### 2ac short – rc & ontology

Squo conceptualizes Mexico’s ecosystem as devoid of intrinsic value this results in arbitrary hierarchies between forms of life ie: humans and animals; this underscores all other modes of oppression and precedes their root cause arguments because the human animal distinction occurred structurally prior to distinctions within the species

Separating the environment from humanity also precludes ones ability to feel that they belong in the universe, a lack of belonging results in a constant horror of isolation precluding ones ability to embrace subjectivity

## fw

### 2ac framework

Wm we defend a hypothetical world in which the plan is implemented – no pre-round, cross ex, or evidential clarification in the 1ac means this is the only objective argument

-no new offense or modifications to their interpretation in the block – that skews the 1ar if they try to do this you should sign your ballot and leave

Our plan text is hyper specific

Wm we are in direction of the topic

Wm we engage in a discussion of the topic

Wm govt policy is a means to achieve ecoprag – we propose a govt policy

C/i: vote for who best utilizes a theoretical framework for approaching policy in the context of the ecosystem, if they win a method that disagrees with ours they win the debate

#### Resolved before the colon means reserved – it’s the starting point for discussion

**Evans, 1** (Nathan Kirk, CEDA Debate, “A2: Jeff P-Is the resolution a question?,” http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2001-February/030719.html)

The resolution is not a question. It is a statement that has "resolved" on one side and a normative statement on the other separated by a colon. What is the meaning of "resolved?" I know Bill Shanahan has made the argument that "resolved" means "reserved," in which case the resolution doesn't require you to arrive at any certainty about the truth of the normative statement. 2. The resolution has no intonation. Thus, various types of ironic and non-serious advocacies could be possible, none of which would prove the "truth" of the resolution: they might prove the opposite. 3. Why all this focus on truth? Language also has "performative" value: it does things. To take an example from Austin, the founder of "performativity" theory, the statement "I do" is not simply a statement of fact. In the context of a marriage ceremony, it does something--it binds a couple in matrimony. Or to take another example, hate speech has effects that can be evaluated outside questions of truth/falsity. Debaters could thus evaluate the performative effect of the resolution outside of its truth value. For example, saying/performing the resolution might be productive even if the resolution is untrue. (Several months ago I wrote out a fairly lengthy explanation of performativity which I could send out if people are still confused about what I mean.) 4. How important is the resolution? Could the resolution just be a springboard for discussion rather than being the prime motivator of debates? There's no debate rule-book that says debates always have to be won or lost on the resolution. If both teams are having a fair and productive debate about DA within the GHA, hasn't the resolution's purpose been served? I know you might not think these possibilities make for the best debate. My point, however, is that there is a debate to be had about what the meaning of the debate forum is and you should allow debaters to have that debate rather than pre-deciding the issue. The difference between debaters being judged and students having their papers graded is that in the latter example students are generally unable to argue in their papers that the standards by which their papers are graded should itself be changed. Debaters, however, have that opportunity.

our interpretation is good

-aff choice, alternative frameworks moot the 1ac and place us at a disadvantage

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-Lee says any politics that disregards anthropocentrism is doomed to failure because of the centrality that anthropocentrism occupies

Their interpretation is bad

-when we get bogged down in the counterplan-disad level of the debate it distracts from broader movements and results in political failures

Reasonability is best

-avoids arbitrary exclusion of affirmatives

-avoids infinite regress

#### Questions of methodology are the most important ones - they dictate how conclusions are achieved

Bartlett, 1990 (Katharine, professor of law at Duke University, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [\*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

## k

### 2ac framing top

Conceded that your role as an academic is to evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis – the alternative is not an environmental practice all I need to win is that the aff practice is comparatively better than status quo environmental praxis

The role of the ballot is which team best develops a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem we’ll win that our methodology is superior to theirs

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

### 2AC AT: Dodds / Psycho

#### **Psychoanalysis in the context of the affirmative is flawed – even their author concedes that it devolves into human centered negotiations which prevents alternative solvency**

Renee Lertzman 12 Royal Roads University, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada Review of Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos: Complexity Theory, DeleuzejGuattari and Psychoanalysis for a Climate in Crisis by Joseph Dodds

