### case

we all agree this debate is about the appreciation of nature it should be a question of method

couple of distinct disads to their method

-Applied ecology is superior to pure ecology in the context of Mexico because it is solution rather than problem oriented, institutional structures also ONLY accredit applied ecology which means the aff is key to alt solvency

-We control uniqueness managerialism happening now state is inevitable means acting within existing structures is key we manage less net than the squo which is a reason to vote aff

-We link turn it our ev indicates that status quo maquiladoras manage nature more than the aff

-They’re complicit with environmental degradation occurring in the squo

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan is amazing theoretical disputes mask decisions that uphold the system

--also makes a link differential between ecopragmatism and the techno addiction that they criticize

Conceded Lichatovich – focusing on alternative mechanisms

Question of starting points

We control micro level uniqueness – academia does not in the status quo engage eco pragamtism

Even if managerialism is bad our affirmatives starting point is good – Hirokawa

#### Rejection of managerialism is just as dangerous – their author

Luke, 97 – professor of political science at Virginia polytechnic

Timothy, “Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture”, pg. 80

Although resource managerialism can be criticized on many levels, it has provisionally guaranteed some measure of limited protection to wilderness areas, animal species, and watercourses in the United States. And, whatever its flaws, the attempt to extend the scope of its oversight to other regions of the world probably could have a similar impact. Resource managerialism directly confronts the existing cultural, economic, and social regime of transnational corporate capitalism with the fact that millions of Americans, as well as billions of other human beings, must be provisioned from the living things populating Earth’s biosphere (the situation of all these other living things, of course, is usually ignored or reduced to an aesthetic question). And, if they are left unregulated, as history as shown, the existing corporate circuits of commodity production will degrade the biosphere to the point that all living things will not be able to renew themselves. Other ecological activists can fault resource managerialism, but few, if any, of them face these present-day realities as forthrightly in actual practice, largely because the prevailing regimes of state and corporate power, now assuming the forms of the “wise-use” movement often regard even this limited challenge as far too radical. Still, this record of “success” is not a license to ignore the flawed working of resource managerialism. In fact, this forthright engagement with resource realities raises very serious questions, as the global tactics of such agencies as the Worldwatch Institute reveal.

#### Comparative evidence – their movement gets co-opted and risks ecological catastrophe

**Wapner, 8 -** Associate Professor and Director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in the School of International Service at American University (Paul, Global Environmental Politics, February, “The Importance of Critical Environmental Studies in the New Environmentalism,” Project Muse)\*don’t endorse ableist language

