### Contention One is Ecology

#### Current Mexican environmental regulations are insufficient to combat environmental pollution – instead they incentivize toxic waste dumping into the surrounding environment

**NLM, 13** – National Library of Medicine (“Maquiladora” June 10 2013, http://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/text\_version/locations.php?id=35Maquiladoras)ah

Maquiladoras are foreign-owned factories located in Mexico that are typically found along the U.S. - Mexico border. Maquiladoras produce a variety of products including electronic components, chemicals, clothes, machinery, and auto parts. The maquiladora program began in 1965 as part of the Mexican government’s Border Industrialization Program. It was developed in response to the demise of the U.S. government’s Bracero Program, which allowed Mexican farmworkers to legally perform seasonal work within the U.S. The end of the Bracero Program caused an unemployment crisis in the border region. The Mexican government responded to this crisis by creating the maquiladora program which provided an incentive to foreign manufacturers to move production to Mexico. This incentive was created by allowing duty free import of raw materials and other supplies into the country with the stipulation that the manufactured goods and the resulting wastes were eventually exported to another country. The passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 led to an increased number of maquiladoras in the border region. In 2003, there were 2,893 maquiladoras employing 1,063,123 people. The high concentration of maquiladoras combined with less rigorous environmental regulations, limited capacity to enforce environmental laws, and the expense of exporting hazardous waste has created an incentive for illegal dumping and has polluted the surrounding land, water, and air. Inside the maquiladoras, occupational hazards relating to toxic chemical exposure and workplace safety also affect human health. Occupational hazards are of particular concern in Mexico since first-time violators are rarely punished and since penalties are typically incurred only for imminent dangers and failures to address previously highlighted violations.

#### Specifically this devastates the Tijuana River region

Good 5 David Good. Dave Good is an award-winning journalist and author for the San Diego Reader. “Showdown on the Rio Alamar.”http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2012/sep/05/cover-showdown-rio-alamar/?page=2&

Before NAFTA,” (the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994) says Mendez, “people could fish and bathe in the Rio Alamar. Before the maquilas came in 1986, you could actually drink the water.”¶ It is no longer news to anyone in San Diego that during winter storms, sewage-laden floodwaters from the Tijuana River overwhelm both the Tijuana estuary, one of the most important salt-marsh ecosystems left in the U.S., and the Pacific Ocean. The winter waters off Imperial Beach become a hellish broth of contaminants and raw sewage, and area beaches are known to remain closed to the public throughout the season. This sewage spill has a name: the Tijuana River plume, and it is tracked by the Southern California Coastal Ocean Observing System.A TED (the acronym stands for Trade and Environmental Database) case study, #147, titled “Tijuana River Pollution,” placed a substantial portion of the blame for all that pollution on the maquiladora program. NAFTA, they say, provided paychecks, but in turn encouraged the migration of thousands upon thousands of job-seekers to Tijuana in advance of any sort of infrastructure. In other words, humans outnumbered toilets. Much of the workforce simply squatted in makeshift encampments on the banks of the Alamar. The maquilas themselves, some 3000 factories and assembly plants, generate additional toxic waste and sewage.Mendez says that practicing environmentalism in the midst of such third-world abuse is difficult. “You never really know where the Mexican government is at, what they’re doing, or why they’re doing it. It’s hard to get documents.”He takes one last look around the pitiful arroyo and the Alamar before we leave, but one senses that he sees something aside from the results of years of dumping. “It is a great opportunity,” he finally says, “to clean the air with all these trees.”“Tijuana is a coast city. We’re a river city.”Margarita Díaz is the director of Proyecto Fronterizo de Educación Ambiental A.C. (Border Environmental Education Project) in Tijuana. Proyecto Fronterizo is one of a list of binational environmental agencies, governmental agencies, and nonprofits that have a stake in the outcome of the Rio Alamar project.She calls from her office in Playas. “But the [Mexican] government doesn’t see it that way,” she says, “and even we don’t see ourselves as a river city. I tell people that we have a river running through the middle of our city. That’s not a river, they say. That’s a tunnel.”The Tijuana River originates in Mexico and crosses the international boundary into the United States near San Ysidro. The majority of the river was channelized and run into a concrete straitjacket during the late 1960s. The channelization of creeks and rivers and seeps and above-ground springs is an old-school engineering solution to seasonal flooding that dates back to the 1930s and possibly earlier. Channelization does exactly what it is supposed to do: it provides a concrete fast track through which large volumes of water can move out of a given area at a high rate of speed. On paper, it seems like a good solution, if, that is, one doesn’t mind the total loss of nature that comes with the process.But channelization has also been identified as a major source of ocean pollution. Along with water, urban channels transport anything and everything that happens to be in them, including, sometimes, humans. In spite of the best engineering intentions, people have drowned in such culverts during storm events.“Channelization is always bad for a river,” says Travis Pritchard, a chemist who monitors water quality for San Diego Coastkeeper. “Six months ago I went down to Tijuana and met with Margarita Díaz.” They observed what remained of the Rio Alamar. “It’s super sad. I felt like I was watching the death of a river before my eyes.”

#### The river is important ecologically

NERR 10 (“Tijuana River Comprehensive Management Plan- National Estuarine Research Reserve”. National Estuarine Research Reserve. August 2010. [http://www.nerrs.noaa.gov/Doc/PDF/Reserve/TJR\_ MgmtPlan.pdf](http://www.nerrs.noaa.gov/Doc/PDF/Reserve/TJR_%20MgmtPlan.pdf))

The Tijuana River National Estuarine Research Reserve (TRNERR) is unique in a local, regional, national, and international context. It offers one of the best and largest remaining examples of California’s coastal wetland habitat, a habitat that has been largely lost due to urban development or seriously degraded elsewhere in southern California. This section includes a brief description of the importance of estuarine habitats and the natural resources protected within the Reserve. I. THE NEED TO PROTECT ESTUARIES A. DEFINITION Estuaries are a hydrological and biological crossroads, defined as the portion of the earth's coastal zone where there is interaction of ocean water, freshwater, land, and atmosphere. The specific plant and animal habitats that may be supported by an estuarine system are determined by conditions in the watershed and in the adjacent ocean. The rate at which fresh water enters the estuary, the amount and type of waterborne and bottom sediments, the degree of tidal flushing, and water depth (hence temperature and degree of sunlight), all combine to produce diverse biological communities in a dynamic and complex system. A significant physical change in any of those factors can trigger traumatic changes in the estuarine biologic community, greatly enlarging or reducing the size of various species' populations. B. ESTUARINE FUNCTIONS Estuarine wetlands provide a number of valuable ecological functions, or so-called “ecosystem services.” Most broadly, there are sources of recreational and aesthetic benefits, as witnessed by the boom in industries such as eco-tourism. Also, they offer critical buffers between the sea, land, and freshwater. They can protect inland areas from ocean-borne waves and storm activity. Also, they also can help protect the ocean from watershed inputs, filtering and helping to purify water. In a healthy estuarine system, the interaction of tides, unpolluted fresh water, and sediments creates some of the most productive systems on the planet. Sheltered shallow waters and soft mud or sand flats, regularly flooded by the tides, provide ideal conditions for abundant life. Among the most important estuarine species are microscopic photosynthetic organisms called phytoplankton. Phytoplankton, like green plants, make the energy of sunlight available to animals as food. Phytoplankton are consumed by microscopic and minute animals called zooplankton. These animals include small crustaceans such as copepods, and the larvae of fish, crabs, clams, and other species. These organisms themselves are part of the food supply for adults of their own or other species. Marsh plants and eelgrass growing in shallow estuarine waters are critically important to estuarine animal life. Marsh vegetation not only provides cover for many animals, but also, as it dies back each season, creates detritus that feeds and houses the species on which larger species depend. The blades of eelgrass are homes for algae, snails, and other food for larger animals. Juveniles of many species reach adulthood by hiding among estuarine vegetation. In an undisturbed estuary, the wealth of food can support huge populations of immature and adult fish, crabs, shrimp, and other species. Those animals provide essential food for populations of birds and mammals, including people. ¶ C. MODIFICATION OF ESTUARIES Estuaries--characteristically flat land that offers sheltered access to the sea, and a profusion of fish and other seafood--offer attractive conditions for human habitation, agricultural production, and transportation. Estuaries on the west coast of the U.S. supported native peoples for thousands of years and, more recently, settlers from other parts of the globe. ¶ Prior to the 1970s, the value and finite nature of estuaries were not fully appreciated. It was not recognized that estuaries are integral to ecological and human well-being. Destruction of estuaries was disastrously affecting water quality, commercial and recreational fisheries, and overall ecosystem health. Estuary-dependent plants and animal populations began to dwindle with lost habitat, food sources, and reproductive sites. Affected species included not only ¶ salmonids, crab, and clams, but also birds such as eagles and falcons, which feed on the ¶ tideflats. Increasing awareness of the value of estuaries triggered current efforts to preserve, ¶ conserve, and restore these fragile systems.

#### This modern paradigm of ecological destruction underlies a systematic understanding of ecology

Castello and Toledo, 2k (Alicia Castello and Victor M Toledo; "Applying ecology in the Third World: the case of Mexico." BioScience 50.1 (2000): 66-76; google scholar)

