## Plan Text

#### The United States federal government should remove its restrictions on upstream petroleum cooperation towards the republic of Cuba.

## Relations

#### Contention 1 is Relations

#### Chavez’s death means now is key to solve Cuban relations---that’s key to broader Latin America relations

Tisdall 3-5 – Simon Tisdall, writer for the Guardian, March 5th, 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print)

Hugo **Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an** opportunity to repair US ties with Venezuela**, but also with** other Latin American states **whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction**.¶ In particular, **the change of leadership in Caracas could** unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can summon the requisite political will.¶ Possibly anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn.¶ Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations.¶ "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a **step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in** counter-narcotics**,** counter-terrorism **and** energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald.¶ There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro.¶ "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term for the United States – for every ill … In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn."¶ Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US.¶ In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start.¶ Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Raúl Castro in Cuba.¶ Yet **it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America**. **He now has a chance to do better**.¶ The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions.¶ "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico).¶ Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued.¶ "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said.¶ Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and **one way to do it would be to unpick** the Cuban problem**, which continues to** colour the way Latin Americans view Washington.¶ "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.

#### The plan allows for US-Cuban energy cooperation---spurs broader relations

Benjamin 10 – Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, 2010, Brookings Institution book, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”

Conclusion and Recommendations

Oil exploration is an inherently risky enterprise; there are always trade-offs between negatives and positives relating to energy security, environmental integrity, and geostrategic considerations. The consensus arising from the studies and the analyses in this book is that the creation of mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities between the United States and Cuba is long overdue. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Cuban infrastructure and economic development were direct beneficiaries of commercial relations with the United States. This relationship was instrumental in providing Cuba with access to advanced technologies and the signs of modernity that were unparalleled in Latin America and far beyond.¶ Once again, the United States is presented with an opportunity that might serve as the basis of a new relationship between the United States and Cuba. It holds out the possibility of enhancing the stability and development of a region that is wrestling with questions of how and when it too might benefit from engagement with a global economic development model. The question is whether the United States chooses to be at the center, or to leave Cuba to seek some alternate path toward its goals.¶ Ironically, Cuban officials have invited American oil companies to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas reserves. American oil, oil equipment, and service companies possess the capital, technology, and operational know-how to explore, produce, and refine these resources in a safe and responsible manner. Yet they remain on the sidelines because of our almost five-decades-old unilateral political and economic embargo. The United States can **end this impasse by licensing American oil companies to participate in the development of Cuba’s energy resources**. By seizing the initiative on Cuba policy, the United States will **be strategically positioned to play an important role** in the future of the island, thereby giving Cubans a better chance for a stable, prosperous, and democratic future. The creation of stable and transparent commercial relations in the energy sector will bolster state capacity in Cuba while enhancing U.S. geostrategic interests, and can help Cuba’s future leaders avoid illicit business practices, minimize the influence of narcotrafficking enterprises, and stanch the outflow of illegal immigrants to the United States.¶ If U.S. companies are allowed to contribute to the development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as the development of alternative and renewable energy (solar, wind, and biofuels), it will give the United States the opportunity to **engage Cuba’s future leaders to carry out long-overdue** economic reforms and development that will perhaps pave the way to a **more open and representative society** while helping to promote Cuba as a stable partner and leader in the region and beyond.¶ Under no circumstances is this meant to suggest that the United States should come to dominate energy development policy in Cuba. The United States certainly has a role to play, but unlike its past relationship with Cuba, its interaction and cooperation will be predicated on its ability to accept, at a minimum, that Cuba will be the dominant partner in potential commercial ventures, and an equal partner in future diplomatic and interstate relations. Without a doubt Cuban government actors are wary of the possibility of being dominated by the “colossus of the North,” but as Cuba’s energy policymakers face the daunting reality of their nation’s energy future, it is abundantly clear that they possess the willingness and the capacity to assiduously pursue sound policy objectives and initiatives that begin to address the island’s immediate and long-term challenges. In the end, this course of action will have **direct and tangible benefits for the people of Cuba, it neighbors, and beyond.**

#### Scenario 1 is Russia

#### Cuba-Russia relations are increasing and will cause war---boosting US-Cuba relations solves

Inter-American Dialogue 12 (U.S. based think tank for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, “Are External Tensions Entangling Latin American Countries?” http://www.cepr.net/documents/CEPR\_News/LAA120810.pdf)