Defence’’ leads specifically into how a psychoanalytic perspective can be so valuable for our work in the environmental sectors. It is one of the more astute arguments for why our field would benefit tremendously from a more open and explicit engagement with psychoanalysis as a viable field of research, theory, and practice. Dodds writes, Psychoanalysis cannot provide the answer to how we should respond, but it can help us to think about the difficult questions and to avoid overly simplistic and reassuring answers. It is important to study not only the defensive aspects of anti-environmentalist beliefs, phantasies and behaviors, but also those found in the green movement itself, including flights into superego moralism, reaching for comforting pseudo-solutions, or the collapse into despair. In whatever form they take, social phantasy systems are constructed incorporating differing individual and collective needs, anxieties and defences. (p. 53) Implicit in Dodds’ arguments is a critique of the overwhelming tendency to frame psychological dimensions of environmental threats in terms of ‘‘behavior change.’’ While he may not address this outright, his arguments for why psychoanalysis is so vital for our conceptual orientations, as well as providing rich material to support further research (often pointing out the lack of empirical research—a huge issue in social science research, that goes beyond the scope of the book), imply what we miss when we focus almost exclusively on behavior, metrics and measurements of attitudes, views, beliefs, or values. Dodds’ contributes to and joins a growing community of scholars (Jordan, 2009; Lertzman, 2012a; Randall, 2009; Rust, 2008; Weintrobe, 2012) who are beginning to articulate the depth, richness, and insight offered by decades of psychoana- lytic thought. However, Dodds doesn’t rest easy with psychoanalysis entirely. As others have pointed out (Lertzman, 2012b; Zizek, 2010), psycho- analysis has its blind spots as well. Specifically, going back to the legacy of Freud’s exclusive focus on the human-populated world— interpsychic and the intrapsychic dimensions, also referred to as object relations—psychoanalysis runs the great risk of being too disconnected with the physical, breathing, and natural world, and frankly too caught up in its own intricate theories of the human psyche to take notice of concurrent streams of ecological thought over the past several decades. In other words, when psychoanalysts come to ecological topics, there can be a lack of acknowledgement and recognition of related bodies of work and research that can both support and complement the psychoanalytic contributions. As a re- sult, the risk of appearing ‘‘out of touch’’ and in a bubble continues to be negotiated. That said, there is no question Dodds recognizes the beauty and profundity of psychoanalytic thought, and as others have before (Lertzman, 2004; Nicholsen, 2003; Searles, 1960, 1972). But in rec- ognizing its limitations, he movesusquicklyintoathoughtfulreview of where ecopsychological thinking has brought us.

### reitan stuff

#### Perm solves - Pragmatic action in the face of critique is the only way to break out of recurrent environmental harms

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

What I would like to do here is demonstrate, by way of an example, **the value of pragmatic principles not only for the critique of the modern worldview, but also for guiding the on-going process of developing new, environmentally friendly alternatives**. Perhaps the most useful role of pragmatism for current environmental philosophy lies in its capacity to identify which theoretic debates really matter, and to mediate these debates in terms of shared pragmatic goals--in particular, the goal of cultivating sustainable human-natural systems. With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, **we cannot afford to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing.**

#### Juxtaposition solves – environmental criticism is pluralistic

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

Second, **it is worth noting that there is almost certainly more than one human social arrangement that harmonizes sustainable with the natural environment.** Put another way, **there is more than one set of human practices that works in terms of promoting a healthy** human-natural **system**. And it follows from this observation that more than one¶ worldview can be pragmatically true: while two worldviews may imply environmental behaviors that are different, and hence have a different pragmatic meaning, insofar as they both promote sustainable behaviors they are both true from a pragmatic standpoint. **Pragmatic truth is not monistic, but pluralistic. Given the urgent pragmatic goals of environmental philosophy, sustained theoretic debates about meaning differences of this sort appear to be unwarranted, and should be put aside in favor of the task of finding practical ways of integrating and accommodating those alternative social arrangements** which serve the common goal of sustainable human-natural systems.

