### 2ac short – rc & ontology

Squo conceptualizes Mexico’s ecosystem as devoid of intrinsic value this results in arbitrary hierarchies between forms of life ie: humans and animals; this underscores all other modes of oppression and precedes their root cause arguments because the human animal distinction occurred structurally prior to distinctions within the species

Separating the environment from humanity also precludes ones ability to feel that they belong in the universe, a lack of belonging results in a constant horror of isolation precluding ones ability to embrace subjectivity

### 2ac framework v t

Wm status quo conceptualizes nature as economic our affirmative engages that conceptualization

Counterinterp the aff can have a discussion about the topic rather than a topical discussion solves their offense because the debates they want to occur still happen

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-role of the ballot is to relate to mexico’s ecosystem not to win hypothetical implementation of a topical action is good means we precede T

#### The lack of assistance for environmental protection impairs effective environmental protection in Mexico – plan solves

USMBC 9 (“New Horizons in United States-Mexico Relations” A report by the U.S.-Mexico Binational Council, University of Texas at Austin Staff, CSIS Mexico Project Staff, Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo Staff, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico Staff)

Funding Governmental Capacity to Protect the Environment The implementation of NAFTA and its environmental side accord has pushed Mexico and its Environmental and Natural Resources Ministry (SEMARNAT) to a level of environmental performance for which it is both underfunded and unprepared. SEMARNAT needs assistance in developing both its institutional and its technical ability to implement domestic environmental programs and international cooperative efforts. Therefore, additional funding should be provided and augmented by technical assistance from the United States § Marked 22:49 § via the CEC, along the lines proposed below. Binational Advisory Committees Independent consulting committees from both countries-including nongovernmental organizations-should work together to establish clear-cut environmental goals. These committees should also set goals and time frames for providing technical assistance to Mexican federal authorities. Harmonization of Indicators The two countries should work to improve and harmonize environmental indicators in the existing databases on environmental indicators for both countries. This measure will make clear country-to-country' comparisons possible. State and Local Authority The federal governments of both nations should look for creative opportunities to divest power to the states and localities. A presidential directive can make it possible, tor example, to authorize trans-boundary port authorities to manage fees and float bonds similar to the functions performed by the Port Authorits' of New York and New Jersey. State and Local Taxation Mexicos federal government should enhance the authority' of local and state governments to assess and collect taxes for infrastructure development and to incur debt to finance such projects. Technical Assistance to the States Federal U.S. funding should include technical assistance for environmental programs that are jointly undertaken by individual states in Mexico and in the United States. Nonprofit Sector Contributions Regional nonprofit organizations have been helpful in the binational environ men- tal relationship, including the updating of Mexico's emissions inventory system and increased application and implementation ot" current environmental laws. Enhanced U.S. and international funding can be provided to activities of nonprofit organizations that are aimed at solving environmental problems in the border region.

### 2ac t proper

#### Their pre-conceived definition is another link – we should rather critically re-conceptualize economic engagement

[Demartino 11 (George F. Demartino is professor and co-director at University of Denver, MA in Global, Finance, Trade and Economic Integration “Ethical engagement in a world beyond control” https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CC8QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fportfolio.du.edu%2Fportfolio%2Fgetportfoliofile%3Fuid%3D227663&ei=xC3TUYv2GcOoyAHQ54DgCw&usg=AFQjCNFTnNLRWOelypLIF35TwVe1HNFdxw&sig2=x\_GWn3i7iLcMuSiJh3SAng)//BK](file:///K%3A%5CDocuments%5CMy%20Projects%5CWest%5CDebate%5CPolicy%5CPreSeasonDebate2013%5CMNDI%5CDemartino%2011%20%28George%20F.%20Demartino%20is%20professor%20and%C2%A0co-director%20at%20University%20of%20Denver%2C%20MA%20in%20Global%2C%20Finance%2C%20Trade%20and%20Economic%20Integration)

In A Postcapitalist Politics, “An Ethics of the Local” (2003) and other work Gibson-Graham explore the power of language and theory, but also interpersonal encounter and collaboration, in confronting and overcoming these obstacles. What they would later come to call “hybrid research collectives” came to serve as the chief practical vehicle for pursuing projects of economic emancipation. The collective joins university and community-based researchers with other community members in joint projects to inventory already existing alternative economic practices and indigenous resources and capacities, and to imagine and pursue economic practices and build economic institutions that defy traditional conceptions of just **what economic forms are and are not achievable and sustainable.** A central goal is to proliferate economic forms—to generate a vibrant economic ecosystem populated by all sorts of economic species—**rather than to pursue a pre-defined set of models of economic engagement.**