A Stephen Johnson, senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: "It may or may not be true that Russia's government is seeking to build resupply bases for its navy in Cuba, Vietnam and the Seychelles islands. While Russian navy officials say 'da,' the foreign ministry says 'nyet.' Similar talk of establishing bases elsewhere, such as Venezuela, has not materialized. In any case, it would not present a direct threat unless such a facility became an entry point for hostile arms similar to the nuclear-tipped missiles that provoked the 1962 crisis. Like any other state, Russia can strike diplomatic agreements to base military units in other countries. On the other hand, it would be a challenge. First, it would rekindle a military relationship that ended when Russia transferred its signals intelligence facility at Lourdes to the Cuban government in 2002. A new base might be a shot in the arm to the Cuban economy, helping the Castro brothers hang on to aspects of their old command economy without going cold turkey for market reforms. A base could also serve as a hub for military weapons sales to other Latin American nations when the region needs help in fighting transnational crime. The Soviet Union fell more than 20 years ago, but Russia still has large military industries and needs to sell arms more than washing machines. Its prime customers would, like Cuba, be in the Bolivarian alliance. Second, a Russian navy station in Cuba might complicate U.S. politics, specifically any plans a U.S. administration might have to hand back Guantanamo Naval Base in the near future, for which Cuba's current government refuses to cash our rent checks. At a time when U.S. Northern and Southern Commands are gearing more toward military support for civilian law enforcement missions, it would reintroduce a strategic deterrence component into joint exercises and training. That might not be a bad thing, but it would argue for more U.S. defense spending on the Western Hemisphere. All of which seems to argue that recent threat trends in the Americas are not very predictive and that certain old alliances won't go easily into the sunset."¶ A Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "Russia is in military talks with Cuba for three reasons. One is economic, related to Russian investment in Cuban nickel and oil and the need to guarantee protection of these investments. Another factor is geostrategic. Recent events in Syria have confirmed Russian fears of the long-term strategic aims of the United States. The Russians are very aware that the United States and Western Europe have been supporting the rebels in Syria and they see this as an indirect attack upon their interests as Assad provides them with a naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean. The third reason is possibly rather more personal, Vladimir Putin has turned his face against Washington since his recent re-election because he perceived a U.S. hand in organizing the protests against him. From Cuba's point of view, having a Russian military base would be a guarantee of security since it would mean that U.S. military action against it would be less likely. If Washington would not wish for Havana to have such an ally, it ought to reconsider its own policy toward the island. At present, the embargo, and especially the Helms Burton Law, makes it sensible for the Cuban government to seek alliances with as many powers as possible in order to protect itself. U.S. military presence in Latin America has grown in recent years. There are now 24 bases including two new ones in Chile and Argentina. Seven bases in Colombia are being expanded. The justification for this expansion is the war on drugs and for humanitarian intervention purposes. However, it should come as no surprise that this is not the way that Cuba or its closest allies such as Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales view them. They see the bases as potential threats to their independence and sovereignty and a sign that Washington's hegemonic designs on the region are very much alive."¶ A Wayne S. Smith, senior fellow and director of the Cuba Project at the Center for International Policy: "Given the history of the 1962 U.S.-Soviet missile crisis, for the Russians now to propose exploring with the Cubans the setting up of naval bases on the island would seem a rather maladroit idea. The United States made it clear in 1962 that the positioning of offensive nuclear missiles on the island was unacceptable and demanded that they be withdrawn. The world has never been so close to an allout nuclear war. Fortunately, both Kennedy and Khrushchev showed themselves to be sensible men. They reached an understanding under which Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles and Kennedy gave assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba. Subsequently, without informing the United States, the Soviets began building a submarine base on the island, but when it was made clear to them that the United States would consider this a violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1962, work on the base was quietly halted and never resumed. The United States should of course oppose the positioning of Russian bases in Cuba today, as should the other countries of the hemisphere. They would serve no reasonable purpose and could only unnecessarily add to tensions. The United States has not increased its military presence in Latin America. There is no reason for the Russians to do so."

#### Increased Cuba-Russia relations causes war

Richter 08 (Paul, Staff Writer for New York Times, “Moscow-Havana ties worry U.S.” http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/01/world/fg-usrussia1)

But at a time when Russia has intervened forcefully in Georgia and is extending the global reach of its rebuilt military, some senior officials fear it may not be only bluster.¶ Russia "has strategic ties to Cuba again, or at least, that's where they're going," a senior U.S. official said recently, speaking, like others, on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive implications of the assessments.¶ The officials said they doubted the Russians would risk stationing nuclear bombers on Cuba. But some believe that Moscow might seek to restore its once-energetic intelligence cooperation with Havana, and to resume limited military cooperation, possibly including refueling stops for aircraft and warships.¶ In the current environment, such contacts would make U.S. officials uneasy, serving as a reminder of a military relationship between Havana and Moscow that stretched from the Cuban Revolution in 1959 until a weakened, post-Soviet Russia finally closed a massive electronic intelligence complex in Lourdes near Havana in 2001.¶ One senior military officer said a return of Russian ships or planes could force additional U.S. deployments in the region. But the Bush administration and Pentagon declined to comment publicly on the implications.¶ "It is very Cold War retro," said a government official. "The topic could be reminiscent of the Cuban missile crisis, and that is a chapter that people don't want to revisit."¶ The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed a report in the newspaper Izvestia in July that quoted an unidentified Russian official as saying the government intended to begin basing Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tupolev Tu-95 Bear nuclear bombers in Cuba.¶ However, the report was taken seriously enough in Washington that Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, the new Air Force chief of staff, said during his Senate confirmation hearing at the time that sending the bombers would cross a "red line in the sand."

