### 2ac framework

Wm endorsing our praxis necessitates saying yes to engagement and saying yes to mexico

Wm we engage in a discussion of the topic

Wm govt policy is a means to achieve ecoprag – we propose a govt policy

C/i: vote for who best utilizes a theoretical framework for approaching policy in the context of the ecosystem, if they win a method that disagrees with ours they win the debate

#### Resolved before the colon means reserved – it’s the starting point for discussion

**Evans, 1** (Nathan Kirk, CEDA Debate, “A2: Jeff P-Is the resolution a question?,” http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2001-February/030719.html)

The resolution is not a question. It is a statement that has "resolved" on one side and a normative statement on the other separated by a colon. What is the meaning of "resolved?" I know Bill Shanahan has made the argument that "resolved" means "reserved," in which case the resolution doesn't require you to arrive at any certainty about the truth of the normative statement. 2. The resolution has no intonation. Thus, various types of ironic and non-serious advocacies could be possible, none of which would prove the "truth" of the resolution: they might prove the opposite. 3. Why all this focus on truth? Language also has "performative" value: it does things. To take an example from Austin, the founder of "performativity" theory, the statement "I do" is not simply a statement of fact. In the context of a marriage ceremony, it does something--it binds a couple in matrimony. Or to take another example, hate speech has effects that can be evaluated outside questions of truth/falsity. Debaters could thus evaluate the performative effect of the resolution outside of its truth value. For example, saying/performing the resolution might be productive even if the resolution is untrue. (Several months ago I wrote out a fairly lengthy explanation of performativity which I could send out if people are still confused about what I mean.) 4. How important is the resolution? Could the resolution just be a springboard for discussion rather than being the prime motivator of debates? There's no debate rule-book that says debates always have to be won or lost on the resolution. If both teams are having a fair and productive debate about DA within the GHA, hasn't the resolution's purpose been served? I know you might not think these possibilities make for the best debate. My point, however, is that there is a debate to be had about what the meaning of the debate forum is and you should allow debaters to have that debate rather than pre-deciding the issue. The difference between debaters being judged and students having their papers graded is that in the latter example students are generally unable to argue in their papers that the standards by which their papers are graded should itself be changed. Debaters, however, have that opportunity.

#### Economic engagement is academic analysis of economic areas

Bond and Paterson, 5 – \*lecturer in Sociology in the School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh AND \*\*professor of educational policy at the University of Edinburgh (Ross and Lindsay, “Coming down from the ivory tower? Academics’ civic and economic engagement with the community”; September 2005)

We now turn our attention to a more specific form of interaction with the nonacademic community: economic engagement. As stated earlier, this should not be thought of as completely distinct from civic engagement. Nevertheless, given the contemporary interest in academia’s economic role outlined above, economic engagement merits separate and detailed analysis. Our definition here is somewhat different from that of civic engagement, in that we will consider the extent to which the more routine academic activities of research and teaching, as well as those which transcend these areas, are perceived to have economic relevance. Importantly, we will also consider beliefs about the extent to which they should have economic relevance.

our interpretation is good

-aff choice, alternative frameworks moot the 1ac and place us at a disadvantage

-neg ground, they still get the status quo, alternate methodologies, a critique of ecopragmatism, disads to our method etc

-topic literature, our evidence is in the context of US economic engagement policies towards Mexico

-Schlossberg indicates that in the status quo academia does NOT engage environmental praxis, our framework is key to that because debate is fundamentally an academic game