¶ To many readers, such questions probably sound familiar. Efforts to rid the world of war, poverty, human rights abuses and injustice in general are perennial challenges that require heightened compassion and a commitment that transcends one's time on earth. The questions are especially relevant, however, to environmentalists. They represent the kind of challenges we constantly pose to ourselves and to those we try to convince to join us. Environmental issues are some of the gravest dangers facing humanity and all life on the planet. At their most immediate, environmental problems undermine the quality of life for the poorest and are increasingly eroding the quality of life of even the affluent. At the extreme, environmental challenges threaten to fracture the fundamental organic infrastructure that supports life on Earth and thus imperil life's very survival. What to do?¶ Environmental Studies is the academic discipline charged with trying to figure this out. Like Feminist and Race Studies, it emerged out of a political movement and thus never understood itself as value-neutral. Coming on the heels of the modern environmental movement of the 1960s, environmental studies has directed itself toward understanding the biophysical limits of the earth and how humans can live sustainably given those limits. As such, it has always seen its normative commitments not as biases that muddy its inquiry but as disciplining directives that focus scholarship in scientifically and politically [End Page 6] relevant directions. To be sure, the discipline's natural scientists see themselves as objective observers of the natural world and understand their work as normative only to the degree that it is shaped by the hope of helping to solve environmental problems. Most otherwise remain detached from the political conditions in which their work is assessed. The discipline's social scientists also maintain a stance of objectivity to the degree that they respect the facts of the social world, but many of them engage the political world by offering policy prescriptions and new political visions.¶ What is it like to research and teach Environmental Studies these days? Where does the normative dimension of the discipline fit into contemporary political affairs? Specifically, how should social thinkers within Environmental Studies understand the application of their normative commitments?¶ Robert Cox once distinguished what he calls "problem-solving" theory from "critical theory." The former, which aims toward social and political reform, accepts prevailing power relationships and institutions and implicitly uses these as a framework for inquiry and action. As a theoretical enterprise, problem-solving theory works within current paradigms to address particular intellectual and practical challenges. Critical theory, in contrast, questions existing power dynamics and seeks not only to reform but to transform social and political conditions.1¶ Critical environmental theory has come under attack in recent years. As the discipline has matured and further cross-pollinated with other fields, some of us have become enamored with continental philosophy, cultural and communication studies, high-level anthropological and sociological theory and a host of other insightful disciplines that tend to step back from contemporary events and paradigms of thought and reveal structures of power that reproduce social and political life. While such engagement has refined our ability to identify and make visible impediments to creating a greener world, it has also isolated critical Environmental Studies from the broader discipline and, seemingly, the actual world it is trying to transform. Indeed, critical environmental theory has become almost a sub-discipline to itself. It has developed a rarefied language and, increasingly, an insular audience. To many, this has rendered critical theory not more but less politically engaged as it scales the heights of thought only to be further distanced from practice. It increasingly seems, to many, to be an impotent discourse preaching radical ideas to an already initiated choir.¶ Critical Environmental Studies is also sounding flat these days coming off the heels of, arguably, the most anti-environmentalist decade ever. The Bush Administration's tenure has been an all-time low for environmental protection. The Administration has installed industry-friendly administrators throughout the executive branch, rolled back decades of domestic environmental law and international environmental leadership, politicized scientific evidence and expressed outright hostility to almost any form of environmental regulation.2 With the US as the global hegemon, it is hard to overestimate the impact these actions have had on world environmental affairs.¶ Being a politically engaged environmental scholar has been difficult during the past several years. In the US, instead of being proactive, the environmental community has adopted a type of rearguard politics in which it has tried simply to hold the line against assaults on everything from the Endangered Species Act, New Source Review and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the Kyoto Protocol and international cooperative efforts to curb deforestation and loss of biological diversity. Outside the US, the environmental community has had to struggle for pronounced relevance in similar issues as it has operated in the shadow of an environmentally-irresponsible hegemon. Much of the academic world has followed suit, as it were. In the US, it has found itself needing to argue for basics like the knowledge of environmental science, the wisdom of enforcing established law, the importance of holding violators accountable and the significance of the US to remain engaged in international environmental affairs. Outside the US, the academic community has fared only marginally better. For instance, many in Europe, who have long advanced analyses of the formation and implementation of regimes, found themselves backpedaling as they wrestled with the significance of international regimes absent hegemonic participation. The result is that the space for what was considered politically-relevant scholarship has shrunk dramatically; what used to be considered problem-solving theory has become so out of touch with political possibility that it has been relegated to the margins of contemporary thought. Put differently, the realm of critical theory has grown tremendously as hitherto reasonable ideas have increasingly appeared radical and previously radical ones have been pushed even further to the hinterlands of critical thought.¶ As we enter the final stretch of the Bush Administration and the waning years of the millennium's first decade, the political landscape appears to be changing. In the US, a Democratic Congress, environmental action at the municipal and state levels, and a growing sense that a green foreign policy may be a way to weaken global terrorism, enhance US energy independence and re-establish US moral leadership in the world, have partially resuscitated and re-energized environmental concern.3 Worldwide, there seems to be a similar and even more profound shift as people in all walks of life are recognizing the ecological, social and economic effects of climate change, corporations are realizing that environmental action can make business sense, and environmental values in general are permeating even some of the most stubborn societies. The "perfect storm" of this combination is beginning to put environmental issues firmly on the world's radar screen. It seems that a new day is arising for environmentalism and, by extension, Environmental Studies.¶ What role should environmental scholarship assume in this new climate? Specifically, how wise is it to pursue critical Environmental Studies at such an opportune moment? Is it strategically useful to study the outer reaches of environmental thought and continue to reflect on the structural dimensions of environmental degradation when the political tide seems to be turning and problem-solving theorists may once again have the ear of those in power? Is now the time to run to the renewed, apparently meaningful center or to cultivate more incisive critical environmental thought?**¶** ¶ Notwithstanding the promise of the new environmental moment for asking fundamental questions, many may counsel caution toward critical Environmental Studies. The political landscape may be changing but it is unclear if critical Environmental Studies is prepared to make itself relevant. Years of being distant from political influence has intensified the insularity and arcane character of critical environmental theory, leaving the discipline rusty in its ability to make friends within policy circles. Additionally, over the past few years, the public has grown less open to radical environmental ideas, as it has been fed a steady diet of questioning even the basics of environmental issues. Indeed, that the Bush Administration enjoyed years of bulldozing over environmental concern without loud, sustained, vocal opposition should give us pause. It suggests that we should not expect too much, too soon. The world is still ensconced in an age of global terror; the "high" politics of national security and economic productivity continue to over-shadow environmental issues; and the public needs to be slowly seasoned to the insights and arguments of critical theory before it can appreciate their importance—as if it has been in the dark for years and will be temporary blinded if thrown into the daylight too soon. From this perspective, so the logic might go, scholars should restrict themselves to problem-solving theory and direct their work toward the mainstream of environmental thought.¶ Such prudence makes sense. However, we should remember that problem-solving theory, by working within existing paradigms, at best simply smoothes bumps in the road in the reproduction of social practices. It solves certain dilemmas of contemporary life but is unable to address the structural factors that reproduce broad, intractable challenges. Problem-solving theory, to put it differently, gets at the symptoms of environmental harm rather than the root causes. As such, it might slow the pace of environmental degradation but doesn't steer us in fundamentally new, more promising directions. No matter how politically sensitive one wants to be, such new direction is precisely what the world needs.¶ The last few years have been lost time, in terms of fashioning a meaningful, global environmental agenda. Nonetheless, we shouldn't kid ourselves that we were in some kind of green nirvana before the Bush Administration took power and before the world of terror politics trumped all other policy initiatives. The world has faced severe environmental challenges for decades and, while it may seem a ripe time to reinvigorate problem-solving theory in the new political climate, we must recognize that all the problem-solving theory of the world won't get us out of the predicament we've been building for years.¶ We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life [End Page 9] formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don't change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.4 Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.5 Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on significant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.6 Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the face of such a predicament?¶ Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward. This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn't like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn't like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline.¶ Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now—when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical theory. We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or, put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. ¶ Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy, problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policy-relevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility.¶ For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language. As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only the best and brightest can understand. Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problem-solving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences.¶ In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order.¶ While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially self-evident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators. We need to find metaphors, [End Page 11] analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times.¶ Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless, it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a "critical" role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism—specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation.

