# SSS

### 1

#### Economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a tit-for-tat exchange

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.¶ The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.¶ The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.¶ The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.¶ The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8¶ [To footnotes]¶ 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### Violation --- The aff unilaterally engage w/ mexico – that is a form of unconditional engagement.

#### Reasons to Vote Negative –

#### Limits – the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs – conditionality forces the aff to find deals that Cuba would accept

#### Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments, and country specific DAs such as the local PTX das which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 2

#### CP text: Plan the 50 States and subsequent territories should economically engage in a short sea shipping strategy for the purpose of trade providing all funds necessary for the implementation of the program

#### States can solve SSS –MARAD recommended state involvement to congress

Cook, 1AC Author, 11 — former General Counsel of the Maritime Administration, Counsel to Seward and Kissel LLP (H. Clayton, “Dead in the Water”, Maritime Executive, 7/8/2012, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/dead-in-the-water, Deech)

Section 1121 mandated actions to create an environment that would foster federal, state and local cooperation in the planning and financing of shore-side infrastructure and attract private sector investment to finance vessel fleet requirements. The House version of Section 1122 addressed the need for U.S. government-assisted financing for the vessels that would be involved by extending the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) Capital Construction Fund’s (CCF) tax-deferral program to container and ro/ro services nationwide and authorizing $2 billion for MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program. Section 1123 mandated a report to be made not later than one year after the December 19, 2007 enactment to detail progress in the implementation of SST and provide recommendations for further administrative or legislative action as appropriate.Certain actions in the Act are mandated as "shall" while others are merely permitted as "may." The Act provides that the Secretary "shall establish a short sea transportation program and designate short sea transportation projects to be conducted under the program to mitigate landside congestion and encourage the use of short sea transportation through the development and expansion of: (1) documented vessels; (2) shipper utilization; (3) port and landside infrastructure; and (4) marine transportation strategies by state and local governments." In administering the program, the Secretary "shall": • Designate SST routes as extensions of the surface transportation system to focus public and private efforts to use the waterways to relieve landside congestion along coastal corridors; • Enter into memorandums of understanding with the heads of other federal entities to transport federally owned or generated cargo using program-designated SST projects when practical or available; • Consult with shippers and other participants in transportation logistics and develop proposals for short-term incentives to encourage the use of SST in consultation with federal entities and state and local governments; • Develop strategies to encourage the use of SST for passengers and cargo; • Assess the extent to which states and local governments include SST and other marine transportation solutions in their transportation planning, and encourage state departments of transportation to develop strategies, where appropriate, to incorporate SST, ferries, and other marine transportation solutions for regional and interstate transport of freight and passengers in their transportation planning; • Encourage groups of states and multi-state transportation entities to determine how SST can address congestion, bottlenecks, and other interstate transportation challenges; • Establish a board to identify and seek solutions to impediments hindering effective use of SST, with representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal, state, and local governmental entities and private sector entities; and • Issue temporary SST program regulations for the implementation of the SST program not later than 90 days after December 19, 2007, and to issue final regulations not later than October 1, 2008. MARAD was assigned responsibility for implementation of SST, which it renamed America's Marine Highway Program.

### 3

#### Chinease influence is high now- CELAC proves

Tiezzi 2/08/14 (Shannon Tiezzi is an assiosiate editor at the diplomat “China’s push into america’s back yard” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-push-into-americas-backyard/>)-Neal

On the political level, since 2001, China has signed strategic partnership agreements with five countries in the region: Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. As a sign of the region’s importance, Xi Jinping visited Central America in June of last year, stopping in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Several regional leaders have also made the trek to Beijing, including [Equador’s Vice President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1122098.shtml) Jorge Glas Espinel, [Bolivian President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1111188.shtml) Juan Evo Morales Ayma, and [Brazilian Vice President](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/ldmzs/xwlb/t1097537.shtml) Michel Temer. Adding an extra level of enticement for China, the majority of countries that still recognize Taiwan are located in Central America and the Caribbean. Though there’s currently somewhat of an unofficial truce on this issue between Taipei and Beijing, long term Beijing may seek to woo these 11 countries away from Taiwan. Meanwhile, China’s engagement also helps highlight some regional ambivalence towards the United States. CELAC itself was conceived of as an alternative to the Washington-led Organization of American States. CELAC member states include every country in the Western hemisphere expect Canada and the United States, rather pointed omissions. The fact that the most recent CELAC summit was held in Havana only served to underscore a lack of coherent U.S. [policy](http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-push-into-americas-backyard/) in the region. The U.S. still has in place an embargo on Cuba, which has outlived both logic and usefulness — something Raul Castro, in his speech to the CELAC summit, [was not shy about pointing out](http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Cuba-calls-for-integration-free-of-US-at-CELAC-summit_15900593). Underlining the sentiments of some in CELAC, Castro warned that CELAC must be on guard against attempts by the U.S. to leverage the region for its own benefit. “The so-called centers of power do not resign themselves to having lost control over this rich region, nor will they ever renounce attempts to change the course of history in our countries in order to recover the influence they have lost,” he said. Partnering with China seems to be CELAC’s way of hedging against U.S. dominance in the region — just as some states in the Asia-Pacific are edging closer to the U.S. in a bid against growing Chinese power

#### Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with Chinese influence

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability – preventing US influence key

Ellis 11

[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf>]

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests

. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 4

#### TPA will pass, but Obama’s push is key

Truitt 2-21 (Gary Truitt, writer for NAFB News Service, “Obama Administration Has Plan to Get TPA Approval” <http://www.hoosieragtoday.com/obama-administration-has-plan-to-get-tpa-approval/> 2-21-14)AH

The Obama Administration plans to give Congress reason to approve Trade Promotion Authority by negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement they can’t pass up. According to U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman – the votes are there as long as the Administration brings back a good agreement. He says the focus is to do just that – including for agriculture. Froman reports spending time on Capitol Hill with both parties to lay the foundation for broad bipartisan support of TPA legislation. He says Congress has recognized the infeasibility of designating more than 500 people – their full membership – as trade negotiators. Froman also says the Administration recognizes the importance of agriculture in not just the TPP negotiations – but also the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union.¶ He says increasing ag trade is important to the entire U.S. economy. That’s why he’s looking to those in agriculture to urge Congress to grant President Obama the trade promotion authority he needs to assure leaders of other countries that Congress will vote deals up or down rather than amending them.

