### 2ac long

The status quo conceptualizes Mexico’s ecosystem specifically the Tijuana River as devoid of intrinsic value, this manifests itself in destructive ecological practices such as toxic waste dumping, voting affirmative ruptures the legitimacy of such violence, couple of impacts

-arbitrary hierarchies between forms of life underlie all forms of violence, this is the root cause of oppression

-separating the environment from humanity precludes ones ability to feel that they belong in the universe eviscerating ontology

Thus the role of the ballot is who has a better methodology to relate to Mexico’s ecosystem through a conceptual approach to environmental praxis, our approach is superior

-solution rather than problem oriented (Castello)

-identifies debates that really matter (Reitan)

-opens up new contingencies for problem solving (hirokawa)

-takes responsibility for environmental destruction (lichatovich)

-ruptures epistemic construction of nature in the border region (orihuela)

-problematizes the narratives the legitimize violence against nature (bell and russel)

### case

#### Their impact calculus re-entrenches the worst form of colonial violence

**Gough 1994** (neil prof center for education @ Deakin U “PLAYING AT CATASTROPHE: ECOPOLITICAL EDUCATION AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM” EDUCATIONAL THEORY /Spring 1994 / Volume 44 / Number 2

In his provocative reflections on travelling in the United States, Baudrillard asserts that many popular representations of ecological catastrophe should not be taken ”too seriusly.T”~o my mind, support for this judgment comes less from any direct evidence cited in Baudrillard’s text than by questioning its silences and engaging the intertextual “conversations” toward which it gestures. For example, Baudrillard writes that “everywhere [which in this context must be read as everywhere in America] survival has become a burning issue.” But as I reflect on the material consequences of building a global political and economic system in which it often seems that “everywhere” is equated with North America and Europe, I am led to conclude that elsewhere - such as in the many rural areas of the non-Western world that are home to at least one billion people living and dying in abject poverty4 - survival is not an “issue”; the people who dwell in such circumstances have no choices, there is no “play” in the operations, relations, andconditions that determine if they live or die.5 Thus, while “playing at [ecological] catastrophe” may “prove” that “we” - the “we” of Western worlds and worldviews - ”are very much alive,” it does not hold similar assurances for the people and habitats of the non-Western world that we have systematically destroyed: “the ease with which we now live ... makes survivors of us.

### 1nc reject

Standinf reserve is ableist

#### Ableism is the foundation of oppression – reject them

Siebers, University of Michigan, Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism, 9

(Tobin, “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, Oct 28, Lecture, <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdisabilities.temple.edu%2Fmedia%2Fds%2Flecture20091028siebersAesthetics_FULL.doc&ei=LWz4T6jyN8bHqAHLkY2LCQ&usg=AFQjCNGdkDuSJkRXMHgbXqvuyyeDpldVcQ&sig2=UCGDC4tHbeh2j7-Yce9lsA>, accessed 7/7/12, sl)

Oppression is the systematic victimization of one group by another. It is a form of intergroup violence. That oppression involves “groups,” and not “individuals,” means that it concerns identities, and this means, furthermore, that oppression always focuses on how the body appears, both on how it appears as a public and physical presence and on its specific and various appearances. Oppression is justified most often by the attribution of natural inferiority—what some call “in-built” or “biological” inferiority. Natural inferiority is always somatic, focusing on the mental and physical features of the group, and it figures as disability. The prototype of biological inferiority is disability. The representation of inferiority always comes back to the appearance of the body and the way the body makes other bodies feel. This is why the study of oppression requires an understanding of aesthetics—not only because oppression uses aesthetic judgments for its violence but also because the signposts of how oppression works are visible in the history of art, where aesthetic judgments about the creation and appreciation of bodies are openly discussed. One additional thought must be noted before I treat some analytic examples from the historical record. First, despite my statement that disability now serves as the master trope of human disqualification, § Marked 09:59 § it is not a matter of reducing other minority identities to disability identity. Rather, it is a matter of understanding the work done by disability in oppressive systems. In disability oppression, the physical and mental properties of the body are socially constructed as disqualifying defects, but this specific type of social construction happens to be integral at the present moment to the symbolic requirements of oppression in general. In every oppressive system of our day, I want to claim, the oppressed identity is represented in some way as disabled, and although it is hard to understand, the same process obtains when disability is the oppressed identity. “Racism” disqualifies on the basis of race, providing justification for the inferiority of certain skin colors, bloodlines, and physical features. “Sexism” disqualifies on the basis of sex/gender as a direct representation of mental and physical inferiority. “Classism” disqualifies on the basis of family lineage and socioeconomic power as proof of inferior genealogical status. “Ableism” disqualifies on the basis of mental and physical differences, first selecting and then stigmatizing them as disabilities. The oppressive system occults in each case the fact that the disqualified identity is socially constructed, a mere convention, representing signs of incompetence, weakness, or inferiority as undeniable facts of nature. As racism, sexism, and classism fall away slowly as justifications for human inferiority—and the critiques of these prejudices prove powerful examples of how to fight oppression—the prejudice against disability remains in full force, providing seemingly credible reasons for the belief in human inferiority and the oppressive systems built upon it. This usage will continue, I expect, until we reach a historical moment when we know as much about the social construction of disability as we now know about the social construction of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Disability represents at this moment in time the final frontier of justifiable human inferiority.