#### No link our praxis reframes environmental policy

Callicott 2 (J. BAIRD CALLICOTT; Environmental Values, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 3-25; “The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New¶ Discourse”; KDUB)

THE PRACTICAL EFFICACY OF THEORETICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY I have no quarrel whatever with the bottom-up approach to environmental philosophy. I myself was a recipient of a three-year grant from the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery Commission to work with an ichthyologist and an aquatic community ecologist to re-envision fishery management policy in the Great Lakes for the new millennium. My role was precisely to clarify such fuzzy conservation concepts as biological integrity, ecosystem health, ecosystem management, ecological restoration, ecological rehabilitation, ecological sustainability, sustainable development, and adaptive management; and to examine the values that have driven, drive, and will drive fishery management in the Great Lakes in the past, present, and future (Callicott et al. 1999). I do have a quarrel, however, with the representation of the bottom-up, Pragmatic ap- proach as a competitive alternative to theoretical environmental philosophy and to the invidious comparison that environmental Pragmatists make between the two, virtually insisting that theorists should stop their pointless and pernicious theorising (Norton 1992, 1995; Minteer 1998). I believe that the two -theory and practice - should be complementary, not competitive. Further, I think that theoretical environmental philosophy is powerfully pragmatic; that theory does make a difference to practice. What difference? First, the convergence hypothesis - which Norton (1991 : 241) confesses is merely 'an article of environmentalists' faith' -is not a credible article of faith because it is hard to believe that all Earth's myriad species, for example, are in some way useful to human beings (Ehrenfeld 1976, 1988). Many may represent unexplored potential new pharmaceuticals, foods, fibres, and fuels. But many more may not (Ehrenfeld 1976). Many species that have no actual or potential resource value are critical agents in ecological processes and/ or perform vital ecological functions or 'services'. But many more do not (Ehrenfeld 1988). Many non-resource, non-ecological-service-provider species are, nevertheless, objects of aesthetic wonder and/or epistemic curiosity to the small percentage of the human population that is aesthetically cultured and scientifically educated. But such amenity values that endangered non-resource, non-ecological-service-provider species have for a tiny human minority afford them little protection in a world increasingly governed by market economics and majority-rule politics. In short, conservation policy based on anthropocentrism alone - however broadened to include potential as well as actual resources, ecosystem services, and the aesthetic, epistemic, and spiritual uses of nature by present and future people - is less robust and inclusive than conservation policy based on the intrinsic value of nature (Ehrenfeld 1976, 1988). Second, in setting forth the 'convergence hypothesis ' , Norton ( 1 99 1 ) focuses exclusively on the content of anthropocentric and nonanthropocentic (or intrin- sic) values and the environmental policies they support But if we focus instead on the formalities, as it were, or structural features of the policy discourses involving, on the one hand, claims of intrinsic value in nature and those, on the other, that only involve anthropocentric value claims, a hypothesis contrary to the 'convergence hypothesis' is suggested. Perhaps it should be called the 'divergence hypothesis'. Broad recognition of the intrinsic value of human beings places the burden of proof on those who would over-ride that value for the sake of realising instrumental values. For example, an intrinsically valuable human being not wishing to sell a piece of property at any price may refuse any offer to buy it. Their intransigence, however, may be trumped if benefits to the public rise beyond a certain threshold. If, for example, the recalcitrant owner's property stands in the way of an urban light-rail train track, then the property may be 'condemned' , and the owner paid fair market value for it, whether he or she is willing to sell it or not. If nature were also broadly recognised to have intrinsic value the burden of proof would shift, mutatis mutandis, from conservators of nature to exploiters of nature (Fox 1993). If something has only instrumental value, its disposition goes to the highest bidder. If that something is some subsection of nature - say, a wetland - conservationists must prove that an economic cost-benefit analysis unequivocally indicates that it has greater value as an amenity than it has, drained and filled, as a site for a proposed shopping mall. But if the intrinsic value of wetlands were broadly recognised, then developers would have to prove that the value to the human community of the shopping mall was so great as to trump the intrinsic value of the wetland. The concept of intrinsic value in nature functions politically much like the concept of human rights. Human rights - to liberty, even to life - may be over-ridden by considerations of public or aggregate utility. But in all such cases, the burden of proof for doing so rests not with the rights holder, but with those who would over- ride human rights. And the utilitarian threshold for over-riding human rights is pitched very high indeed. As Fox (1993: 101) puts it: The mere fact that moral agents must be able to justify their actions in regard to their treatment of entities that are intrinsically valuable means that recognizing the intrinsic value of the nonhuman world has a dramatic effect upon the framework of environmental debate and decision-making. If the nonhuman world is only considered to be instrumentally valuable then people are permitted to use and otherwise interfere with any aspect of it for whatever reasons they wish (i.e., no justification is required). If anyone objects to such interference then, within this framework of reference, the onus is clearly on the person who objects to justify why it is more useful to humans to leave that aspect of the nonhuman world alone. If, however, the nonhuman world is considered to be intrinsically valuable then the onus shifts to the person who wants to interfere with it to justify why they should be allowed to do so: anyone who wants to interfere with any entity that is intrinsically valuable is morally obliged to be able to offer ^sufficient justification for their actions. Thus recognizing the intrinsic value of the nonhuman world shifts the onus of justification from the person who wants to protect the nonhuman world to the person who wants to interfere with it - and that, in itself, represents a fundamental shift in the terms of environmental debate and decision- making