#### The lens of environmental justice is the most productive approach to the topic – all other explanations fail

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Horizontal and vertical expansion If there has been a single major development in the framing of environmental justice in the past decade, it has been the way the use of the concept, as an organising theme or value by a range of movements, has expanded spatially (Sze and London 2008, Walker 2009). While there has been a continued focus on the original core of environmental justice issues in the distribution of toxins – or environmental bads more generally – in the United States, environmental justice discourse and literature has been extended in both topical and geographic scope. As Sze and London (2008) note in their important overview, environmental justice has seen the expansion into new issues and constituencies on the one hand, and new places and spatial analyses from the local to the global on the other. They celebrate this expansion, arguing that this attention to the expanding spatial realm of environmental justice has been the focus of many crucial researchers in the field, from politics to sociology to geography.5 This expansion has been more than simply an exercise in academic interdisciplinarity – it has led to a broad extension of the foci of environmental justice scholarship. Environmental justice may have been originally focused on the inequity of the distribution of toxics and hazardous waste in the United States, but it has moved far beyond this. Perhaps, however, such a broadening is not new, but a longstanding characteristic of the movement. Cole and Foster’s (2001) now classic study of the movement discussed the various ‘tributaries’ that make up the environmental justice movement. They included the civil rights and antitoxics movements, but also indigenous rights movements, the labour movement (including farm labour, occupational health and safety, and some industrial unions), and traditional environmentalists. Faber and McCarthy (2003) added the solidarity movement and the more general social and economic justice movements. We could easily add immigrant rights groups and urban environmental and smart growth movements, as well as local foods and food justice movements, to the list. Environmental justice as an organising frame has been applied not only to the initial issues of toxins and dumps, but also analyses of transportation, access to countryside and green space, land use and smart growth policy, water quality and distribution, energy development and jobs, brownfields refurbishment, and food justice.6 Questions of the role of scientific expertise, and the relationship between science and environmental justice communities, have also been examined.7 There has also been more thorough examination of the roles of under-examined groups in the environmental justice movement, or exposed to environmental hazards – indigenous peoples, Asian and Latino workers, women and youth,8 illustrating the broadening range of foci of environmental justice scholarship in the United States. I do not mean to imply that all of these studies offer similar or unproblematic analyses of the issues, but simply to note the longstanding and continuing trend of the expanding topical space of the environmental justice frame. In addition to the expansion of issues, there has been a push to globalise environmental justice as an explanatory discourse. There are two distinct moments to this expansion: the application of the frame to movements in a variety of countries, and the examination of the globalised and transnational nature of environmental justice movements and discourse. Walker (2009) sees this development as both a horizontal diffusion of environmental justice ideas, meanings, and framings, along with the vertical extension of an environmental justice frame beyond borders, and into relations between countries and truly global issues. As for the first, the applications of my own theoretical framework of environmental justice have been more broad than I would have imagined, including cases of postcolonial environmental justice in India, waste management in the United Kingdom, agrarian change in Sumatra, nuclear waste in Taiwan, salmon farming and First Nations in Canada, gold mining in Ghana, oil politics in Ecuador, indigenous water rights in Australia, wind farm development in Wales, pesticide drift in California, energy politics in Mexico, and many more.9 In addition, there have been collections on environmental justice focused on issues and movements in Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and the exSoviet Union.10 Walker (2009, p. 361) lists no fewer than 37 countries in which the environmental justice frame has been applied. Clearly, the discourse of environmental justice has expanded horizontally, and been engaged by both activists and academics involved in issues across the globe. The vertical extension of an environmental justice framework is evidently illustrated by the use of environmental justice as an organising theme by a number of global movements, such as food security, indigenous rights, and anti-neoliberalism (Schlosberg 2004). This global approach has been thoroughly analysed in Pellow’s (2007, 2011) enlightening work on the global toxics trade and both local community and global non-governmental organisation (NGO) resistance to it. Offering both a thorough analysis of the international production of waste, and keen observation of the transnational movement(s) that have risen in response, Pellow’s work brings attention to the global potential of environmental justice analysis. The essence of transnational networks, he argues, is found in their critique of environmental inequities, the disruption of social relations that produce such inequities, and the articulation of ecologically sustainable and socially just institutions and practices (Pellow 2011, p. 248). Such an analysis focuses on both the nature of the injustice and the creative and crucially networked response on the part of movements. Mohai et al. (2009) note a number of additional transnational issue networks that have environmental justice as an organising theme, from those concerned with e-waste to the movement for climate justice. Carmin and Agyeman (2011) bring both of these elements of expansion together in a recent collection that focuses both on specific issues and movements and a larger global framework of analysis. Clearly, environmental justice analysis continues to expand in scope and scale.