#### Alt fails – absent pragmatic action, environmental theorizing continues the destruction of the environment

Reitan ’98- Professor of Philosophy at Oklahoma State University (Eric, “Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability”, 1998, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0th496m4>) //CW

The emerging environmental crisis creates an urgency to make changes in how we live, and there is considerable merit to the claim that we cannot make the changes that are required if we do not alter how we think about the human-natural relationship. **But the urgency for change does not afford us the luxury of pursuing academic debates that lack a clear pragmatic significance. § Marked 11:00 §** Because the incentive driving the development of new environmental worldviews is a pragmatic one, it is important for the theoreticians who construct these new worldviews not to lose sight of the pragmatic meanings of what they build. When two worldviews have pragmatic environmental meanings as close as what we find between Christian stewardship and deep ecology, the appropriate response is mutual support and collaboration, and the discussion should concern how best to integrate the efforts of adherents to either view**. To the extent that environmental theorists can keep these pragmatic meanings in mind, we will see increased cooperation among theorists who emerge from alternative perspectives**, and we will see a greater real-world impact of the work they do.

### 2ac sharpe

#### The alternative fails and can’t explain the aff

Sharpe 10 – lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University

Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182-185

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate – which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan’s notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (*b*), Žižek’s option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose ‘traversal of the fantasy’ is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio- political system or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject–object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (*IDLC* 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Žižek’s model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subject’s entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Žižek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’ – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (*IDLC* 153; *OB* 144–8). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

### 2ac not true

#### No scientific, empirical, or logical basis for psychoanalysis

mootz, 2k (Francis J. ,II, Visiting Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, Yale Journal of the Law & Humanities, 12 Yale J.L. & Human. 299, p. 319-320)

Freudian psychoanalysis increasingly is the target of blistering criticism from a wide variety of commentators. **54** In a recent review, Frederick Crews reports that independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict... that there isliterally **nothing to be said,** scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of theentireFreudiansystem orany ofits component dogmas. Analysis as a whole remains powerless... and understandably so, because a thoroughgoing epistemological critique, based on commonly acknowledgedstandards of evidence and logic decertifies everydistinctivelypsychoanalytic proposition. **55** The most telling criticism of Freud's psychoanalytic theory is that it has proven no more effective in producing therapeutic benefits than have other forms of psychotherapy. 56 Critics draw the obvious conclusion that the benefits (if any) of psychotherapy are neither explained nor facilitated by psychoanalytic theories. Although Freudian psychoanalytic theory purports to provide a truthful account of the operations of the psyche and the causes for mental disturbances, critics argue that psychoanalytic theory may prove in the end to be nothing more than fancy verbiage that tends to obscure whatever healing effects psychotherapeutic dialogue may have. **57** Freudian psychoanalysis failed because it **could not make good on its claim to be** a **rigorous and empirical science**. Although Freud's mystique is premised on a widespread belief that psychoanalysis was a profound innovation made possible by his genius, Freud claimed only that he was extending the scientific research of his day within the organizing context of a biological model of the human mind. **58** [\*320] Freud's adherents created the embarrassing cult of personality and the myth of a self-validating psychoanalytic method only after Freud's empirical claims could not withstand critical scrutiny in accordance with the scientific methodology demanded by his metapsychology. **59** The record is clear that Freud believed that psychoanalysis would take its place among the sciences and that his clinical work provided empirical confirmation of his theories. This belief now appears to be completely **unfounded and indefensible.** Freud's quest for a scientifically grounded psychotherapy was not amateurish or naive. Although Freud viewed his "metapsychology as a set of directives for constructing a scientific psychology," n60 Patricia Kitcher makes a persuasive case that he was not a blind dogmatist who refused to adjust his metapsychology in the face of contradictory evidence. n61 Freud's commitment to the scientific method, coupled with his creative vision, led him to construct a comprehensive and integrative metapsychology that drew from a number of scientific disciplines in an impressive and persuasive manner. n62 However, the natural and social sciences upon which he built his derivative and interdisciplinary approach developed too rapidly and unpredictably for him to respond. n63 As **developments in biology** quickly **undermined Freud's theory**, he "began to look to linguistics and especially to anthropology as more hopeful sources of support," n64 but this strategy later in his career proved equally [\*321] unsuccessful. n65 The scientific justification claimed by Freud literally eroded when the knowledge base underlying his theory **collapsed**, leaving his disciples with the impossible task of defending a theory whose presuppositions no longer were plausible according to their own criteria of validation. n66