### 2ac framework

Wm we are in direction of the topic

Wm we engage in a discussion of the topic

Wm govt policy is a means to achieve ecoprag – we propose a govt policy

C/i: vote for who best utilizes a theoretical framework for approaching policy in the context of the ecosystem, if they win a method that disagrees with ours they win the debate

#### Resolved before the colon means reserved – it’s the starting point for discussion

**Evans, 1** (Nathan Kirk, CEDA Debate, “A2: Jeff P-Is the resolution a question?,” http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2001-February/030719.html)

The resolution is not a question. It is a statement that has "resolved" on one side and a normative statement on the other separated by a colon. What is the meaning of "resolved?" I know Bill Shanahan has made the argument that "resolved" means "reserved," in which case the resolution doesn't require you to arrive at any certainty about the truth of the normative statement. 2. The resolution has no intonation. Thus, various types of ironic and non-serious advocacies could be possible, none of which would prove the "truth" of the resolution: they might prove the opposite. 3. Why all this focus on truth? Language also has "performative" value: it does things. To take an example from Austin, the founder of "performativity" theory, the statement "I do" is not simply a statement of fact. In the context of a marriage ceremony, it does something--it binds a couple in matrimony. Or to take another example, hate speech has effects that can be evaluated outside questions of truth/falsity. Debaters could thus evaluate the performative effect of the resolution outside of its truth value. For example, saying/performing the resolution might be productive even if the resolution is untrue. (Several months ago I wrote out a fairly lengthy explanation of performativity which I could send out if people are still confused about what I mean.) 4. How important is the resolution? Could the resolution just be a springboard for discussion rather than being the prime motivator of debates? There's no debate rule-book that says debates always have to be won or lost on the resolution. If both teams are having a fair and productive debate about DA within the GHA, hasn't the resolution's purpose been served? I know you might not think these possibilities make for the best debate. My point, however, is that there is a debate to be had about what the meaning of the debate forum is and you should allow debaters to have that debate rather than pre-deciding the issue. The difference between debaters being judged and students having their papers graded is that in the latter example students are generally unable to argue in their papers that the standards by which their papers are graded should itself be changed. Debaters, however, have that opportunity.

#### Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas

Bond and Paterson, 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, economic engagement merits separate and detailed analysis. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