Ecologists and policymakers alike generally agree that ecological knowledge should be considered in setting environmental policy and that ecologists should be more involved in decisions related to the man-agement and conservation of natural resources (e.g., Ehrlich 1989, Lubchenco et al. 1991). The essence of applied ecology is that it is "solution oriented," in contrast to pure ecology, which is "problem oriented" (Newman 1993). Applied ecology seeks solutions to practical problems and is guided, at present, by the paradigm of sustain- ability. Applying ecology would mean using original research in the management and conservation of natural resources. That is, it implies that scientific methods can be used to solve problems in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, wildlife management, resource extraction, and biodiversity conservation. Despite the potential of applied ecology, there is still disagreement about the extent to which ecological science is applicable to real-world problems. This concern is intensified by the fact that, although the numbers of ecol-ogists and journals specifically dedicated to ecological topics are growing, the main global environmental problems, such as deforestation, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, water depletion, and species exploitation, are continuing to increase at alarming rates. For example, an analysis of the influence on management practice or policy of 50 representative articles published over the last 30 years in one prominent ecology journal, the Journal of Applied Ecology, showed that most of these articles lacked an indication of the practical applications of the work or of management recommendations derived from the research (Pienkowski and Watkinson 1996). Ecology and related disciplines now confront the urgent challenge of making a relevant contribution to the wise management and conservation of Earth's resources and life support systems. Many ecologists are now taking up this challenge. For example, the publication of the Sus-tamable Biosphere Initiative (Lubchenco et al. 1991), which was based on an awareness of the need to link sci-ence with decision-making, constituted an important step. Another important contribution was an article by Ludwig et al. (1993), which served as the basis for a forum in Eco-logical Applications about natural resources exploitation. Among the conclusions of the forum was the importance of recognizing the limitations of ecologists' knowledge of managed systems and the difficulties involved in gaining the necessary understanding. Based on the recognition that environmental problems are not entirely or even primarily scientific (Levin 1993), some authors (e.g., Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, Costanza 1993) have emphasized the need to integrate science with other sources of information. These authors relate ecology's low impact on solving problems to its limited capacity to function in an interdisciplinary context. In particular, information from the social sciences and the knowledge generated by rural societies worldwide (which are commonly referred to as indigenous or traditional) have an important role to play in formulating strategies for natural resource management and conservation (Alfieri and Hecht 1990, Toledo 1992, Costanza 1993). Ecological information is, therefore, only one part of the decision- making process for environmental management. Consequently, more integrative forms of ecological inquiry that analyze issues from a systems perspective, including the interactions of social systems with natural systems, are needed (Holling et al. 1998). In this article, we consider applied ecological research in developing countries, in which natural resources are pre-dominantly used, managed, and conserved by communi-ty-based actors. We review the situation in Mexico, using it to suggest that the perceived limits of applied ecological research is related to how knowledge is generated, com-municated, and socializedby scientists and their institu-tions. Applied ecology, at least in Mexico, seems to better accomplish its objectives when researchers and institu-tions conduct research in conjunction with the social actors involved in the management of natural resources. Such sectors include government agencies, nongovern-mental organizations, international agencies, and rural producers themselves—the complex array of agricultur-ists, cattle ranchers, forest dwellers and harvesters, hunters, gatherers, and fishermen whose lives depend directly on the appropriation of natural resources. We conclude by proposing a model that can serve as a general framework for developing more integrative forms of applied ecological research and by emphasizing the role of communication in facilitating the use of scientific findings. The management of nat ural resources in the Third World Understanding how scientific institutions and their researchers perceive the social and economic actors in nat-ural resource management is crucial for designing strategies for applying ecological research. Labels such as "users," "managers," "exploiters," "stakeholders," or "decision-makers" commonly found in the ecological literature oversimplify a complex reality. These terms fail to recognize specific actors who can be identified culturally, social-ly, and economically. The management of ecosystems is not only an ecologi-cal event but also a social—and, therefore, an economic, cultural, and even political—phenomenon. Human appropriation of nature removes minerals, water, energy, and living beings (biomass) from ecosystems. A substantial proportion of the world's biomass is directly appropriated through rural production, including agriculture, cattle raising, fisheries, hunting, gathering, and forestry. These activities are the main human activities on Earth and the principal influences on our planet's ecology (Vitousek et al. 1986). They constitute the first step in the process by which societies organize the exchange of matter and energy with nature. Although most humans live in cities, and almost no place on Earth is free of industrial artifacts, products, and services, the portion of humanity involved in the capture of biomass is still considerable. By 1950, more than half of the human population participated in the direct appropriation of the products of nature. In 1990, the total number of people was twice that of 1950, but 45% of them were still engaged in some kind of primary production activities (FAO 1991). Approximately 95% of the agricultural population occurs in Third World countries, whereas only 5% occurs in developed nations. Consequently, human appropriation of nature is carried out mainly in nations characterized by high biological richness (Mittermeier et al. 1997), a diversity of cultures, and, ironically, high social and economic poverty and high rates of environmental depletion (UNEP 1997).

#### This ongoing process is critical – it affects global understandings of ecology

Hovden 99 (Eivind Hovden; Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; 1999; “As if nature doesn't matter: Ecology, regime theory and¶ international relations”; Environmental Politics, 8:2, 50-74; KDUB)

It is worth emphasising that the argument presented below is not merely¶ of significance for IR as an academic discipline. IR is in many ways¶ uniquely positioned as a field which takes the planet as a whole as the centre¶ of analysis, and may therefore be able to contribute significantly to a debate¶ which so far has been dominated by philosophers, sociologists and political¶ theorists. The relevance of IR for environmental politics is clearly (albeit¶ possibly unwittingly) pointed to by Redclift, who argues that '[m]any of the¶ processes which govern our environment are established at the global level.¶ They exist at this level not because they are international in origin, but¶ because they are totalising processes, often difficult to divorce from¶ economic activities themselves. Global relations, in this sense, are¶ embodied in myriad local practices' [Redclift, 1996:148]. The relationship¶ between the individual understanding and perception of nature, and the¶ ways in which we might assume responsibility for the ecological¶ consequences of our behaviour and consumption are clearly affected by¶ processes that are not confined to the national level. The 'global relations'¶ which Redclift refers to, are, in various forms, the subject matter of IR, and¶ it is therefore well worth considering the relationship between IR theory and¶ the environmental crisis.

#### This engenders anthropocentrism

Taciano L. **Milfont** prof at univ of Auckland Preservation and Utilization: Understanding the Structure of Environmental Attitudes1 Medio Ambiente y Comportamiento Humano **2006**, 7(1), 29-50.

EA = environmental attitudes Bogner and his colleagues (Bogner, Brengelmann, & Wiseman, 2000; Bogner & Wiseman, 1997, 1999; Wiseman & Bogner, 2003) have tried to evaluate the dimensionality of EA empirically by conducting second-order factor analysis. In line with the two-dimensional tradition, Wiseman and Bogner (2003) proposed a Model of Ecological Values (MEV) with two orthogonal dimensions: Preservation and Utilization. They argued that ecological values are established by “one’s position on two orthogonal dimensions, a biocentric dimension that reflects conservation and protection of the environment (Preservation); and an anthropocentric dimension that reflects the utilization of natural resources (Utilization)’’ (Wiseman & Bogner, 2003, p. 787). In a more extensive investigation, Milfont and Duckitt (2004) evaluated the structure of EA by factor analysing 99 items from well-know EA measures. The results from both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis showed that the EA were organized in a hierarchical structure. These were ten first-order factors that loaded on one of two correlated second-order factors. Their findings indicated that Preservation and Utilization were strongly correlated and not orthogonal, as proposed by the MEV. Although purely empirically based, Milfont and Duckitt’s (2004) findings are consistent with a number of theories. These theories have argued that people-environment relations can be viewed in terms of two distinct beliefs that are very similar to these Preservation and Utilization dimensions (Corral-Verdugo & Armendáriz, 2000; Dobson, 1998; Dunlap & Jones, 2002; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2001; Thompson & Barton, 1994). For example, these Preservation and Utilization dimensions seem to be related, respectively, to the spiritual and instrumental views of people-environment relations (Stokols, 1990). According to Stokols (1990), the spiritual view sees the environment as an end in itself, whereas the instrumental view sees the environment as a means for human objectives. Kaiser and Fuhler (2003) have also argued that “if the evaluative component of people’s attitudes consists of at least two distinguishable lines of values—utilitarian values as well as moral/altruistic ones—then it would be better to consider them independently” (p. 1041). Therefore, EA can be seen as rooted in two philosophical or ideological principles that would be expressed in two correlated higher-order environmental value dimensions

#### Anthropocentric dualism creates unending violence underscores all other modes of oppression

Kochi, 2009 (Tarik, Sussex law school, Species war: Law, Violence and Animals, Law Culture and Humanities Oct 5.3)

This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. 21 In this respect, **the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good.** For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. 22 The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for example, drawn between: **Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized.** Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normal-ized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s norm-alization.

#### Only in challenging this ideology can we reclaim meaning

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 151-152, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)\*don’t endorse gendered language

But on top of this special burden nature has arranged that it is impossible for man to feel “right” in any straightforward way. Here we have to introduce a paradox that seems to go right to the heart of organismic life and that is especially sharpened in man. The paradox takes the form of two motives or urges that seem to be part of creature consciousness and that point in two opposite directions. On the one hand the creature is impelled by a powerful desire to identify with the cosmic process, to merge himself with the rest of nature. On the other hand ~~he~~ wants to be unique, to stand out as something different and apart. The first motive— to merge and lose oneself in something larger—comes from man’s horror of isolation, of being thrust back upon his own feeble energies alone; he feels tremblingly small and impotent in the face of transcendent nature. If ~~he~~ gives in to his natural feeling of cosmic dependence, the desire to be part of something bigger, it puts him at peace and at oneness, gives ~~him~~ a sense of self-expansion in a larger beyond, and so heightens ~~his~~ being, giving ~~him~~ truly a feeling of transcendent value. This is the Christian motive of Agape—the natural melding of created life in the “Creation-in-love” which transcends it. As Rank put it, **man yearns for a “feeling of kinship with the All.” ~~He~~ wants to be “delivered from his isolation” and become “part of a greater and higher whole.” The person reaches out naturally for a self beyond ~~his~~ own self in order to know who ~~he~~ is at all, in order to feel that ~~he~~ belongs in the universe.** Long before Camus penned the words of the epigraph to this chapter, Rank said: “For only by living in close union with a god-ideal that has been erected outside one’s own ego is one able to live at all.”55

### Advocacy

#### Thus in the face of ongoing ecological destruction Kristof and I propose that the United States federal government provide Mexico with assistance for environmental programs.

### Contention Two is Solvency

#### Eco-pragmatism is key to unlock a broader worldview which politicizes and challenges the dominant notions environmental policy – only by disrupting the current paradigm of ecological management can we truly embrace a pragmatic approach necessary for sustainability and value

Reitan, 98 – PhD, Philosophy Professor at Oklahoma State University, an award-winning scholar and writer, peer reviewed (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, Electric Green Journal, UCLA Library, 1;9, Article 11)ahayes