Our advocacy is a precondition to education

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

-Lee says any politics that disregards anthropocentrism is doomed to failure because of the centrality that anthropocentrism occupies

Their interpretation is bad

-when we get bogged down in the counterplan-disad level of the debate it distracts from broader movements and results in political failures

#### You are not a policy-maker—pretending you are absolves individual responsibility for violence – makes serial policy failure inevitable and is an independent reason to vote affirmative

Kappeler, 1995 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential, not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)

Reasonability is best

-avoids arbitrary exclusion of affirmatives

-avoids infinite regress

#### The justification for an action is itself an action

Risman 2004 (Barbara J. Risman is Associate Professor of Sociology and Found Director of Women 's Studies at North Carolina State University, “Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism” Gender and Society, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 429-450 Jstor)

Giddens's (1984) structuration theory adds considerably more depth to this  analysis of gender as a social structure  with his emphasis on the recursive  relation ship between social structure  and individuals.  That is, social structures  shape individuals, but simultaneously, individuals shape the social structure. Giddens  embraced  the transformative  power of human action. He insisted that  any structural theory must be concerned with reflexivity and actors' interpretations of their own  lives. Social structures  not only act on people; people act on social structures.  Indeed,  social structures  are created  not by mysterious  forces but by human action.  When people act on structure, they do so for their  own reasons.  We must, therefore,  be concerned with why actors choose their acts. Giddens insisted that  concern with meaning must go beyond the verbal justification easily available from actors because so much of social life is routine and so taken for granted that actors will not articulate, or even consider, why they act. This nonreflexive habituated  action is what I refer to as the cultural component  of the social structure:  The taken  for granted  or cognitive image rules that  belong to  the situational  context (not only or necessarily to the actor's personality).  The cul tural  component of the social structure  includes the interactional expectations  that  each of us meet in every social encounter.  My aims are to bring women and men  back into a structural theory where gender is the structure  under analysis and to  identify when behavior is habit (an enactment of taken for granted  gendered cul tural norms) and when we do gender consciously, with intent, rebellion, or even  with irony. When are we doing gender and re-creating inequality without intent?  And what happens to interactional dynamics and male-dominated institutions  when we rebel?  Can we refuse to do gender or is rebellion simply doing gender  dif ferently, forging alternative masculinities and femininities?  Connell (1987) applied Giddens's (1984) concern with social structure  as both  constraint  and created by action in his treatise on gender and power (see particu larly chapter  5). In his analysis, structure  constrains action,  yet "since human  action  involves free invention  ... and is reflexive, practice  can be turned  against  what con strains it; so structure  can deliberately  be the object of practice"  (Connell 1987, 95).  Action may turn against structure  but can never escape it. We must pay attention both to how structure shapes individual choice and social interaction  and to how  human agency creates, sustains, and modifies current  structure.  Action itself may change the immediate or future  context. A theory of gender as a social structure  must integrate  this notion of causality as  recursive with attention to gender  consequences at multiple  levels of analysis. Gen der is deeply embedded  as a basis for stratification  not just in our personalities,  our  cultural  rules, or institutions  but in all these, and in complicated ways. The gender  structure  differentiates  opportunities  and constraints based on sex category and  thus has consequences on three dimensions: (1) At the individual level, for the  development  of gendered  selves; (2) during  interaction  as men and women face dif ferent cultural  expectations even when they fill the identical structural  positions;  and (3) in institutional domains where explicit regulations regarding resource  distribution  and material  goods are gender specific.

#### Questions of methodology are the most important ones - they dictate how conclusions are achieved

Bartlett, 1990 (Katharine, professor of law at Duke University, 103 Harvard Law Review 829, February, lexis)

Feminists have developed extensive critiques of law n2 and proposals for legal reform. n3 Feminists have had much less to say, however, about what the "doing" of law should entail and what truth status to give to the legal claims that follow. These methodological issues matter because methods shape one's view of the possibilities for legal practice and reform. Method "organizes the apprehension of truth; it determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification." n4 Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to challenge existing structures of power with the same methods that [\*831] have defined what counts within those structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate power structures [that they are] trying to identify and undermine." n5

### ---a2 limits

We are real world solve lutz evidence Hayes read this part in cx

#### Our transgression is a redefinition of limits that allow for better political expression.

Simons 95 (Jon, Professor of Political Philosophy and Feminism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Foucault and the Political, P. 89)

We know what we are (our ontology) only by understanding the limits that make us what we are by defining our form. Limits are revealed by the lightning flash of transgression through the effort to go beyond them, an effort which paradoxically can reinforce the limit (1990a:34–5). The knowledge of ourselves that Foucault supposes is available to us is not really an ontology. Work on our limits transforms us by altering some of the present limits and instituting new limits. Knowledge of ourselves is thus as transitory as the transgressive flash that illuminates limits.