#### Normalizing relations with Cuba crowds out Russia

Blank 09 (Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,” pdf)

The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. ¶ Washington can do much more to facilitate security in Latin America: regenerating its own economy; simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba.¶ Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro’s days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez’s balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to imagine.¶ Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijin for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington’s negligence; under President Obama, the US should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

#### Russian expansion spurs a new Cold War and proxy conflicts

Walle 12 (Walter, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Russia Turns to the South for Military and Economic Alliances,” http://www.coha.org/russia-turns-to-the-south-for-military-and-economic-alliances/)

Quite clearly, Russia’s interest in Latin America is escalating. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, argued in his article, “The New Stage of Development of Russian-Latin American Relations,” that there is great attractiveness in establishing bilateral relations, especially when three of the top twenty emerging economies -Mexico, Brazil and Argentina- are in Latin America.[23] Lavrov has also stated that the Russian Federation has an interest in joining the Inter-American Development Bank, perhaps a move to better accommodate Russian interests in the region, while at the same time neutralizing American influence.¶ Demonstrably, Russia has been developing cooperative relationships with prominent organizational bodies of the region, such as the OAS (Organization of American States), and has ratified visa-free travel agreements with countries like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In his article, Lavrov argues that Russia’s intention behind quests for partnerships is the establishment of non-ideologized relationships with Latin American countries, relationships that could be of mutual benefit to all parties involved.¶ However, the Russian stance on Latin America ultimately may be cause for apprehension. The establishment of bilateral, cordial relations between Russia and Latin American countries could evolve to a proxy, neo-Cold War scenario. If the situation in the regions worsens, some countries would be funded and supported by the U.S., while others, including several members of Latin America’s “New Left”, would become the major beneficiaries of Moscow. An analogy of such practice is the Georgia – Russia crisis that surfaced in August of 2008. During this brief war, the U.S. sent military aid to Georgia[24] on warships to territory Russia considers its “backyard” (i.e. the Caucasus and the Black Sea), infuriating Moscow. A month after the conflict erupted, ostensibly in retaliation, Russia sent two Tu-160 bombers to conduct military exercises with Washington’s least favorite nation in Latin America: Venezuela[25]. More importantly, in November of 2008 Moscow conducted war games with Caracas, in which a small Russian fleet was sent to the Caribbean to participate in joint naval maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy.[26] This was a powerful symbolic act: as it was the first time that Russian warships had visited the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis.¶ In the wake of the post-Georgia conflict, such joint military maneuvers between Russia and Venezuela were revitalized, and helped to build up the tensions between Washington and Moscow, sending strong signals of a Cold War revival. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the declarations of independence by the breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela[27] and Nicaragua[28] were alone among Latin American countries in recognizing the independence of the new republics.

#### That causes miscalculation

Orozco 08 (Jose, Correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela,” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html)

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war.¶ But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises.¶ That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers.¶ Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble.¶ The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news.¶ Still, an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new regional cold war.¶ "This is a risky step that could provoke the US," says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela.

#### Extinction

Helfand and Pastore 9 [Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility. March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html]

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

#### Scenario 2 is Latin American Relations

#### Cuba key to all Latin American relations, and Castro’s willing to talk

Sweig, August 2013 (Sweig is a writer for the council of foreign relations, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, “Cuba After Communism” < http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991>) nicole

The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba. For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era, contributing to Washington's own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the Americas. But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S.–Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy. To make such a shift, however, Washington must move past its assumption that Havana prefers an adversarial relationship with the United States. Raúl Castro has shown that he is not his brother and has availed himself of numerous channels, public and private, to communicate to Washington that he is ready to talk. This does not mean that he or his successors are prepared to compromise on Cuba's internal politics; indeed, what Castro is willing to put on the table remains unclear. But his government's decisions to release more than 120 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 and allow a number of dissident bloggers and activists to travel abroad this year were presumably meant to help set the stage for potential talks with the United States.