### 2ac deep eco cp

Perm do both

CP doesn’t access role of the ballot Castellano is very specific insofar as only ecopragmatism can facilitate the interdisciplinary context necessary for a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

#### Detaching theory and practice mean they don’t solve

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

This focus on the relationship between practice and theory has also been central to my attempts to understand the ‘justice’ of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, 2007). Many attempts to define environmental or climate justice have been too detached from the actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an organising theme or identity. This does assume that there is a value to movement practice – that theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements. Why, the more purist academic or sceptic might ask, should we prioritise what activists believe or do? But the question should not be about who is the best judge of a conception of justice – activists or theorists. The point is that different discourses of justice, and the various experiences and articulations of injustice, inform how the concept is used, understood, articulated, and demanded in practice; the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study. It continues to be unfortunate that there are those in the study of environmentalism, or in the theoretical realm, who simply cannot see the importance, and range, of these articulations at the intersection of theory and practice – especially when movement innovation is as broad and informative as it is in environmental justice.

Hirokawa is a solvency deficit they don’t have an answer to – incremental changes produce new contexts that open up the space for alternative paradigms to emerge

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

Their framing is bad and results in political apathy because instead of fixing a problem we constantly shift the blame for failure on an external entity – in this case the state - Lichatovich

The counterplan is not competitive – the exact proposed plan of action is irrelevant in a world we don’t need to defend fiat to gain access to our advantage

Applied ecology is superior to pure ecology in the context of Mexico because it is solution rather than problem oriented, institutional structures also ONLY accredit applied ecology which means the aff is key to alt solvency

#### Eco-pragmatism avoids totalizing theory and allows solutions to the environmental issues of the squo

Hirokawa 2 (Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the UConn and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002, "Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law," Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June; lexis; Kristof)