### ---predictability

#### Truth and predictability are nihilistic illusions built upon a myth of sameness and unity grounded in a fear of the flux and movement which lie at the heart of life – embrace the ecstasy of risk and the glory of active interpretation which uses force to wrest meaning from the abyss of nihilism.

**Lotringer, 1** – Professor of Foreign Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, (Sylvere, “The Dance of Signs” in Hatred of Capitalism: A Semiotext(e) Reader ed. Kraus&Lotringer, Los Angeles:Semiotext(e), pg 174-176)

Freud is not blind to this: "The producer which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far reaching similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with the analytical method which consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill" (Standard Edition, IX, 88). Such is the powerful thrust of similitude. Freud has no more qualms to reduce "poetic creations" to real persons or the "Pompeian fancy" to a simple "psychiatric study." Beneath the trappings of truth, on the razor's edge of demonstration, forces are confronting each other in order to turn the process - the text -into a product. If Gradiva adheres so perfectly to the analytical mold, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof, in Freud's words, of the theory of the unconscious. Absolute proof - or absolute counter-proof... Even thought "absolute" is clearly too strong a word for such a circum-scribed operation, to counter Freud's interpretation and thus unsettle he theory of the unconscious is indeed the substance of the present attempt. Not to replace Freud's elaborate construct with another, more powerful, mode of evaluation would certainly prove the wisdom in the face of the illusion of truth. Although "nihilistic" at heart, such a perspective is not bound to be simply negative. It can attest to a growing force. I realize that I can overcome the temptation of total interpretations, whose values are universal (they are actually symptoms of fear and apathy). To destroy the belief in the law, to dissipate the fiction of predictability, to reject the sage recurrence of the "same," this is not just a "critical" stand. It is an act of force. But destruction must not open onto an absence of values, worthless or meaninglessness. It must lead to a new evaluation. Nietzsche sees in the wisdom of the East a principle of decadence, a weakening of the power of appropriation. Force of intention matters more than will to truth. To reject truth without intensifying the force of invention still participates in the ascetic ideal, thus in ressentiment. "To read off a text without interposing an interpretation" therefore is "hardly possible" (The Will to Power, 479). I must use my creative forces to create values without falling into the inertia of truth or an anemia of will. I must render the text, and the world, to their "disturbing and enigmatic character"; will them incomprehensible, elusive, "in flux," only indebted to perspective valuations: "The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (WP, 655). Inner decay: to dance away over oneself. Motion, not emotions. Freud's interpretation resists the false neutrality of science. § Marked 19:11 § It only shows a sign of decline when it aims for the truth, when it succumbs to the temptation of unity, the sick security of monism, the illusion of a reconciliation. A reactive interpretation, it assumes powerful, but fabricated, weapons: the difference between objects and subjects, cause and effect, means and ends, etc. That Gradiva presents a certain order of succession in no way proves that individual moments are related to one another as cause and effect, that they obey a "law" and a calculus but rather that different factions abruptly confront each other in their attempt to draw their ultimate consequence at every moment. "As long as there is a structure, as long as there is a method, or better yet as long as structure and method exist through the mental, through intelligence, time is trapped - or else we imagine we have trapped it" (John Cage, Pour les Oiseaux. Belfond, 1976, 34). Structural analysis properly discerned that a narrative establishes | a confusion between time (succession) and logic (cause and effect). However, instead of "delogifying" time, it forced narrative time to sub-mit to narrative logic. Far from being dispelled, the confusion became the very springboard of analysis! It is high time to take advantage of this latency of the narrative, of the divorce between consequence and construction, in order to "rechronocize" succession. I will, here and now, stop wanting the story to go somewhere. I will forget what I know feebly, in advance, in order to gather the whole complexity of forces at play in a text. I will learn to resist the melody of casual relations and the torpor of narrative accumulations in order to reinvent the intensity of risks, ceaselessly menacing and forever being reborn.