#### The plan is a political lightning rod – tanks capital

Meyers, 12 – staff writer for Politico (Jessica Meyers, “Federal marine highways project hard to launch”, Politico, 5/22/12, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76633.html> | AK)

Mention America’s highways and notice the nods. Talk about its marine highways and watch the blank stares. A Department of Transportation initiative intended to promote the country’s water routes has failed to make substantial inroads despite a 2007 federal law, escalating highway congestion and a push for greener transport. These river and coastal corridors, known as marine highways or short-sea shipping, thrive in Europe and exist in a handful of U.S. regions. They’re billed as the future — a cheaper and more fuel-efficient option for an overburdened transportation system. But marine highways remain more a political talking point than an industry reality. Trucks and railroads maintain the upper hand on speed. Waterways have less experience carrying container goods than bulk cargo. And companies remain leery of an uncertain market filled with tax hurdles and ship shortages. Without greater demand, the water road concept won’t float. “It’s a chicken-and-egg type of thing,” said Sean Connaughton, a former DOT maritime administrator who created the department’s America’s Marine Highway Program. “Shippers won’t commit until there’s reliable service, but you can’t have that until shippers commit.” To do that, the industry needs an almost mythical nexus of federal incentives, public recognition and state support. Connaughton, now Virginia’s secretary of transportation, told POLITICO that the federal DOT’s marine highway push languished partly because it coincided with the economic downturn. Transportation funding disappeared for paved roads, much less a quiet transportation mode still trying to prove its worth. “The bottom line,” he said, “is freight doesn’t vote.” Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood has designated 18 marine highway corridors in recent years and directed more than $110 million toward marine highway projects. The agency backs the Marine Highways Cooperative, a public-private partnership dedicated to developing the country’s 25,000 miles of water routes. “The Obama administration is committed to investing in innovative marine transportation services along America’s coast and waterways, in order to relieve congestion on our roadways, make our transportation system greener and develop the vast unused capacity on our waterways,” said DOT spokesman Justin Nisly. Not all Democratic lawmakers agree. “I personally don’t think it has happened as well as it should,” Rep. Rick Larsen (D-Wash.), ranking member of the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, told POLITICO. “This administration has yet to request any funding goals for a marine transportation system. We still have a ways to go.” Maritime groups point to the elimination of a so-called double tax as the place to start. All cargo that comes into the country is subject to a harbor maintenance tax. But shippers have to pay an additional tax if goods are off-loaded in one location and shipped to a second port. When freight moves by land, it doesn’t face this second tax. “Putting this forward would be an indication of how serious the government is to help the industry into existence,” said C. James Patti, the president of the Maritime Institute for Research and Industrial Development. “It’s a lightning rod.” Several lawmakers have keyed on the issue. “This system encourages people not to use the water,” Rep. Patrick Tiberi, (R-Ohio), a Ways and Means Committee member, told POLITICO. He has sponsored a bipartisan bill to gut the tax. “It levels the playing field and achieves some balance in the movement of goods,” he said. Like similar bills in previous sessions, it hasn’t gotten far

. The tax issue also delves into transport equality. Trucks already pay higher user fees and railroads are mostly self-financed. Even if the bill were to pass, the industry would need enough ships to carry the goods. A longtime law known as the Jones Act allows only American built and manned ships to operate between U.S. ports. The problem: American companies don’t want to build container vessels for an invisible buyer. “When financing a vessel, it’s great to have an established market to point to,” said Paul Bea, a maritime adviser who specializes in marine highways. Back to the Catch-22. American Feeder Lines just ended its nine-month container ship service along the Northeast largely because of a shortage of suitable vessels. “The markets aren’t there,” said Chris Coakley, the vice president of governmental affairs for Saltchuk Resources, a company that started with marine transport and now manages a variety of trade operations. “There’s not a retail connection to the maritime industry.” Waterways are a bit of a public relations nightmare. UPS stops at the front door. Rail toots by towns. Container ships don’t pop up on the drive to work.

#### TPA’s key to prevent backsliding on globalization and protectionism

The Economist 2-22, “How to make the world $600 billion poorer,” 2/22/14 (Print Edition), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596934-barack-obamas-unwillingness-fight-free-trade-expensive-mistake-how-make-world