#### Strong Latin American Relations is key to stop escalation in the region and solve international security and democracy

Sabatini and Marczak, ’10 [January 2010, As Senior Director of Policy, Christopher Sabatini oversees the Americas Society and Council of the Americas’ (AS/COA) research and publishing programs. In his capacity at the AS/COA, he chairs the organizations’ working group on rule of law which recently published a report on rule of law in the hemisphere titled Rule of Law, Economic Growth and Prosperity, which in 2008 appeared in Spanish. Dr. Sabatini also chairs the AS/COA’s Cuba Working Group. In April 2007, Dr. Sabatini created and launched the AS/COA’s policy journal, Americas Quarterly (AQ). He is now the Editor-in-Chief of AQ and oversees the AQ website (www.americasquarterly.org) on which he has a regular blog on policy in the Americas, Jason Marczak is director of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas and senior editor of the AS/COA policy journal Americas Quarterly, “Obama’s Tango, Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America”, <http://www.unc.edu/world/2010Seminars/LANC%20reading%202.pdf>]

Since he took office, U.S. President Barack Obama has articulated a policy toward Latin America that is centered on the idea of partnership. As he said last April, there would be “no senior or junior partner to this new engagement.” The United States, in other words, would be but one actor on the regional stage, not its director. But recent crises -- from the coup in Honduras to simmering tensions in the Andes -- have revealed a fundamental weakness in the Obama administration’s nascent Latin America policy. Without strong U.S. leadership, partnership in the Americas risks inertia or, even worse, an escalation of tensions on many of the hemisphere’s critical issues, such as transnational crime, democracy, and security. Although some countries -- including Brazil and Chile -- have been willing to take on diplomatic responsibilities commensurate with their economic status, they remain averse to conflict with neighbors, even to the point of willfully downplaying existing disagreements. Such an approach may have served Latin American governments well in the past, when a unified front helped to push issues such as debt relief and alternative thinking on antinarcotics policy. But the failure of any one country to assume a larger regional profile – especially with regards to protecting norms and security -- has allowed problems to fester.

#### Latin America instability causes extinction

Rochlin, ’94 [1994, James Francis Rochlin is Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,” p. 130-131]