### ---a2 shively

Not responsive – I could read an ecoprag k against your aff when I’m neg means you have to prepare against it

#### Dissent turns switch side

Feinberg & Nemeth 08 (Matthew Feinberg and Charlan J. Nemeth Department of Psychology University of California, Berkeley Institute for Research on Labor and Employment The “Rules” of Brainstorming: An Impediment to Creativity? <http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/167-08.pdf>)

In contrast to such literature, there is some theoretical reasons and recent evidence to suggest that these rules and, in particular, the rule “not to criticize” may actually inhibit creativity. Rather, there is evidence of the value of debate even criticism in the stimulation of creative thought. A variety of studies demonstrates that exposure to a persistent minority dissenter sparks more flexible, open-minded, and multi-perspective thinking which, in turn, produces less conformist and more creative outcomes (e.g., Peterson & Nemeth, 1996; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985). This line of research maintains that the benefits of dissent stem from the cognitive conflict it generates§ Marked 19:11 § ; the dissent compels those in the majority to search for possible explanations as to why the dissenter is willing to openly disagree and suffer the rejection that often accompanies such disagreement. This search for explanations then fosters thinking on all sides of the issue (Nemeth, 2003). People search for information on all sides of the issue, use multiple strategies in problem solving and detect solutions that otherwise would have gone undetected (Nemeth, 1995).

### 2ac framing top

Conceded that your role as an academic is to evaluate conceptual approaches to environmental praxis – the alternative is not an environmental practice all I need to win is that the aff practice is comparatively better than status quo environmental praxis

The role of the ballot is which team best develops a relationship to Mexico’s ecosystem we’ll win that our methodology is superior to theirs

-Castellano indicates that interrogating how people institutions and ecosystems interact is a prerequisite to good policy

-Reitan indicates that problem solving requires a change in worldview and that pragmatism is key to identify which debates really matter and how to mediate those debates

-Bell and Russel indicate that as an educator you should promote discussion about societal narratives that legitimize environmental destruction

### a2 rc

#### Class CAN’T be the root of our aff – be skeptical of their ev

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Another major focus of environmental justice scholarship has always been a move beyond the simple description and documentation of inequity into a thorough analysis of the underlying reasons for that injustice. Initially, the central explanatory focus was racism. Environmental justice wasn’t simply about establishing the fact that more environmental bads and risks were being put on minority communities – it endeavoured to explore the question of why those communities were devalued in the first place. One of the original popularisers of the term environmental racism was Benjamin Chavis, then head of the United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice – the organisation that published the influential study of Toxic Wastes and Race. The practice, and experience, of racism has been at the heart of environmental justice discourse in the United States – so much so that Getches and Pellow (2002) once made the argument that the term, and movement, should actually be limited to communities of colour. Pellow’s (2004, 2007) work has clearly extended an analysis of racial discrimination, and connected it to the practices of capital. Following that analysis, Mohai et al. (2009) lay out three interrelated causal factors for environmental injustice. First, economic considerations address both the impoverishment of impacted populations and the reasoning for industrial externalisation of social and environmental costs. Second, industry and government seek the path of least resistance to development, and poor and racial minority communities make easier targets. Finally, a distinct form of racism simply associates communities of colour with pollution. Any and all of these cultural and institutional structures contribute to the construction of inequity, misrecognition, exclusion, and the generalised injustice confronted by communities and movement organisations. Still, the central idea is that generalised social injustices are manifest in environmental conditions, among other ways.