By rejecting commitments to theory, pragmatists are denied the benefit of having a justifying principle (such as free will, equality, utility, ecocentrism, etc.) under which they can rally support. However, what pragmatists lose by rejecting meta-theory they replace by widening the field of potential solutions. **Avoiding commitment to** a **substantive meta-theory frees the environmental thinker from worry about whether the solutions proposed for a given problem are consistent with an ultimate theoretical grounding**; that is, the pragmatist is not bound by deductive reasoning within the confines of any particular analytic scheme. Visionary reasoning becomes an eclectic array of possibilities, limited only by those contextual needs that make the inquiry important in the first place. The turn to pragmatism thus symbolizes a rejection of the alleged [\*251] relationship between theory and answers to practical questions. To the pragmatist, this rejection comes for very good reason. Competing conclusions can often be derived from the same incomplete set of premises, and divergent theories can often produce the same conclusions. Pragmatists redirect human inquiry to avoid the indeterminacy of theory, since the "knowledge of obstacles is not itself an obstacle unless it leads to defeatism; for pragmatists it serves as a spur to seek a way to overcome those obstacles." n118 In the final analysis, although theories are important, the pragmatist warns against theory commitments, because theories provide "no more than commentary on practice, based on premises drawn from that practice itself." n119 Accordingly, the pragmatic position against theory is not a broad, sweeping dismissal of every idea derived from a theoretical framework. n120 Rather, **the pragmatist is free to consider a variety of ideas, approaches and solutions without committing to particular theoretical foundations**. The method and strength of problem solving, n121 if not the purpose, is to ensure conversation participants [\*252] that their theories are duly considered. n122 **The resulting formation of policy is "inclusive, treating current theories as perspectives, each of which can add to the understanding of law**." n123 **Pragmatism**, then, **is a helpful tool** (especially **to environmental debate**) **because of its freedom from any particular method of inquiry and any particular metaphysical "good"** of society. For the pragmatist, **theories** "**are not** Euclidean axioms or Kantian categorical **imperatives, but** graffiti, **practical guidelines to be noticed** by the alertly street-wise **when context makes them applicable**." n124 **When unbounded by consistency** with or loyalty to any particular theory, **all relevant ideas become useful to the resolution** of a dilemma. The lesson from pragmatism is that to see the law as something more than a refined, yet interminably eclectic conglomerate of ideas, taken from all forms of social and cultural practices, would be to give too much credit to our insight into the nature of justice. The resulting amalgam - the plurality of perspectives arranged for inclusive discourse - is not mandated by pragmatism. n125 Nonetheless, since pragmatism is in its most useful capacity when put to the task of dispute resolution, pragmatism inevitably finds itself confronted with opposing and incompatible perspectives. A pragmatic conclusion is one in which those opposing and incompatible perspectives are represented. To this end, some pragmatists have tried to surmount the foundationalists' problem of theory-hope (that the right theory will supply the right solutions) by proposing pluralist perspectives to bridge the gaps between competing paradigms. Pluralism serves as a helpful model for pragmatism's [\*253] application. n126 In summary, pragmatic inquiry illustrates three main themes. First, **pragmatism embodies "anti-foundationalism" in that it** is not loyal to any particular substantive theory. Second, pragmatism **allows negotiation between** purportedly **uncompromising positions for the purpose of solving real problems, due** in large part **to its lack of dependency on any "truths" § Marked 09:59 § claimed** in these positions. Finally, particular theory determines the right answers to difficult questions. The **pragmatist uses these tools to transcend barriers between alternative perceptions by critically examining such perspectives to determine how each of them can be applied in a helpful, non-exclusive manner**. **These tools can be applied to debates over environmental protection, which were** above portrayed as **deadlocked dialogues between deeply held beliefs**. Below, the problems of frustrated belief are contrasted to examples of pragmatic environmentalism, verifying the potential benefits of legal pragmatism for advocates and judges engaged in environmental disputes.

#### Shallow ecology is comparatively superior – our subject position ensures that ontological commitment will always be rooted in humanity – their arg discredits ecological academia

Avery 4 (STEPHEN AVERY; “The Misbegotten Child of Deep Ecology”; Environmental Values, Vol. 13, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 31-50; KDUB)

Hand-in-hand with this ontological commitment, however, is the belief that this holistic ontology entails a non-anthropocentric ethic. Within the literature this entailment is almost universally accepted, so much so that deep ecology is often characterised by its non-anthropocentric stance. It is my contention, however, that such an entailment is misbegotten. The development of a non- anthropocentric ethic is a problematic task that must be aborted. The debate between those advocating and those opposing a non-anthropocentric ethic has been one of the most prominent and long-running debates within environmental philosophical circles. Supporters of a non-anthropocentric or ecocentric ethic seek to locate intrinsic value in the non-human world, thus providing all creatures an equal right to 'live and blossom' . However, in this endeavour, such ethicists fail to recognise the essentially practical nature of ethics and the consequent impossibility of separating human concern and value from any environmental ethical consideration. Invariably, non-anthropocentrists, at least those who wish to avoid the inherent misanthropic consequences of a consistent application of non-anthropocentric ethics, develop a hierarchy of needs to solve this problematic practical application. These hierarchies, however, lead ulti- mately to a question-begging ethical preference for the human species. § Marked 09:50 § Despite the rejection of non-anthropocentric ethics, I believe that the deep ecological ontological commitment does have merit. However, intrinsic in deep ecologists' failure to develop a viable environmental ethic, I believe, is a lack of understanding of the derivation of ethics from ontology. As Heidegger claims, 'Before we attempt to determine more precisely the relationship between "ontology" and "ethics" we must ask what "ontology" and "ethics" themselves are'.2 In pursuing this question it becomes apparent that ontology itself is derivative of what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontol- ogy offers the recognition that we, as humans, have no ontological access except through our own understanding of what it is to 'be' . For this reason I believe that, to meet deep ecology's ontological conception, a distinction needs to be made between shallow and deep anthropocentrism. Like its namesake, deep anthropocentrism is suggestive of a deeper connection between humans and the world, a connection that has its roots in the human condition. Such a connection can be contrasted with 'shallow' or 'formal' anthropocentrism, the idea that we necessarily view the world from a human perspective. The need for a deep anthropocentric distinction follows the conception that ontology itself is not possible outside a fundamental human standpoint.