Over the last several years, there has been an emerging discussion among environmental philosophers over the question of whether philosophical pragmatism can have a place of value in the environmental movement. Pragmatism is the distinctively American philosophical school which, roughly, holds that our ideas, theories, and worldviews should be examined and evaluated in the light of their impact on lived experience, according to how well they enable us to maneuver through experience successfully. Some worry that pragmatism’s tendency to root all values in subjective human experience undercuts the environmentalist’s claim that all of us ought to care about nature, because nature has an intrinsic value independent of the human activity of valuing**.** (Katz 1987) Others insist that pragmatism’s tendency to view individuals as inextricably connected to their field of experience--to their environment--can serve as the basis for environmental concern. (Parker 1996) What has not been explicitly noted in these discussions is that one of the key ideas advocated in current environmental theory--specifically, the idea that the contemporary consumerist worldview is largely to blame for our current environmental crisis, and any solution to that crisis must be driven by a change in worldview-- is itself an essentially pragmatic idea. I would like to explore the significance of this fact for those environmental theorists who embrace this idea. My suggestion is that, while not committed to all the traditional aspects of philosophical pragmatism, theorists who insist on the importance of cultivating a new worldview are implicitly committing themselves to some core pragmatic principles, and that the environmental movement will be strengthened by paying explicit attention to these principles and what they mean for environmental theory and practice. The Environmentalist Push for a New Worldview One of the most recurring themes in contemporary environmental theory is the idea that, in order to create a sustainable human society embedded in a flourishing natural environment, we need to change how we think about our relationship with nature. A simple change in public policy is not enough. Modest social changes--such as increased use of public transportation or a growing commitment to recycling--are not enough. Nor is environmental education that stresses the dangers of current practices and the prudence of caring for the earth. Even appeals to moral duty--obligations to future generations and to the fellow creatures with whom we share the planet--are insufficient**.** What is needed is a change in our worldview. More specifically, we need to change our view of nature and of our relationship with nature. Again and again, environmental thinkers press home this point. Aldo Leopold, one of the seminal figures of the environmental movement, advocates the adoption of a "land ethic" which "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to just plain member of it." (Leopold 1949) Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess advocate a process of deep questioning of our basic assumptions about nature and our relationship to nature, and they argue that unless we move away from "anthropocentric" conceptions of nature, and towards a more ecocentric view which accords value to all parts of the ecosphere, we will not want to do the things which need to be done to live sustainably in the natural world. (Naess 1988) Fritjof Capra, a research physicist and environmentalist, holds that the hope of the earth lies in a "new vision of reality," a "new ecological paradig**m**" currently emerging among scientists, philosophers, and other thinkers--one which views humans as part of a larger, interrelated whole. (Capra 1987) Thomas Berry insists that "to be viable, the human community must move from its present anthropocentric norm to a geocentric norm of reality and value." (Berry 1987) Psychologist Chellis Glendinning believes that Western culture imposes on us a mechanistic worldview that is fundamentally unsatisfying, leading to a "Techno-Addiction" that can be overcome only if we "integrate into our lives a new philosophy" that is "earth-based, ecological, and indigenous." (Glendinning 1992) While not all environmentalists embrace this clamoring for a new worldview, the trend is clear and unmistakable. Driving this trend is a growing suspicion that the prevailing modern worldview--a consumerist vision of life which denigrates nature to the status of property--is largely responsible for inspiring the unsustainable social and individual practices which threaten the health of our planet and ourselves. Thus, the only viable path to sustainability is the adoption of a new, environmentally friendly worldview. The Pragmatic Basis of Environmentalism The fundamental assumption here is that there exists an essential link between our outlook on the world and our behavior, one so strong that how we look at the world--our worldview--will largely determine what we do. The fundamental justification for changing our worldview, then, is that making such a change is the only realistic way to sufficiently change our harmful behavior. Anyone at all familiar with the history of American philosophy will recognize this assumption, and its concomitant justification of the environmental agenda, as essentially pragmatic--by which I mean that this mode of thinking received a central place in the American philosophical school known as pragmatism. In his 1906 lectures on pragmatism, William James (one of the central figures in American philosophical pragmatism) opened his remarks with the following quote from G.K. Chesterton: There are some people--and I am one of them--who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy’s numbers, but still more important to know the enemy’s philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them. (James 1991) The principle here, embraced by James as a starting point for his discussion of philosophical pragmatism, is that our worldview (or overall philosophy) has more direct impact on how we live our lives than any other single thing. And it is this principle which undergirds the current trend in environmental philosophy: according to a plethora of environmentalists, the only realistic way to move from the current unsustainable practices in human society to genuinely sustainable ones is to abandon the worldview that drives our unsustainable consumerist lifestyle and replace it with a worldview that inspires a caring and nurturing relationship with nature. To this extent at least, the majority of environmental theorists writing today are pragmatic in the philosophical sense. But if the ultimate justification for a shift in worldviews is pragmatic in this sense, then the various candidates for an "environmentally friendly" worldview should be evaluated in terms of their pragmatic effect, and the theoretic discussions that emerge among these rival worldviews should be mediated by pragmatic considerations. It is here that pragmatic philosophy can be especially helpful to environmentalism, by way of giving us criteria for evaluating worldviews and mediating theoretic discussions in terms of their pragmatic significance. Pragmatic Criteria for Evaluating Worldviews There are two principal pragmatic criteria for evaluating worldviews, both of which are articulated by James in his lectures on pragmatism. The first is what I will call the Criterion of Meaning, and it is expressed by James as the "pragmatic method," in the following way: The pragmatic method... is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other’s being right. (James 1991) In short, the meaning of a worldview is to be evaluated in terms of the way of life which it tends to produce. From the standpoint of environmental philosophy, which calls for new worldviews in order to promote a harmonious relationship between humanity and nature, this criterion asks us to examine explicitly the effects of alternative worldviews on the sustainability of human-natural systems, and to distinguish them according to their practical impact on these systems. If two environmental worldviews have the same impact on the humannature relationship, they have the same environmental meaning (although they may have a different meaning in some other sphere of human endeavor). The second pragmatic criterion, what I will call the Criterion of Truth, is expressed by James in his pragmatic account of truth, in the following way: (Truth) means ... nothing but this, that ideas ... become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience.... (James 1991) In other words, the ultimate test of a worldview’s truth is how well it enables us to function in the world of experience--not only how well it enables us to passively interpret our experience in a consistent way, but also how well it guides us through the active dimension of our lives. When evaluating a worldview, we must evaluate how well it works out in lived experience. Does it enable us to sustainably act in ways that are compatible with the dictates of the worldview itself and the rest of our experience? For example, a worldview which defines success as the accumulation of material wealth might be viewed as self-defeating, and hence false, if the pursuit of wealth destroys the natural resources on which wealth-accumulation depends. A worldview that cannot be lived out without running into contradictions or--as in the case above--without undermining the very preconditions for the possibility of living it out, is pragmatically false. (It is worth noting that according to this pragmatic criterion of truth, the label of "truth" is never final, since a belief that works in one experiential setting might no longer work given the advent of new experiences.) The Pragmatic Failure of the Modern Worldview Implicit in the widespread critique of the modern worldview is the observation that it has proven itself to be pragmatically false. While the modern consumerist worldview may have "worked" in the past, at least to some degree, it does not work anymore. The approaching environmental crisis can be solved only if we begin to act in ways that bring us into harmony with the ecosystems around us. We can realize such harmony only if we stop consuming more than nature can replenish--but the modern worldview defines success in terms of consumption, and thus inspires ever-increasing rates of resource depletion. We can find such harmony only if we stop contaminating natural systems more quickly than those systems can cleanse themselves--but the modern view of happiness is directly tied to the technological and industrial artifacts that are largely responsible for that contamination. We are likely to find such harmony only if harmony really matters to us--but the modern worldview is built upon a paradigm of dominating nature, of transforming and controlling nature to suit human preferences, not on realizing harmony with it. From this pragmatic framework, then, environmentalists are right to critique the prevailing modern worldview. The practical meaning of this worldview is activity that radically transforms the ecosphere, constructing human communities and habitats that are isolated from natural ecosystems and which disrupt not only the local ecosystems which they about, but also the atmosphere and hence the whole planet. That such practices are unsustainable is clear from the growing preponderance of scientific evidence. Human beings evolved in the natural environment that we are presently transforming. We evolved to be dependent upon that natural environment for our physical as well as psychological sustenance. Our actions amount to a destruction of much upon which we depend, and are therefore self-defeating in a very straight-forward way. The worldview that impels such actions is therefore pragmatically false. What I would like to do here is demonstrate, by way of an example, the value of pragmatic principles not only for the critique of the modern worldview, but also for guiding the on-going process of developing new, environmentally friendly alternatives. Perhaps the most useful role of pragmatism for current environmental philosophy **lies in its capacity to identify** which theoretic debates really matter, and to mediate these debates in terms of shared pragmatic goals--in particular, the goal of cultivating sustainable human-natural systems. With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, we cannot afford to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing.

#### Our approach to this discussion is key to REVEAL and RESIST the normalization of ecological devastation

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Much of the scholarship on films representing the US/Mexico border analyzes the space and the texts about the border through single critical approaches, whether feminist, Marxist, national/transnational concerns, or race and ethnicity. In contrast, our ecocritical approach is a mode of analysis and argument that works in a threepart structure comprising Ecotones, Machines, and Gender. Through this multivalent approach, we argue that placing these films in conversation with one another, despite their formalistic differences, reveals the social conditions that enable and naturalize ecological devastation along the US/Mexico border. In other words, both Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer irrevocably disturb conventional conceptualizations of gender, machines, borders, and their interconnectedness in matters of ecology. Analyzing these disparate films together discloses the way gender, machines, and borders are constituent components of ecosystems and our prospects for thinking and acting ecologically. We begin with key interrelated events that have resulted in unequal trade and labor relations between the USA and Mexico and culminated in the ongoing construction of a barrier along the US/Mexico border: the signing of the Bracero Program of 1942, the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, and the ongoing environmental justice movement along the US/Mexico border. The Bracero Program of 1942, a series of diplomatic agreements that responded to a shortage of cheap labor in the USA at the onset of US involvement in World War II, also resulted in the migration of an undocumented labor population across the border in search of work. This ‘‘illegal’’ migration had the effect of discursively and socioeconomically creating an exploitable Mexican surplus labor population in the USA, which later gave rise to historic labor unions such as the National Farm Laborers Union (NFLU) and Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), and the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).1 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trilateral trade bloc inaugurated on January 1, 1994, ushered in a new set of trade relations in the Americas that relies on a static and cheap labor force in Mexico that assemble imported raw components into commodities, including TVs, radios, and other small electronic items. Some of the greatest long-term effects of NAFTA have to do with the environmental impact of the maquila industry on small Mexican cities along the US-Mexico border. These small cities are often unable and/or unwilling to cope with the influx of industrial expansion. Thus, unsuitable infrastructure and lax government regulation regarding chemical dumping in these areas result in the greatest ecological impacts. The struggle to improve these living conditions are depicted in Maquilapolis, where the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice’s community-led clean-up efforts of the Metales y Derivados toxic site reflect the concern of the ‘‘serious industrial pollution impacts of NAFTA. . .in the base metals sector’’ (Reinert & Roland-Holst, 2000, p. 5). Although not represented directly in the film, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the Environmental Health Coalition’s Border Environmental Justice Campaign (EHC-BEJC) become two of the most significant organizations in support of the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice’s campaign for the clean-up of the Metales y Derivados toxic site. The Chilpancingo Colectivo’s struggle for environmental justice along the border is matched by a myriad of ongoing environmental struggles around climate change, land use, and industrial pollution and waste along the border. The Environmental Health Coalition’s report, Globalization at the Crossroads: Ten Years of NAFTA in the San Diego/Tijuana Border Region Report Summary, on the impact of free trade on local Mexican communities notes that ‘‘worker injury and illness rates are 250% higher in Mexico than in comparable U.S. factories’’ (p. 2), a trend in worker treatment that is mirrored by Mexican governmental disinterest in the working conditions of the factories themselves since ‘‘Mexico’s spending on pollution monitoring and factory inspections is down 45% since 1994 [and] only 5% of companies required to report industrial toxic discharges do so in Mexico’’ (p. 2). Finally, the ‘‘66 documented toxic dumps along the border’’ (Report Summary, p. 2) point to the interrelated processes by which worker livelihood in the maquila system is interrelated with worker life outside the maquila factories in Mexico. As both Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer illustrate, life along the border is economically and ecologically precarious. In the next section we articulate the concept of ecotone as a methodological intervention into ecocriticism, and the following sections apply an ecotone approach to the intersections of ecology, the machine, and gender in these border films. A reason that both Sleep Dealer and Maquilapolis invoke a multi-scaled ecotone approach is that they are border films of the Global South, a cinema that is different from, yet in conversation with, the Hollywood industry. Both have transnational production histories with independent financial backing and relatively low budgets that blur conventional boundaries of the nation-states and the film industries involved. They explicitly negotiate the Tijuana-to-San Diego region of the US/Mexico border, an ecotone where the boundaries of two nations meet and where the relative wealth and prosperity of San Diego comes into contact with the environmental hazards and unsafe working conditions of Tijuana. Sleep Dealer also disturbs generic frontiers as its director Alex Rivera has suggested: ‘‘To think about the future is to open up a space of possibility and it’s something that has never happened in science fiction cinema in the Global South’’ (Guillen, 2008). The film represents the future from the perspective of the Global South that figures systemic inequities through the genre of science fiction. Here the future does not idealistically erase national boundaries, but it is seen to continue systematic reinforcement of disparate access to resources. Furthermore, the US/Mexico border setting situates these films in historically contested ecotones involving land and labor, capital, people, trade, and resources. As such, these films participate in a geographic-cinematic ecotone that includes texts like Why Braceros? and Salt of the Earth, both of which engendered lasting controversies about labor, land as private property, and the selective permeability of national boundaries. Unlike those films that speak to labor migration and nation-building disenfranchisement, however, Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer depict labor forces whose human bodies do not cross the border even as they participate in transnational economic exchanges. Let us consider the production history of Maquilapolis as a collaboration between filmmakers Vicky Funari and Sergio De La Torre, and promotoras from Grupo Factor X, the Chilpancingo Collective for Environmental Justice, and Women’s Rights Advocates, and how this might itself be ecotonal. The film brings together Tijuana maquila workers, grassroots labor, and environmental community organizers/promotoras from the USA and Mexico. The official film website notes that this bilateral process ‘‘embraces subjectivity as a value and a goal’’ in the efforts of not replicating the top-down approach to the production of value and information, or the bottom-up approach to the production of labor. The website adds that ‘‘this collaborative process breaks with the traditional documentary practice of dropping into a location, shooting and leaving with the ‘goods,’ which would only repeat the pattern of the maquiladora itself’’ (Funari & de la Torre, 2006a). Thus, the film was made with equitable input from all those involved and without the attitude that enables ‘‘natural resources,’’ including human beings, to be exploited and abandoned.

#### Voting aff is an endorsement of a system which values more than exclusively the human

Weston 9 (Anthony, “The incompleat eco-philosopher p. 11-13 <http://esotericonline.net/docs/library/Philosophy/Environmental%20philosophy/Ethics/Weston%20-%20The%20Incompleat%20Eco-Philosopher.%20Essays%20from%20the%20Edges%20of%20Environmental%20Ethics%20(2009).pdf)>

One problem, I argue, is that in an unnoticed but also almost tautological sense, this project remains ineradicably human-centered, despite its generous intentions. Not only is our standing never in question, but moral standing is extended to others by analogy to our own precious selves: to animals, maybe, on the grounds that they suffer as we do. But here is the most fundamental worry: Can an ethic of relationship actually remain so monocentric, homogeneous, single-featured? Might we not even wonder whether monocentrism almost by defi nition militates against real relationship? The eco-theologian Thomas Berry has declared that the essential task of environmental ethics is “to move from a world of objects to a community of subjects.” Berry’s almost Buberian language of subject-hood is not much heard in the environmental ethics we know. The phrase may call us up short. A true community of subjects must be an interacting whole of distinctive, nonhomogenized parts, in which no one set of members arrogates to themselves alone the right to gate-keep or even merely to welcome, however generously, moral newcomers. We are all “in” to start with. Thus Berry might be read as calling not merely for an alternative to anthropocentrism but for an alternative to the entire homogenizing framework of “centrism” itself. And this invitation, arguably, has very little to do with the received project of “expanding the circle” of moral consideration. What we actually need is a vision of multiple “circles,” including the whole of the world from the start. What I propose to call multicentrism thus envisions a world of irreducibly diverse and multiple centers of being and value—not one single moral realm, however expansive, but many realms, as particular as may be, partly overlapping, each with its own center. Human “circles,” then, do not necessarily invite expansion or extension, but rather augmentation and addition. In a similar pluralistic vein, William James challenges us to imagine this world not as a universe but as a “multiverse,” and thus a world that calls for (and, we might hope, calls forth) an entirely different set of skills—even, perhaps, something more like improvisation and etiquette, once again, in the all-too-serious place usually accorded ethics. Certainly it would have to be a world in which etiquette is in play: where collective understandings are negotiated rather than devised and imposed, however sympathetically, by one group of participants on the others. Introduction 13 All of these themes, I believe, are emerging from a wide variety of work both within and outside academic environmental ethics. My own emerging emphasis on the responsiveness of the world, and correspondingly how much a responsive world can be reduced by unresponsiveness on the other side; Cheney’s insistence on the constitutive role of what he calls “bioregional narrative,” co-constituted between human and more-than-human; our mutual friend Tom Birch’s argument for “universal consideration,” according to which moral “consideration” itself must, of necessity, keep itself considerately and carefully open to everything (there’s universality for you!). Many strands in ecofeminism, from a persistent and overdue attention to actual patterns and failures of human-animal relationships to Val Plumwood’s incisive exposure of the whole seamy conceptual underpinnings of “centering,” whether it be on and by males or Europeans or humans as a whole. Thomas Berry, David Abram, Gary Snyder, Paul Shepard, Sean Kane, and many others, cited and drawn upon in this paper, all speak of the human relation to nature in terms of negotiation and covenant rather than the philosophical unilateralism we have learned to expect. There is a movement here, in short: much more than a collection of scattered, hard-to-categorize complaints and idiosyncratic, extraphilosophical views, but a shared alternative vision of the world—and of the tasks of anything rightly called an “environmental ethic.” “Multicentrism” is not the perfect name for it—the chapter explores this problem too—but for the moment I think it will have to do.

#### The role of the ballot is to establish a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

Castello and Toledo 2k (Alicia Castello and Victor M Toledo; "Applying ecology in the Third World: the case of Mexico." BioScience 50.1 (2000): 66-76; google scholar; KDUB)

The establishment of efficient communication between research institutions and the sectors directly involved in the management of ecosystems will not, by itself, lead to improved ecosystem management and solutions to envi-ronmental problems. Solutions will be found only through new approaches to policy setting and decision making that consider what the different social sectors have to say. Governmental bodies, nongovernmental organizations, international agencies that fund research and action projects, research institutions, and rural producers all need to network and collaborate in the search for solutions. Particularly in the context of Third World countries, a change is needed in the way in which scientific activities are organized and evaluated. It is important to promote a science that, in addition to nurturing humans' under-standing of the natural world (which is of extreme importance in both cultural and utilitarian terms), also contributes more directly to solving problems. This approach to science should originate from the recognition that the function of science is not limited to the production of new knowledge but also includes its transmission, exchange, and use. The challenge of promoting this new approach to science involves whole institutions more than individual efforts. In the last decade, some ecologists have asked the scientific community to change the academic reward system to promote communication with wider audiences. Such was the message of a recent letter by several internationally recognized ecologists (Bazzaz et al. 1998), who referred strongly to the relevant role of individual ecologists. It is essential to start thinking in terms of accomplishment of goals by institutions, particularly regarding the fulfillment of their social responsibility. For science to have a relevant impact on the way human societies relate to ecosystems, institutional mechanisms must be devel¬oped that allow the participation of all professional scien¬tists—those generating the knowledge and those working on its transformation, transmission, exchange, and use. The environmental crisis is in grave need of solutions, and society as a whole—especially ecologists and their institu¬tions—must keep reacting and responding to the urgent calls from the world's reality.

#### Furthermore, investigating anthropocentric assumptions is critical to formulate a productive pedagogy

Bell and Russell 2K (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)//RSW

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-tions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, **critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind** (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). **Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks** (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) **that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered** (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the humancentred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, **anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited**. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

#### You must evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Theory and movements: environmental justice discourse and praxis All of this, to me, illustrates how environmental justice in practice offers a rich form of politics and practice – one that academics in the field would do well to engage. One of the signature characteristics in much environmental justice scholarship has been a relationship between academic work and movement groups. The original articulation of an environmental justice movement came out of academic studies and conferences. The early history of the academic side of the movement was based on the work of Robert Bullard (1990, 1993) and early conferences, such as that organised by Bryant and Mohai (1992), that helped articulate and publicise findings of inequitable distribution of environmental goods and bads.14 The relationship between academic studies and the environmental justice movement has been integral to its development and growth, and its discourses, in the past three decades. Sze and London (2008) see this relationship as one of the continuing elements of reflection in the recent literature, and one of the promising trends in the field. In part, this relationship is about the idea of praxis – that theory and practice must inform each other (Sze and London 2008, p. 1347). As Holifield et al. (2010, p. 18) insist, there is ‘a need for environmental justice scholarship to actively work at its connections to activism and its engagement with those at the sharp end of injustice, however it is understood, and to bring theory to bear in meaningful ways into praxis and diverse forms of public engagement’. Theorising from movement experience works to expand our understanding of those movements; in return, those movements can and do inform theory in productive ways. There are numerous examinations of this intersection in the United States, from my own work on movement pluralism (Schlosberg 1999), to Di Chiro’s (2008) work on social reproduction in environment/feminist coalitions, to Sze et al’s (2010) examination of water politics in California, to the range of responses to community organising after Katrina (Bullard and Wright 2009). All of this illustrates the relationship between environmental justice as an academic idea and a social movement, to the benefit of each. This focus on the relationship between practice and theory has also been central to my attempts to understand the ‘justice’ of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, 2007). Many attempts to define environmental or climate justice have been too detached from the actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an organising theme or identity. This does assume that there is a value to movement practice – that theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements. Why, the more purist academic or sceptic might ask, should we prioritise what activists believe or do? But the question should not be about who is the best judge of a conception of justice – activists or theorists. The point is that different discourses of justice, and the various experiences and articulations of injustice, inform how the concept is used, understood, articulated, and demanded in practice; the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study. It continues to be unfortunate that there are those in the study of environmentalism, or in the theoretical realm, who simply cannot see the importance, and range, of these articulations at the intersection of theory and practice – especially when movement innovation is as broad and informative as it is in environmental justice.

#### Even the incremental can inform our political decisions

Hirokawa 2 Keith Hirokawa, J.D. from the University of Connecticut and LL.M. from the Northwestern School of Law, 2002 (“Some Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique In Environmental Law,” *Stanford Environmental Law Journal*, Volume 21, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

Changes in each instance create entirely new contexts in which more (or less) progressive arguments find a hold. Every time a change occurs, even if it is incremental or ostensibly seems benign, the change creates a new context within which an entirely new set of possibilities will arise. n230 The pragmatist therefore evaluates progress by the distance a new idea causes practices to move away from past practices and paradigms. The difference between the pragmatic version of progress and the Kuhnian version is one only of degree. In the end, the results of both versions of progress are the same - we look back at the change and realize that earlier ideas do not make sense anymore. The effectiveness of the pragmatic approach lies in the simple realization that, in adopting an innovative approach to a legal question, courts will find comfort in adopting what appears to be an incremental change, rather than a radical paradigmatic shift. In [\*278] contrast to radical theorists that deny the existence of progress because of a failure to immediately reach the radical goals of alternative paradigms, the pragmatist recognizes that a series of incremental changes eventually add up. Environmental pragmatism enables environmentalists to seek achievable gains by focusing on minor improvements in the law that incrementally close the gap between the values that pre-existed current environmental law and the alternative paradigms of environmental protection.

#### Focusing on alternative causes and mechanisms results in political deadlock and ecological destruction

Lichatowich 1 (James, Masters in Fishery Science from Oregon State University, former Marine, Assistant Chief of Fisheries, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Board Member of the Independent Scientific Advisory Board (ISAB), “Salmon Without Rivers: A History Of The Pacific Salmon Crisis”, pp 1-7, google books; Tara)

Solving the salmon’s problem has proven difficult because their extensive migrations create an ideal situation for obfuscation. Each industry, institution, or individual that contributes to the salmon’s depletion at some place in their extended ecosystem can readily point to some other industry, institution, or individual that affects the salmon at some other place in their ecosystem as the cause of the problem. For the last half-century, the salmon’s rapid decline has generated endless attempts to shift blame and prompted disingenuous evasion. Because the depletion is the cumulative effect of many human activities over a wide geographic area, proof that absolves or implicates a particular factor is impossible to obtain. Though it has sparked debate and study, the misguided search for a singular cause of salmon decline has wasted a great deal of time, effort, and money. More important, it accomplishes little in solving the salmon’s problem, which has truly become everyone’s problem. The people of the Pacific Northwest must answer some important questions: Do they value the salmon enough to restore habitat and pull the fish back from the brink of extinction? Are they willing to save the salmon even if it means changing the way the industrial economy uses the region’s land and water? And if they are not willing to make the necessary changes, will a Pacific Northwest without salmon retain its appeal as a high-quality environment for people?

#### While yes we recognize there are problems with the state alternatives are net worse and can’t adequately address problems

Daniel A Farber 2002 Berkeley Law Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco- pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect \*not down with that ableist language

¶ Besides bringing to mind a popular song, the title of this¶ Essay is intended to evoke a somewhat complex image of the¶ task facing today's pragmatic ecologists. "Building bridges"¶ suggests most immediately a desire to occupy the space between two extremes. This is clearly an important part of¶ Eco-pragmatism. 2 Yet, as the title is intended to suggest, there¶ is more to the picture. Building a bridge is different from¶ merely compromising by standing in the middle of the stream.¶ A bridge must have its own strength and structure; it must¶ (literally) stand for something. But an even more important¶ part of the image relates to the troubled waters.¶ Environmental issues involve powerful, turbulent, and¶ unpredictable forces that can easily rush us to disaster.¶ Building a bridge in such circumstances is an inherently risky¶ venture. Thus, I mean to stress not just the need for bridge¶ building, but the potential hazards of the venture. In such a¶ venture, excessive pessimism can be ~~paralyzing~~, but blithe¶ optimism can be fatal.¶ Pragmatists are often accused of a facile optimism. 3 Like¶ Gatsby, it is said, they believe "'in the green light, the orgiastic¶ future that year by year recedes before us'-a future that¶ eluded us in the past, 'but that's no matter-tomorrow we will¶ run faster, stretch out our arms farther.' 4 In this, if in nothing¶ else, environmental scholars seem almost universally "pragmatic,"5 for references to pessimism are few and far¶ between in legal scholarship about the environment.¶ Blind optimism, however, is not what pragmatism stands¶ for. Nor is such an attitude a sound foundation for¶ environmental efforts (or for bridge construction, for that¶ matter). Rather, eco-pragmatism must be based on a realistic¶ understanding of our current situation and future prospects—¶ one that fully acknowledges our difficulties without being¶ ~~paralyzed~~ by despair.7 In short, eco-pragmatism must confront¶ and overcome the case for eco-pessimism.8 Only then can it¶ escape the accusation of being an "anxious-to-please kind of¶ pragmatism, without much room for strong feelings" or an¶ "excuse for watered-down and muddled substance."9¶ This Essay takes on the challenge of eco-pessimism. My¶ concern is not with the worst-case scenarios: the possibilities¶ that it is already too late to save the environment or that the¶ scientific and technical problems will prove insoluble. These¶ possibilities cannot be disproved definitively. Yet we have no¶ real reason to believe them to be true, and, in any event, they¶ are beyond any possible human control. If our condition is¶ incurable, so be it. Yet what is more discouraging is the¶ possibility that solutions are available but that we lack the¶ political will or institutional means to implement them. It is¶ this political form of eco-pessimism that I will address.¶ The first part of this Essay considers the arguments for¶ eco-pessimism. It is disturbingly easy to make the case that¶ human institutions are incapable of successfully solving¶ environmental problems. Besides the inherent difficulties¶ posed by the problems themselves, implementing solutions¶ requires that we overcome deep-seated human weaknesses:¶ grave collective action problems, the limitations of human¶ rationality, and a necessarily imperfect political system. These¶ are formidable challenges. Certainly, there is no guarantee¶ that they will be overcome.¶ As Part II of this Essay shows, however, these difficulties¶ are not insurmountable. Environmental law has had some¶ significant successes, and creative new solutions continue to¶ bubble up. Despite the defects of the political process and the¶ discouraging setbacks, democracy does better in reality than¶ one might expect in theory. It would be foolish to assume that¶ policy victories are assured, but equally foolish to assume that¶ defeat is inevitable. In light of the difficulties, the successes¶ achieved to date are remarkable.¶ The concluding part of this Essay considers how eco-¶ pragmatists can contribute to the success of environmental¶ protection. Part of the work of eco-pragmatism is reactive:¶ exploring how current legal rules and doctrine can be brought¶ more into line with a pragmatic environmentalism, and¶ defending pragmatism against fundamentalists of the Right¶ and the Left. In the short run, these may be the most¶ important contributions that eco-pragmatists can make. But in¶ the long run, eco-pragmatists need to create new¶ understandings of our environmental goals and help design¶ novel institutions to meet the distinctive challenges of¶ environmental protection. As legal scholars, eco-pragmatists¶ cannot single-handedly solve environmental problems; often,¶ their direct contribution will be small. What they can do is¶ foster a legal context in which solutions become possible.¶ ¶ It seems unlikely that courts will abandon their reliance on¶ causation in various doctrinal contexts. Nor should they¶ necessarily do so, for even complex systems can sometimes be¶ predicted with some assurance, particularly in the short run.¶ Pragmatists can thus make an important contribution by¶ helping to reformulate doctrine to deal more appropriately with¶ uncertain harms.¶ ¶ It is tempting to ascribe the frustrations of environmental¶ politics to human frailty. If only people were totally rational,¶ well informed, and committed to environmental progress, then¶ the difficulties would dissolve. Or so we would like to think.¶ But the actuality is that even under these unattainable ideal¶ circumstances, environmental protection might not take place.¶ The basic collective action problem is described by Buzz¶ Thompson:¶ Anyone who has studied the environment for very long understands¶ the tragedy of the commons. When a resource is freely available to¶ everyone in common, everyone has an incentive to take as much of¶ that resource as they want, even though the collective result may be¶ the destruction of the resource itself. Society as a whole would be¶ better off restraining consumption and preserving the resource. But¶ the rational action for each individual is to consume to her heart's¶ content,... The cumulative result of reasonable individual choices is¶ collective disaster.39¶ As Thompson points out, several solutions to the tragedy of¶ the commons exist in principle.40 First, the commons may be¶ privatized, so that each user has the exclusive right to use (and¶ a corresponding interest in preserving) a portion of the¶ commons.41 Second, control over the commons can be given to a¶ single manager, who can share the proceeds among the¶ community.42 Third, where the first two solutions are not¶ practical, the government or the community can place limits on¶ individual use to prevent damage to the commons.43¶ Unfortunately, Thompson concludes that despite the existence¶ of these solutions, "governments and other institutions have¶ found it extremely difficult to address many of the most¶ important commons dilemmas facing the world today."44 Two¶ of his examples are depletion of world fisheries and exhaustion¶ of groundwater supplies.45 Of particular interest is the¶ example of global climate change, where Thompson concludes¶ that "[flinding a formula for reducing and capping emissions¶ that is acceptable to all nations is proving to be a Herculean¶ task."46¶ As Carol Rose has pointed out, the tragedy of the commons¶ is not inevitable:¶ If one looks only to the conventional theory of the commons, one can¶ easily grow pessimistic about solving vast and multilayered ecological¶ problems like these. But after a generation of concern with commons¶ issues, we have also learned that whatever the difficulties in¶ principle, people in practice sometimes do manage to cope with¶ collective resources, so that the "inexorable" logic of the commons¶ does not always play out so inexorably after all. Left to their own¶ devices, people can figure out ways to preserve fishing grounds and¶ wild animal stocks; they can organize and operate collective irrigation¶ systems; and indeed as our own legislation suggests, they can make¶ some inroads on the polluted commons in air and water, even if the¶ successes have been costly and limited.83¶ Last year, the National Research Council published an¶ extensive report about commons problems.84 Research has¶ expanded in a number of directions: using game theory to¶ undermine the traditional economic analysis of the commons;85¶ investigating the characteristics that foster success in¶ controlling the commons;86 and exploring the utility of¶ alternative institutional designs.87 Some of the most¶ interesting research involves the effect of uncertainty on¶ commons problems.88 In an intriguing paper on fisheries,¶ James Wilson argues that current approaches, which focus on¶ preserving stocks of individual species, are fundamentally¶ flawed because they ignore ecological interactions.89 Because of¶ the dynamic nature of these interactions, however, prediction is¶ difficult. In response to these difficulties, Wilson suggests a¶ three-prong approach: (1) concentration on protecting the slow-¶ changing elements of the ecosystem, which do not determine¶ specific short-term outcomes but do dictate the long-term¶ patterns of outcomes; (2) the use of nested governance areas so¶ that parallel learning about ecosystem behavior can take place;¶ and (3) granting fishermen broad, multispecies rights (rather¶ than fishing quotas limited to individual species), so as to¶ broaden their financial interest in ecosystem health and give¶ them an incentive to develop information about interactions¶ between species in particular regions.90 These proposals are to¶ some extent specific to the fisheries setting, but it is¶ encouraging to see progress in dealing with the effects of¶ uncertainty and complexity on commons management.91¶ Solving commons problems is most difficult at the¶ international level, where there is no possibility of enforcement¶ by an outside body.92 But despite these obstacles, some success¶ stories can be told. The most notable involves protection of the ¶ ozone layer. The ozone layer is a classic commons problem—it¶ is to everyone's advantage to preserve it, but efforts by some¶ nations to reduce the use of harmful chemicals achieve little if¶ other countries continue their production. Nevertheless,¶ considerable progress had been made. By the mid-1970s,¶ significant scientific concern existed about the effect of human¶ chemical production (particularly CPCs) on the ozone layer,¶ which is crucial to blocking ultraviolet light from the earth's¶ surface.93 It took another ten years for a scientific consensus to¶ emerge.94 By then, international negotiations were already far¶ along, with a 1985 agreement in Vienna to cooperate on¶ investigating the problem.95 In 1987, a more dramatic ~~step~~ was¶ taken with the Montreal Protocol, which mandated sharp¶ reductions in CFC production.96 By 1990, the agreement had¶ been strengthened again and a fund (eventually $240 million)¶ was created to assist developing countries in switching to¶ substitutes; by 2001, India and China had also joined the¶ agreement.97 Like all success stories, this one had its unusual¶ circumstances (such as the cooperative attitude of the U.S.¶ chemical industry).98 But the achievement of international¶ agreement about ozone does show that success in protecting the¶ global commons is possible.