### cap

#### Historical materialism fails in the context of our aff

Hovden 99 (Eivind Hovden; Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway; 1999; “As if nature doesn't matter: Ecology, regime theory and¶ international relations”; Environmental Politics, 8:2, 50-74; KDUB)

Marxism is, of course, a natural focal point of any theoretical challenge¶ to the mainstream of IR theory. Indeed, Saurin's [1996] critique of Smith is¶ clearly inspired by Marxism. Saurin lists a number of authors that have¶ challenged the environmentalist mainstream - Michael Redclift, David¶ Pepper, Carolyn Merchant, Murray Bookchin, and Robyn Eckersley - but¶ somehow suggests that they are united by an understanding that¶ 'environmental change was crucially determined by ... the ownership of the¶ means of production and the control over the criteria of exchange' [Saurin,¶ 1996: 84]. This is arguably a controversial picture of the landscape of¶ radical ecologists that oppose the mainstream of environmentalism, since¶ much radical environmentalist thought has been at pains to distance itself¶ from Marxism [Eckersley, 1992: Chs.4 and 6; Dobson, 1995: Ch.5; Benton,¶ 1989, 1992, 1993; Clark, 1989; Enzenberger, 1974; Grundmann, 1991;¶ Jung, 1983; Routley, 1981; Tolman 1981; Zimmerman, 1979]. Even if we¶ accept Saurin's sample as representative of radical environmentalism, it is¶ doubtful whether Eckersley fits at all with Saurin's description of the field,¶ and Bookchin's relationship to Marxism is highly ambivalent.18 Saurin's use¶ of Marx hide the long history of antagonism and mutual contempt between¶ Marxism and ecological thought. While one should not deny the obvious¶ affiliations between the political left and radical environmentalism,¶ Marxism as such remains one of the less promising starting points for an¶ alternative IR theoretical approach to environmental issues.

#### our praxis resolves the negative impacts to cap

Schlosberg 13 (David Schlosberg; Environmental Politics Volume 22, Issue 1, 2013 Special Issue: Coming of Age? Environmental Politics at 21; “Theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse”; pages 37-55; KDUB)

Environmental justice and sustainable materialism But it is not simply the rebound effect of climate change that has pushed a conception of environmental justice into broader engagement of the relationship between environment and social justice. The discussion of climate change illustrates the centrality of this connection between the condition of the natural world and the material experience of everyday life. This concern has led to another key development – a focus on more reconstructive material practices and sustainable relationships with the environment. While most well-known environmental justice battles have been reactions to inequity, threats to health or capabilities more generally, or responses to misrecognition and exclusion from decision-making, there has been a growth of groups using environmental justice and sustainability to design and implement more just and sustainable practices of everyday life. So we see the environmental justice movement making demands for investment in environmental technologies and jobs, food justice, and liveable communities more generally. The prominent green jobs and community-building work of Van Jones (2009), along with the ‘just sustainability’ frame of Julian Agyeman (2005), are examples of the potential of an environmental justice praxis that sees just communities as based on a working, sustainable relationship with the natural world. This approach is especially obvious in movements for food justice and just energy development. These movements directly take on both unjust practices and institutions and unsustainable environmental processes. They are not satisfied with purely individualistic or consumerist responses to environmental concerns – it is not about simply installing one’s own rooftop solar panels, or getting a Whole Foods in the neighbourhood. The focus is on building new practices and institutions for sustainability – practices and institutions that embody not only principles of environmental or climate justice, but a broader sense of sustainability as well. Call it a more reconstructive environmental justice, based on a conception of sustainable materialism. In many communities, a growing focus is on resisting, rethinking, and redesigning basic institutions that embody problematic practices connected to our basic material needs. § Marked 19:13 § So the response to food deserts is not buying organic veggies at a natural foods megamart, but getting more involved in growing and sharing food in community supported agriculture, collective gardening, urban farms, farmers markets (Gottlieb and Joshi 2010, Alcon and Agyeman 2011). The idea of the food justice movement is to transform our relationship with food, its production, transportation, and consumption. It is not simply about supplying a basic need; it is, in addition, awareness that such basic needs that supply the functioning of a community should themselves be sourced without creating injustices. In terms of energy, many environmental justice communities are organising around the development of community-wide local generation and networking of solar and wind.13 The idea of just energy transition is to replace destructive practices – for example, the damage done to the environment by coal mining and burning, and the abuse of local autonomy by mining companies. This concept of environmental justice shifts from resistance to reconstruction, aims to transform both dominating and unsustainable practices of production and consumption, and works to sustainably rebuild the material relationships we have with the resources we use every day. All while supplying a host of basic needs. These trends can be framed in at least three important ways. First, such practices are clearly a Foucauldian form of resistance to the relations that contribute to the continued reproduction of unsustainable practices; movement groups simply want to step out of the processes where they themselves are part of the creation of injustice. Second, they represent practices of equity, recognition, participation, and the delivery of basic capabilities in just and inclusive ways. Third, they embody the institutionalisation of a new form of sustainable materialism and the direct involvement of groups in the development of institutions that re-imagine, and reconstruct, our relationship with the natural world. These new movements and efforts illustrate environmental justice moving toward a form of just sustainability that embodies not only a variety of themes of justice, but also a thorough engagement in everyday material life – the things that pass through our bodies, the practices we use to transform the natural world, and the institutions we can shape collectively (Gabrielson and Paraday 2010). Many environmental justice movements, in this way, have expanded beyond a reactive position to environmental conditions, and now refuse to participate in practices that create or circulate injustice, propose and create new counterinstitutions and practices, and, crucially, embrace a more sustainable relationship between just communities and a working environment.