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

#### Scenario 3 is China

#### US-Cuban oil coop checks US-China resource war.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 9-11

Those involved in managing the security interests of the United States need to understand the geostrategic implications of interstate relations in the region in terms of energy security, and the extent to which they affect cooperation between the United States and Cuba. This includes an assessment of the medium to long-term evolution of energy cooperation between Cuba and Venezuela; of the broader relations between states aligned with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas, or ALBA) and Petrocaribe consortiums; and of the growing influence of China in the region. 14 Also discussed in this volume is the extent to which the diversification and dispersion of energy resources in Cuba might be a buffer against disruptions in U.S. energy production and distribution that could result from natural disasters or market disruptions. Before analyzing U.S. energy security in a geostrategic context, it is necessary to define “energy security” and “strategic energy policy.” Energy security is the capacity to avoid disruptions caused by natural, accidental, or intentional events affecting energy and utility supply and distribution systems. Energy security is said to prevail when fuel, power production and distribution systems, and end-user devices possess the five so-called “S” characteristics, as outlined by Drexel Kleber, the director of the Strategic Operations Power Surety Task Force, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: 15 —Surety. Access to energy and fuel sources is assured. —Survivability. Energy and fuel sources are resilient and durable in the face of potential damage. —Supply. There is an identified available source of energy— traditional fossil fuels, alternative energy (nuclear, clean coal, biomass, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, hydrogen), or renewable energy (hydropower, geothermal pressure, wind, tidal. and solar). —Sufficiency. There is an adequate quantity of power and fuel from a variety of sources. —Sustainability. Operating practices can be perpetuated by limiting demand, reducing waste, and effectively exploiting alternative energy and renewable resources to the fullest extent possible.¶ The five “S” energy security and conservation objectives, though initially intended as a guide for the U.S. Department of Defense, have a much broader applicability; not least, they serve as value parameters for energy policy decisionmaking. As Kleber has noted, “Expenditures on energy conservation measures are viewed as ‘investments’ with long-term rewards and dividends which are paid in commodities beyond money— national security, soldiers’ lives, improved manpower utilization, military to civilian transfers, and increased foreign policy options for elected officials, to name a few.” 16 What, then, would an ideal strategic energy policy look like for the United States— or any other country, for that matter? Mahmoud Amin El-Gamal and Amy Myers Jaffe have set out a detailed analysis of the objectives of a strategic energy policy, including the following: 1. To assure that markets operate efficiently so as to develop the infrastructure necessary to meet growing energy demand 2. To ensure the well-being of the human habitat and ecosystem 3. To ensure that mechanisms are in place for preventing and, if necessary, managing disruptions to energy supply. 17 Articulating these objectives doesn’t mean that fulfilling them is simple for policymakers for the following reasons. First, there are no overnight solutions to the energy supply and infrastructure bottlenecks facing the global markets. The trade-offs between energy-security considerations and national (non-energy) goals across the board must be continuously reviewed. States must adopt an integrated energy policy balancing foreign policy, trade policy, and national security imperatives. In this way, strategic energy policy has the ability to play a significant role in diplomatic discourse, especially where bilateral relations with major oil producers are concerned. For El-Gamal and Jaffe this is a critical consideration, for three principal reasons: 1. U.S. energy independence is not attainable. 2. The policy instruments available to deal with energy supply disruptions are increasingly inadequate. 3.¶ The United States needs to articulate a new vision for optimal management of international energy interdependence. 18 Thus, the questions and issues surrounding energy security become existential in a manner that has hardly been discussed heretofore, but clearly resonates in the face of ongoing changes in access to secure energy sources, persistent energy dependency, and the seemingly insatiable demand for petroleum products to fuel the American way of life. These concerns immediately raise three important questions relevant to our discussion of possible engagement with Cuba in the energy sphere: 1. How will the ongoing development and evolution of Unión Cubapetróleo S.A. (Cupet), Cuba’s state oil company, limit or obstruct U.S. efforts to meet its strategic objectives? 2. What role can international oil companies play in the short and long-term development of energy resources and infrastructure in Cuba? 3. How will the specter of competition with Brazil, Russia, China, and India over scarce petroleum resources affect U.S. energy-security policy, especially in light of the recent energy-development agreements between Brazil and Cuba, and Russia and Cuba, and the Chinese incursion into Latin American energy markets? These questions deserve consideration, particularly in light of the growing presence of these external actors in Latin American energy markets. How might they increase competition and cooperation over scarce energy resources? In assessing the development of Cupet and its impact on U.S. geostrategic imperatives, it is essential to evaluate how the United States might promote its interest in a global and regional energy market shaped and influenced by the activities of national oil companies, especially their influence on developments in Cuba. Including Mexico’s Petróleos Mexicanos S.A. (Pemex) and Venezuela’s state oil firm, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA)—both of them NOCs— in this evaluation is critically important for ensuring an acceptable strategic context to U.S. interests. 19 The objective of this highly path-dependent development is the transformation of Cupet into a stable NOC that exhibits high technical competency culminating in upstream oilfield production and downstream refining and marketing capabilities. It is path-dependent because the set of decisions undertaken to achieve the objective (energy self-sufficiency) is limited by the decisions made in the past by Cuban policymakers, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Prior to 2005, the energy policy objective was clearly centered on the revitalization of existing energy infrastructure and the expansion of domestic production, as limited as that may have been. Now there is a big change in Cuba’s circumstances: the growing importance of tapping the offshore reserves. An NOC, to be successful, must balance national social and political objectives with commercial objectives. Consequently, U.S. strategic policy¶ must balance the promotion of broader U.S. interests with those of the NOC if there is to be cooperation. 20 In light of the recent resurgence of oil nationalism, future cooperation depends largely on the extent to which observers can identify and articulate the common energy-policy interests of NOCs and the United States. In Venezuela, high oil prices have encouraged the Chávez government to undertake bold social policy initiatives. 21 Some suggest these decisions have come at the expense of critical energy infrastructure needs, thereby increasing the likelihood of energy supply disruptions in the future. Because the United States relies on Venezuela for nearly 1 million barrels of oil daily, the policy decision to prioritize social spending over energy infrastructure revitalization by the Chávez regime could have a significant impact in the United States, if it were to result in diminished capacity in Venezuela to produce and export oil to the United States. 22 In Mexico, state control of the NOC Pemex has had the “stultifying impact” of prolonged bureaucratic stagnation, resulting in a decline in production and insufficient funding for reinvestment in new exploration and production. This is highly problematic for Mexico because the government derives 40 percent of its revenue from Pemex. 23 It also has raised concerns about the possibility of energy supply disruptions for the United States. In fact, in the first quarter of 2010 Mexico’s oil exports to the United States fell by over 8 percent, as compared to 2009. 24 Concerns over the ability of major oil-producing countries and their NOCs to meet future global demand is compounded by insufficient levels of reinvestment and the looming specter of interstate instability. But it is becoming abundantly clear that Venezuela’s growing investment in Cuba’s energy infrastructure creates the basis for a longer-term relationship that will enable Cuba to expand its productive, storage, and refining capacity, as it simultaneously strengthens the Venezuelan position in the region as a supplier of both crude and refined petroleum products for its Petrocaribe and ALBA partners.¶ There is also growing consternation that NOCs may be “used as instruments of state policy inimical to U.S. national interests.” 25 In particular, China’s growing presence in Latin America is being interpreted as a sign of intensifying competition over energy resources. Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader suggest that this competition could easily be the cause of international conflict in the coming years, as energy demands place a rising premium on the ability of China— already the world’s third-largest crude oil importer, after the United States and Japan— to access oil and gas resources.