#### It’s not falsifiable

Mahrer, 99 (Alvin R., professor emeritus at the University of Ottawa School of Psychology, “Embarrassing Problems for the Field of Psychotherapy” John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Clin Psychol 55: 1147–1156, 1999. p. 1152, via Wiley Inter Science)

11. Psychotherapy Rests on a Foundation of Absolute Truths, Beyond Questioning, Examination, and Falsification Here is a small sample of the absolute truths in the virtual foundation of the field of psychotherapy: There are mental illnesses, diseases, and disorders. Biological, neurological, physiological, and chemical variables are basic to psychological variables. Responses with satisfactory consequences tend to be strengthened**,** andresponses with unsatisfactory consequences tend to be weakened. The brain is a basic determinant of human behavior. There are psychobiological stages of human development. There are universal basic needs, drives, and motivations. Therapists first diagnose and assess the problem or mental disorder and then apply the appropriate treatment. The therapist-client relationship is prerequisite to therapeutic change. Clients seek therapy for relief of problems and distress. The catechism of absolute truths is so hallowed that it is elevatedvirtually beyond serious questioning and examination of wherethesetruths came from, of what endows them with the mantle of absolute truths, and of just why we should worship them as basic scientific knowledge. One common answer is that great thinkers proclaimed them as absolutely true. Another common answer is that they were bequeathed by what we simply accept as more fundamental sciences such as biology, neurology, physiology, and experimental psychology. A third common answer is that they were placed there by basic researchers. However, a serious problem is that these absolute truths are accepted as true more on the basis oftrustingfaith thancarefulquestioning (Feigl, 1959; Feyerabend, 1972; Mahrer, 1995, 1996; Meehl, 1978). Almost without exception, none of these absolute truths has been examined in a way that could find them to be false, wrong, disconfirmed, disproven, or unworthy of a place in a respected pool of absolute truths. Nor have many, if any, of these absolute truths been admitted to or removed from this pool on the basis of rigorous research scrutiny (Chalmers, 1982; O’Donohue, 1989). The conclusion may well be that psychotherapy rests on a foundation of **supposed**ly absolute truths that are beyond questioning, examination, or falsification. Most of what we accept as absolutely true is accepted as true because we unquestioningly accept it as true. Perhaps one solution is to dare to expose our hidden basic axioms, our virtually unquestioned basic truths, to wholesale and refreshing study, examination, and exploration. The first step may consist in identifying just what they are. The next step may involve examining them closely in a spirit of willingness to open them up to careful refinement, modification, or even radical replacement. Here is a powerful challenge and opportunity for theoreticians, philosophers of science, and perhaps researchers.

### 2ac narcissism turn

#### The K cannot be divorced from the narcissism of man – causes us to repeat the tragedy of narcissus

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 14, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