### 2ac solvency advocate

Neg must have a specific solvency advocate

Literature is the litmus test for fairness – impossible to generate offense

Disincentivizes research – portable skill

### 2ac cp’s that result in plan

Counterplans that could result in the plan are a VI -

Disincentivizes advocacy construction and research – it’s impossible to generate offense

Plan specific solvency advocate solves their offense

### 2ac process

Perm do the counterplan – we should be able to define the mandates of the plan, we’ll defend links for disads but not for counterplan competition, timeframe fiat means the perm is reciprocal, checks fairness

### gender

Conceded that your role as an academic is to evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis – the alternative is not an environmental practice all I need to win is that the aff practice is comparatively better than status quo environmental praxis

The role of the ballot is which team best develops a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem we’ll win that our methodology is superior to theirs

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

**Intersex people disprove the k - link turn**

**Guenther** asst prof phil @ vandy **2010** (Lisa “Other Fecundities: Proust and Irigaray on Sexual Difference” Differences: A journal of feminst cultural studies Volume 21, Number 2)

Irigaray offers a trenchant critique of the patriarchal monoculture that fails to recognize sexual difference, and so represses women’s voices, bodies, and ways of being. But her recent focus on the duality of the sexes, and her apparent suspicion of multiplicity, lead to problems theorizing other forms of difference such as race, culture, and sexuality, and it may prematurely disqualify possibilities for imagining sexual difference beyond the magical “two.” Even Alison Stone’s recent revision of Irigaray, which attempts to reconcile her account of sexual duality with bodily multiplicity as a way of addressing the exclusion of intersex bodies in her work, still maintains the primacy of duality and in my view fails to address claims of multiplicity on its own terms. In what follows, I test the limits of Irigaray’s approach to sexual difference through a reading of Proust’s novel Sodom and Gomorrah, in which I develop a model of sexual difference based on an irreducible duality of sexual “parts,” both of which may be found in the same individual but that nevertheless relate to one another and so become meaningful only through the circulation of an incongruous third element or libidinal force that generates multiple forms of pleasure and fecundity. Proust’s novel opens with an extended comparison of a sexual encounter between two men to the fertilization of a rare orchid by a bumblebee; the men connect to the sexual difference in themselves and in the other through their mutual enjoyment of pleasure across a threshold of alterity that is as mobile and contingent as it is irreducible to sameness. In my reading, this scene from Proust suggests a flexible way of accounting for practices that complicate the sexual duality of male and female without dissolving it, but also without enshrining it in the figure of the heterosexual couple. As such, it promises to open new ways of theorizing sexual difference in contexts where “to be two” is simply not enough. Irigaray and the Limits of Sexual Difference Alison Stone’s recent analysis of Irigaray’s later work addresses precisely the concerns I have raised here about the relation between duality and multiplicity. In Stone’s reading, Irigaray is a realist essentialist, which means that she believes in a natural, irreducible, and really existing sexual duality.7 This duality has yet to find adequate cultural expression; under patriarchy, and even under certain forms of feminism, sexual difference is reduced to an explicitly neutral but implicitly masculine monoculture of humanity. For Stone, Irigaray’s concept of sexual difference is best understood in terms of different rhythms or temporalities such as expansion and contraction, which are linked in a process like breathing where “each pole, alternately, inhales and exhales air, so that the one expands while the other shrinks” (Luce 90). Female rhythms, like female sexual development, are depicted as irreversible and discontinuous; they are connected to cyclical processes in nature like the change of the seasons. Male rhythms, on the other hand, are characterized by homeostatic processes that hover around an ideal mean, building up tension and releasing it while maintaining a steady equilibrium. Stone locates these processes not only in sexed organisms but also in more diffuse natural processes like weather or the growth of plants; ultimately, she draws on German Romantic thought to fill in a more general account of male and female principles operating in all of nature (Luce 92–93, 138–43, 154–60, 193–215). Stone frankly acknowledges the limits and potential problems of Irigaray’s realist essentialism. It is simply not the case that every woman experiences her body in terms of irreversible cyclical rhythms, and the reason for this is not merely because our culture fails to give expression to innate female rhythms. Even in a feminist utopia, it is not clear that each and every woman would identify with Irigaray’s account of our “real” natures, nor is it clear that everyone who identifies as a woman would count as such for Irigaray. The conviction that there are two and only two sexes marginalizes an experience of bodily multiplicity that is just as phenomenologically real and compelling as the experience of sexual duality (Luce 85, 112–13). Irigaray’s repeated suggestion that the only genuine encounter with difference can happen between the two sexes enforces a heterosexual paradigm that marginalizes same-sex relationships (Luce 7, 48, 189–90, 221–22) and makes it impossible for Irigaray to account for intersex or transsexual bodies without characterizing them as aberrant or unnatural (Luce 49, 113–21).

