leads to war. Given that World Wars are certainly the most costly in terms of human welfare, this is not a small achievement. We interpret more our paper as a word of caution and a possible explanation of the changing nature of wars.

#### Liberalism is based upon violence and coercion, but ironically fears it and denies its inevitability. The 1AC subscribes to similar principles declaring that war will not and cannot happen, it fails to understand that war is an inevitability of the political

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Liberalism knows of course about violence and coercion. Contrary to what liberal theoreticians like Adam Smith and Tocqueville feared about the defensive capabilities of liberal democracies (see chapter 4) and to what German radical conservatives exclaimed between the two world wars, liberal democracies have been extraordinarily good at projecting force, including military force, as evidenced in WW2, in the Cold War and in the projecting of societal force as evidenced by the smooth functioning of liberal governmentality (Rose 2000). What liberalism has neglected is reflection and recognition about these facts. To anticipate further arguments, I’ll briefly state that the problematic here is liberalism’s tendency to portray its use of force as anything but force and its tendency to ‘hide’ its political nature behind an image of the apolitical, i.e. the rational, the pacific, the economic, the deliberative, the cultural etc. The conflict perspective has lived somewhat of a shadow life primarily as a negative frame of reference in liberalism and as an academic discourse (and diplomatic practice) in international politics as the both academic discourse and practice of realism and neorealism. There has been an effective marginalization of ‘the thinkers of violence’ and their partial ‘translation’ to less radical versions as evidenced in the literature on Machiavelli and Hobbes. Or this was the case until around the mid-1990s, where a renewed interest in the conflict perspective broke through. In my view because of a dissatisfaction with the hegemonic liberal interpretation and management of the West. This coincided with the re-emergence of an idea of ‘post-liberalism’, which was always more a hope than an actual registration of fact. The argument was that liberalism was a living dead, equally unaware of its own mortality and death. The return of the conflict perspective was and often is couched in various variants of the ‘return of the political’ or more pronounced in reassertions of ‘the primacy of the political’ (Honig 1993; Mouffe 1993, 2005a; Müller 1997). It has also had a more mellow expression as a ‘political turn’ (Beck 1993; Giddens 1994; Bauman 1999) which are basically new pacific understandings of politics. Some of the conflictual perspectives are inspired by Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen and there is a sort of dialectics between the return of Schmitt and the return of the political. It is from these very diverse texts – and their motivations – that I take my starting point and it is from the debates on the return of the political that I find the reasons and arguments of this text. The return of the political has many causes. Noël O’Sullivan (1997) lists three: Postmodern theory, radical feminism and multicultural theory. What they have in common is a sensitivity to difference and the oppression behind seeming unity and consensus. The return of the political is also the return of political conflict – at least in academic terms. The concept of post-liberalism and the return of the political are parts of the same dissatisfaction with contemporary liberalism, and not least with what I’ll later term liberal globalism, that is, the projection of liberal values and liberal sociability across the globe. What the conflict perspective highlights is the very political nature and consequences of this antipolitical globalization. This work draws upon a conflictual understanding of the political that sets it apart from the liberal. Giovanni Sartori has dichotomized the approach to politics (1987a: 41-2): The fundamental distinction is … between (a) a warlike view of politics; and (b) a peace-oriented, legalitarian view of politics. In the former, force monitors persuasion, might establishes right, and conflict resolution is sought in terms of the defeat of the enemy – of the ’other’ looked on as a hostis. In the latter, force is kept in reserve as an ultima ratio, as a last and worse resort, and conflict resolution is sought by means of covenants, courts, and ‘rightful’ procedures. One could also mention Michael Mann (1988: chap. 4 & 5) Hans Joas (2003: chap. 1-4, 7 & 8) and Giddens (1985: 25-7), who all distinguish between a pacifist liberal/Marxist and a militarist approach to war as further illustration of the clash between two concepts of the political. Although the distinction was meant to cover 19 century sociology, I want to argue that it has a broader relevance and application value. Depoliticization is the strategy of the peace-oriented whereas repoliticization is the strategy of the ‘war-like’ concept of the political. Mann describes the two camps or approaches as follows: Whatever else divided such theorists as Adam Smith, Bastiat, Carey and Schumpeter or St Simon, Comte, Spencer, Marx himself and Durkheim, on one prediction they united. Contemporary militarism between states was ‘archaic’, the declining residue of an earlier epoch (to which they often gave a militaristic name; for example Spencer’s militant society or Bastiat’s, Carey’s and Schumpeter’s age of imperialist plunder). The modern era was to be pacific, because its keystone, industrial capitalism, was transnational. These views, prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in England, the United States and France, did not go unchallenged. Writers like Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, Schmitt, Hintze, Mosca and Pareto stressed the continued vitality of militaristic currents in contemporary society. But several of them seemed actually to approve of militarism. And as, ironically, they all belonged to the defeated powers of the two world wars, their memory was largely suppressed. By and large the Anglo-Saxon and Gallic victors in the West preferred to forget their ideas. (1988: 126) This text starts from the assumption of Mann (1988: 149), that today both approaches are unacceptable, as the pacifist approach overestimates the pacifying nature of modern developments, whereas the militarist approach exaggerates the all-importance of war. I want to denote the pacifist approach as the liberal (I’ll have a bit to say further on about the pacifism of Marxism). Liberalism is informed by a pacifist or deconflictualized concept of the political. It is in this context that one is to understand my claim of liberalism as an escape from the political; it is an escape from the political as conflictual. Mann defines militarism as “an attitude and a set of institutions which regard war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (1988: 124).5 I want, initially, to define the conflictual view of the political as the idea that ‘conflict (and ultimately war) is a recurrent, permanent and deeply ambivalent social activity’. Ambivalent, because it acknowledges that conflict has a range of positive effects but it does not – or at least does not have to – succumb to a glorification of combat. Conflictuality has also invited positive recept.ions, for instance in some republican interpretations as a cure for corruption (McCormick 1993, 2001) or in historical sociology focusing on the constructive forces unleashed by conflict. As Charles Tilly (1985) famously said: “States made war, and war made states”. Lewis A. Coser wrote in his classic The Functions of Social Conflict: “To focus on the functional aspects of social conflict is not to deny that certain forms of conflict are indeed destructive of group unity or that they lead to disintegration of specific social structures. Such focusing serves, however, to correct a balance of analysis which has been tilted in the other direction” (1956: 8). At the same time as the pacifist and the militarist approaches are unacceptable (in their radical form), they are also inevitable and necessary (in the form I use them here). Because they constitute the main sources of political debate and contest. It is the claim that large parts of the history of political ideas can be read and understood through the prism depoliticization/repoliticization, where for instance liberals insist on depoliticization as the way to overcome violence, force, coercion and, in this view, also the political, whereas the different liberalism critiques insist on the permanence of force, coercion and violence as (and as well as) the political. In her book Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Bonnie Honig differentiates between two approaches to politics: A ‘virtue theory of politics’, which is a peace-perspective and a ‘virtù theory of politics’, which is a conflict perspective, and her description of the conflict perspective and its use covers very well my use of it here: To affirm the perpetuity of conflict is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimensions of contestation. It is to see that the always imperfect closure of political space tends to engender remainders and that, if those remainders are not engaged, they may return to haunt and destabilize the very closures that deny their existence. It is to treat rights and law as a part of political contest rather than as the instruments of its closure. It is to see that attempts to shut down the agon perpetually fail, that the best (or worst) they do is to displace politics onto other sites and topics, where the struggle of identity and difference, resistance and closure, is then repeated. (1993: 15-16) The liberalism critique of Chantal Mouffe is of the same nature and intent (1995a, 1999, 2005a). In this text I will from a liberal starting point allow an inspiration from the militarist approach, while trying to stay clear of the temptations of both approaches: The liberal temptation to ignore, downplay or dismiss violence and the militarist temptation to get fascinated by and even glorify violence and the battle. The critical part of the dissertation will focus on aspects of the shadow side of the liberal dream. Again I quote Joas: ”However, this blunt rejection of violence was accompanied by a certain tendency to underestimate its importance in the present. It allowed an optimistic gaze firmly fixed on the future to view the bad old world in its death-throes with impatience and without genuine interest.” (2003: 31). The problem with the optimistic gaze is its underestimation of the continued presence of violence and coercion. My main point of criticism will not be a conspiratorial debunking of liberalism which claims that liberalism wilfully hides its political and violent nature, but rather that the ‘blindness’ is inscribed in the particular liberal way of understanding the political and not least the international.