our interpretation is good

-aff choice, alternative frameworks moot the 1ac and place us at a disadvantage

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

#### The lens of environmental justice is the most productive approach to the topic – all other explanations fail

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Horizontal and vertical expansion If there has been a single major development in the framing of environmental justice in the past decade, it has been the way the use of the concept, as an organising theme or value by a range of movements, has expanded spatially (Sze and London 2008, Walker 2009). While there has been a continued focus on the original core of environmental justice issues in the distribution of toxins – or environmental bads more generally – in the United States, environmental justice discourse and literature has been extended in both topical and geographic scope. As Sze and London (2008) note in their important overview, environmental justice has seen the expansion into new issues and constituencies on the one hand, and new places and spatial analyses from the local to the global on the other. They celebrate this expansion, arguing that this attention to the expanding spatial realm of environmental justice has been the focus of many crucial researchers in the field, from politics to sociology to geography.5 This expansion has been more than simply an exercise in academic interdisciplinarity – it has led to a broad extension of the foci of environmental justice scholarship. Environmental justice may have been originally focused on the inequity of the distribution of toxics and hazardous waste in the United States, but it has moved far beyond this. Perhaps, however, such a broadening is not new, but a longstanding characteristic of the movement. Cole and Foster’s (2001) now classic study of the movement discussed the various ‘tributaries’ that make up the environmental justice movement. They included the civil rights and antitoxics movements, but also indigenous rights movements, the labour movement (including farm labour, occupational health and safety, and some industrial unions), and traditional environmentalists. Faber and McCarthy (2003) added the solidarity movement and the more general social and economic justice movements. We could easily add immigrant rights groups and urban environmental and smart growth movements, as well as local foods and food justice movements, to the list. Environmental justice as an organising frame has been applied not only to the initial issues of toxins and dumps, but also analyses of transportation, access to countryside and green space, land use and smart growth policy, water quality and distribution, energy development and jobs, brownfields refurbishment, and food justice.6 Questions of the role of scientific expertise, and the relationship between science and environmental justice communities, have also been examined.7 There has also been more thorough examination of the roles of under-examined groups in the environmental justice movement, or exposed to environmental hazards – indigenous peoples, Asian and Latino workers, women and youth,8 illustrating the broadening range of foci of environmental justice scholarship in the United States. I do not mean to imply that all of these studies offer similar or unproblematic analyses of the issues, but simply to note the longstanding and continuing trend of the expanding topical space of the environmental justice frame. In addition to the expansion of issues, there has been a push to globalise environmental justice as an explanatory discourse. There are two distinct moments to this expansion: the application of the frame to movements in a variety of countries, and the examination of the globalised and transnational nature of environmental justice movements and discourse. Walker (2009) sees this development as both a horizontal diffusion of environmental justice ideas, meanings, and framings, along with the vertical extension of an environmental justice frame beyond borders, and into relations between countries and truly global issues. As for the first, the applications of my own theoretical framework of environmental justice have been more broad than I would have imagined, including cases of postcolonial environmental justice in India, waste management in the United Kingdom, agrarian change in Sumatra, nuclear waste in Taiwan, salmon farming and First Nations in Canada, gold mining in Ghana, oil politics in Ecuador, indigenous water rights in Australia, wind farm development in Wales, pesticide drift in California, energy politics in Mexico, and many more.9 In addition, there have been collections on environmental justice focused on issues and movements in Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and the exSoviet Union.10 Walker (2009, p. 361) lists no fewer than 37 countries in which the environmental justice frame has been applied. Clearly, the discourse of environmental justice has expanded horizontally, and been engaged by both activists and academics involved in issues across the globe. The vertical extension of an environmental justice framework is evidently illustrated by the use of environmental justice as an organising theme by a number of global movements, such as food security, indigenous rights, and anti-neoliberalism (Schlosberg 2004). This global approach has been thoroughly analysed in Pellow’s (2007, 2011) enlightening work on the global toxics trade and both local community and global non-governmental organisation (NGO) resistance to it. Offering both a thorough analysis of the international production of waste, and keen observation of the transnational movement(s) that have risen in response, Pellow’s work brings attention to the global potential of environmental justice analysis. The essence of transnational networks, he argues, is found in their critique of environmental inequities, the disruption of social relations that produce such inequities, and the articulation of ecologically sustainable and socially just institutions and practices (Pellow 2011, p. 248). Such an analysis focuses on both the nature of the injustice and the creative and crucially networked response on the part of movements. Mohai et al. (2009) note a number of additional transnational issue networks that have environmental justice as an organising theme, from those concerned with e-waste to the movement for climate justice. Carmin and Agyeman (2011) bring both of these elements of expansion together in a recent collection that focuses both on specific issues and movements and a larger global framework of analysis. Clearly, environmental justice analysis continues to expand in scope and scale.

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-Lee says any politics that disregards anthropocentrism is doomed to failure because of the centrality that anthropocentrism occupies

Their interpretation is bad

-when we get bogged down in the counterplan-disad level of the debate it distracts from broader movements and results in political failures

#### You are not a policy-maker—pretending you are absolves individual responsibility for violence – makes serial policy failure inevitable and is an independent reason to vote affirmative

Kappeler, 1995 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)

Reasonability is best

-avoids arbitrary exclusion of affirmatives

-avoids infinite regress

#### The justification for an action is itself an action

Risman 2004 (Barbara J. Risman is Associate Professor of Sociology and Found Director of Women 's Studies at North Carolina State University, “Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism” Gender and Society, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 429-450 Jstor)

Giddens's (1984) structuration theory adds considerably more depth to this  analysis of gender as a social structure  with his emphasis on the recursive  relation ship between social structure  and individuals.  That is, social structures  shape individuals, but simultaneously, individuals shape the social structure. Giddens  embraced  the transformative  power of human action. He insisted that  any structural theory must be concerned with reflexivity and actors' interpretations of their own  lives. Social structures  not only act on people; people act on social structures.  Indeed,  social structures  are created  not by mysterious  forces but by human action.  When people act on structure, they do so for their  own reasons.  We must, therefore,  be concerned with why actors choose their acts. Giddens insisted that  concern with meaning must go beyond the verbal justification easily available from actors because so much of social life is routine and so taken for granted that actors will not articulate, or even consider, why they act. This nonreflexive habituated  action is what I refer to as the cultural component  of the social structure:  The taken  for granted  or cognitive image rules that  belong to  the situational  context (not only or necessarily to the actor's personality).  The cul tural  component of the social structure  includes the interactional expectations  that  each of us meet in every social encounter.  My aims are to bring women and men  back into a structural theory where gender is the structure  under analysis and to  identify when behavior is habit (an enactment of taken for granted  gendered cul tural norms) and when we do gender consciously, with intent, rebellion, or even  with irony. When are we doing gender and re-creating inequality without intent?  And what happens to interactional dynamics and male-dominated institutions  when we rebel?  Can we refuse to do gender or is rebellion simply doing gender  dif ferently, forging alternative masculinities and femininities?  Connell (1987) applied Giddens's (1984) concern with social structure  as both  constraint  and created by action in his treatise on gender and power (see particu larly chapter  5). In his analysis, structure  constrains action,  yet "since human  action  involves free invention  ... and is reflexive, practice  can be turned  against  what con strains it; so structure  can deliberately  be the object of practice"  (Connell 1987, 95).  Action may turn against structure  but can never escape it. We must pay attention both to how structure shapes individual choice and social interaction  and to how  human agency creates, sustains, and modifies current  structure.  Action itself may change the immediate or future  context. A theory of gender as a social structure  must integrate  this notion of causality as  recursive with attention to gender  consequences at multiple  levels of analysis. Gen der is deeply embedded  as a basis for stratification  not just in our personalities,  our  cultural  rules, or institutions  but in all these, and in complicated ways. The gender  structure  differentiates  opportunities  and constraints based on sex category and  thus has consequences on three dimensions: (1) At the individual level, for the  development  of gendered  selves; (2) during  interaction  as men and women face dif ferent cultural  expectations even when they fill the identical structural  positions;  and (3) in institutional domains where explicit regulations regarding resource  distribution  and material  goods are gender specific.