IN JULY 2008 Barack Obama, then a candidate for the presidency, declared before an adoring crowd in Berlin that “true partnership and true progress [require] constant work and sustained sacrifice.” So it is with free trade. If not championed by leaders who understand its broad benefits, it will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism. Mr Obama now appears to be surrendering to protectionists within his own party. If he cannot drag Democrats back to their senses, the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of liberalisation. It will also be a signal that America is giving up its role as defender of an open global economy in the same way that Mr Obama has retreated in foreign policy. ¶ Mr Obama did little to promote free trade during his first term, but has seemed bolder in his second. He launched America into ambitious new deals with large Pacific economies and the European Union, breathing new life into global trade talks. Momentum built up; the “constant work and sacrifice” paid dividends. Members of the World Trade Organisation agreed on a package of trade reforms in December—the first truly multilateral deal in the organisation’s 20-year history. Diplomats credit the White House’s new resolve for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table. Progress suddenly seemed possible in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and reducing barriers to the exchange of “environmental goods and services”, which would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions.¶ First, shoot yourself in the foot. Then repeat…¶ The hitch is that Congress must approve trade agreements. Previous presidents had the advantage of “fast-track” trade promotion authority, which let them present deals to Congress for a simple yes or no vote. Without it, lawmakers can wreck carefully negotiated deals with toxic amendments. No country would engage in serious talks with America under such circumstances. Fast-track is therefore essential—and elusive. Congress last granted it in 2002; it expired in 2007. The Obama administration blithely asserted that Congress would renew it, but many lawmakers, primarily Democrats, have signed letters opposing it. Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, has all but ruled out a vote this year. And on February 14th Joe Biden, the vice-president, told a gathering of Democratic leaders that he understood their opposition. The White House appears to have given up with scarcely a fight. A fast-track vote before November’s mid-term elections seems unlikely (see article). ¶ Why panic about this? Tactically, it could just be another piece of Washington politicking: some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track, providing Mr Obama allows some boilerplate language in the bill chiding China for allegedly manipulating its currency. Others wonder whether the trade deals are really so vital. Indeed, the idea that they will not do much to help the economy is one excuse for Democrats undermining their president. ¶ In fact, the deals on the table are big. Reasonable estimates say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could boost the world’s annual output by $600 billion—equivalent to adding another Saudi Arabia. Some $200 billion of that would accrue to America. And the actual gains could be even larger. The agreements would clear the way for freer trade in services, which account for most of rich countries’ GDP but only a small share of trade. Opening up trade in services could help reduce the cost of everything from shipping to banking, education and health care. Exposing professional occupations to the same global competition that factory workers have faced for decades could even strike a blow against the income inequality that Mr Obama so often decries. ¶ Tactically, even a short delay could prove fatal to both deals. Pacific negotiations have been extended while America and Japan hammer out compromises on agriculture. Why should Japanese politicians risk infuriating their farmers when any agreement can be torn up on Capitol Hill? The deal with the EU was meant to be done swiftly—perhaps in as little as two years—to keep politics from mucking it up. Europe’s leaders will now doubt America’s commitment, given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track. Trade sceptics, such as French farmers, are drooling. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, who is already furious about American spying, may decide that a trade deal is not worth battling for. ¶ The greatest risk of all is that the political momentum in America, having swung against free trade, will be hard to reverse. Some Tea Party Republicans oppose fast-track because they are loth to grant Mr Obama the authority to do anything. Democrats, keen to brand themselves as the anti-inequality party, may find economic nationalism an easy sell on the campaign stump: and, once pledged to that cause in November, candidates will not vote for the opposite in Congress. ¶ And for this Mr Obama deserves some blame. He is far more ardent in bemoaning inequality than in explaining why an American retreat from the world would be the wrong way to address it. He seldom mentions, for example, that cheap imports help the poor by cutting their shopping bills, and so reduce inequality of consumption. ¶ It’s not a zero-sum world¶ There is nothing inevitable about globalisation. Governments have put up barriers before—with disastrous consequences during the 1930s—and could do so again. So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals. Only recently Congress childishly refused to honour an agreed-upon increase in America’s financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund. The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with new banking regulations that could penalise foreign banks and further Balkanise global finance (see article). Mr Obama continues to delay approval of a critical oil pipeline from Canada, and is slow to grant permits to export American natural gas.¶ “America cannot turn inward,” the Obama of 2008 said in Berlin. The Obama of 2014 is now responding: “Yes we can.”

#### Trade and growth solve nuclear war

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Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more **heated arguments and** dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences.

 Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Ship building

1. **The impact is empirically denied and their evidence reflects a flawed understanding of how to measure the aggregate of US naval power**

Hoffman, 8 [Frank G. Hoffman, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century, http://www.cnas.org/node/529]

One of the most important national security challenges facing the next president of the United States will be preserving America’s maritime power. The U.S. Navy has been **cut in half** since the 1980s, shrinking steadily from 594 to today’s 280 ships. The fleet size has been cut by 60 ships during the Bush administration alone, despite significantly increased Pentagon budgets.¶ Several naval analysts and commentators, including the observant Robert Kaplan, have argued that America’s present naval fleet constitutes an “elegant decline” or outright neglect. A former Reagan administration naval official contends that our current maritime policy and investment levels are “verging towards unilateral naval disarmament.” ¶ This is something of an overstatement. The American naval fleet is still substantially larger than any other, and has **unmatched global reach and endurance.** The U.S. Navy’s aggregate tonnage is **the equivalent of the next 17 international** navies, of which 14 are U.S. allies, and our power projection capabilities retain a 4:1 advantage in missiles. Looking simply at overall **naval ship totals may not be the most accurate measure of naval power**, but it is an historical standard of measurement. By that criterion, the U.S. Navy has not been this size since World War I, when Britain’s Royal Navy was the guarantor of the global commons.

#### Naval power is inevitable

Farley 7 (Robert Farley, Assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, "The False Decline of the US Navy," The American Prospect, http://prospect.org/article/false-decline-us-navy)

We live in strange times. While the United States is responsible for close to 50 percent of aggregate world military expenditure, and maintains close alliances with almost all of the other major military powers, a community of defense analysts continues to insist that we need to spend more. In the November issue of The Atlantic, Robert Kaplan asserts that United States hegemony is under the threat of “elegant decline,” and points to what conventional analysts might suggest is the most secure element of American power; the United States Navy. Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy remains several orders of magnitude more powerful than its nearest rival, Kaplan says that we must beware; if we allow the size of our Navy to further decline, we risk repeating the experience of the United Kingdom in the years before World War I. Unfortunately, since no actual evidence of U.S. naval decline exists, Kaplan is forced to rely on obfuscation, distortion, and tendentious historical analogies to make his case. The centerpiece of Kaplan’s argument is a comparison of the current U.S. Navy to the British Royal Navy at the end of the 19th century. The decline of the Royal Navy heralded the collapse of British hegemony, and the decline of the U.S. Navy threatens a similar fate for the United States. The only problem with this argument is that similarities between the 21st century United States and the 19th century United Kingdom are more imagined than real. It’s true that the relative strength of the Royal Navy declined at the end of the 19th century, but this was due entirely the rise of the United States and Germany. But the absolute strength of the Royal Navy increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the United Kingdom strove to maintain naval dominance over two countries that possessed larger economies and larger industrial bases than that of Great Britain. In other words, the position of the Royal Navy declined because the position of the United Kingdom declined; in spite of this decline, the Royal Navy continued to dominate the seas against all comers until 1941. Britain’s relative economic decline preceded its naval decline, although the efforts to keep up with Germany, the United States, and later Japan did serious damage to the British economy. The United States faces a situation which is in no way similar. Returning to the present, Kaplan takes note of the growth of several foreign navies, including the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese. He points out that the Japanese Navy has a large number of destroyers and a growing number of submarines. He warns that India “may soon have the world’s third largest navy” without giving any indication of why that matters. Most serious of all, he describes the threat of a growing Chinese Navy and claims that, just as the Battle of Wounded Knee opened a new age for American imperialism, the conquest of Taiwan could transform China into an expansionist, imperial power. The curious historical analogies aside, Kaplan is careful to make no direct comparisons between the growing navies of foreign countries and the actual strength of the United States Navy. There’s a good reason for this oversight; there is no comparison between the U.S. Navy and any navy afloat today. The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft carriers. The oldest and least capable is faster, one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the Russian Navy. Unlike China’s only aircraft carrier, the former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are capable of self-propulsion. The only carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American counterparts. No navy besides the United States' has more than one aircraft carrier