One such vital truth that has long been known is the idea of heroism; but in “normal” scholarly times we never thought of making much out of it, of parading it, or of using it as a central concept. Yet the popular mind always knew how important it was: as William James—who covered just about everything— remarked at the turn of the century: “mankind’s common instinct for reality … has always held the world to be essentially a theatre for heroism.”1 Not only the popular mind knew, but philosophers of all ages, and in our culture especially Emerson and Nietzsche—which is why we still thrill to them: we like to be reminded that our central calling, our main task on this planet, is the heroic.\* One way of looking at the whole development of social science since Marx and of psychology since Freud is that it represents a massive detailing and clarification of the problem of human heroism. This perspective sets the tone for the seriousness of our discussion: we now have the scientific underpinning for a true understanding of the nature of heroism and its place in human life. If “mankind’s common instinct for reality” is right, we have achieved the remarkable feat of exposing that reality in a scientific way. One of the key concepts for understanding man’s urge to heroism is the idea of “narcissism.” As Erich Fromm has so well reminded us, this idea is one of Freud’s great and lasting contributions. Freud discovered that each of us repeats the tragedy of the mythical Greek Narcissus: we are hopelessly absorbed with ourselves. If we care about anyone it is usually ourselves first of all. As Aristotle somewhere put it: luck is when the guy next to you gets hit with the arrow. Twenty-five hundred years of history have not changed man’s basic narcissism; most of the time, for most of us, this is still a workable definition of luck. It is one of the meaner aspects of narcissism that we feel that practically everyone is expendable except ourselves. We should feel prepared, as Emerson once put it, to recreate the whole world out of ourselves even if no one else existed. The thought frightens us; we don’t know how we could do it without others—yet at bottom the basic resource is there: we could suffice alone if need be, if we could trust ourselves as Emerson wanted. And if we don’t feel this trust emotionally, still most of us would struggle to survive with all our powers, no matter how many around us died. Our organism is ready to fill the world all alone, even if our mind shrinks at the thought. This narcissism is what keeps men marching into point-blank fire in wars: at heart one doesn’t feel that he will die, he only feels sorry for the man next to him. Freud’s explanation for this was that the unconscious does not know death or time: in man’s physiochemical, inner organic recesses he feels immortal. None of these observations implies human guile. Man does not seem able to “help” his selfishness; it seems to come from his animal nature. Through countless ages of evolution the organism has had to protect its own integrity; it had its own physiochemical identity and was dedicated to preserving it. This is one of the main problems in organ transplants: the organism protects itself against foreign matter, even if it is a new heart that would keep it alive. The protoplasm itself harbors its own, nurtures itself against the world, against invasions of its integrity. It seems to enjoy its own pulsations, expanding into the world and ingesting pieces of it. If you took a blind and dumb organism and gave it self-consciousness and a name, if you made it stand out of nature and know consciously that it was unique, then you would have narcissism. In man, physiochemical identity and the sense of power and activity have become conscious. In man a working level of narcissism is inseparable from self-esteem, from a basic sense of self-worth. We have learned, mostly from Alfred Adler, that what man needs most is to feel secure in his self-esteem. But man is not just a blind glob of idling protoplasm, but a creature with a name who lives in a world of symbols and dreams and not merely matter. His sense of self-worth is constituted symbolically, his cherished narcissism feeds on symbols, on an abstract idea of his own worth, an idea composed of sounds, words, and images, in the air, in the mind, on paper. And this means that man’s natural yearning for organismic activity, the pleasures of incorporation and expansion, can be fed limitlessly in the domain of symbols and so into immortality. The single organism can expand into dimensions of worlds and times without moving a physical limb; it can take eternity into itself even as it gaspingly dies.

#### This narcissism leads to oppressive systems such as Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and contemporary capitalism

Becker 73 (Earnest, The Denial of Death, pg 15, Ph.D ins Cultural Anthropology, was a professor the University of California at Berkely, San Franciso State College, and Simon Fraser University, and founder of The Ernest Becker Foundation; Kristof)

If we were to peel away this massive disguise, the blocks of repression over human techniques for earning glory, we would arrive at the potentially most liberating question of all, the main problem of human life: How empirically true is the cultural hero system that sustains and drives men? We mentioned the meaner side of man’s urge to cosmic heroism, but there is obviously the noble side as well. Man will lay down his life for his country, his society, his family. He will choose to throw himself on a grenade to save his comrades; he is capable of the highest generosity and self-sacrifice. But he has to feel and believe that what he is doing is truly heroic, timeless, and supremely meaningful. The crisis of modern society is precisely that the youth no longer feel heroic in the plan for action that their culture has set up. They don’t believe it is empirically true to the problems of their lives and times. We are living a crisis of heroism that reaches into every aspect of our social life: the dropouts of university heroism, of business and career heroism, of political-action heroism; the rise of anti-heroes, those who would be heroic each in his own way or like Charles Manson with his special “family”, those whose tormented heroics lash out at the system that itself has ceased to represent agreed heroism. The great perplexity of our time, the churning of our age, is that the youth have sensed—for better or for worse—a great social-historical truth: that just as there are useless self-sacrifices in unjust wars, so too is there an ignoble heroics of whole societies: it can be the viciously destructive heroics of Hitler’s Germany or the plain debasing and silly heroics of the acquisition and display of consumer goods, the piling up of money and privileges that now characterizes whole ways of life, capitalist and Soviet.