**That reifies hierarchies and makes exclusion inevitable**

**Nagoshi1** phd student in social work @ ASU **and Brzuzy** Chair and Associate Professor of Social Work @ xavier **10** (Julie L, Stephan/ie “Transgender Theory: Embodying Research and Practice “ Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work 25(4) 431-443)

The experiences of transgender individuals (hereafter ‘‘transgenders’’), those who do not conform to traditional gender identity binaries, raise compelling questions about the nature of socially defined identities. Does one’s identity in a category, such as gender, require that this identity be fixed in a particular body? What if one’s central experience of oppression is being forced to conform to a socially constructed identity category that one does not actually identify with? How do social workers empower and collaborate with individuals who have fluid identities? Transgender theory is a newly emerging theoretical orientation that encompasses the unique experiences of transgenders. Although previous essentialist approaches viewed social identities as fixed within the person, feminist and queer theories locate social identities in the conflict between social- and self-determinants. These approaches are incomplete for social work practice. If someone’s social identity is understood as being fixed or essential within the person, it can validate and **justify sex, racial, class, and other differences as being ‘‘natural**,’’ which can ultimately **reify the multiple systems of oppression**. At the same time, questioning and destabilizing all social identities disintegrates the individual’s sense of core self within a socially oppressed group, even though such an identity can be the basis for personal empowerment and empowerment to oppose social oppression. Transgender theory encompasses and transcends feminist and queer theory by explicitly incorporating ideas of the fluidly embodied, socially constructed, and self-constructed aspects of social identity, along with the dynamic interaction and integration of these aspects of identity within the narratives of lived experiences. Starting from feminist and queer theory approaches, this article discusses the evolution of transgender theory as an important next step to a more complete and inclusive understanding of gender and sexual identity. Suggestions are then provided for applying transgender theory to specific issues of understanding, working with, and empowering transgenders and building coalitions between transgender communities and other socially oppressed groups. Transgender and Transsexual Transgenderism can be defined as the breaking of gender roles and gender identity and/or going across the boundaries of gender to another gender (Green, 2004). Transgenders typically express gender identities outside traditional heteronormative definitions, but may have little or no intention of having sex-reassignment surgeries or hormone treatments (Bornstein, 1994). Transsexual individuals can be either pretransition/operative, transitioning/in the process of hormonal and surgical sexreassignment, or posttransition/operative (Hird, 2002). Transgenders differ widely in their degree of belief in the fluidity of gender identity. Some accept such fluidity only to the extent that one can switch between two otherwise separate, essentialist, and pure gender categories, whereas others believe that an embodied gender identity is still highly malleable. Lane (2009) noted the concern that transsexual voices may be silenced or ultimately erased under the umbrella of transgender. Concentrating on the artificiality of gender can de-emphasize the need for transsexuals to change their sexed bodies, which is central to a transsexual lived experience, thus excluding transsexual narratives in queer and transgender theories. Transsexualism is defined as innate and biological, not chosen, therefore deserving of both social and legal recognitions. Conversely, transgenderism is thought of as learned, freely chosen, and socially determined, therefore not deserving of legal recognition (Wallbank, 2004). The transgender experience thus challenges heteronormative assumptions of the nature of gender, sexuality, and identity in ways that cannot be fully addressed by feminist and queer theories.

#### Ecofeminism won’t solve- it devalues women and will not be accepted by a larger public

Bretherton 1 - MA in Latin American Studies

Charlotte Bretherton “ECOCENTRIC IDENTITY AND TRANSFORMATORY POLITICS,” The International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 6, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2001

The implications of ecofeminist ideas for human identity are numerous. For women, particularly those (primarily Western) women who have become alienated from the natural world, there is a need to rediscover their "natural" ecocentric/ecofeminine identification. Ecofeminism thus posits, for women, an essentialist ecocentric identity. This would involve not a loss or negation of the self but an opportunity to experience the fulfilment of recovering one's true maternal nature and to embrace the responsibilities associated with identification as a saviour of the planet. To some extent women have appeared to take up these responsibilities. In many parts of the world they have undoubtedly contributed significantly to environmental activism. Moreover, a number of women's environmental organisations have espoused overtly ecofeminist principles (Bretherton 1996). Indeed, Mies and Shiva (1993, p.3) claim, from their conversations with women's groups in many parts of the world, "women, worldwide, felt the same anger and anxiety, and the same sense of responsibility to preserve the bases of life, and to end its destruction." However, this raises the danger that women, who are everywhere the least powerful members of society, might be expected to assume disproportionate responsibility for cleaning up men's messes. § Marked 09:52 § Rather, an ecocentric identification demands that the "feminine" qualities of cooperation and nurturance be valued and embraced by all members of societies. It demands, too, that the "masculine" qualities of competition and dominance be devalued and rejected. Consequently, it must be concluded that, in many societies, the adoption of an ecocentric identity would involve, for men, a change of consciousness very much more fundamental than that required of women. While the major focus of an ecofeminine identity is positive identification with the natural world, there are implicitly elements of an identity defined negatively against the alien other of unreconstructed "masculine" man. Because of its implied exclusivity, which reflects a tendency towards maternalist essentialism, ecofeminism is unlikely to provide the basis for a universal ecocentric identity. Ecofeminism is important, nevertheless. It provides a trenchant critique of those cultural norms and values which support the power structures of contemporary societies and which have facilitated the development of a dangerously dysfunctional relationship between human collectivities and the ecosystems of which they are a part. In focusing very specifically upon this latter issue, bioregionalists would be well advised to incorporate feminist insights concerning the origin, and persistence, of gendered structures of power (Plumwood 1994; Bretherton 1998).

### Nietzsche

Permutation do the alternative because this is illogical

#### Ability to disobey oneself is the highest form of action – comparatively outweighs their offense

Baudrillard, 1 (Jean, “Impossible exchange”, Verso, 60-61; google books)

To be able to disobey moral rules and laws, to be able to disobey others, is a mark of freedom. But the ability to disobey oneself marks the highest stage of freedom. Obeying ones will is an even worse vice than being enslaved to ones passions. It is certainly worse than enslavement to the will of others. And it is indeed those who submit themselves mercilessly to their own decisions who fill the greater part of the authoritarian ranks, alleging sacrifice on their own part to impose even greater sacrifices on others. Each stage of servitude is both more subtle and worse than the one which precedes it. Involuntary servitude, the servitude of the slave, is overt violence. Voluntary servitude is violence consented to: a freedom to will, but not the will to be free. Last comes voluntary self-servitude or enslavement to ones own will: the individual possesses the faculty to will, but is no longer free in respect of it. He is the automatic agent of that faculty. He is the serf to no master but himself.

#### The only way we can become the Übermensch is by embracing the finitude of our lives and the enormousness of nature

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 73, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

Here Rank joins Kierkegaard in the belief that one should not stop and circumscribe his life with beyonds that are near at hand, or a bit further out, or created by oneself. One should reach for the highest beyond of religion: man should cultivate the passivity of renunciation to the highest powers no matter how diffcult it is. Anything less is less than full development, even if it seems like weakness and compromise to the best thinkers. Nietzsche railed at the Judeo-Christian renunciatory morality; but as Rank said, he “overlooked the deep need in the human being for just that kind of morality… .”34 Rank goes so far as to say that the “need for a truly religious ideology … is inherent in human nature and its fulfillment is basic to any kind of social life.”35 Do Freud and others imagine that surrender to God is masochistic, that to empty oneself is demeaning? Well, answers Rank, it represents on the contrary the furthest reach of the self, the highest idealization man can achieve. It represents the fulfillment of the Agape love-expansion, the achievement of the truly creative type. Only in this way, says Rank, only by surrendering to the bigness of nature on the highest, least-fetishized level, can man conquer death. In other words, the true heroic validation of one’s life lies beyond sex, beyond the other, beyond the private religion—all these are makeshifts that pull man down or that hem him in, leaving him torn with ambiguity. Man feels inferior precisely when he lacks “true inner values in the personality,” when he is merely a reflex of something next to him and has no steadying inner gyroscope, no centering in himself. And in order to get such centering man has to look beyond the “thou,” beyond the consolations of others and of the things of this world.36

#### Ressentiment is silly—avoiding it by rejecting active compassion is life-negating

Frazer 6

The Review of Politics (2006), 68: 49-78 Cambridge University Press

Michael Frazer's research focuses on Enlightenment political philosophy and its relevance for contemporary political theory. His current book project, “The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today,” defends a psychologically holistic approach to political reflection through an examination of such authors as David Hume, Adam Smith and J. G. Herder. Dr. Frazer has also published articles on Maimonides, Nietzsche, John Rawls and Leo Strauss in such journals as "Political Theory" and "The Review of Politics." After receiving his B.A. from Yale University and his Ph.D. from Princeton University, Dr. Frazer spent the 2006-7 academic year as a postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at Brown University.

Assistant professor – HARVARD

There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement.

By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet, or psychologist—the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche's protagonist warns against those who unduly oppose compassion as well as those who unduly celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of human flourishing.

#### There is no opposition between arguing for pragmatic change in the world and affirming life in a Nietzschean sense---their refusal of change and reform is self-delusion that withdraws from the world and denies an important aspect of life

May 5 (Todd, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, September 2005, “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 31, No. 5-6)

For those among us who seek in philosophy a way to grapple with our lives rather than to solve logical puzzles; for those whose reading and whose writing are not merely appropriate steps toward academic advancement but a struggle to see ourselves and our world in a fresher, clearer light; for those who find nourishment among impassioned ideas and go hungry among empty truths: there is a struggle that is often waged within us. It is a struggle that will be familiar to anyone who has heard in Foucault’s sentences the stammering of a fellow human being struggling to speak in words worth hearing. Why else would we read Foucault?

We seek to conceive what is wrong in the world, to grasp it in a way that offers us the possibility for change. § Marked 09:54 § We know that there is much that is, to use Foucault’s word, ‘intolerable’. There is much that binds us to social and political arrangements that are oppressive, domineering, patronizing, and exploitative. We would like to understand why this is and how it happens, in order that we may prevent its continuance. In short, we want our theories to be tools for changing the world, for offering it a new face, or at least a new expression. There is struggle in this, struggle against ideas and ways of thinking that present themselves to us as inescapable. We know this struggle from Foucault’s writings. It is not clear that he ever wrote about anything else. But this is not the struggle I want to address here.

For there is, on the other hand, another search and another goal. They lie not so much in the revisioning of this world as in the embrace of it. There is much to be celebrated in the lives we lead, or in those led by others, or in the unfolding of the world as it is, a world resonant with the rhythms of our voices and our movements. We would like to understand this, too, to grasp in thought the elusive beauty of our world. There is, after all, no other world, except, as Nietzsche taught, for those who would have created another one with which to denigrate our own. In short, we would like our thought to celebrate our lives.

To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness.

Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now.

The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way.

This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life-celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.