#### US-Sino war goes nuclear. Crisis management won’t check

Lowther ‘13

Note: when this card has a line that reads “it says”, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, who is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211

“Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says: “With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”

#### This specific type of resource war escalates – causing huge death tolls.

Lendman ‘7

(Stephen Lendman is a renowned author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG). The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is involved in book publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public conferences and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. Stephen has written extensively on war and peace, social justice in America and many other national and international issues. Stephen Lendman is a recipient of a 2008 Project Censored Award, University of California at Sonoma – “Resource Wars – Can We Survive Them?” – Global Research, June 06, 2007 – http://www.globalresearch.ca/resource-wars-can-we-survive-them/5892)

With the world’s energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and “peak oil” near or approaching, “security” for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we can’t do without. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. That means energy’s partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New “Great Game” and Perils From It The new “Great Game’s” begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn’t oil. This time, it’s the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today’s weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It’s planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet’s ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone’s paying attention. They’d better be because beyond the point of no return, there’s no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” Under a worst case scenario, it’s more dire than that. There may be nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy’s “quarantine” line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

#### Plan *sufficiently* hedges US energy security.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 118-19

In chapter 1, I spotlighted five “S” characteristics of energy security and the related imperatives of strategic energy policy relevant to both the Cuban case as well as that of the United States. The successful development of Cuban energy resources will enhance the energy security of the United States and its broader geostrategic imperatives in the Caribbean region. Cuba can do this by potentially serving as an entrepôt for U.S. downstream activities (refining, marketing, storage, and transshipment). Cuba has already embarked on an aggressive program of investment and development of its refining capacity, which could potentially support American energy needs by serving as a hedge against supply disruptions of refined petroleum products or facilitating the redirection of oil shipments as needed owing to any number of circumstances.

## Venezuela Oil Dependence

#### Contention 2 is Venezuela

#### Cuban oil dependence on Venezuela is unsustainable---Venezuela will cut off supplies

Keppel 3/16 (Stephen, ABC News, “What Chávez's Death Means for Cuba, Venezuela and the U.S.” http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/chavezs-death-means-cuba-venezuela-us/story?id=18669003)

Upon hearing news of the death of Hugo Chávez, scores of Venezuelans gathered in cautious celebration in Doral, a South Florida community with the highest concentration of Venezuelans outside Venezuela. They are hoping that Chávez's passing will bring about change in their homeland.¶ Others in the region were not as happy.¶ Sure Chávez was politically influential in Latin America, but in many ways his economic influence was even greater — especially with friendly countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia and a score of Caribbean nations that benefited from Venezuela's oil-discount program, PetroCaribe.¶ In the name of "economic solidarity," Chávez was extremely generous with these friends, offering oil at discounted rates and with flexible lending conditions. Nicaragua, for example, was known to pay for Venezuelan oil with shipments of beef, sugar, coffee, milk and even 19,000 pairs of pants.¶ According to figures from the state-owned oil company PDVSA, in 2011 Venezuela sent 243,500 barrels of oil a day (or around 8 percent of its production) to 16 countries across Latin America.¶ Yet the absence of Chávez and the potential drawdown of economic support would have the biggest impact on Cuba. That country receives more than 100,000 barrels of discounted oil per day and billions of dollars each year in exchange for Cuban medical personnel, technology experts, political consultants and other "professionals."¶ That's because Chávez had a special relationship with Cuba and the Castros. His relationships with other presidents were also often very personal. That approach may be difficult to sustain in his absence. Even if Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's chosen replacement, wins the upcoming election, he will be more susceptible to domestic pressure to reduce Venezuela's foreign aid, given all the economic challenges at home.¶ The Cubans have bad memories of the ending of Soviet patronage in the 1990s and are right to be worried about what the death of Chávez may bring.¶ Where will Cuba turn this time if Venezuelan aid dries up? Maybe the United States. That doesn't mean the U.S. government, however. Rather, Cuba would likely turn to the nearly two million Cubans living in this country. They are already sending around $2 billion a year back to the island in remittances. Already, Raul Castro seems to have been preparing to make the Cuban economy a little bit more flexible and open to investment, and the Obama administration has made it easier for Cubans in the U.S. to send money back home.¶ Which brings us to Venezuela's financial situation. The truth is the economic state there has been uncertain and chaotic ever since Chavez got sick, and that is unlikely to change in the short term. There is supposed to be a new election, and it appears that Maduro will win. But he will face a tough economic situation. Plus, he lacks the charisma of Chávez and may not be able to maintain popularity if things get tougher.

#### Oil’s key to Cuba’s economy

Benjamin-Alvadaro 10 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation”)

The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked, as Cuba produces about 85 percent of its power using liquid fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of the energy consumed in Cuba has been estimated at 14 percent of GDP, compared with a world average of about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 40 percent of total consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil is applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries.

#### US-Cuban oil cooperation is key to revitalize their domestic oil sector

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United States to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peaceful transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy. As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position against the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership.¶ The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguously reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development policies that will benefit Cuba for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Two factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is the possibility of normalization of trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, realized through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market disruptions. Moreover, all states could derive benefit from the public information campaigns to promote energy efficiency and conservation presently being promoted in Cuba in the face of diminishing energy stocks and uncertain global markets. Ultimately, and only after normalization, the task still falls to the Cuban government, but the cost will necessarily be spread through a number of sources that are predominately American because of strategic interests, proximity and affinity. It suffices to say that the requisite investment and assistance will have a distinct American tinge to it, inasmuch as American corporations, U.S. government agencies, and international financial institutions, of which the U.S. is a major contributor, will play important roles in the funding of the effort to revitalize the Cuban energy sector. Cuban officials are not averse and perhaps would prefer that the U.S. be its major partner in this effort owing to the fact that most if not all of the cutting-edge technology in energy, oil and gas comes from the United States. It is remarkable that the Cuban energy sector is as vibrant as it presently is, absent the type of infrastructural investment that is available to most developing states, in large part because of the American economic embargo. ¶ Finally, the cost is significant and it stands to reason that the longer one waits to address the challenge at hand the higher the cost of modernizing the energy sector. For this reason alone, the American role in assisting Cuba in this effort will be significant and every day that the task is put off, it increases the long-term cost of the effort. This should serve as an obvious point of entry into cooperation with the Cuban government and perhaps can serve as a catalyst for promoting confidence, trust and cooperation in this critical issue area across the region.

#### The plan solves Cuban dependence on Venezuela---revenues lead to political reforms that create stability

Pinon 11 – Jorge R. Piñón is a visiting research fellow at the Latin American and Caribbean Center’s Cuban Research Institute at FIU. Spring 2011, "Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What Could Happen If They Don't)"casgroup.fiu.edu/pages/docs/2157/1306356964\_Hemisphere\_Vol.\_20.pdf

If Cuba’s suspected but yet undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are proven real, it will take between three and five years to develop them fully. Production volumes would have to reach more than 200,000 barrels per day to have the same positive economic impact currently derived from foreign oil subsidies. If this occurs, **significant revenues from oil, natural gas and sugarcane ethanol would integrate Cuba into global and regional markets within the next five years.**¶ International oil companies such as Spain’s Repsol, Norway’s Statoil Norsk Hydro and Brazil’s Petrobras are actively exploring Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters. Cuban authorities have invited United States oil companies to participate in developing the island’s offshore oil and natural gas resources, but US law does not allow this.¶ Although US oil, oil equipment and service companies have the capital, technology and operational knowhow to explore, produce and refine Cuba’s potential reserves in a safe and responsible manner, the almost five-decade old unilateral political and economic embargo keeps them on the sidelines.¶ Cuba currently **relies on heavily subsidized oil from Venezuela** for two-thirds of its petroleum needs. This supply **contributes to the Cuban government’s ability to maintain a** politically antagonistic and belligerent position **towards the US**.¶ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Cuba aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of depending on a single source of imported oil. **Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore hydrocarbon resources**, estimated by the United States Geological Survey at 5.5 million barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have the economic independence to consider political and economic reforms. It is in the US interest to develop a new policy toward the island based on constructive engagement to support the emergence of a Cuban state in which Cubans themselves can determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. Cuba is about to embark on an 18-month oil exploration drilling program to validate the presence of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves.¶ US support of such endeavors would be beneficial in the framework of a constructive engagement policy. The Deepwater Horizon drilling semi-submersible incident and the resulting catastrophic oil spill demonstrate the urgency of developing a policy of energy and environmental cooperation between the United States and Cuba. As Cuba develops its deepwater oil and natural gas potential, the possible consequences of a spill call for proactive planning by both countries to minimize or avoid an environmental disaster.¶ To respond effectively to an oil-related marine accident, any company operating in Cuba would require immediate access to US oil services companies for the nearinstant technology and know-how needed to halt and limit damage to the marine environment. Obviously, the establishment of working relations between the US and Cuba in the area of marine environmental protection would assist enormously in the contingency planning and cooperation necessary for an early and effective response to an oil spill.¶ The United States and Cuba are already parties to a number of multilateral oil pollution agreements, such as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the 1983 Convention for the protection and Development of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention). Both agreements address prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes. The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation also offers a precedent for cooperation. The convention is designed to encourage and facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance in preparing for and responding to major oil pollution incidents. Signatory nations are tasked with developing and maintaining adequate capabilities to deal with such an emergency. In the case of Cuba and the United States, the capabilities must be transnational, as there is no barrier to the movement of oil from one country’s waters to another’s. The United States, therefore, must develop appropriate regulatory and procedural frameworks for the free movement of equipment, personnel and expertise between the two countries as part of any oil spill response.¶ The 1980 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Mexico Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUS Plan) provides the foundation for a similar protocol with Cuba. This would include the establishment of joint response teams, coordinating roles, rapid incident notification mechanisms, joint operations centers and communication procedures, along with regular exercises and meetings. The United States government, irrespective of the current embargo, has the power to license the sale, lease or loan of emergency relief and reconstruction equipment and the travel of expert personnel to Cuba following an oil spill.¶ Cuba’s long-term energy challenges will be a consequence of its future economic growth and rising standard of living within a market environment. This anticipated growth will depend largely on the development of a competitively priced, readily available and environmentally sound long-term energy plan. Cuban energy policy should embrace energy conservation, modernization of the energy infrastructure, and balance in sourcing oil/gas supplies and renewable energy sources that protect the island’s environment. **The country would benefit from the guidance of a variety of partners, including the United States.**

#### Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability,

Gorrell 5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### Caribbean instability causes bioterrorism and LNG explosions

Bryan 1 (Anthony T., Director of the Caribbean Program – North/South Center, and Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S.-Caribbean Cooperation”, 10-21, http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism\_porous\_borders\_and \_homeland\_ security.html)

Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that produce the majority of the world’s methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists **as bases from which to attack the** United States. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.

#### LNG tanker explosions cause catastrophic damage – outweighs nuclear war

Lovin 1 (Amory B., Chief Scientist of the [Rocky Mountain Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocky_Mountain_Institute), and L. Hunter Lovin, President – National Capitalism and Co-Founder – Rocky Mountain Institute, “Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security”, http://verdilivorno.it/doc\_gnl/198204\_Brittle\_Power\_intro\_GNL\_note.pdf)

About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes. 3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hot- ter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The result- ing gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes. 4 It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles. 5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away. 6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.” 7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.

#### Bioterrorism results in extinction

Sandberg et al 8 – Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. Ćirković—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens **are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive**. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

## Solvency

#### First – Plan is *effective*, *topical*, and *US firms would say “yes”*.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 125-26

There are numerous areas in the energy sector in which the United States and Cuba can and should cooperate: exploration, energy production, downstream operations, transportation, and auxiliary services. In addition, the opportunity for U.S. firms to invest directly in the development of Cuban energy resources should be created. Recent history shows that Cuba possesses the potential to be a strong regional trade partner in the area of energy and infrastructure development. It might be premature for U.S. firms to begin opening branch offices along Avenida Quinta in the Miramar district of Havana, but it is rational to consider the benefits that would be drawn from the expansion of trade and cooperation between Cuba and the United States in energy development. There will be obvious limitations on such investment opportunities because of the empresa mixta joint-venture model that the Cuban government employs, but as previously stated, international oil companies are not averse to adjusting their investment models to specific market conditions, and in the case of Cuba it would be no different. In fact, there has been no lack of interest on the part of American international oil firms in developing a Cuban market. The prevailing Cuban model of joint-venture investment and cooperation has proved to be attractive internationally, and there are numerous opportunities in this area for American firms as soon as there are significant changes in the Cuban embargo so that this type of engagement can occur.

#### Second – Cuba also says “yes”. This spills-into broader coop.

Benjamin-Alvarado ‘10

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication – obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 120

Undoubtedly, after fifty years of enmity, there is a significant lack of trust and confidence between the United States and Cuba. This is plain from the almost quaint maintenance of a sanctions regime that seeks to isolate Cuba economically and politically but hardly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred on the island since 1991, not to mention since 2008, when Fidel Castro officially stepped aside as Cuba’s president. Now, the opportunity to advance relations in the energy arena appears to be ripe. Since 2004, representatives from American companies, trade organizations, universities, and think tanks have had the opportunity to meet with Cuban energy officials. The scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes have been disseminated, dissected, and discussed across a number of settings where the interested parties are now familiar with and well versed in the agendas and opportunities that exist in this arena. In public discussions, Cuban energy authorities have made it clear that their preferred energy development scenario includes working closely with the U.S. oil and gas industry and using state-of-the-art U.S. oil technologies. The assessment from U.S. energy experts on the technical acumen and capability of Cuban energy officials has been overwhelmingly positive. 9 Should the U.S. government and the Obama administration see fit to shift its policy so as to allow broader participation of American academics and practitioners in the energy field to attend conferences and meet with Cuban energy officials, it may pave the way to establishing much-needed familiarity and confidence across these communities.