#### Counter interpretation Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas

Bond and Paterson, 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, economic engagement merits separate and detailed analysis. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

-They arbitrarily exclude the affirmative, that’s a voting issue because the neg will always win, terminally impacted by the Bryant evidence this empirically leads to silencing the voice of marginalized groups ensuring oppression

Reasonability -avoids infinite regress

Extra t – no link

Inev – diplomatic engagement

Good – ground

#### Questions of methodology are the most important ones - they dictate how conclusions are achieved

Bartlett, 1990 (Katharine, professor of law at Duke University, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [\*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

### 2ac specification args

We meet –

Forcing the neg to read through 1AC evidence is good, this is the way they actually learn about what our research says

Cross ex checks

Solves ground – they can just look through our lit

That means no abuse – as long as they have ground there’s no reason we should lose

Counterinterp – the aff has to defend specificity to the extent of the resolution/literature

Resolutional basis – all the rez says is that we need to use the fedgov, no reason we should overspecify

Best for ground – they get their agency links as long as we use a federal agent

Overspecification is worse – we could just chose an obscure agent that jacks their ground

Potential abuse is not a voter – just cuz debate could be better doesn’t mean that we should lose

#### Emphasizing the legal and technical minutiae of environmentalism disempowers local communities who are rendered passive in the face of expertise debate

**Shutkin in 2000** (William, Urban Studies and Planning at M.I.T., The Land That Could Be: Environmentalism And Democracy In The Twenty-First Century, P. Ebook)

**With its emphasis on legal and technical solutions, mainstream-professional environmentalism has failed to encourage active political and civic participation. The legal and technical nature of mainstream-professional environmentalism has given it the appearance of being almost apolitical**—beyond politics and **in the realm of neutral expertise.** Viewed as a high-powered elite with access to government and industry leaders, mainstream-professional environmentalists have inadvertently disempowered local constituencies, who are often left feeling they are not heard in determining environmental outcomes and that the issues that matter to them are generally not of concern to mainstream-professional environmentalists. With its direct mail machinery, centralized structure, and top-down decision making, mainstream-professional environmentalism has cultivated a largely passive constituency and in the process has stripped itself of the ability to activate and inspire robust political participation and civic engagement§ Marked 22:52 § , the very forces that can hold decision makers accountable, prevent environmental harms, and institute local and regional environmental strategies like smart growth and brownfields redevelopment. ¶ This kind of environmentalism has relied on legal and advocacy tools often at the expense of other techniques, such as community and regional planning, which both engages local stakeholders and establishes meaningful environmental and social goals. Planners and their expansive toolbox of ideas and practices aimed at building livable, health communities comprise a separate tradition from mainstream-professional environmentalism. In the light of the traditional disjunction between environmental law and policy on the one hand and land use and planning on the other, the failure of environmentalism to embrace proactive, planning-oriented strategies is understandable, though unfortunate. The ideas of visionary planners, from Frederick Law Olmsted, Lewis Mumford, and Jane Jacobs, to Benton MacKaye, Ian MacHarg, and Robert Yaro, have remained outside the sphere of mainstream-professional environmental advocacy, resulting in a largely after-the-fact approach to environmental problem-solving. ¶ Moreover, without an engaged constituency behind them, mainstream-professional environmentalists have been at a disadvantage in dealing with the influence of corporations and other private actors on the design and enforcement of environmental laws. As new initiatives like Project XL and ERP demonstrate, **even the most well-intentioned policies can falter in the absence of the full participation of community stakeholders**. Mainstream-professional environmentalists have not prepared these stakeholders to participate in initiatives like Project XL or ERP and have failed to marshal the broad-based political power necessary to level the playing field of environmental law and policy. ¶ The elitism and homogeneity of traditional environmentalism is further evidence of the movement's democratic deficits. Only recently bothering to reach out across racial or economic lines, mainstream-professional environmentalism has alienated racial minorities and the working class, who traditionally have not identified with environmentalists. Moreover, notwithstanding the progress of the past several decades, environmental harms have not let up in lower-income and minority communities, revealing a gap in mainstream-professional environmentalism's advocacy agenda or, worse, **confirming the success of the environmental law and policy system.** As environmental justice attorney Luke Cole writes, ¶ Environmental laws are not designed by or for poor people. The theory and ideology behind environmental laws ignores the systemic genesis of pollution. Environmental statutes actually legitimate the pollution of low-income neighborhoods. Further, those with political and economic power have used environmental laws in ways which have resulted in poor people bearing a disproportionate share of environmental hazards.... ¶ Mainstream environmentalists see pollution as the failure of government and industry—if the environmentalists could only shape up the few bad apples, our environment would be protected. But grassroots activists come to view pollution as the success of government and industry, success at industry's primary objective: maximizing profits by externalizing environmental costs. Pollution of our air, land, and water that is literally killing people is often not in violation of environmental laws. 54