#### Castro says no to US-Cuban relations-Anti-Americanism is too entrenched

Suchliki 13 (James, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami., 3/4/13, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> aks)

In the meantime, Raul Castro will still rule with an iron fist. Some Cuba observers expect that Raul will open up the economy and even provide some political changes. Not so soon. With Fidel alive, or even when he is dead, it would be difficult for Raul to reject his brother's legacy of political and economic centralization. His legitimacy is based on being Fidel's heir. Any major move to reject Fidel's "teachings" would create uncertainty among Cuba's ruling elites - party and military. It could also increase instability as some would advocate rapid change, while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms. For Raul Castro, the uncertainties of uncorking the genie's bottle of reform in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving cautiously. For the past 52 years, political considerations have always dictated economic policies. He had been the longest serving Minister of Defense (47 years). He presided over the worst period of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power. During his speech to Parliament, Raul Castro scoffed at any idea that the country would soon abandon socialism and embrace profound economic changes. "I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba," he emphasized. "I was elected to defend, maintain and continue to perfect socialism and not to destroy it." General Castro faces significant challenges in his second term. A non-productive and highly dependent economy on Venezuela and other foreign sources, popular unhappiness, the need to maintain order and discipline among the population and the need to increase productivity. Raul is critically dependent on the military. Lacking the charisma of his brother, he still needs the support of key party leaders and technocrats within the government bureaucracy. The critical challenge for Raul Castro will be to balance the need to improve the economy and satisfy the needs of the population with maintaining political control. Too rapid economic reforms may lead to an unraveling of political control, a fact feared by Raul, the military, and other allies keen on remaining in power. A partial solution may be to provide more consumer goods to the population, including food, but without any structural economic changes. Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.