#### Questions of methodology are the most important ones - they dictate how conclusions are achieved

Bartlett, 1990 (Katharine, professor of law at Duke University, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [\*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

#### Situatedness determines efficacy

**Dillon ‘99** (Bumblebee Dillon, Prof of Politics, University of Lancaster, Moral Spaces, p. 97-98)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

### 2ac t

Wm status quo conceptualizes nature as economic our affirmative engages that conceptualization

Counterinterp the aff can have a discussion about the topic rather than a topical discussion solves their offense because the debates they want to occur still happen

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-role of the ballot is to relate to mexico’s ecosystem not to win hypothetical implementation of a topical action is good means we precede T

#### Their pre-conceived definition is another link – we should rather critically re-conceptualize economic engagement

[Demartino 11 (George F. Demartino is professor and co-director at University of Denver, MA in Global, Finance, Trade and Economic Integration “Ethical engagement in a world beyond control” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CC8QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fportfolio.du.edu%2Fportfolio%2Fgetportfoliofile%3Fuid%3D227663&ei=xC3TUYv2GcOoyAHQ54DgCw&usg=AFQjCNFTnNLRWOelypLIF35TwVe1HNFdxw&sig2=x\_GWn3i7iLcMuSiJh3SAng)//BK](file:///K%3A%5CDocuments%5CMy%20Projects%5CWest%5CDebate%5CPolicy%5CPreSeasonDebate2013%5CMNDI%5CDemartino%2011%20%28George%20F.%20Demartino%20is%20professor%20and%C2%A0co-director%20at%20University%20of%20Denver%2C%20MA%20in%20Global%2C%20Finance%2C%20Trade%20and%20Economic%20Integration)

In A Postcapitalist Politics, “An Ethics of the Local” (2003) and other work Gibson-Graham explore the power of language and theory, but also interpersonal encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming these obstacles. What they would later come to call “hybrid research collectives” came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for pursuing projects of economic emancipation. The collective joins university and community-based researchers with other community members in joint projects to inventory already existing alternative economic practices and indigenous resources and capacities, and to imagine and pursue economic practices and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just **what economic forms are and are not achievable and sustainable.** A central goal is to proliferate economic forms—to generate a vibrant economic ecosystem populated by all sorts of economic species—**rather than to pursue a pre-defined set of models of economic engagement.**

#### Counter interpretation Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas

Bond and Paterson, 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, economic engagement merits separate and detailed analysis. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

Reasonability is best

-avoids arbitrary exclusion of affirmatives

-avoids infinite regress

### Cap

Conceded that your role as an academic is to evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis – the alternative is not an environmental practice all I need to win is that the aff practice is comparatively better than status quo environmental praxis

The role of the ballot is which team best develops a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem we’ll win that our methodology is superior to theirs

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

Card doesn’t say it’ll collapse just says it’s bad

RC

Cap can’t explain littering

P both

P do plan and alt in all other instances

#### Race and class CAN’T be the root of our aff – be skeptical of their ev

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Another major focus of environmental justice scholarship has always been a move beyond the simple description and documentation of inequity into a thorough analysis of the underlying reasons for that injustice. Initially, the central explanatory focus was racism. Environmental justice wasn’t simply about establishing the fact that more environmental bads and risks were being put on minority communities – it endeavoured to explore the question of why those communities were devalued in the first place. One of the original popularisers of the term environmental racism was Benjamin Chavis, then head of the United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice – the organisation that published the influential study of Toxic Wastes and Race. The practice, and experience, of racism has been at the heart of environmental justice discourse in the United States – so much so that Getches and Pellow (2002) once made the argument that the term, and movement, should actually be limited to communities of colour. Pellow’s (2004, 2007) work has clearly extended an analysis of racial discrimination, and connected it to the practices of capital. Following that analysis, Mohai et al. (2009) lay out three interrelated causal factors for environmental injustice. First, economic considerations address both the impoverishment of impacted populations and the reasoning for industrial externalisation of social and environmental costs. Second, industry and government seek the path of least resistance to development, and poor and racial minority communities make easier targets. Finally, a distinct form of racism simply associates communities of colour with pollution. Any and all of these cultural and institutional structures contribute to the construction of inequity, misrecognition, exclusion, and the generalised injustice confronted by communities and movement organisations. Still, the central idea is that generalised social injustices are manifest in environmental conditions, among other ways.