#### You are not a policy-maker—pretending you are absolves individual responsibility for violence – makes serial policy failure inevitable and is an independent reason to vote affirmative --- kind of education we get is necessarily flawed, passive in the face of educational shit, even if we become policymakers we won’t do anything

Kappeler, 1995 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence § Marked 22:53 § in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)

\_\_\_[their agent] is a VI

No actor can decide whether to use the usfg or \_\_\_\_

Fiats through usfg key warrants means no 2ac offense

Comparative solvency advocate in the context of the aff solves their offense

### 2ac cp

Not relevant

-Schlosberg indicates it’s a debate about competing environmental praxis’s, the counterplan doesn’t compete

-the exact proposed plan of action is irrelevant in a world we don’t need to defend fiat to gain access to our advantage

#### Detaching theory and practice mean they don’t solve

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

This focus on the relationship between practice and theory has also been central to my attempts to understand the ‘justice’ of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, 2007). Many attempts to define environmental or climate justice have been too detached from the actual demands of social movements that use the idea as an organising theme or identity. This does assume that there is a value to movement practice – that theory can, and should, actually learn from the language, demands, and action of movements. Why, the more purist academic or sceptic might ask, should we prioritise what activists believe or do? But the question should not be about who is the best judge of a conception of justice – activists or theorists. The point is that different discourses of justice, and the various experiences and articulations of injustice, inform how the concept is used, understood, articulated, and demanded in practice; the engagement with what is articulated on the ground is of crucial value to our understanding and development of the concepts we study. It continues to be unfortunate that there are those in the study of environmentalism, or in the theoretical realm, who simply cannot see the importance, and range, of these articulations at the intersection of theory and practice – especially when movement innovation is as broad and informative as it is in environmental justice.

Alternate mechanisms to solve harms shift the blame for the problem to someone else and result in political deadlock while letting river species die

#### Their counterplan reinforces ineffective frameworks for addressing environmental degradation

Hovden 99 (Eivind Hovden; Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; 1999; “As if nature doesn't matter: Ecology, regime theory and¶ international relations”; Environmental Politics, 8:2, 50-74; KDUB)

The above points should go some way to illustrate how some IR¶ theorists have arrived at the idea that there are severe limitations in the¶ regime theoretical approach to global environmental degradation.¶ Environmental problems appear to have been taken out of a very specific¶ historical and social context and viewed much like any other problem of¶ international co-operation. By doing this, regime theorists confine the¶ debate to questions of governance and collective action, which regime¶ theory, as pointed out above, always has had as its central concern. Rather¶ than considering the possibility that the environmental crisis may have¶ epistemological implications for social science, the problem is approach¶ through an already existing framework of regime theory.¶ An important problem seems to lie in the regime theoretical¶ understanding of environmental problems primarily, if not exclusively, as¶ problems of co-operation. Haas et al. argue that, '[t]he international¶ community's ability to preserve the planet for future generations depends¶ upon international co-operation. Successful co-operation, in turn, requires¶ effective international institutions to guide international behaviour along a¶ path of sustainable development' [Haas et al., 1993: 4]. At one level, this¶ appears to be a reasonable diagnosis. Nevertheless, this is bound to be a¶ very limited understanding of the nature of the problem of achieving a more¶ sustainable world. While, admittedly, there are areas where a lack of¶ effective institutions lead to continued environmental degradation,¶ historically, environmental degradation has not come about because states¶ have been unable to co-operate. On the contrary, it could just as well be¶ argued that co-operation has been an aggravating factor as much as an¶ alleviating one.

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### 2ac disad

Disad is irrelevant

-role of the ballot is who establishes the best relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem

-Schlossberg indicates it’s a debate about competing approaches to environmental praxis they need to win a link to our method

-the disad is a reason why passing the plan would be bad not a reason why proposing the plan is a bad idea we don’t defend a hypothetical world in which the usfg passes the plan

It’s inevitable

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy