### 1

#### **Interpretation – economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a quid pro quo**

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### Violation – the aff is not a quid pro quo offer

#### Vote negative –

#### Limits – there are an infinite number of unilateral actions a government can take – conditionality limits affs only to predictable forms of engagement in the literature,

#### Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments and creates an unfair division of ground

### 2

#### The Government of Mexico should substantially increase its investment in Small Modular Reactors

###  3

#### The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world needing innovative solutions to constant problems, which entrenches insecurity logic. The impact is a circular apocalyptic impulse that makes violence inevitable

-Threats are just to preserve the perception of innocence- if we are powerless, then the troubles of the world are not our fault.

- System is unstable- Each step to create a more secure world ends up making us to be more insecure.

- By the use of security, we only perpetuate our need for control- we find that control through violence and action with the justification that we are only acting in self-defense. Through that violence, we become frustrated with losses on our own side which acts as greater justification for violence.

- actions built on a story are only doomed to fail as they only justify more security rhetoric and further put us in a state of insecurity.

-Insecurity that was a result of the security discourse perpetuates the violence that because it dictates our responses to the threats

- the perception that the nation is at risk is enough to envoke cries of pearl harbor and rally the US to go to conflict to protect our interests

- perpetuates the use of a security state- evidence becomes irrelevant- How do we know our existence is threatened, because it is- Serial policy failure

-insecurity is a justification for the resistance to change- as long as the threat of an attack exists, it makes is so that we justify more death in order to deal with it.

Chernus 1—Ira Chernus, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder [“Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm]

Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity. It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay. Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe. The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out. It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war. The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee that the promise will be fulfilled. But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all. The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state. The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks. The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nation’s very existence was threatened. In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more. One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bush’s charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical beliefs on people everywhere¼ and end a way of life." Yet evidence is irrelevant in the national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened! QED. This circular argument seems to be confirmed by the expressions of fear that have filled the mass media since September 11. They are certainly sincere. Yet it has become almost obligatory to say, "Life will never be the same because now, for the first time, we feel vulnerable." Most who say this can still remember, if they care to, the long cold war years of living on the brink of nuclear annihilation. Many are old enough to recall the Cuban missile crisis. Even more can remember the Reagan administration’s serious plans to fight a nuclear war. Are we really more vulnerable now, or only vulnerable in a different way? Are we really less secure than the days when one push of the button could trigger a thousand September 11’s? True, the September 11 attack was actual rather than merely potential. Yet the scale of the potential attack we feared for so long was so much greater than the actual attack. Why should so many say that the actual attack marked a quantum leap in national anxiety? The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of the answer. A larger part is the need to contain this new eruption of disorder within a familiar meaning structure. The study of human culture shows, over and over, that anxiety can be held in check, if not banished, by the way people talk about it. People can feel relatively secure amidst the most extraordinary disruption and anxiety, as long as they have familiar words that put the disruption into some larger, dependable, enduring order. The lifeline of security is a language that affirms the enduring truth of the prevailing discourse and worldview. Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nation’s most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly, there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise that danger is eternal and unavoidable. The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure. Thus the problem¾ the fear of terrorist attack¾ becomes the solution. The film of the towers bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over again. All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive challenge. The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives, and the Bush administration’s humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy¾ the national pride in heroic rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslim- and Arab-Americans¾ are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the sources of continuing insecurity. Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence. if our policies are not relevant to the problem, there is nothing to negotiate. In other words, the U.S. will not contemplate policy changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to heighten the nation’s guard and use force to control the behavior of would-be attackers. Much of the response to the tragedy reinforces these interlocked assumptions of powerlessness and innocence. The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the impression that the nation is circling the wagons and hunkering down for a long siege, because there is nothing else to do. The ubiquitous American flag becomes a symbol, not of abolishing evil, but of banding together to withstand the assault of evil forever. Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable. The new sense of national unity comes less from a common commitment to victory than from a common conviction of victimization. Powerful vestiges of the crusading spirit do remain. There is still a longing for unconditional triumph over the foreign foe. The constant allusions to Pearl Harbor, FDR, and World War II express these longings. More importantly, they create the illusion that genuine security is still possible. It is disconcerting to live amidst insecurity and even more disconcerting to acknowledge it openly. So the story of the "good war" is evoked endlessly, because it would be so reassuring to be able to wage another "good war." But the gestures of apocalyptic hope have a peculiarly forced, artificial quality, as if the public is trying to draw the last vestiges of living marrow out of an increasingly dead husk. The symbols, rituals, and mantras of the redeemer nation serve a very different role when public culture no longer really believes in the redemption. The problem is defined in apocalyptic terms. But no apocalyptic solution is available, nor even suggested. Talk of hope for security still elicits powerful images of the peril we hope to be secure from. But talk of peril is simply talk of peril, not a prelude to hope. There are no safe homes we can return to, for we must assume that the enemy, in one form or another, will always be at our gates. Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging efforts to maintain relative stability. In an inherently unstable world, made less stable by a superpower pursuing control, this is indeed "a task that does not end." All that once symbolized hope for the Kingdom of God on earth (whether in religious or secular form) now locks us into a future of inconclusive struggle and mounting anxiety. And the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the more we will resist fundamental change. That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long, twilight struggle returns our culture to the certitude of simplistic absolutes. It erases the uncertainties of the ‘90s. It reassures us that nothing has really changed and nothing need ever change. It offers the best reason to go on resisting change. All of the preparations for and acts of war, all the warnings of and protections against future attacks, all the patriotic singing and flag-waving, all the gestures of hope that things will be better in the future, indeed all the dominant cultural responses to the attacks¾ all are now representations of the overriding conviction that security is still an impossible dream, that the future will not be fundamentally different from the present. In a society so fearful of change, where constant change provokes widespread despair, the conviction of unchanging insecurity engenders a strange kind of confidence. Millions now look ahead with more hope precisely because they can now believe that there is nothing really new to hope for. They cling to the insecurity that justifies their resistance to change. They take comfort in knowing that the explosions of September 11, which we are told changed everything, could not shake the foundations of the national insecurity state. The official story of the war on terrorism gives them that perverse comfort. For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering. The national insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering. So this war pushes us further into the shadow of the most tragic death of all: the death of hope for a better, a more peaceful, a genuinely secure future.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a critical approach to security. This is crucial to open space for emancipatory perspectives—our critique is mutually exclusive with the affirmative.

* Intelectuals can intervene by providing a critique of the current situation- calling attention to the problem to open up space for political discussion. The presenting of appropriate critiques is what is nessisary
* The critiques put forth by the intellectuals present a more realistic picuture of the world- they offer a more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world.
* Becoming aware of the politics of security helps us understand the role of human agency and reveils an alternate approach to the topic.

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

### 4

#### There will be bipartisan compromise on a long term budget

Matthews 11-13 (Laura Matthews, U.S. politics reporter for the International Business Times, “Budget Conference Committee Hopes To 'Keep Ball Rolling'” <http://www.ibtimes.com/budget-conference-committee-hopes-keep-ball-rolling-1468804> 11-13-13)AH

Further, House and Senate budget committee leaders have said they won’t waste time debating the areas where they already know there’s no agreement, but will focus on where deals can be cut.¶ “We hope that today’s meeting will keep the ball rolling,” said U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., and chair of the House Budget Committee.¶ “The hard part is figuring out where we agree,” he later added.¶ Related¶ ¶ Ryan's call for compromise was echoed by Senate Budget Committee Chair Patty Murray, D-Wash., who told the conference that the highest priority is ensuring short- and medium-term needs for improving the economy are met.¶ Even so, the two are very much aware there is a chasm between them in terms of their respective budgets. Just how they will bridge that gap and reach common ground on a compromise budget before the Dec. 13 deadline is the massive task. But each side remains optimistic.¶ “Our budgets are dramatically different,” Murray said, but added that it is extremely important the two sides step out of their partisan corner and cut a deal.¶ Cutting a deal has never been easy for Democrats and Republicans, who differ greatly on taxes and spending. At the heart of past budget deal failures: programs and policies that are dear to each party's constituents: Democrats favor increasing taxes while Republicans do not; Republicans want significant cuts to entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security, but Democrats are opposed to it. Still, Murray suggested their is a deal-point - an act by the GOP that could put things in motion:¶ “I am willing to meet Republicans halfway and make some compromises when it comes to additional spending reductions,” Murray wrote in a recent Washington Post op-ed. “Democrats won’t agree to irresponsible cuts that hurt seniors and families, but we can find responsible savings across the federal budget to get to a fair deal.”¶ “Compromise, however, runs both ways,” Murray continued. “While we scour programs to identify savings, Republicans have to work with us to scour the bloated tax code and close loopholes used by the wealthiest Americans and corporations to replace the other half of sequestration.”

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Obama needs PC for negotiations

Madhani 10/17/13 (Aamer Madhani- writer for USA Today, writes about a variety of topics, including politics, current events, Congress, the government, etc, thank you for writing this article omg, “In fiscal fight, Obama steps back, looks to next battle,” <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/17/obama-shutdown-strategy-gop/2997437/>, 10/17/13, 12:05 pm, Sundar)

¶ WASHINGTON — As the battle over the government shutdown and debt ceiling barreled toward a culminating point this week, President Obama stepped back from a debate that seemed to grow more chaotic by the day.¶ After two weeks of vowing that he would not negotiate with Republicans or pay them "a ransom" to "do their job," Obama appeared to decide that keeping an arms-length from the fight was the best strategy with an even bigger budget battle on the horizon.¶ On Thursday, he called on his allies and adversaries to look past the punditry that has declared him the winner in this battle and the Republicans losers.¶ "Let's be clear, there are no winners here," Obama said. "The last few weeks have inflicted completely unnecessary damage to our economy. We don't know the full scope of it yet, but every analyst out there believes it slowed our growth."¶ Even before Congress voted to reopen a shuttered federal government and raise the debt ceiling Wednesday night, Obama began discarding some of the sharper rhetorical darts and tried to melt into the background as the Republican leadership grappled with the reality that they would have to blink first.¶ When the president addressed reporters Wednesday night shortly after the Senate voted, he thanked Republican and Democratic leaders for ending the impasse and spoke in conciliatory terms.¶ "I am eager to work with anybody — Democrat or Republican, House or Senate members — on any idea that will grow our economy, create new jobs, strengthen the middle class, and get our fiscal house in order for the long term," Obama said. "I've never believed that Democrats have a monopoly on good ideas. And despite the differences over the issue of shutting down our government, I'm convinced that Democrats and Republicans can work together to make progress for America."¶ The president began shifting toward a longer view early in the week.¶ STORY: Congress passes deal to end shutdown, raise debt limit¶ On Monday, he commiserated with furloughed federal workers at a Washington food pantry. Later that day, he scrapped a scheduled meeting with the four top congressional leaders when it appeared talks between Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell were making headway — keeping the onus on Congress.¶ The following day he made only a glancing reference to the crisis at his only public appearance for the day — a ceremony to award former U.S. Army Capt. William Swenson the Medal of Honor — when he suggested that Washington could learn something from the young officer's selfless action.¶ Throughout the debate, White House officials insisted that Obama would not negotiate, even as he hosted Republican leadership for talks at the White House during the shutdown.¶ And unlike the past two standoffs over fiscal issues earlier in his administration, Obama did not dispatch Vice President Biden — who some Democrats groused gave up too much to McConnell in the earlier talks — to Capitol Hill.¶ Instead, Obama had White House chief of staff Denis McDonough and his senior adviser Rob Nabors serve as point men to deal with Congress during the crisis.¶ "It was a smart move to take a hands-off approach — particularly since the American people weren't going to be particularly thrilled with the outcome anyway," said Allan Lichtman, an expert on the American presidency at American University.¶ In the end, Obama more or less stuck to his guns and gave little to the Republicans — whose starting negotiating point included defunding implementation of the president's signature health care law — for agreeing to reopen the government or extending the borrowing authority through Feb. 7.¶ The agreement extends spending levels that were set in the 2011 fiscal battle through Jan. 15. The deal also sets a mid-December deadline for congressional budget negotiators to report on their efforts to find solutions to longer-term fiscal issues. Those talks will be led by Sen. Patty Murray D-Wash., and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis.¶ The only change to the health care law Republicans were able to extract was minor: The administration will have to verify the incomes of individuals who receive federal subsidies to help pay for health insurance. McConnell offered that the deal was "far less than many of us hoped for, quite frankly, but far better than what some had sought."¶ Still, the White House wasn't exactly spiking the football in the end zone.¶ "There is a lot of work ahead of us, including our need to earn back the trust of the American people that has been lost over the last few weeks," Obama said.¶ Obama's hands-off approach may have worked for this round in part because his end goal was straight forward: sending the message that Republicans would not win concessions from him by shuttering government or threatening default.¶ It required him "to draw a line in the sand and then stand back and tell Congress that's where the line in the sand was," explained Jonathan Cowan, a former Clinton administration official and president of the centrist Democratic group the Third Way.¶ But in his next fiscal battle, Obama will have to push not only Republicans, but also the left-wing of his own party on difficult issues like entitlement and tax reform if there is any chance for a big legacy-setting budget deal that he desires.¶ "It may be that the president played it right in this round by having an intentionally more hands-off strategy," Cowan said. "But in the next round, it's imperative that President Obama call for and push aggressively for a big economic bargain."

#### Certainty is key to long term economic growth

Novack 10/16 (Janet Novack writes from D.C. about tax and retirement policy and planning, 10/16/13, “Political Uncertainty Will Continue To Stunt Economic Growth”, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2013/10/16/its-the-washington-uncertainty-stupid/>, TL)

Even if, as now appears likely, Congress passes a deal to raise the debt ceiling until Feb. 7th and fund the federal government through Jan. 15th, the uncertainty emanating from Washington will continue to hold down economic growth, Moody’s Analytics Chief Economist Mark Zandi said Wednesday. “I’m increasingly of the view that the reason why our economy can’t get into a higher gear is because of the uncertainty created by Washington, that this brinkmanship which happens every 3, to 6, to 12 months is corrosive on our collective psyche and it’s weighing on our willingness and ability to take risk,’’ Zandi said during a meeting with journalists at Washington think tank Third Way. Such uncertainty doesn’t cause businesses to lay off workers, but it does cause them to delay hiring and reduces their willingness to invest in riskier areas such as research and development, he said. While acknowledging that the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. ObamaCare) has created some “wrenching changes,” Zandi said the “uncertainty related to ObamaCare is fading fast.” He added: “The predominant contribution to uncertainty is the mess we’re in right now related to the brinkmanship. So if lawmakers decide what they’re going to do is raise the debt limit for a few months, the stock market is going to be okay, but it means we’re doomed to be in this lackluster growth. We really need for Washington to get out of the way, literally get out of the way. If they could just get off the front pages of The New York Times and Wall Street Journal…that would mean the private economy would really be taking off. I think that’s the key impediment to the ability of the private sector to really engage. “ Zandi estimates that the combination of the January 1 fiscal cliff tax hikes and the budget cuts that were agreed to in 2011 have reduced the GDP gowth rate from 3% to 1.5% a year. While that fiscal contraction was faster than he favored, Zandi said, it would be manageable if Washington would just end the uncertainty—and leave well enough alone for a few years. “I think we’ve made a lot of progress on the deficit. Deficits are coming down very rapidly, faster than people would have expected,’’ he said. The key to solving the longer term deficit issues, he added, “is establishing a stronger rate of growth and the key to doing that is getting Washington off the front page. They have to do nothing, literally nothing. No change at all for the next 3 or 4 years. Let the private economy do its thing. Let’s reconvene 3 or 4 years from now and see what it looks like.” By that time, he noted, Congress will have a better idea of whether ObamaCare has done anything to bend the health care cost curve down—crucial to controlling the long term deficit as the baby boomers move onto Medicare. Zandi isn’t the only economist to argue that Washington’s partisan wars are holding the economy back. Vanguard Group Chief Economist Joseph Davis, for example, estimates that even before the current federal shutdown/debt ceiling crisis, a Washington “Uncertainty Tax” was knocking about a percentage point off U.S. economic growth. Washington’s recurring budget wars are also changing attitudes oversees, Zandi believes. During the first crisis over raising the debt ceiling in 2011, he said, foreign investors assumed the U.S. would work it out. “This is now changing to the point where people overseas are really concerned about the dysfunctionality of the process,’’ he said. “You’re hearing increasing calls and increasing preferences to diversify away from the United States.”

#### Economic decline leads to miscalculation and crisis escalation—escalates

Harris and Burrows, ‘09 [Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>]

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## Leadership

#### No impact to Leuga verde meltdown- Chernobyl didn’t cause extinction- most uncontrolled reactor meltdown in history- your impact is empirically denied

#### They can’t stop prolif from rising nations like Iran or North Korea who already posses the Tech- Impact is inev

#### Nuclear policy has no effects on states

Stanley- 1AC author- 7 (Elizabeth Stanley, Ph.D. in Government – Harvard University, Assistant Professor – Georgetown University, Member – National Security Advisement Board of Sandia National Laboratories, “International Perceptions of U.S. Nuclear Policy” [http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/2007/070903.pdf)](http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/2007/070903.pdf%29)

With this in mind, there are three implications of the findings presented above. First, because

these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US

nuclear policy will have a drastic material effect on US relations with these states, unless the

policy changes are perceived as being congruent with other US policies and actions. Put another

way, a change in nuclear policy with a change in the same “direction” (more cooperative or more

confrontational) of policy in another issue area could manifest as a material change in the

relationship. Otherwise, nuclear policy is unlikely to lead to a material change by itself. Second,

the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the material

relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions.

#### Cooperation with mexico wont have sway with rogue nations like North Korea and iran which is what your evidence cites as the most likely to prolif

#### Nuclear leadership doesn’t solve all impacts- the card is in the context of soft power- nuclear leadership is just a small part

#### Chernobyl can’t happen in the US

Robert Morris, PhD in Science Education and retired Environmental Consultant, *The Environmental Case for Nuclear Power,* 2000, pg 127-8

There are some very crucial differences between U.S.-built nuclear power reactors and Russian-built reactors. In the U.S. reactors, the uranium fuel rods are surrounded by water which acts as a moderator and also serves to transfer the heat generated by the fuel rods. If a U.S. reactor loses water, the nuclear reaction stops all by itself because the moderator, which is necessary for the reaction, is gone. But, in many Russian-built reactors, graphite is used as the moderator, and the water which is used to transfer heat actually slows down the reaction. This means that when water is lost from a Russian reactor, the chain reaction accelerates rapidly, and an engineer in the plant must act immediately to stop the rapidly increasing reaction rate and heat. Reactors of the Chernobyl type are so dangerous that they could never be licensed to generate electricity in the U.S., or in most Western countries. Secondly, U.S. nuclear power plants are built with multiple layers of containment. Usually, several 8-inch-thick steel jackets and a steel reinforced concrete containment up to 3-and-one-half feet thick enclose the reactor and insure that nothing can escape from it. But, at Chernobyl, this kind of safety containment was completely absent. Figure 7.1 shows this containment. Unlike Western-built power reactors, Chernobyl was built to serve a dual purpose: As it generated electricity, it was producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Because the plutonium must be removed frequently, a heavy concrete containment would be in the way and, therefore, was never built. After the accident, observers studying the situation concluded that had containment such as is used in U.S. nuclear power plants been present, there would have been no escape of radioactive materials from the plant. At the time of the accident, electrical engineers—not nuclear engineers—were carrying out an electrical experiment which led to nuclear conditions so dangerous that plant rules strictly forbid operating under such conditions. However, the electrical engineers in charge disregarded these rules and proceeded with their experiment. Apparently, no nuclear engineers were on hand to emphasize how dangerous this was. At 1:23 A.M., on April 26, 1986, an automatically-generated computer print-out warned plant operators that the reactor should be shut down immediately, but the operators ignored this warning. Only minutes later, two explosions occurred almost simultaneously. Although the U.S. media failed to make the point clear, the explosion was not nuclear, but was either chemical or a steam explosion such as occurs when a water heater without a safety valve becomes overheated. In addition to the fact that not enough of the fissionable isotope of uranium is present for a nuclear explosion to occur, the fact that only two people were killed in the two explosions further indicates that the explosions were not nuclear.

#### Current violence is a nuisance but unlikely to escalate to large scale conflict or pose at threat to US security interests

**Cárdenas, 3-17-11** [Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full>]

"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

#### Nuclear modernization isn’t k2 deterrence

Travis Sharp 10, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, “The Numbers Game”, Nukes of Hazard, Center for Arms Control & Nonproliferation, 2-24, http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/2/24/123221/390

This complaint is regularly expressed by Keith Payne, the paragon of conservative nuclear strategists. For instance, Payne wrote last year that “informed estimates about the functioning of deterrence must also include assessments of opponent decision-making processes, values, intentions, histories, levels of determination, goals, stakes and worldviews.” Since deterrence is not a quantifiable or scientific outcome, Payne concluded,¶ In the contemporary strategic environment, it is impossible to provide high-confidence, quantitatively precise and enduring answers to the question “how much is enough” for deterrence. The familiar game of linking some specific number of nuclear weapons with confidence in deterrence and the adequacy of U.S. strategic forces in general remains popular, but it now is unsupportable…even if done rigorously, identifying the requirements for deterrence is an incomplete basis for defining the necessary parameters for U.S. strategic forces in general.¶ Before considering whether this “numbers game” critique is justified, a comment is needed on Bolton’s and Payne’s methodology. Deterrence indubitably involves historical, cultural, psychological, and political calculations, as Payne suggests. NOH readers should recognize, however, that predicating deterrence on potential adversaries’ values, goals, stakes, and worldviews allows Bolton and Payne to configure U.S. nuclear forces according to how evil they perceive other countries to be. Do we really want to dismiss targeting-based deterrence analyses, such as Cimbala’s JFQ article and Lieber’s and Press’s Foreign Affairs appendix, as mere Cold War remnants and replace them with 1 inflammatory Ahmadinejad quote = 1 credible limited U.S. counterforce option? Payne is arguing, laudably, for recognizing deterrence’s complexity. Yet will an injection of red-blooded Manichaeism make U.S. nuclear policy more effective? I doubt it.¶ Payne is right that it is difficult to formulate “quantitatively precise” answers to deterrence questions, but that uncertainty doesn’t necessarily justify rounding up to the larger U.S. nuclear arsenal he would prefer. As Charles Glaser convincingly put it, “Deterrence is likely to be effective because, as was argued extensively during the Cold War, even relatively little credibility is sufficient when the costs of retaliation are so large.” In other words, a little nuke still goes a long way.

#### Reforms ensure stability

Barone 4-8 (Michael Barone, Senior Political Analyst for the Washington Examiner, co-author of The Almanac of American Politics, “Mexico Becomes a Stable, Politically Diverse Neighbor” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/04/08/mexico\_becomes\_a\_stable\_politically\_diverse\_neighbor\_\_117830.html> 4-8-13)AH

Pena won the July election handily and on taking office in December called for major reforms. He issued a 34-page Pact for Mexico, which proposed greater competition for Pemex in the energy sector plus education and judicial reforms.¶ Remarkably, it was endorsed by PAN and PRD, as well as the PRI. Pemex has been a sacred cow in Mexico since the 1930s, when President Lazaro Cardenas seized foreign oil operations and created the state-owned monopoly.¶ The Pemex union was a pillar of the PRI establishment. Now a PRI president was proposing to reform it, and his move was endorsed by a PRI party convention in March.¶ Pena also acted on education. In February, Congress passed a law establishing a transparent system for teacher hiring and evaluation.¶ The next day, the government arrested the head of the teachers' union and charged her with spending $156 million of union funds on luxury goods.¶ And Pena has moved to deregulate telecommunications, which threatens the position of telecom billionaire Carlos Slim.¶ There is other heartening news from south of our border. Mexico's economy is moving ahead with 5 percent growth.¶ Since the NAFTA treaty went into effect in the 1990s, it seemed that Mexico's economy was tethered to ours, leaving it unable to close the gap with the United States. Now as our economy slogs along slowly, Mexico is moving toward catching up. It is, as former Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda has proclaimed, a majority middle-class country now.¶ It is also a country from which, according to the Pew Hispanic Center, there has been no net migration to the United States since 2007.¶ All this vindicates our previous four presidents, who pressed for closer ties with Mexico. But most of the credit belongs to the leaders and people of Mexico. Good neighbors.

### Prolif

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Prolif is super slow—empirics disprove their fear mongering.

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon.

Yet there is another possibility. The Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate.

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves.

NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED

"Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

#### Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

#### Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves more lives than it costs.

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

Seng 98 (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### SMRs leads to accidents

Wang, 12

[Ucilia, Forbes, 1-20, “Feds To Finance Small Nuclear Reactor Designs,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/20/feds-to-finance-small-nuclear-reactor-designs/]

The U.S. Department of Energy on Friday announced a plan to support the design of so-called “small modular nuclear reactors” and popularize their use for power generation. The plan is to fund two reactor designs that will become available for licensing and production by 2022. The department is first asking for advice from the power industry on crafting the details of this project, and it hasn’t said how much it would dole out. But whoever wins the contracts to design the reactors will have to pony up money as well. Small reactors are generally about one-third the size of existing nuclear reactors, and a power plant with small reactors promises to be cheaper to build and easier to obtain permits more quickly than a full-size nuclear power plant, proponents say. Utilities should have more flexibility in modifying the size of a power plant with small reactors – if they need more power, then they can add more reactors over time. Nuclear reactors have historically been designed to be 1-gigawatt or more each because such scale helps to drive down the manufacturing and installation costs. Small reactors can be economical, too, advocates say, because they can be shipped more easily and cheaply around the world. “We think (small, modular nuclear) solves a lot of issues in terms of investments and electricity infrastructure,” Chu said at a press conference a year ago. “And it’s a way for the United States to regain its leadership in nuclear.” Several startups and major power equipment makers are working on small modular nuclear reactors. They include TerraPower, which is backed by Bill Gates and recently received funding from Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries. TerraPower also has been talking to the governments of China, India and Russia, basically countries where nuclear power won’t likely receive the kind of intense opposition that you’ll find in the United States, Germany or Japan. Other venture capital-funded startups include NuScale Power and Hyperion Power Generation (see a list from GigaOm). These companies aren’t just working on shrinking the size of the reactors. They also are investigating the use of different fuels and ways to reduce nuclear waste, for example. Following the energy department’s announcement Friday morning, Westinghouse Electric Co. issued a statement to say it intends to apply for the funding. Westinghouse already is in the nuclear reactor design business. It received approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a large, 1,154-megawatt nuclear reactor called AP1000 last month. The energy department funded part of the project to design AP1000. Just because small nuclear reactors promise many economic and environmental benefits (they don’t produce dirty air like coal or natural gas power plants do) doesn’t mean they can be developed and made more quickly or cheaply, however. Technology companies also will have to prove that their small nuclear reactors can be just as safe if not safer than the conventional, large-scale nuclear reactors today. The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in Japan has shown that a misstep in designing and operating a nuclear plant can have a far greater and more devastating impact than a mistake in running other types of power plants. That means nuclear power companies — and the government — will have to do a lot more to prove that nuclear power should remain an important part of the country’s energy mix.

#### Extinction

Lendman, ‘11

[Stephen, Research Associate -- Center for Research on Globalization, 3-13, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,” http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan]

For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. Moreover, other nuclear cycle steps also use fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the enrichment process itself, and conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant construction, dismantling and cleanup at the end of their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including contaminated cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling, transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover, nuclear power costs and risks are so enormous that the industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding annually. The Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially everyone living close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time, causing illness and early death. The link between radiation exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending only on the amount of cumulative exposure over time, Caldicott saying: "If a regulatory gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will begin to incubate cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In fact, a single gene mutation can prove fatal. No amount of radiation exposure is safe. Moreover, when combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals and contaminated GMO foods and ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add nuclear war to the mix, also potentially inevitable according to some experts, by accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying: "Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the consequences of which "would be profound, potentially killing "tens of millions of people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people." Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate nightmare, able to end all life if it happens. It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a clear and present danger as long as nuclear weapons and commercial dependency exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two choices - abolish all forms of nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened. The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.