#### Specifically in the context of Mexico

Carruthers 7 (David V. Carruthers; “Environmental justice and the politics of energy on the US–Mexico border”; Environmental Politics Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007; pages 394-413; KDUB)

Consider race. Environmental justice appeared in the US as an extension of civil rights struggles into environmental health; the environmental justice movement built directly on that rhetoric, organisational experience, and those institutions. If we think of environmental justice in such strict terms, only in parts of the Caribbean and Brazil might we find a comparable legacy of slavery, segregation, and racial struggle. Yet race-based struggles for rights and citizenship have been present across centuries of Latin American history. Latin America’s indigenous people face some of the region’s most egregious social and environmental inequities, though the fusion of environmental and justice concerns takes very different forms around the region. We should also not expect the geographic and socioeconomic assertions of US-styled environmental justice to hold in other contexts. US analysts confirm the disproportionate siting of industrial hazards in minority communities by mapping the hazards over race or income data. Yet in urban northern Mexico, we do not find clear correlations between poverty or ethnicity and environmental risk. Industrial hazards are widely distributed throughout the metropolitan zones and outskirts, and risks faced by lower and working class residents are not consistently greater than those faced by the middle or even upper middle classes. While we often find higher risks facing the poorest, most recent immigrants, that is more typically a function of urban growth patterns that produce squatter settlements near factories; it is not a counterpart to policy choices that deliberately impose hazards on minority communities – what David Pellow calls the ‘perpetrator–victim scenario’ (2000b)

#### Historical materialism fails in the context of our aff

Hovden 99 (Eivind Hovden; Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; 1999; “As if nature doesn't matter: Ecology, regime theory and¶ international relations”; Environmental Politics, 8:2, 50-74; KDUB)

Marxism is, of course, a natural focal point of any theoretical challenge¶ to the mainstream of IR theory. Indeed, Saurin's [1996] critique of Smith is¶ clearly inspired by Marxism. Saurin lists a number of authors that have¶ challenged the environmentalist mainstream - Michael Redclift, David¶ Pepper, Carolyn Merchant, Murray Bookchin, and Robyn Eckersley - but¶ somehow suggests that they are united by an understanding that¶ 'environmental change was crucially determined by ... the ownership of the¶ means of production and the control over the criteria of exchange' [Saurin,¶ 1996: 84]. This is arguably a controversial picture of the landscape of¶ radical ecologists that oppose the mainstream of environmentalism, since¶ much radical environmentalist thought has been at pains to distance itself¶ from Marxism [Eckersley, 1992: Chs.4 and 6; Dobson, 1995: Ch.5; Benton,¶ 1989, 1992, 1993; Clark, 1989; Enzenberger, 1974; Grundmann, 1991;¶ Jung, 1983; Routley, 1981; Tolman 1981; Zimmerman, 1979]. Even if we¶ accept Saurin's sample as representative of radical environmentalism, it is¶ doubtful whether Eckersley fits at all with Saurin's description of the field,¶ and Bookchin's relationship to Marxism is highly ambivalent.18 Saurin's use¶ of Marx hide the long history of antagonism and mutual contempt between¶ Marxism and ecological thought. While one should not deny the obvious¶ affiliations between the political left and radical environmentalism,¶ Marxism as such remains one of the less promising starting points for an¶ alternative IR theoretical approach to environmental issues.

#### our praxis resolves the negative impacts to cap

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Environmental justice and sustainable materialism But it is not simply the rebound effect of climate change that has pushed a conception of environmental justice into broader engagement of the relationship between environment and social justice. The discussion of climate change illustrates the centrality of this connection between the condition of the natural world and the material experience of everyday life. This concern has led to another key development – a focus on more reconstructive material practices and sustainable relationships with the environment. While most well-known environmental justice battles have been reactions to inequity, threats to health or capabilities more generally, or responses to misrecognition and exclusion from decision-making, there has been a growth of groups using environmental justice and sustainability to design and implement more just and sustainable practices of everyday life. So we see the environmental justice movement making demands for investment in environmental technologies and jobs, food justice, and liveable communities more generally. The prominent green jobs and community-building work of Van Jones (2009), along with the ‘just sustainability’ frame of Julian Agyeman (2005), are examples of the potential of an environmental justice praxis that sees just communities as based on a working, sustainable relationship with the natural world. This approach is especially obvious in movements for food justice and just energy development. These movements directly take on both unjust practices and institutions and unsustainable environmental processes. They are not satisfied with purely individualistic or consumerist responses to environmental concerns – it is not about simply installing one’s own rooftop solar panels, or getting a Whole Foods in the neighbourhood. The focus is on building new practices and institutions for sustainability – practices and institutions that embody not only principles of environmental or climate justice, but a broader sense of sustainability as well. Call it a more reconstructive environmental justice, based on a conception of sustainable materialism. In many communities, a growing focus is on resisting, rethinking, and redesigning basic institutions that embody problematic practices connected to our basic material needs. So the response to food deserts is not buying organic veggies at a natural foods megamart, but getting more involved in growing and sharing food in community supported agriculture, collective gardening, urban farms, farmers markets (Gottlieb and Joshi 2010, Alcon and Agyeman 2011). The idea of the food justice movement is to transform our relationship with food, its production, transportation, and consumption. It is not simply about supplying a basic need; it is, in addition, awareness that such basic needs that supply the functioning of a community should themselves be sourced without creating injustices. In terms of energy, many environmental justice communities are organising around the development of community-wide local generation and networking of solar and wind.13 The idea of just energy transition is to replace destructive practices – for example, the damage done to the environment by coal mining and burning, and the abuse of local autonomy by mining companies. This concept of environmental justice shifts from resistance to reconstruction, aims to transform both dominating and unsustainable practices of production and consumption, and works to sustainably rebuild the material relationships we have with the resources we use every day. All while supplying a host of basic needs. These trends can be framed in at least three important ways. First, such practices are clearly a Foucauldian form of resistance to the relations that contribute to the continued reproduction of unsustainable practices; movement groups simply want to step out of the processes where they themselves are part of the creation of injustice. Second, they represent practices of equity, recognition, participation, and the delivery of basic capabilities in just and inclusive ways. Third, they embody the institutionalisation of a new form of sustainable materialism and the direct involvement of groups in the development of institutions that re-imagine, and reconstruct, our relationship with the natural world. These new movements and efforts illustrate environmental justice moving toward a form of just sustainability that embodies not only a variety of themes of justice, but also a thorough engagement in everyday material life – the things that pass through our bodies, the practices we use to transform the natural world, and the institutions we can shape collectively (Gabrielson and Paraday 2010). Many environmental justice movements, in this way, have expanded beyond a reactive position to environmental conditions, and now refuse to participate in practices that create or circulate injustice, propose and create new counterinstitutions and practices, and, crucially, embrace a more sustainable relationship between just communities and a working environment.