#### **Catastrophe is a political device used to silence and oppress**

Bryant 11 (Levi, Prof of Philosophy at Collins College, july 26, The Scandal of Political Realism, [http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/the-scandal-of-political-realism/)\*don’t](http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/07/26/the-scandal-of-political-realism/)*don't) endorse ableist language

It’s no wonder that realism has such a bad name. It has perpetually been ruined by political realism. Political realism has always been that despicable ideology whose name is necessity. It has always functioned at the behest of inegalitarian social arrangements, justifying one more way deny people their voice and to expropriate their goods. On the one hand it strives to regulate bodies in such a way that only some bodies are entitled to have a say, to govern, to rule, to lead, while others are relegated to silence and, above all, invisibility. Political realism is here a mechanism designed to render invisible voice and other social entities. The political realist always says “listen to those in the know”– usually oligarchs or servants of oligarchs –”they are naturally superior, they have your best interests at heart!” Speaking against the masters becomes pure folly. The voice of those that protest, that refuse the “wisdom” of the masters, is immediately coded as animal noise without reason that only “emotes”. We can think here of the difference between how the medical establishment treated hysterics before and after Freud. Prior to Freud, the hysteric was to be dismissed, to be denied voice, to be relegated to the irrational. After Freud the hysteric is to be listened to as articulating a wrong and a breach in the order of identifications. Political realism strives to silence the ~~hysteric~~, claiming that their voice is no voice at all, that that voice comes from no place of knowledge or wisdom.¶ In this way, second, the political realist insures the smooth operation of exploitation and oppression. If the voice of the hysteric (the protester, the activist) is successfully silenced, then they never have a place in the process of deliberation. Their vantage need never enter into the calculus of forming ways of life, bodies, rankings, countings, etc. The oligarch and servant of the oligarch always claims that he knows what’s really best for such and such a body. That body, of course, is no longer consulted, nor is it allowed to participate in any way. Like the patients in older systems of psychiatry that are never consulted but which are subjected to everything from forced medication to electro-shock therapy to lobotomy, this part is everywhere regulated by the state, by the masters, by the oligarchs– and “for their own good” –without having any say in it. Political realism always strives for this refusal of voice. The voice of this uncounted part is reduced to mere emoting, ignorance, stupidity, lack of tactical understanding, etc., etc., etc. It’s infantalized and animalized. Of course, here the animal is the example par excellence of the voice denied voice; of the voice reduced to a grunt. The animal is what we all are within the statist framework of political realism. It is in this way that exploitation and oppression proceeds apace. The animal becomes entirely invisible, or rather reduced to a code that’s already managed by the regime of the oligarch… It is reduced to a voice that has always already spoken and been understood; which is to say that it has been reduced to what the oligarch believes the animal to be saying. As such, it is inapparent.¶ Yet the “animal” must still be convinced. This is the most despicable gesture of the political realist. The political realist naturalizes the contingent organization of the social order, perpetually arguing that this the only that can and does exist. By virtue of this effacement of the contingency of this order, by virtue of the naturalization of this order and the identities that populate it, the “animal” must accept austerity foisted on its back because the alternative is “worse”, the animal must accept second class status as a woman, a latino, a black person, a queer, a worker, etc., because the alternative is “worse”. The mechanism always consists in creating a false dilemma between catastrophe and exploitation and oppression. To avoid the former, the political realist hopes to persuade the animal to accept the latter. Of course, this deadlock only proceeds through the denial of voice to the animal, a voice which opens the possibility of different distributions of the social than those that currently reign. ¶

#### Any praxis that disregards anthropocentrism is doomed to failure

LEE, ‘06 (Wendy Lynne, “On Ecology and Aesthetic Experience: A Feminist Theory of Value and Praxis”, *Ethics & the Environment* 11.1 (2006) 21-41, accessed through Project MUSE, September 19, 2011, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ethics\_and\_the\_environment/v011/11.1lee.html)

**In light of what we now know about the intimacy of the relationships between human beings, nonhuman animals, and ecological systems, any praxis—feminist or otherwise—that does not take this intimacy seriously is destined to fail in its emancipatory quest**. **Freedom has no meaning outside the endeavour to free those others who, in virtue of their capacity for labor, their vulnerability, and/or their consumability, have sustained much of Western culture, including Western feminism. This is not to say that freedom comes packaged in some universally accessible form; it does not**. Indeed, one of our tasks is to reevaluate just what this family resemblance term means for a new century whose own distinct characteristics cannot fail to influence our pursuit of happiness. Among these distinct characteristics, however, is a far greater and more globally accessible knowledge about how this pursuit affects the welfare of nonhuman animals and ecological systems; hence **whatever luxury we may have had with respect to defining freedom solely in terms of human welfare is clearly vanquished in the recognition that an emancipation whose cost is the expropriation and extinction of nonhuman others, has no place in a morally or politically defensible vision of the future**.

### 2ac short – rc & ontology

Squo conceptualizes Mexico’s ecosystem as devoid of intrinsic value this results in arbitrary hierarchies between forms of life ie: humans and animals; this underscores all other modes of oppression and precedes their root cause arguments because the human animal distinction occurred structurally prior to distinctions within the species

Separating the environment from humanity also precludes ones ability to feel that they belong in the universe, a lack of belonging results in a constant horror of isolation precluding ones ability to embrace subjectivity

### 2ac short – rotb & method

The role of the ballot is who has a better methodology to develop a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem the academic reward system must be changed to facilitate discussions about competing ecological praxis (Castello)

The discourses of competing environmental practices inform how concepts are used understood articulated and demanded from institutions such as the state means only competing environmental practices should be evaluated any other evaluation links to all our offense

Our method is superior

-solution rather than problem oriented (Castello)

-identifies debates that really matter (Reitan)

-opens up new contingencies for problem solving (hirokawa)

-takes responsibility for environmental destruction (lichatovich)

-ruptures epistemic construction of nature in the border region (orihuela)

-problematizes the narratives the legitimize violence against nature (bell and russel)

### managerialism

#### Explanations of managerialism are overly SIMPLISTIC and insufficient – an ecological approach is comparatively better in the context of Maquiladoras

Orihuela and Hageman 11 (Balachandran Orihuela, Sharada, and Andrew Carl Hageman. "The Virtual Realities Of US/Mexico Border Ecologies In Maquilapolis And Sleep Dealer." Environmental Communication 5.2 (2011): 166-186. Communication & Mass Media Complete. EBSCO. 3 Sept. 2013. KDUB)

First, it would be simple enough to assert that the protagonists of both films¶ become part of the machines. This could mean that they become part of the physical¶ machines with which they produce commodities or perform construction labor, or it¶ could mean that they are interchangeable components in the machine of the factory,¶ or, on an even larger scale, components of global capitalism itself. Without analytical¶ specificity, the overused and undertheorized assertion of humans becoming parts, or¶ cogs, in the machine can be more obfuscating than clarifying. Thus, a brief¶ explanation of what we mean by this phrase is necessary. There is a long and diverse¶ history of the figure of humans being turned into a part of the machine. Perhaps,¶ most famous are Karl Marx’s passage in Volume I of Capital, when he writes, ‘‘in¶ handicraft, the worker makes use of tools; in the factory, the machines make use of¶ him’’ (1990, p. 548), and ‘‘they distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they¶ degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual¶ 174 S. B. Orihuela and A. C. Hageman¶ content of his labor by turning it into a torment . . .’’ (1990, p. 799). And in The¶ Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels write:¶ Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of¶ the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for¶ the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most¶ simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him¶ (2003, p. 131).¶ Other theorists (Max Weber, Herbert Marcuse, and Hannah Arendt, to name a few)¶ have rehearsed this human becoming part of the machine figure, but one of the most¶ significant historical developments in this line of theorizing human/machine¶ interfaces is the way Taylorization equally served the seemingly contrary ideologies¶ of capitalism and communism in the 1920s1930s. Fredrick Taylor’s program of¶ tuning human efficiency and productivity served the ideologies of both the American¶ assembly-line industrial capitalist production and Stalinist soviet production. In both¶ cases, to serve as an appendage of the machine was a positive state of being, at least¶ from the point of view of the capitalist owner and the communist social engineer.¶ Today, however, becoming part of the machine conjures an almost exclusively¶ pejorative connotation, labeled as a figure of an exploitative attitude that facilitates¶ dehumanization and unsustainable use of the nonhuman elements of the biophysical¶ material world.¶ The laborers’ state of becoming part of the machine in Maquilapolis is illustrated¶ strikingly in the multiple scenes in which they pantomime their machine-tending¶ work outdoors. Because the laborers have no way to document the machines and¶ their interfacing with them inside the policed maquiladoras, they must demonstrate¶ their labor uncoupled from the machines when engaged in political protests. From¶ one point of view, their movements could look like an odd version of Chinese¶ taijiquan,3 but the pace and pressures of factory production easily dispel any¶ comparison to that meditative exercise. Instead, the spectator sees a group of human¶ beings performing strange routines that illustrate the internalization of their labor,¶ including their interfacing with machines. Thus, it seems that the automation of their¶ labor is what makes this spectacle horrifying. Revealed in these scenes is a state of¶ being in which the humanness of laborers is displaced by enforced automation that¶ rebuilds each one of them as a machine.¶ However, if we can interrogate this phobia of automation, a different horror comes¶ into view. Gilbert Simondon has suggested in On the Mode of Existence of Technical¶ Objects that machines have historically been designed and modified under the control¶ of the market. The machines are, no less than their human laborer counterparts,¶ slaves to market forces and thereby to the modes of production of which they are¶ constituents; or, as Simondon puts it, ‘‘In order to make a machine automatic, it is¶ necessary to sacrifice many of its functional possibilities and many of its possible¶ uses’’ (1980, p. 13). To be automated is for the machine to be de-mechanized just as¶ the laborers pantomiming appear to be dehumanized through their automatic¶ movements. By absenting the machines from view, Maquilapolis allows the spectator¶ Virtual Realities of Maquilapolis and Sleep Dealer 175¶ to visualize and think awry the machine production in these factories. Rather than¶ being dazzled by the fascinating movements of complex machines, the spectator is¶ liberated to conceptualize this mode of production as effects. Because there is no¶ machine here against which to rage, we can see and think about the laborers in relation¶ to the maquiladora machines that are poisoning the watershed, including these people¶ and their families. The point is not to dismiss the notion of dehumanization, but to¶ shift the focus to the way the machines we are not shown are not neutral objects. Yet,¶ the machines are negative objects because of their participation in structures that¶ exploit labor and commit mass acts of ecological degradation.