capable of flying modern fixed wing aircraft. The United States enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and submarines, operating twenty-two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and ten amphibious assault ships (vessels roughly equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical superiority with a significant ship-to-ship advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. The French Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most ambitious plans ascribed to the People’s Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given China’s inexperience with carrier operations and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability to achieve local dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the world’s oceans and littorals for at least the next fifty years. In order to try to show that the U.S. Navy is insufficient in the face of future threats, Kaplan argues that we on are our way to “a 150 ship navy” that will be overwhelmed by the demands of warfighting and global economic maintenance. He suggests that the “1,000 Ship Navy” proposal, an international plan to streamline cooperation between the world’s navies on maritime maintenance issues such as piracy, interdiction of drug and human smuggling, and disaster relief, is an effort at “elegant decline,” and declares that the dominance of the United States Navy cannot be maintained through collaboration with others. It’s true that a 600 ship navy can do more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but Kaplan’s playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s. Because of the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking, navies have two missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be done in collaboration with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance mission, while still possessing utter military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the situation that the United States Navy currently enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S. Navy can destroy any (and probably all, at the same time) naval challengers. To conflate these two missions is equal parts silly and dishonest. The Navy has arrived at an ideal compromise between the two, keeping its fighting supremacy while leading and facilitating cooperation around the world on maritime issues. This compromise has allowed the Navy to build positive relationships with the navies of the world, a fact that Kaplan ignores. While asserting the dangers posed by a variety of foreign navies, Kaplan makes a distortion depressingly common to those who warn of the decline of American hegemony; he forgets that the United States has allies. While Kaplan can plausibly argue that growth in Russian or Chinese naval strength threatens the United States, the same cannot reasonably be said of Japan, India, France, or the United Kingdom. With the exception of China and Russia, all of the most powerful navies in the world belong to American allies. United States cooperation with the navies of NATO, India, and Japan has tightened, rather than waned in the last ten years, and the United States also retains warm relations with third tier navies such as those of South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia. In any conceivable naval confrontation the United States will have friends, just as the Royal Navy had friends in 1914 and 1941.

#### Sequester empirically denies the impact

Ackerman 13 (Robert K. Ackerman, writer for Signal online, “Navy Leader Pledges to Meet Shipbuilding Goals” < http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/10599> 1-29-13)Hesu

U.S. Navy shipbuilding will sail on in spite of potentially severe budget cuts, according to the undersecretary of the Navy. Robert O. Work, giving the luncheon keynote address to a packed audience at AFCEA/USNI West 2013, declared that the Navy would achieve its goal of a 300-ship Navy “by hook or by crook” by 2019. Calling the shipbuilding program “the best it has ever been since the heyday of the 600-ship Navy” during the Reagan Administration, Work noted that the 42 additional ships currently planned all are under contract, and most of these contracts are fixed-price. Still, the Navy will have to realize savings and cuts elsewhere to address what undoubtedly will be a tight budget. “‘Flat’ is the new ‘up’ in this defense budget environment,” he said, quipping, “We have an average budget … lower than last year, higher than next year.” And, sequestration might be catastrophic, he added. The Navy might have to furlough its civilian workers for 22 days, which would have serious effects on both Navy operations and the personal lives of those furloughed. That would be only one of many severe repercussions that would afflict the Navy. “If we have sequestration, we will have a hollow force by the end of the year,” he warned.

#### No internal link – the plan increases commercial shipbuilding CX proves no spill over

#### Collapse of US hegemony inevitable- economic decline ensures decline in military power and an end to unipolarity

Layne 11 (Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, March 28, 2011, “Bye bye, Miss American Pie”, The European Magazine, <http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana>)

The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.

#### 2. **Hegemony doesn’t check back conflict- states still oppose US primacy**

Maher 10 (Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

The other way to think about power is the ability to realize one's own preferences or preferred outcomes, or the ability to influence other actors—usually other states but not always—to do what you want them to do. When we think of power this way, we realize that the United States’ vast resources alone often are not sufficient to realize its preferred ends. There is no perfect correlation between the resources at one's command and the ability to realize preferred outcomes. Perhaps no other period of world politics in recent memory represents this discrepancy more acutely than today. U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other state. Politically, diplomatically, and economically the United States remains in a preeminent position. While it hardly gets everything it wants, no other country can match U.S. influence in these realms. At the same time, from Iran, to North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention Russia and China, the United States is seemingly not getting its way on issues central to its interests. More states are unafraid to challenge the United States (if only at the margins), ignore its blandishments, or seek to decrease their reliance or dependence on American security guarantees.

#### 3. hegemony necessitates using India to balance China

**Ward** **3/23** (Alex Ward, Interim Assistant to the Senior Vice President, Director of Studies & Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at Council on Foreign Relations, “Is the USA Still the Indispensible Power in East Asia?”, March 23, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/>)

As a response to the spectre of a Chinese regional order, Washington has reiterated its ambitions to “secure [US] interests and advance [US] values” (Clinton, 2011: npn). In November 2011, America attended the East Asia Summit for the first time, perhaps signifying a revitalized pursuit of multilateral integration. This notwithstanding, Washington’s primary regional agenda has been to facilitate “the ascent of friendly Asian centres of power that will constrain any Chinese bid for hegemony” (Twining, 2007: 80). Washington has developed new bilateral partnerships with Indonesia, Vietnam and most notably India, which according to Clinton (2011: npn) “will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century”. In particular, the fostering of India as a regional counterweight to China could serve to retain Washington’s role as the region’s decisive strategic player, in an “asymmetrically multipolar Asian security order” (Twining, 2007: 91).