#### The affirmative is a necessary advocacy to resist neoliberalism

Carruthers 7 (David V. Carruthers; “Environmental justice and the politics of energy on the US–Mexico border”; Environmental Politics Volume 16, Issue 3, 2007; pages 394-413; KDUB)

Globalisation and Environmental Justice Starting with the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Latin American governments have acceded to the mandates of international creditors and financial institutions, implementing strict restructuring policies to stabilise currencies, reduce inflation, shrink the role of the state in the economy, introduce greater competitiveness, create a favourable climate for corporate investment, and eliminate barriers to trade. While the controversies surrounding the ‘Washington Consensus’ economic programme lie beyond my scope here, it has by now provoked broad popular resistance across Latin America, as people react against crippling austerity programmes, deepening economic polarisation, the erosion of basic economic security, the collapse of small farms and businesses, and insurmountable household debt. Efforts to constrain or renegotiate the process, character, and terms of international economic integration are now central to the region’s politics (Finnegan, 2003; Kingstone, 2006). The US–Mexico border presents a microcosm of North–South relations, reflecting the forms, tensions, and consequences of neoliberal globalisation. It hosts one of the world’s densest concentrations of the myriad ‘transnational advocacy networks’ that have emerged with aspirations to humanise the workings of the global economy (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Brooks & Fox, 2002; Hogenboom et al., 2003). An important thread of this story originated in the early 1990s with a network of labour and citizens’ campaigns from Mexico, the US, and Canada to challenge and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Transnational citizen activism captured the world’s attention a few years later in the street protests of the 1999 World Trade Organization ministerial meeeting in Seattle. Since then, a broader global justice movement calling for debt relief and reform of the institutions of global trade and finance has made its presence felt at dozens of meetings of regional and international institutions across the globe. Transnational activism incorporates important elements of environmental justice, on a global scale. Environmental injustices are not ‘relegated to local failures in wealthy nations’, but are instead ‘symptomatic of systemic tendencies of globalization’ § Marked 19:14 § (Byrne et al., 2002b: 8). Global systems of production and distribution parcel out costs and benefits unfairly, accruing special benefits to international capital, domestic subsidiaries, and locally allied industrial and agricultural elites. Consuming classes enjoy a cornucopia of inexpensive manufactures and foods while the ‘poor neighbourhoods’ of the global South pay disproportionate human and environmental costs in the form of exploitive, low-wage labour and unchecked environmental devastation. Without corrections, free trade regimes reward those producers most effective at pushing the negative externalities of production onto nature, the poor, and future generations. As the cases below will demonstrate, Baja California’s environmental justice activists are acutely tuned to this global dimension: For most people in Mexico the environment means forests, species.We’re breaking away from that. We want to focus on human beings . . . If we think of the world as neighbourhoods, then it’s obvious – the poor countries pay the environmental costs. Mexico is a poor neighbourhood. (Cerda, 2002) We’re very aware of the fact that they want to put this here because they don’t want it there. There is absolutely no doubt in anyone’s mind about that . . . they’re going to put this on our side of the border and all the benefits are going to go to the other side. That is ingrained in people’s minds as border inhabitants. (Garcı´a Zendejas, 2005)