### 2ac framework v t

Wm status quo conceptualizes nature as economic our affirmative engages that conceptualization

Counterinterp the aff can have a discussion about the topic rather than a topical discussion solves their offense because the debates they want to occur still happen

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-role of the ballot is to relate to mexico’s ecosystem not to win hypothetical implementation of a topical action is good means we precede T

We meet – we’re not an environmental treaty we’re ee in the context of the environment

### 2ac t proper

#### Their pre-conceived definition is another link – we should rather critically re-conceptualize economic engagement

[Demartino 11 (George F. Demartino is professor and co-director at University of Denver, MA in Global, Finance, Trade and Economic Integration “Ethical engagement in a world beyond control” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CC8QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fportfolio.du.edu%2Fportfolio%2Fgetportfoliofile%3Fuid%3D227663&ei=xC3TUYv2GcOoyAHQ54DgCw&usg=AFQjCNFTnNLRWOelypLIF35TwVe1HNFdxw&sig2=x\_GWn3i7iLcMuSiJh3SAng)//BK](file:///K:\Documents\My%20Projects\West\Debate\Policy\PreSeasonDebate2013\MNDI\Demartino%2011%20(George%20F.%20Demartino%20is%20professor%20and co-director%20at%20University%20of%20Denver,%20MA%20in%20Global,%20Finance,%20Trade%20and%20Economic%20Integration)

In A Postcapitalist Politics, “An Ethics of the Local” (2003) and other work Gibson-Graham explore the power of language and theory, but also interpersonal encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming these obstacles. What they would later come to call “hybrid research collectives” came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for pursuing projects of economic emancipation. The collective joins university and community-based researchers with other community members in joint projects to inventory already existing alternative economic practices and indigenous resources and capacities, and to imagine and pursue economic practices and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just **what economic forms are and are not achievable and sustainable.** A central goal is to proliferate economic forms—to generate a vibrant economic ecosystem populated by all sorts of economic species—**rather than to pursue a pre-defined set of models of economic engagement.**

#### Counter interpretation Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas

Bond and Paterson, 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, economic engagement merits separate and detailed analysis. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

-They arbitrarily exclude the affirmative, that’s a voting issue because the neg will always win, terminally impacted by the Bryant evidence this empirically leads to silencing the voice of marginalized groups ensuring oppression

Reasonability -avoids infinite regress

### 2ac k

Conceded that your role as an academic is to evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis – the alternative is not an environmental practice all I need to win is that the aff practice is comparatively better than status quo environmental praxis

The role of the ballot is which team best develops a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem we’ll win that our methodology is superior to theirs

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

#### Anthro rc of race

Best 6(Steven, Intl Journal of Inclusive Democracy, http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2\_no3\_Best\_rethinking\_revolution\_PRINTABLE.htm)

The next great step in moral evolution is to abolish the last acceptable form of slavery that subjugates the vast majority of species on this planet to the violent whim of one. Moral advance today involves sending human supremacy to the same refuse bin that society earlier discarded much male supremacy and white supremacy. Animal liberation requires that people transcend the complacent boundaries of humanism in order to make a qualitative leap in ethical consideration, thereby moving the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. Animal liberation is the culmination of a vast historical learning process whereby human beings gradually realize that arguments justifying hierarchy, inequality, and discrimination of any kind are arbitrary, baseless, and fallacious. Moral progress occurs in the process of demystifying and deconstructing all myths ―from ancient patriarchy and the divine right of kings to Social Darwinism and speciesism― that attempt to legitimate the domination of one group over another. Moral progress advances through the dynamic of replacing hierarchical visions with egalitarian visions and developing a broader and more inclusive ethical community. Having recognized the illogical and unjustifiable rationales used to oppress blacks, women, and other disadvantaged groups, society is beginning to grasp that speciesism is another unsubstantiated form of oppression and discrimination. The gross inconsistency of Leftists who champion democracy and rights while supporting a system that enslaves billions of other sentient and intelligent life forms is on par with the hypocrisy of American colonists protesting British tyranny while enslaving millions of blacks. The commonalities of oppression help us to narrativize the history of human moral consciousness, and to map the emergence of moral progress in our culture. This trajectory can be traced through the gradual universalization of rights. By grasping the similarities of experience and oppression, we gain insight into the nature of power, we discern the expansive boundaries of the moral community, and we acquire a new vision of progress and civilization, one based upon ecological and non-speciesist principles and universal justice.

The alt simply rejects the aff that’s a voting issue

Neg will always control the direction of offense – deters 2ac answers

Arbitrarily fiats the ballot as a solvency mechanism

Neg must have a specific solvency advocate

Literature is the litmus test for fairness – impossible to generate offense

Disincentivizes research – portable skill

**Coloniality is inevitable and the attempts to singularize a notion of coloniality is impossible – the affirmative is a productive engagement to break down the negative effects of colonialism and the alternative reentrenches exclusion**

Pheng **Cheah** is Associate Professor of Rhetoric. **2006** http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies

Mignolo announces nothing less than a radical critique of modernity that seeks to situate it within what he calls “coloniality.” By the term “coloniality,” he seems to designate something that is much wider than the related historical projects of imperialism and colonialism. It refers to an epochal condition and an epistemological frame that binds these historical projects to modernity in an inseverable manner. Mignolo suggests that a totalitarian idea of totality is a key feature of modernity. Modernity conserves itself as a totality by positing an “outside” of Europe and the North Atlantic that is excluded from modernity through a discourse of racism. The rhetoric of modernity therefore leads inevitably to a logic of coloniality. This frame also engulfs the present and underwrites much radical thought that occurs under the rubric of “emancipation,” including Marx’s idea of a proletarian revolution as well as Toni Negri and Michael Hardt’s idea of the multitude, but also varieties of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonial theory. What Mignolo counterposes to this entire formation is a project of liberation that involves delinking from coloniality and modernity. He calls this project “decoloniality” and it involves generalizing the experiences of decolonization and anticolonial struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as the experiences of the damnés, the wretched of the earth, into a new epistemic frame. The project of decoloniality therefore involves a double gesture: first, the re-embodiment and relocation of thought in order to unmask the limited situation of modern knowledges and their link to coloniality, and second, an-other thinking that calls for plurality and intercultural dialogue, especially within the South. Mignolo’s manifesto is syncretically rich and wide-ranging in its scope and polemical reach. It traverses the discourses of philosophy and various social sciences and the humanities and also draws on radical activist discourse. But more importantly, it is so uplifting in its spirit of demagogic optimism that it is difficult to disagree with most of its exhortations. I would like to begin by focusing on a rhetorical gesture that runs throughout Professor Mignolo’s text. The single word title of the text, “Delinking,” is identical to a book written by the Marxist political economist, Samir Amin (Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World). Yet, Mignolo repeatedly distances his project from that of Amin (and all dependency theory) for at least two reasons. First, Amin only conceived of political and economic delinking, i.e. delinking in the sphere of political economy. He did not understand the urgent need for delinking at the epistemic level, the more fundamental level of thought. Hence, Amin’s project fails to break with the modern concept of totality. Second, and as a consequence of this failure to engage in epistemic delinking, Amin remains caught up in the modern disembodied universalistic project of Marxism. It is thus not really a radical delinking but only “radical emancipation within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality.” A different polemical critique is directed at the postcolonial theory of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Postcolonial theory may engage in the epistemic questioning of the concept of totality and may also be critical of modernity. However, since it is grounded on the poststructuralism of Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, it is still “a project of scholarly transformation within the academy” that remains internal to Europe. Unlike decoloniality, the postcolonial is not attuned to what Mignolo calls “other sources:” the critique and activism (“radical political and epistemological shifts”) of various important figures from Asia, Africa, and Latin America such as Gandhi, Cabral, and Fanon. What unites these two polemical gestures is a sense of the primacy of the epistemic in undoing coloniality. However, Mignolo also has a rather unusual understanding of the epistemic that gives it a special affinity to the damnés. On the one hand, a Marxist political-economic approach to delinking is not conceptual enough since it does not broach the fundamental level of thought. It fails to take over “epistemic power.” On the other hand, however, the intensely epistemic reflections of postcolonial theory remain too abstract and rarefied. “The epistemic locations for delinking,” Mignolo believes, “come from the emergence of the geo- and body-politics of knowledge.” In other words, the epistemic has to have a material dimension. But its materiality is not that of the structures of political economy but of the corporeal experiences of those who have been excluded from the production of knowledge by modernity. What I would like to focus on are not the details of Mignolo’s polemical criticisms, but instead the account of power implied by his understanding of the epistemic. What is put forward here is a logocentrism of power. For Mignolo, power, whether it is oppressive or liberatory, has a logic that we can chart, decipher, and ultimately correct. There is a logic of coloniality and it has to be counteracted by a logic of decoloniality. Delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not seek to reject modernity and its conceptual system because this is so widespread. It requires instead, Mignolo believes, “border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous.” Coloniality is ultimately always a failure of thought, of knowledge, or of a logic that is dangerous. This is also, in many respects, a top-down theory of power, where power is repressive and emanates from a totalizing source according to a logical design or plan. Events and occurrences up to and including the present are grounded in a logic that is dangerous or mistaken and that needs to be corrected by the intervention of other logics that emanate from the various subjects that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. It is at this point that the question of the re-embodiment and relocation of knowledge becomes crucial. For Mignolo admits that the project of epistemic delinking may sound “somewhat messianic.” I would say perhaps “idealistic” in the colloquial sense. However, he immediately asserts that it is “an orientation that in the first decade of the 21st century has shown its potential and its viability,” for example, in the various World Social Forums. Many historical examples of liberation are also adduced: the Amaru rising in Peru, the Hatian revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa. As opposed to the false other that modernity has invented as its exteriority or outside, the outside that it has excluded in order to create itself, these truly other voices introduce “other cosmologies into the dominance and hegemony of Western cosmological variations within the same rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality.” The logic of decoloniality was then explicitly thematized in the thought of radical Arabo-Islamic thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Ayatollah Khomeini and by philosophy of liberation in Latin America and by first-nation intellectuals. The stress is placed on the importance of “other” languages that have been negated by colonial modernity. The argument here is similar to the epistemology of location in feminist theory and critical race theory (for example, Luce Irigaray). I would like to end by posing two questions concerning the two main limbs of Mignolo’s argument: the primacy of the epistemic and the urgency of embodying and locating knowledge. First, does power in fact operate according to a logic and from a totalizing source that represses and subjugates those it has excluded in contemporary globalization? Is the link between modernity and coloniality primarily epistemic in character? It is interesting to note from this perspective that when Mignolo attempts to establish the epistemic link between modernity and coloniality, he relies on a historical biography and the fiction of a collective will or intention to dominate and colonize: “The rhetoric of modernity has been predominantly put forward by European men of letters, philosophers, intellectuals, officers of the state. The modern/colonial power differential was, of course, structured at all levels (economic, political, epistemological, militarily), but it was at the epistemological level that the rhetoric of modernity gained currency. If we had time to go into the biography of the main voices that conceived ‘modernity’ as the series of historical events….all of them would originate in one of the six European countries leading the Renaissance, the colonial expansion and capitalist formation, and the European Enlightenment.” In this view, development in the postcolonial world would be an ideological ruse of the logic of coloniality that forecloses the voices of marginalized peoples. Yet, one might argue that exploitative development in contemporary globalization operates not by racist techniques of exclusion and marginalization, but precisely by including, integrating, and assimilating every being into the circuit of the international division of labor. This is done by transforming them into reserve labor power through techniques of what Foucault called biopower. But we would here need to understand biopower in a different way from Mignolo’s understanding of biopolitics or body-politics, a difference that he also acknowledges. This different understanding of power as productive as opposed to repressive seems especially important in contemporary globalization where the flows of transnational capital fabricate the economic well-being of nation-states and their individual citizens. First, at the macrological level of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. In other words, the current state of power relations is an effect of multiple processes that are dynamic, heterogeneous, and unstable, processes that cannot be reduced to a single logic of coloniality, although the latter can emerge as their effect. What is the relation between these two different conceptions of biopolitics? Do they contradict each other? How would the wretched of the earth fit into this alternative cartography of global power that I have sketched? This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so. One would need to look at the true heterogeneity of the outside and the complex and multifarious technologies that fabricate these various outsides, not just at the level of a racist rhetoric of exclusion, but at the most concrete level of the production of the bodily needs and interests of subjects claiming alterity.