#### B. That risks nuclear conflict and Asian proliferation

**Sullivan & Maza 10** (Sullivan & Maza, research fellow & program manager @ the American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies, a senior research associate @ AEI. “The Next Nuclear Arms Race”, September 27, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703384204575509163717438530.html>)

India and Pakistan are the two countries most likely to engage in nuclear war, or so goes the common wisdom. Yet if recent events are any indication, the world's most vigorous nuclear competition may well erupt between Asia's two giants: India and China. Both countries already house significant and growing arsenals. China is estimated to have approximately 450 warheads; India, roughly 100. Though intensifying as of late, Sino-Indian nuclear competition has a long history: India's pursuit of a weapons program in the 1960s was triggered in part by China's initial nuclear tests, and the two have eyed one another's arsenals with mounting concern ever since. The competition intensified in 2007, when China began to upgrade missile facilities near Tibet, placing targets in northern India within range of its forces. Yet the stakes have been raised yet again in recent months. Indian defense minister A.K. Antony announced last month that the military will soon incorporate into its arsenal a new intermediate-range missile, the Agni-III, which is capable of reaching all of China's major cities. Delhi is also reportedly considering redeploying survivable, medium-range Agni-IIs to its northeastern border. And just last month, India shifted a squadron of Su-30MKI fighters to a base just 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indian border. An Indian Air Force official told Defense News these nuclear-armed planes could operate deep within China with midflight refueling. For its part, China continues to enhance the quality, quantity and delivery systems of its nuclear forces. The Pentagon reported last month that the People's Liberation Army has replaced older, vulnerable ballistic missiles deployed in Western China with modern, survivable ones; this transition has taken place over the last four years. China's Hainan Island naval base houses new, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and affords those boats easy access to the Indian Ocean. China's military is also developing a new, longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile which will allow its subs to strike targets throughout India from the secure confines of the South China Sea. No single event has stoked this rise in tensions. China, already concerned about India's growing strength and its desire to play a greater role in Asia, is even less enthused about the burgeoning strategic partnership between Delhi and Washington. While Beijing has learned to live with American forces on its eastern periphery, the possibility of an intimate U.S.-India military relationship has generated fears of encirclement. The ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute, as well as India's position astride China's key maritime shipping lanes, has made the prospect of a Washington-Delhi axis appear particularly troubling. View Full Image Associated Press India's surface-to-surface missile Agni-II launches off Wheelers island in Orissa state, India, on May 17, 2010. India likewise feels encircled by China's so-called "string of pearls"—a series of Chinese-built, ostensibly commercial port facilities in the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Beijing's military ties to Pakistan, interference in the Kashmir dispute and references to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state, as "Southern Tibet" have done little to reassure New Delhi of Chinese intentions. The rapid growth of China's conventional military might in recent years—between 2000 and 2009, China's military spending more than tripled—and the lack of clarity as to its intentions, has spurred India to pursue its own military modernization. These shifts in India's and China's nuclear force postures thus represent only the latest and most serious efforts to constrain and convey dissatisfaction with the other's perceived regional ambitions. But they are more troubling than conventional redeployments. First, these developments suggest that neither country has confidence in the other's "no first use" policy. India has good reason for concern: The number of missions attributed to China's deterrent—responding to nuclear attacks, deterring conventional attacks against nuclear assets, providing Beijing freedom from nuclear coercion and otherwise "reinforcing China's great power status"—were enough to make the authors of the Pentagon's annual report on China's military power last year question the country's commitment to its "no first use" policy. India, for its part, relies on its nuclear forces to offset gaps and imbalances between its conventional military capabilities and those of China. Second, there is a point at which efforts to enhance deterrence can foster an arms race. Any attempt on the part of China to increase its own defenses necessarily weakens, or is perceived to weaken, the security of India, thus spurring further defense build-ups; the opposite is true as well. Shifts in nuclear force posture can be particularly disruptive, and have been known to precipitate crises. Upon the discovery of Soviet efforts to deploy missiles to Cuba in 1962, for example, the U.S. responded militarily with a naval "quarantine" of the island, bringing Washington and Moscow as close as they have ever come to a nuclear war. Finally, the redeployments of India's and China's nuclear forces suggest that there is deep-seated and growing discord between the two Asian giants. This is troubling news for a region whose future peace and prosperity depends heavily on continued comity between Delhi and Beijing. It is only a matter of time before the China-India military competition begins to affect neighboring states. China's nuclear force modernization, for instance, stands to threaten not only India, but also Korea, Japan and other U.S. partners in Asia. A dramatic defense buildup in India, meanwhile, will no doubt leave Pakistan feeling less secure. Tensions are unlikely to ease any time soon. The two countries appear much closer to the brink of an all-out arms race than they do to any resolution of their differences. While each profits from the other's economic growth, it is that very growth—which finances military modernization and which is so dependent on potentially vulnerable overseas trade—that creates the conditions for heightened insecurity.

#### 4A. Hegemony is the biggest internal link into economic decline- the US can no longer afford to be an empire

Bandow 10 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, J.D. from Stanford University, April 19, 2010, “Bankrupt Empire”, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/bankrupt-empire>) //ZA