#### The affirmative is a necessary advocacy to resist neoliberalism

Carruthers 7 (David V. Carruthers; “Environmental justice and the politics of energy on the US–Mexico border”; Environmental Politics Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007; pages 394-413; KDUB)

Globalisation and Environmental Justice Starting with the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Latin American governments have acceded to the mandates of international creditors and financial institutions, implementing strict restructuring policies to stabilise currencies, reduce inflation, shrink the role of the state in the economy, introduce greater competitiveness, create a favourable climate for corporate investment, and eliminate barriers to trade. While the controversies surrounding the ‘Washington Consensus’ economic programme lie beyond my scope here, it has by now provoked broad popular resistance across Latin America, as people react against crippling austerity programmes, deepening economic polarisation, the erosion of basic economic security, the collapse of small farms and businesses, and insurmountable household debt. Efforts to constrain or renegotiate the process, character, and terms of international economic integration are now central to the region’s politics (Finnegan, 2003; Kingstone, 2006). The US–Mexico border presents a microcosm of North–South relations, reflecting the forms, tensions, and consequences of neoliberal globalisation. It hosts one of the world’s densest concentrations of the myriad ‘transnational advocacy networks’ that have emerged with aspirations to humanise the workings of the global economy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Brooks & Fox, 2002; Hogenboom et al., 2003). An important thread of this story originated in the early 1990s with a network of labour and citizens’ campaigns from Mexico, the US, and Canada to challenge and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Transnational citizen activism captured the world’s attention a few years later in the street protests of the 1999 World Trade Organization ministerial meeeting in Seattle. Since then, a broader global justice movement calling for debt relief and reform of the institutions of global trade and finance has made its presence felt at dozens of meetings of regional and international institutions across the globe. Transnational activism incorporates important elements of environmental justice, on a global scale. Environmental injustices are not ‘relegated to local failures in wealthy nations’, but are instead ‘symptomatic of systemic tendencies of globalization’ (Byrne et al., 2002b: 8). Global systems of production and distribution parcel out costs and benefits unfairly, accruing special benefits to international capital, domestic subsidiaries, and locally allied industrial and agricultural elites. Consuming classes enjoy a cornucopia of inexpensive manufactures and foods while the ‘poor neighbourhoods’ of the global South pay disproportionate human and environmental costs in the form of exploitive, low-wage labour and unchecked environmental devastation. Without corrections, free trade regimes reward those producers most effective at pushing the negative externalities of production onto nature, the poor, and future generations. As the cases below will demonstrate, Baja California’s environmental justice activists are acutely tuned to this global dimension: For most people in Mexico the environment means forests, species.We’re breaking away from that. We want to focus on human beings . . . If we think of the world as neighbourhoods, then it’s obvious – the poor countries pay the environmental costs. Mexico is a poor neighbourhood. (Cerda, 2002) We’re very aware of the fact that they want to put this here because they don’t want it there. There is absolutely no doubt in anyone’s mind about that . . . they’re going to put this on our side of the border and all the benefits are going to go to the other side. That is ingrained in people’s minds as border inhabitants. (Garcı´a Zendejas, 2005)

#### Even if their ideas are good, their presentation fails. The perm frames the alt in a persuasive manner

Hirokawa 2 (Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the UConn and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002, "Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law," Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Volume 21, June; lexis; Kristof)

**Pragmatism's success in** the **environmental debate is owed to its** [\*257] **understanding of the operation of context as a constraint on persuasion and discourse**. **Persuasion** between foundational theories **may result from the attempt to reconcile differing approaches**. **Pragmatists rely on a reconciliation-based description of how paradigms** and belief systems **transform in the face of competing paradigmatic structures**, n147 **in which new** problems, predictions and **solutions can be translated into an existing structure** of beliefs **by displacing the fewest other beliefs**. **Effective dialogue** on solutions espoused from otherwise incommensurable positions simply **requires** a touch of **flexibility toward traditional philosophical questions**. n148 **In applying this** maxim **to legal change, the lesson** to be learned from the pragmatist's understanding of paradigm shifts **is that revolutionary ideals can be presented in light of dominant beliefs,** rather than in spite of them.