**The problem is not that of the state but rather the duality of the alternative – embracing the permutation is the best option**

Walter D. Mignolo, doctor of semiotics and literary theory, professor of decoloniality at Duke University, and professor Madina Tlostanova, doctor of literature and postcolonial studies, professor at People’s Friendship University of Russia. Times for re-thinking, re-learning and networking Ljubljana, February 2009 http://kristinabozic.wordpress.com/decolonization-interview/

Prof Mignolo: Well, we have also the decolonial option. We are not pursuing socialism. Socialism is the same system as capitalism, only with different content. Liberalism says free enterprise, free trade, individuality. Socialism says state, communality. Both are western, 18th century ways of societies’ conceptions. Both are imperial projects – imperial socialist Soviet empire or imperial liberal capitalist West. The question therefore is how to step out of this imperial colonial system of organizing life, economy and society. And here comes the decolonial option. One of its basics is that economy should not be economy of exploitation and accumulation but economy of administration of scarcity. There are limited resources. We should not be fighting for natural resources, for control of the land and to accumulate wealth. Nor is the solution the socialist plan from the above that has the same vices as capitalism. We have to conceive a new, different way of life that is neither capitalist nor socialist, as we understand the last after Marx and Soviet Union. This is where decolonial thinking is going. We are learning from social and economic organizations of the indigenous communities in South America, from their indigenous leaders and intellectuals. The question is how to re-inscribe the economy of reciprocity into the contemporary world. An economy that is aware of scarcity. Future is neither capitalist nor socialist. Our problem is we think these are the only ways how to think future. We want to change this by what we call de-linking. This system has worked for 400 years but it is not working any more. World has changed. There are 6 billion people on the planet, soon there will be 8 billion. We are not talking of a revolution, of Russian or French kind. Something else is going to happen. We can see it. On one hand we can see that socialism destroyed itself with a little help of capitalism. But now capitalism is destroying itself! Hour of its destruction is not an hour of socialism that will fight and destroy it from the outside. Capitalism is killing itself. In Iraq we have the control of authority and of economy. Yet we can not do it anymore. Not in the way that was possible to think and do it in the 19th century. On the other hand we witness emergence of the global political society. It is not the state, it is not the economy and it is not the civil society that buys 4-wheel trucks and votes. It is a political society that brings together all kinds of movements – environmental, women of color, sovereignty of food, fisherman in Indonesia … From there something new is emerging. I am not sure what. However, times of master plans like the Lenin’s or the plan of free-trade society are over. All these global movements join in their antipathy towards capitalism as well as socialism. They are not thinking from Marx’s or Hobbes’ perspective. They are thinking from their own national perspective. This is the new kind of thinking that is emerging. It can be found everywhere. If we read Hobbes to decide what to do, we are actually saving capitalism. We are trying to save Hobbes. We forget to think where we stand and what is going on around us. We need to start thinking from our bodies, their geopolitical position. Then we can realize that we are not alone. You are a woman, a Slovenian, you are white, but then again your white is not the same as British white. So you start to think that you are an active, productive part of a specific community. That is what decolonialisation is about. So saying that we are seeing capitalism redefining itself really comes down to saving Marx? Prof Mignolo: The colonial matrix was basically constructed by the Christians. It was towards the 18th century that colonial power becomes controlled by this new emerging class we today call bourgeoisie. They had built the world they wanted to build and up to today they have kept their control. We are still running behind trying to critique them. At the time the colonial matrix of power was renewed but from the 18th to the 20th century it was in the hands of the Euro-American white male bourgeoisie. They fought but when China and Russia or Ahmadinejad emerged they stood together. What is happening now with this constant renewal of capitalism is that China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela are standing up as well. The colonial matrix of power has got out of the hands of previous Euro-American elite. The conflict of the future could be like WWI and WWII because for five hundred years colonial matrix has been used by the same people – white Christian Euro-American male. Now “slaves”, people left behind, dubbed second class citizens are taking up this matrix. How will capitalism renew itself in this situation? I think it will create a conflict. However, this can create and open wonderful spaces for the emerging political society. A society that is pluriversal and § Marked 14:06 § global. It is today’s equivalent of the bourgeoisie of the 18th century that fought for the emancipation from church and monarchy. This I think is a close-future. Capitalist polycentric world with an emerging powerful political society. It is unknown to us because CNN does not show us it exists. This political society does not have its CNN. What it is doing for the time being, what we are doing is networking through video, internet, the new-thinking newspapers … Prof Tlostanova, you seem to be more pessimistic. You talk of Russians, who are disillusioned, who see no solutions for how to change things? Prof Tlostanova: The problem with the post-Soviet space – Russia and its proper colonies – is that any kind of indigenous subjectivity that could have existed there has been strangled by the Russian, the Czarist or the Soviet empire in many levels of colonization. In Central and South America there are all sorts of indigenous thinking still alive and they create beautiful systems that have dialogues with contemporary reality and interact with it in many interesting ways. In Russia there is nothing like that. It goes back into history to the orthodox Christianity that sees human being as a worm, worth nothing. The lack of any civil or political society goes back centuries. The problem as I see it in Russia is that there is nothing to go back to. There is no living tradition of thought, alternative to both capitalism and socialism. There is no group of people able to offer something that is not derived from capitalism or socialism. Russian intellectuals either turn to nationalism, its fascist kind, or they repeat the liberal talk. There is nothing in between. No mediation, which is unfortunately another feature of Russian culture. It thinks in dualities. It does not have mechanism to find something in between, to join these dualities and see what could be constructed out of both. The only hope is in the ex-colonies of Russia, mainly the non-European ones – the Northern Caucasus, Chechnya, ex-colonies in the Central Asia – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan … they have experienced Russian colonialism up to its highest degree, yet there has remained certain subjectivity, that has got round and has not only survived but has created certain resistance. If there is to be any hope it is to be found there rather than in Russia.

### a2 rc

#### Race CAN’T be the root of our aff – be skeptical of their ev

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Another major focus of environmental justice scholarship has always been a move beyond the simple description and documentation of inequity into a thorough analysis of the underlying reasons for that injustice. Initially, the central explanatory focus was racism. Environmental justice wasn’t simply about establishing the fact that more environmental bads and risks were being put on minority communities – it endeavoured to explore the question of why those communities were devalued in the first place. One of the original popularisers of the term environmental racism was Benjamin Chavis, then head of the United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice – the organisation that published the influential study of Toxic Wastes and Race. The practice, and experience, of racism has been at the heart of environmental justice discourse in the United States – so much so that Getches and Pellow (2002) once made the argument that the term, and movement, should actually be limited to communities of colour. Pellow’s (2004, 2007) work has clearly extended an analysis of racial discrimination, and connected it to the practices of capital§ Marked 13:58 § . Following that analysis, Mohai et al. (2009) lay out three interrelated causal factors for environmental injustice. First, economic considerations address both the impoverishment of impacted populations and the reasoning for industrial externalisation of social and environmental costs. Second, industry and government seek the path of least resistance to development, and poor and racial minority communities make easier targets. Finally, a distinct form of racism simply associates communities of colour with pollution. Any and all of these cultural and institutional structures contribute to the construction of inequity, misrecognition, exclusion, and the generalised injustice confronted by communities and movement organisations. Still, the central idea is that generalised social injustices are manifest in environmental conditions, among other ways.

#### Specifically in the context of Mexico

Carruthers 7 (David V. Carruthers; “Environmental justice and the politics of energy on the US–Mexico border”; Environmental Politics Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007; pages 394-413; KDUB)

Consider race. Environmental justice appeared in the US as an extension of civil rights struggles into environmental health; the environmental justice movement built directly on that rhetoric, organisational experience, and those institutions. If we think of environmental justice in such strict terms, only in parts of the Caribbean and Brazil might we find a comparable legacy of slavery, segregation, and racial struggle. Yet race-based struggles for rights and citizenship have been present across centuries of Latin American history. Latin America’s indigenous people face some of the region’s most egregious social and environmental inequities, though the fusion of environmental and justice concerns takes very different forms around the region. We should also not expect the geographic and socioeconomic assertions of US-styled environmental justice to hold in other contexts. US analysts confirm the disproportionate siting of industrial hazards in minority communities by mapping the hazards over race or income data. Yet in urban northern Mexico, we do not find clear correlations between poverty or ethnicity and environmental risk. Industrial hazards are widely distributed throughout the metropolitan zones and outskirts, and risks faced by lower and working class residents are not consistently greater than those faced by the middle or even upper middle classes. While we often find higher risks facing the poorest, most recent immigrants, that is more typically a function of urban growth patterns that produce squatter settlements near factories; it is not a counterpart to policy choices that deliberately impose hazards on minority communities – what David Pellow calls the ‘perpetrator–victim scenario’ (2000b)

### Cp

Perm do both

Permutation remove the dams and relate to mexico’s ecosystem

Ev in the context of pacific northwestern

CP doesn’t access role of the ballot Castellano is very specific insofar as only applied ecology can facilitate the interdisciplinary context necessary for a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

Their framing is bad and results in political apathy because instead of fixing a problem we constantly shift the blame for failure on an external entity – in this case the state - Lichatovich

The counterplan is not competitive – the exact proposed plan of action is irrelevant in a world we don’t need to defend fiat to gain access to our advantage

#### Detaching theory and practice mean they don’t solve

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

This focus on the relationship between practice and theory has also been central to my attempts to understand the ‘justice’ of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, 2007). Many attempts to define environmental or climate justice have been too detached from the actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an organising theme or identity. This does assume that there is a value to movement practice – that theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements. Why, the more purist academic or sceptic might ask, should we prioritise what activists believe or do? But the question should not be about who is the best judge of a conception of justice – activists or theorists. The point is that different discourses of justice, and the various experiences and articulations of injustice, inform how the concept is used, understood, articulated, and demanded in practice; the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study. It continues to be unfortunate that there are those in the study of environmentalism, or in the theoretical realm, who simply cannot see the importance, and range, of these articulations at the intersection of theory and practice – especially when movement innovation is as broad and informative as it is in environmental justice.

### 2ac disad

Disad is irrelevant

-role of the ballot is who establishes the best relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

-Schlossberg indicates it’s a debate about competing approaches to environmental praxis they need to win a link to our method

-the disad is a reason why passing the plan would be bad not a reason why proposing the plan is a bad idea we don’t defend a hypothetical world in which the usfg passes the plan

It’s inevitable

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-the human animal hierarchy is the root cause of oppression

Our aff is a prerequisite-if existence has no meaning they have no impact that’s Becker

Catastrophic impacts are a way of silencing our advocacy, endorsing their kind of discourse legitimizes the oppression of minorities that’s Bryant