The United States government is effectively bankrupt. Washington no longer can afford to micromanage the world. International social engineering is a dubious venture under the best of circumstances. It is folly to attempt while drowning in red ink. Traditional military threats against America have largely disappeared. There's no more Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Maoist China is distant history and Washington is allied with virtually every industrialized state. As Colin Powell famously put it while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "I'm running out of enemies. . . . I'm down to Kim Il-Sung and Castro." However, the United States continues to act as the globe's 911 number. Unfortunately, a hyperactive foreign policy requires a big military. America accounts for roughly half of global military outlays. In real terms Washington spends more on "defense" today than it during the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam War. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy. U.S. military expenditures are extraordinary by any measure. My Cato Institute colleagues Chris Preble and Charles Zakaib recently compared American and European military outlays. U.S. expenditures have been trending upward and now approach five percent of GDP. In contrast, European outlays have consistently fallen as a percentage of GDP, to an average of less than two percent. The difference is even starker when comparing per capita GDP military expenditures. The U.S. is around $2,200. Most European states fall well below $1,000. Adding in non-Pentagon defense spending — Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Energy (nuclear weapons) — yields American military outlays of $835.1 billion in 2008, which represented 5.9 percent of GDP and $2,700 per capita. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations worries that the increased financial obligations (forget unrealistic estimates about cutting the deficit) resulting from health-care legislation will preclude maintaining such oversize expenditures in the future, thereby threatening America's "global standing." He asks: Who will "police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression?" Of course, nobody is threatening to close the sea lanes these days. Washington has found it hard to stop nuclear proliferation without initiating war, yet promiscuous U.S. military intervention creates a powerful incentive for nations to seek nuclear weapons. Armored divisions and carrier groups aren't useful in confronting terrorists. Iraq demonstrates how the brutality of war often is more inhumane than the depredations of dictators. And there are lots of other nations capable of deterring rogue states. The United States should not attempt to do everything even if it could afford to do so. But it can't. When it comes to the federal Treasury, there's nothing there. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy. The current national debt is $12.7 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office figures that current policy — unrealistically assuming no new spending increases — will run up $10 trillion in deficits over the coming decade. But more spending — a lot more spending — is on the way. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain as active as ever, underwriting $5.4 trillion worth of mortgages while running up additional losses. The Federal Housing Administration's portfolio of insured mortgages continues to rise along with defaults. Exposure for Ginnie Mae, which issues guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, also is jumping skyward. The FDIC shut down a record 140 banks last year and is running low on cash. Last year the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation figured its fund was running a $34 billion deficit. Federal pensions are underfunded by $1 trillion. State and local retirement funds are short about $3 trillion. Outlays for the Iraq war will persist decades after the troops return as the government cares for seriously injured military personnel; total expenditures will hit $2 trillion or more. Extending and expanding the war in Afghanistan will further bloat federal outlays. Worst of all, last year the combined Social Security/Medicare unfunded liability was estimated to be $107 trillion. Social Security, originally expected to go negative in 2016, will spend more than it collects this year, and the "trust fund" is an accounting fiction. Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, also is breaking budgets. At their current growth rate, CBO says that by 2050 these three programs alone will consume virtually the entire federal budget. Uncle Sam's current net liabilities exceed Americans' net worth. Yet the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising and could eventually hit World War II levels. Net interest is expected to more than quadruple to $840 billion annually by 2020. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says: "It's not something that is ten years away. It affects the markets currently." In March, Treasury notes commanded a yield of 3.5 basis points higher than those for Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway. Moody's recently threatened to downgrade federal debt: "Although AAA governments benefit from an unusual degree of balance sheet flexibility, that flexibility is not infinite." In 2008, Tom Lemmon of Moody's warned: "The underlying credit rating of the U.S. government faces the risk of downgrading in the next ten years if solutions are not found to our growing Medicare and Social Security unfunded obligations." This is all without counting a dollar of increased federal spending due to federalizing American medicine. The United States faces a fiscal crisis. If America's survival was at stake, extraordinary military expenditures would still be justified. But not to protect other nations, especially prosperous and populous states well able to defend themselves. Boot warns: "it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time." America should be neither. The issue is not just money. The Constitution envisions a limited government focused on defending Americans, not transforming the rest of the world. Moreover, if Washington continues to act as globocop, America's friends and allies will never have an incentive to do more. The United States will be a world power for decades. But it can no afford to act as if it is the only power. America must begin the process of becoming a normal nation with a normal foreign policy.

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger and Desker, 9 [Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

 The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

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#### No evidence backs diversionary theory.

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Irnportantly, the assumption that Wars are always on balance costly for each side is not uncontroversial. Some feminist approaches contend that states may fight for the sake of lighting, as wars serve patriarchy by reinforcing gender identity.3 A more mainstream critique is that leaders go to war for domestic political reasons, such that a war-avoiding bargain might not be reachable even when both sides knew who would win, as lighting itself provides domestic political benefits from a war to both win- ner and loser.4 Under some conditions, especially if a state is undergoing democratization or if a national leader is experiencing domestic political problems such as unrest or economic downturn, a state may see war as a way to rally the public around the leader and stave off domestic political challenges.5 The proposition that leaders go to war when facing domestic difficulties is often called the "diversionary" hypothesis. However, the evidence that leaders choose war to solve internal political problems is thin. The underlying assumption is that going to war en- genders a rally round the flag effect that boosts the popularity of leaders, but leaders reap this benefit only under very narrow conditions (which often cannot be controlled by the attacking state), and even the biggest rallies are short-lived.6 Importantly, there is almost no smoking gun historical evidence of a leader launching a war primarily as a means of solving domestic political problems. At most, politicians have occasionally speculated about diversionary action, such as Secretary of State William Seward's (ignored) April 1861 suggestion to President Abraham Lincoln that the United States provoke crises with European powers as a means of staving off civil war between the Union and the seceding southern states.7 A Russian minister is famously thought to have declared just after the outbreak ofthe 1904-O5 Russo-japanese War that, "We need a little, victorious war to stem the tide of revolution," but the story is likely too good to be true.8 Leaders sometimes see indirect relationships between starting war and reaping domestic political benefits, such as the possibility that Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam War in 1965 to protect his Great Society program from domestic political attack.9 Some quantitative studies have found that the presence of internal problems like declining economic growth, rising inflation, partial democratization, or declining leader popularity are correlated with an (often slightly) increased likelihood in the use of force. However, these relationships are often limited in scope, occurring only under certain economic or political conditions.10 Any possible diversionary effects might in turn be moderated by the tendency of states to avoid provoking other states that might have diversionary incentives.11

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

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The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### No impact to heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution.

 The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### Trade with Mexico *isn’t* key to the economy — it’s a small percentage of the GDP and their authors conflate correlation with causation

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Effects on the U.S. Economy

The overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily because two-way trade

 with Mexico amounts to less than 3% of U.S. GDP. Thus, any changes in trade patterns with Mexico would not be expected to be significant in relation to the overall U.S. economy. In some sectors, however, trade-related effects could be more significant, especially in those industries that were more exposed to the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, such as the textile and apparel, and automotive industries. Since NAFTA, the automotive, textile, and apparel industries have experienced some of the more noteworthy changes in trading patterns, which may also have affected U.S. employment in these industries. U.S. trade with Mexico has increased considerably more than U.S. trade with other countries, and Mexico has become a more significant trading partner with the United States since NAFTA implementation. In the automotive industry, the industry comprising the most U.S. trade with Mexico, NAFTA provisions consisted of a phased elimination of tariffs, the gradual removal of many non-tariff barriers to trade including rules of origin provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, less restrictive government procurement practices, and the elimination of performance requirements on investors from other NAFTA countries. These provisions may have accelerated the ongoing trade patterns between the United States and Mexico. Because the United States and Canada were already highly integrated, most of the trade impacts on the U.S. automotive industry relate to trade liberalization with Mexico. Prior to NAFTA Mexico had a series of government decrees protecting the domestic auto sector by reserving the domestic automobile market for domestically produced parts and vehicles. NAFTA established the removal of Mexico’s restrictive trade and investment policies and the elimination of U.S. tariffs on autos and auto parts. By 2006, the automotive industry has had the highest dollar increase ($41 billion) in total U.S. trade with Mexico since NAFTA passage. The main NAFTA provisions related to textiles and apparel consisted of eliminating tariffs and quotas for goods coming from Mexico and eliminating Mexican tariffs on U.S. textile and apparel products. To benefit from the free trade provision, goods were required to meet the rules of origin provision, which assured that apparel products that were traded among the three NAFTA partners were made of yarn and fabric made within the free trade area. The strict rules of origin provisions were meant to ensure that U.S. textiles producers would continue to supply U.S. apparel companies that moved to Mexico. Without a rules of origin provision, apparel companies would have been able to import low-cost fabrics from countries such as China and export the final product to the United States under the free trade provision.51 While some U.S. industries may have benefitted from increased demand for U.S. products in Mexico, creating new jobs, other industries have experienced job losses. Data on the effects of trade liberalization with Mexico are limited and the effect on specific sectors of the U.S. economy is difficult to quantify. Trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the trade agreement.52 Quantifying these effects is challenging because of the other economic factors that influence trade and employment levels. The devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1995 resulted in lower Mexican wages, which likely provided an incentive for U.S. companies to move to lower their production costs. Trade-related employment effects following NAFTA could have also resulted from the lowering of trade barriers, and from the economic conditions in Mexico and the United States influencing investment decisions and the demand for goods.

#### Manufacturing decline inevitable and no impact – it’s because the economy is changing not offshoring

Worstall 12 (Tim Worstall, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, a writer for Forbes on business and technology and strangely, one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths, 7/13/2012, "What Is It With This Nostalgia For Manufacturing Jobs?"; [www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/07/13/what-is-it-with-this-nostalgia-for-manufacturing-jobs/))

I have to admit that I just don’t get it. Why is it that so many people are nostalgic for the days of mass employment in manufacturing? More, why is it that even generally bright and well informed people just cannot understand that those days are never coming back? Even someone like Felix Salmon just doesn’t seem to understand: US manufacturing in fact is extremely competitive on a global scale; the problem is that output has lagged productivity improvements, with the result that we’re making more stuff with ever fewer people. This is not a problem. Making more stuff with fewer people means that the people freed up can go and do something else. Run insurance exchanges for Obamacare for example. Think the basics through here. At date one we need 40 people to do the manufacturing we want to have done. At date two we need only 30 because of that rising productivity. This means we now have 10 people who can go and do something else other than manufacturing. We, as a society, are now richer by that extra production of whatever it is plus the manufactures. Requiring less human labour to do something is a good thing. Further, Salmon isn’t actually correct in his facts: There’s no particular reason why that should be the case: when manufacturers in China and Germany become more efficient, that’s their sign to employ more people, rather than fewer. As each employee becomes increasingly profitable, it makes perfect sense to keep on adding more employees. Or at least it does in some countries. In the US, by contrast, capital is cheap and plentiful, and there’s much more incentive here to replace people with capital goods wherever possible. I’m sorry but this just isn’t true. Germany has been shedding manufacturing workers as one of his own commenters shows Salmon. Also, it is not that capital is cheap in the US: it’s much cheaper in China than it is in the US at present. It is that US labour is expensive. This is also a good thing: expensive labour means that workers have high wages, rather one of the things that we’re trying to engineer in an economy. But there’s more! Manufacturing is shrinking as a portion of the economy in every country. Further, every country is shedding manufacturing jobs: yes, even China. The jobs are not being offshored to Mars, they’re being destroyed by rising productivity. It is simply true that the amount of labour we need to manufacture things is falling faster than the amount of things we want manufactured is rising. We shouldn’t be afraid of this: we should welcome it rather. For this is what has happened with agriculture over the past 300 years. We used to need 90% of the population working in the fields to feed 100% of the population. Now we use between 1 and 2% of the population to feed the 100%. We used to use 30-50% of the population working in factories to make the physical goods we wanted. Now we need under 10% (this does change depending upon country) and falling. It won’t be long, probably not in my lifetime but quite possibly in your, that working in manufacturing will be like doing so in agriculture. A slightly odd thing that some 1 or 2% of the population does. Everyone else will be in services of some kind. I’m really sorry but I simply do not understand all of these people nostalgic for some past and vanishing world. Manufacturing as a source of mass employment is just never coming back: get used to the idea.

#### Framing Issue – No Uniqueness or Brink arguments – means their only internal link is congestion collapsing the industry

#### No collapse; Status Quo Solves

Wilson et al, 1AC Author, 13 (Christopher E. Wilson, Eric L. Olsen, Miguel R. Salazar, Andrew Selee, Duncan Wood, Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, January 2013, “New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.- Mexico Relations”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf, JS)

New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States.¶ Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider nearshoring in Mexico or reshoring their production back to the United Sates. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor.The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination.

\*\*Johns Creek’s Card Ends\*\*

Mexico on the Move¶ For years, Mexico oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s largest market. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Measures of the country’s manufacturing sector are showing record-high growth, a clear sign of strengthening competitiveness, and the country is building ever more complex products like cars while leaving behind simpler industries like textiles and shoemaking. Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products and a force for many of the economic and political reforms needed to unleash Mexico’s full economic potential.5Altogether, Mexico’s new government inherited a very solid economic outlook despite the complex global environment, and the recent passage of important labor and education reforms suggest that the political gridlock that blocked the passage of several key economic reforms in congress for years may have finally, if perhaps only temporarily, become unstuck. Recent optimism regarding the Mexican economy has attracted significant foreign investments, and the United Nations expects FDI in Mexico in 2013 to reach a record $38 billion dollars.6 The Peña Nieto administration currently looks poised to manage a period of robust growth, and while global developments or a failure to measure up to high expectations could create downward pressures on Mexico’s growth, if Congress passes key energy, fiscal and accountability reforms, the outlook could become even brighter. A Boom in Bilateral Trade¶ After years of slow growth (4.5 percent average annual growth from 2000-2008) and then a 17 percent drop between 2008 and 2009 during the Great Recession, U.S.-Mexico trade is now booming as never before. It is growing faster than U.S. trade with China and faster than during any period during the post NAFTA spurt in the 1990s.7 In the uncertain context of a global economy in search of a new equilibrium—Europe struggling, China’s decelerating, a fiscal reckoning in the United States—the bilateral economic relationship stands out as a pillar of strength and perhaps a signpost on the path to a stronger economic region

#### No impact to congestion – no causal relationship with economic detriment

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With a few notable exceptions, transportation planning practice in the United States is focused on managing or eliminating traffic congestion. Regardless of whether planners are advocating for highway infrastructure to improve level-of-service, or transit projects intended to “get cars off the road,” the underlying assumption is that congestion relief is an unmitigated good. Such arguments are often based on the idea that traffic congestion and vehicle delay are bad for the economy. According to the Texas Transportation Institute, vehicle delay costs Americans $115 billion in wasted fuel and time each year. The common interpretation of such statistics is that our cities and regions would be so much more economically productive if only we could eliminate the congestion that occurs on urban streets. But this begs the question: is traffic congestion really a drag on the economy? Economies are measured not in terms of vehicle delay or the amount of travel that people do, but in terms of the dollar value of the goods and services that they produce. If it is true that congestion is detrimental to a region’s economy, then one would expect that people living in areas with low levels of traffic congestion would be more economically productive, on a per capita basis, than those in areas with high levels of congestion. This is a testable assertion. With the help of my research assistant Wenhao Li, I sought to determine whether vehicle delay had a negative effect on urban economies. I combined TTI’s data on traffic delay per capita with estimates of regional GDP per capita, acquired from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. I used 2010 data for both variables, converted them to their natural logs, and modeled them using regression analysis. And what did I find? As per capita delay went up, so did GDP per capita. Every 10 percent increase in traffic delay per person was associated with a 3.4 percent increase in per capita GDP. For those interested in statistics, the relationship was significant at the 0.000 level, and the model had an R2 of 0.375. In layman’s terms, this was statistically-meaningful relationship. Such a finding seems counterintuitive on its surface. How could being stuck in traffic lead people to be more productive? The relationship is almost certainly not causal. Instead, regional GDP and traffic congestion are tied to a common moderating variable - the presence of a vibrant, economically-productive city. And as city economies grow, so too does the demand for travel. People travel for work and meetings, for shopping and recreation. They produce and demand goods and services, which further increases travel demand. And when the streets become congested and driving inconvenient, people move to more accessible areas, rebuild at higher densities, travel shorter distances, and shift travel modes. Stated another way, people adapt to congested environments. Because cities provide greater access to job opportunities than do rural areas, as well as wages that are more than 30 percent higher than their non-metropolitan counterparts they have a powerful economic incentive to do so. Fortunately for our cities and their economies, urban environments are precisely what is sought by the millennial generation. 88 percent of millennials report that they would prefer to live in urban environments, and they are already driving less and riding transit more than their Gen X and boomer counterparts. Indeed, many millennials view driving as a vice, with 55 percent indicating that they have made a deliberate effort to reduce the amount of driving that they do. They are also leading a surge in cycling in cities like Seattle, Minneapolis, Denver, and Washington, D.C., all of which have seen their share of bike commuting double over the last decade. These trends are of great concern to the auto industry. While behavioral adaptations and changes in consumer preferences have already begun to address the issue of personal transportation in congested environments, a second issue remains unanswered: how do congested areas deal with freight and goods movement? A common argument is that if a region’s roadways are congested, goods will be unable to get to market and its economy will falter. Yet even the most casual glance at our most congested regions - New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco to name three - quickly dispels this idea. These are not places where consumer choices are limited, nor are they areas with stagnant economies. Quite the contrary. They are precisely the areas where one finds not only the most vibrant economies, but also the greatest variety of goods and services. How is this possible? It is important to recognize that major manufacturing and freight activities rarely occur in congested city centers, where land values are too high to make these activities economically viable. Likewise, long-haul truck drivers, who are paid on a per-mile travelled basis, have a powerful economic incentive to avoid traveling through urban areas during congested time periods, which reduces the number of miles per hour they can travel, and thus the number of dollars per hour they receive for their time. Urban economies naturally encourage these activities to move away from congested areas and time periods. It is nevertheless true that goods movement is growing in the United States, making it a transportation issue that cannot be dismissed lightly. Should a region discover that it needs additional capacity for freight traffic, plenty of capacity can be found by converting a “free” highway lane into a truck-only toll lane, which not only allocates highway capacity for goods movement, but which also generates the revenues needed to pay for the highway’s maintenance. Given that highway infrastructure in the United States is aging and in growing need of repair, and that the ongoing decline of federal gas tax revenues has made it difficult for many state and local governments to fund basic highway maintenance, such solutions are likely to look increasingly attractive in the future. Within cities themselves, the relevant issue is neither manufacturing nor long-haul transport, but the movement of goods destined for local markets. This is currently addressed through a variety of strategies, including the scheduling of deliveries to off-peak periods and the use of bicycle couriers in highly-congested areas. It has also led to the development of more technologically-sophisticated solutions, such as the use of GPS-based fleet management systems that permit dynamic trip scheduling and routing, allowing drivers to bypass localized pockets of traffic congestion. This is a growth industry that is projected to generate more than $9 billion in annual revenues by 2015. As Jane Jacobs has observed, city economies generate the resources needed to solve city problems. None of this is to suggest that there is no benefit in having our transportation system operate efficiently. But automobile congestion, vehicle delay, and their proxy, level-of-service, are not measures of system efficiency. Nor are they measures of economic vitality. They are nothing more or less than measures of how convenient it is to drive an automobile.